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Exemplarity and its Limits in Thomas of Cantimpré’s Hagiographical Corpus 
 
Abstract  
 
This dissertation examines the hagiographical corpus of the Dominican preacher 
Thomas of Cantimpré (c. 1201–1270), a critical early respondent to the burgeoning 
women’s religious movement in the Southern Low Countries. Writing at a time when 
both lay and religious spirituality were being radically refigured in light of new 
organizational structures and devotional practices, Thomas’s hagiographical corpus 
reflects the diversity of vocational possibilities available for women and men in this 
period at a time of great religious experimentation and innovation. Using historical, 
literary, and theological methods, the dissertation examines the ways in which Thomas’s 
vitae struggle with the question of how lay and religious, male and female readers might, 
in Thomas’s words, “take up” the different kinds of figures Thomas offers as models for 
practice and objects of devotion. Each of the vitae offer unique solutions to this question 
even as they represent different sorts of persons as exemplary.  
An important assumption governing the dissertation is that hagiography is a vital 
part of the spiritual and theological tradition of Christianity. Thomas’s vitae, I argue, 
attempt to articulate a theology of exemplarity in order to address the issue of what 
constitutes sanctity, who can become a saint, and by what means sanctity is attained. For 
Thomas, exemplarity is animated by theological notions of incarnation and scriptural 
revelation. Christ, as manifest in his life and in the words of scripture, is the great 
exemplum for embodied lives. For each of Thomas’s saints, Christ is both the singular 
figure who saves and the one in whom the saint participates, raising the question of how 
iv	
	
the individual human being embodies and exemplifies Christ’s singularity. Thomas’s 
Lives will be shown, in the course of their narratives, to illumine the tension between the 
singularity of Christ and its repetition in the saintly figures represented in the vitae and 
the readers of those vitae. Exploration of this tension reveals great richness in Thomas’s 
works, showing that Thomas’s narrative voice often speaks doubly within a single vita, 
thematizing the limits and possibilities of exemplarity and its hagiographical 
representation. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Incarnation and Example 
What does it mean to be a saint?  Who can become one? By what means is 
sanctity attained? These questions were central to laypersons and religious leaders in the 
thirteenth-century Southern Low Countries who lived at a time of great religious 
innovation and experimentation. This dissertation will examine the ways in which key 
questions about the holy life—what constitutes it, how it should be represented, and how 
different audiences might act in light of the example of the saints—are addressed in the 
hagiographical corpus of the thirteenth-century Augustinian canon-turned-Dominican, 
Thomas of Cantimpré (c. 1200-c.1270). Thomas’s vitae, I argue, attempt to articulate a 
theology of exemplarity as an answer. Exemplarity is a quality of “being fit to serve as a 
model or pattern for imitation” or a “warning about what not to do.”1 For Thomas, 
exemplarity is animated by theological notions of incarnation and scriptural revelation. 
Christ, as manifest in his life and in the words of scripture, is the great exemplum for 
embodied lives. For each of Thomas’s saints, Christ is both the singular figure who saves 
and the one in whom the saint participates, raising the question of how the individual 
human being embodies and exemplifies Christ’s singularity. Thomas’s Lives will be 
shown, in the course of their narratives, to illumine the tension between the singularity of 
Christ and its repetition in the saintly figures represented in the vitae and in the readers of 
those vitae. Exploration of this tension reveals great richness in Thomas’s works, 
showing how Thomas’s narrative voice often speaks doubly within a single vita, 
                                                 
1 OED, vol. 5, p. 525, “exemplarity.” 
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thematizing the limits and possibilities of exemplarity and its representation within a 
hagiography.  In Chapter two, I consider this tension as Thomas represents the body of 
Christina the Astonishing, whose imitation of Christ is so literal it encroaches on the 
dogmatically declared singularity of Christ, thereby making her a monstrous horror to 
spectators who are left uncertain about how to respond—an uncertainty that the narrative 
dramatizes and probes. In Chapter three, I again explore the problem of credibility, here 
asking how Thomas understands the status of hagiographical texts that portray the saint 
so assimilated to God that she becomes impossible to believe, even as her incredible 
deeds prove her sanctity. As a solution to this rhetorical conundrum, I argue that Thomas, 
employing a hermeneutical strategy derived from Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana, 
asks readers to approach Lutgard’s vita as they would scriptural revelation. In Chapter 
four, I examine the devotional mode of reading the saint’s life articulated by Thomas as 
the means by which the reader might become the saint who has, already, become 
scripture. In Chapter five, I argue that Thomas treats his writing of the life of an ecstatic 
saint as a means of enabling his own ecstatic encounter with God.  In each chapter, I will 
show the ways in which Thomas problematizes acts of mimesis, thematizing the limits 
and possibilities of the saint’s, reader’s, and author’s capacity to imitate the divine life, 
whether in word or deed.  
Thomas’s theology does not proceed by way of abstract questions and answers 
but adapts and reconstitutes older theological traditions of Augustine, Cassian, Bernard of 
Clairvaux, and William of Saint-Thierry within the particular historical narratives of 
contemporary lives. The saintly example embodies and recapitulates Christ’s example. 
The vitae, in turn, solicit the imitation (or, in the case of the exemplar-as-warning, a 
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change of behavior) of readers who are asked to respond by means of not only an 
intellectual assent but also an affective and bodily participation in the saint’s story.  
The dissertation revisits the question of how the didacticism of Thomas’s 
hagiographical narratives functions. As I will discuss further in this introduction, scholars 
have tended to read Thomas’s vitae as important sources of anti-heretical propaganda and 
as texts that attempt to teach the penitential program of Lateran IV. These analyses are an 
accurate assessment of his Dominican vocation. However, such readings have the 
disadvantage of tending to reduce the entirety of Thomas’s corpus, as well as each 
individual life, to an expression of a prior dogmatic program. This type of historiography 
flattens the diversity within his body of work and elides the differences among the vitae, 
which represent radically different vocational paths for very different sorts of people—
male and female, lay and clerical, beguine, nun, and tertiary—by means of different 
rhetorical strategies. The dissertation considers the entirety of Thomas’s hagiographical 
corpus in an attempt to demonstrate its diversity, pays close attention to the narrative and 
rhetorical strategies by which Thomas portrays individual subjects in order to make them 
compelling figures for readers. These rhetorical strategies and the ways in which Thomas 
understands their effects are, I will show, intrinsically dependent on notions of 
theological language—the representation of the holy—and an understanding of the 
devotional response of the reader. The didactic nature of Thomas’s texts cannot, then, be 
understood apart from his theology of exemplarity. Furthermore, the ways Thomas 
reflects on the process of writing, asking within his works what it is to believe in his story 
or to act on such belief, demonstrates that he does not build his authority with recourse to 
a monologic message, but rather enlists the audience in a process of reflection upon their 
4	
	
response to his works.   
 
Thomas of Cantimpré: A Summary of his Life and Literary Activity  
Thomas of Cantimpré was born in the village of Bellinghen, near Brussels, in the 
year 1200 or 1201, to a noble family.2 The village was situated on the border between 
Flemish and French-speaking communities, under the jurisdiction of the dukes of the 
Brabant, and within the diocese of Cambrai. The bilingualism of the area around the 
place of Thomas’s birth helps explain the ease with which he would later travel in his role 
as itinerant preacher and confessor in the Low Countries, speaking both his native 
Flemish (theutonicus) and French (lingua romana).3 He also had great facility with Latin, 
provided by his extensive education.  The entirety of his literary oeuvre is composed in 
that language. In the year 1206, he was sent to the French-language cathedral school at 
Cambrai, where he remained for eleven years, though he would later profess at the 
Flemish-speaking Dominican house at Louvain.4 Thomas recounts that these early efforts 
to form him into an acceptable candidate for the priesthood—including his education and 
                                                 
2 For the chronology of Thomas’s life, unless otherwise cited, I am drawing on Robert 
Sweetman’s dissertation, “Dominican Preaching in the Low Countries 1240-1260: Materiae 
Praedicabiles in the Liber de natura rerum and Bonum universale de apibus of Thomas of 
Cantimpré,” unpublished dissertation, University of Toronto, 1988. Sweetman reconstructed 
many of the dates from autobiographical notes in Thomas’s works, and also depends upon Alfred 
Deboutte, “Thomas van Cantimpré. Zijn opleiding te Kamerijk,” Ons geestlijke erf 56 (1982) for 
an account of Thomas’s education at Cambrai (rather than Liège, as posited by H. Platelle and R. 
Godding) and Deboutte’s “Thomas van Cantimpré, als auditor van Albertus Magnus,” Ons 
Geestlijke erf 58 (1984), pp. 192-209. The dates of significant events in Thomas’s life 
unfortunately rely to a great extent on conjecture.  
	
3 Barbara Newman, “Introduction” in Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives, 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), p. 4.  
	
4 Jennifer Carpenter, A New Heaven and a New Earth: The vitae of the mulieres religiosae of 
Liège, unpublished dissertation, University of Toronto, 1997, p. 135, n. 67.  
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his “orientation towards a celibate life”—occurred because his father, a Brabantine 
knight, made his confession to a hermit while on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. The 
hermit told him that his sins were of such gravity that his only hope lay in devoting a son 
to the priesthood. This son would, in time, offer particularly efficacious prayers on his 
behalf.5 Thomas’s priestly vocation was thus inspired by the necessity of an intercessory 
religious role that he would later underscore as a component of the piety of the mulieres 
religiosae whose vitae he wrote.  
While still a student at Cambrai, “before he had reached fifteen years,” Thomas 
heard James of Vitry (d. 1240) preach either the Albigensian Crusade (1213) or the 
Crusade against the Saracens in the Holy Land (1214). This encounter was formative. As 
he later recounted in the Supplement to the Life of Marie d’Oignies, “I was happy just at 
the sound of your name.” Ever after, he bore a “special love” for James.6 
 James had visited the Low Countries while still a theology student in Paris, some 
time between 1203 and 1211.7 According to Thomas, James had been drawn to Liège by 
the fame of Marie of Oignies (c. 1177-1213). Marie was a woman who had renounced 
her marriage in order to live in poverty and chastity, first at a leprosarium at 
Willambroux, then as a lay sister with a community of women attached to the 
                                                 
5 Les Exemples du “Livre des abeilles”: Une Vision Médievale, trans. by Henri Platelle 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), Bk. 2.203, p. 236. Henceforth BUA. 
	
6	Thomas of Cantimipré, Vita Mariae Oigniacensis, Supplementum, ed. by A. Raysse, in AASS 
23 June, V, pp. 572-81. English translation by Hugh Feiss OSB in Mary of Oignies: Mother of 
Salvation, ed. Anneke Mulder-Bakker (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006). Henceforth VMO-S. Bk. 4, ch. 
27.  
	
7 Jennifer Carpenter, A New Heaven and a New Earth, p. 124. 
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Augustinian canons at St. Nicholas of Oignies, south of Nivelles.8 Marie herself 
persuaded James to join the community of Regular canons at Oignies. He would go on to 
write her very influential vita, The Life of Marie d’Oignies,9 completing it by 1215, less 
than two years after her death. It recounts not only the beguine’s piety and the novel 
religiosity of the mulieres religiosae in Liège, but also the intimate relationship that arose 
between Marie and James. James depicts Marie as his inspiration and guide in the art of 
preaching. The vita is primarily an account of James’s personal experience of Marie, and 
the stories that compose it—many of them purportedly from Marie’s own mouth—have 
their source in these experiences, confirming James’s claim that he recorded “what I have 
seen and come to know, for a large part from experience.”10  
Brenda Bolton notes that James was inspired by late antique figures such as 
Augustine and Jerome who oversaw groups of wealthy women in the ascetic life. 
Imitating Jerome’s efforts to spread the heroic feats of women such as Melania (in 
contrast with the general perfidy of women expounded upon by Jerome) through 
pamphlets and hagiographies, James understood his own hagiographical work as 
providing models—exempla—for a new kind of sanctity. What he saw in Liège among 
ascetic women, particularly Marie, he believed to be as significant as the movements of 
                                                 
8 VMO-S Bk. 1, ch. 1. On the history of the community at Oignies, see Ernst McDonnell, The 
Beguines and Beghards in Medieval Culture: With Special Emphasis on the Belgian Scene (New 
York: 1954; 1969), pp. 8-19.  
	
9 Jacques de Vitry, Vita Mariae Oigniacensis, in AASS, 23 June, XXV, pp. 547-72. English 
translation by Margot H. King in Mary of Oignies: Mother of Salvation, ed. Anneke Mulder-
Bakker (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pp. 33-128. Henceforth VMO. 
	
10 VMO, Prologue 11. “[Q]uae vidimus et novimus, et ex magna parte per experientiam 
didicimus.” On this personal and experiential emphasis, see Jennifer Carpenter, “Between Heaven 
and Earth,” pp. 125-127.  
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late antiquity: practicing a similarly austere life, these women were possibly the “new 
mothers of the church.”11  
Perhaps inspired by James’s vocation as an Augustinian canon, in 1217 Thomas 
entered the Victorine House of Notre Dame de Cantimpré, just outside Cambrai. The 
small foundation had been established in 1177 by the charismatic John of Cantimpré (c. 
1155—c. 1205/09), the subject of the first of Thomas’s hagiographies. In 1222 or 1223 
Thomas was ordained a priest, after which he began work on the Life of Abbot John of 
Cantimpré. Thomas suddenly stopped work on the vita in 1228 for reasons that remain 
unclear. He completed it in 1270 at the request of Anselm, the Abbot of the canons of 
Cantimpré.12  
The Life (VJC) demonstrates Thomas’s early fascination with the vita apostolica 
and the importance of preaching and the active life in Thomas’s conception of male 
sanctity. It depicts the itinerant adventures of John, whom Thomas represents as a 
peculiarly efficacious preacher. John proclaims his message by means of his deeds as 
well as words, both declaring and living a life of rigorous penance (while, unlike 
Thomas’s female subjects, avoiding debilitating austerity), preaching compassion for the 
urban poor who had been “oppressed” by “usury and unjust profit-taking,” while also 
railing against the heretics of Cambrai.13 The vita also documents John’s efforts to found 
                                                 
11 Brenda Bolton, “Vitae Matrum: A Further Aspect of the Frauenfrage,” Medieval Women, ed. 
Derek Baker (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978),” p. 254. 
	
12Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Ionnis Cantimpratensis, ed. Robert Godding, “Une oeuvre inédite 
de Thomas de Cantimpré: la ‘Vita Ioannis Cantimpratensis,’” in Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique 
76 (1981), pp. 241-316. English translation by Barbara Newman, in Thomas of Cantimpré: The 
Collected Saints’ Lives (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), pp. 57-124. Henceforth VJC. 
	
13 VJC II.12. 
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the community of canons at Cantimpré and have it recognized by the abbey of Saint-
Victor (a task finally accomplished in 1183) and includes biographies of the first men to 
gather around John as well as the women who lived at Prémy, a foundation also 
established by John, which was located next to the male house.14 Thomas emphasizes 
John’s conversion of the rural nobility,15 to whom he preached against violence, greed, 
and usury, as well as his work with urban masses, for whom he staged elaborate 
performances of restitution and penance in order to inspire the crowd’s conversion. 
Thomas elaborately narrates these performances, attempting to recreate on the page the 
exemplary and persuasive power of John’s initial performance. The vita includes stories 
of the ritual suicide of a penitent named Alard who was a moneylender and a priest,16 and 
the theatrical restitution of ill-gotten gains by the nobleman John of Montmirail.17  
During his years as an Augustinian canon, Thomas began to compile material for 
his encyclopedia, De Natura Rerum (DNR).18 Dividing his work into nineteen sections 
addressing humans, animals, plants, water, stones, metals, astronomy, astrology, and 
meteorology, Thomas claimed the work was inspired by Augustine’s observation in De 
Doctrina Christiana that a reference work of strange creatures, animals, stones, and 
“anything that has roots” mentioned in scripture would be useful to scriptural exegetes in 
                                                                                                                                                 
	
14 VJC I.14; I.15. 
	
15 VJC II.8b. 
	
16 VJC II.13. 
	
17 VJC II.8b. 
	
18 Thomas de Cantimpré, Liber de natura rerum von Thomas Cantimpratensis (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1973). Henceforth DNR. 
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understanding figurative expressions used in scriptural analogies.19 Robert Sweetman 
argues that Thomas interpreted this call as pertaining not only to exegesis proper but as a 
means to provide scintillating materia praedicabiles, though M. Michèle Mulchahey 
notes that the work was also intended for use by the laity and was translated into German 
and Flemish within Thomas’s lifetime.20 According to Sweetman, Thomas intended 
preachers to use the DNR in order to create interesting digressions so that, “wandering 
from the trail of Scripture, by putting aside for a time the eloquence of prophets, 
preachers could use the eyes of faith to evoke the witness of creatures to awaken brutish 
minds, using novelties to caress ears no longer moved by what they heard and what was 
impressed directly upon them from Scripture.”21 The DNR thus provided material that 
veiled the moral message of sermons, making them more palatable and memorable, 
“fool[ing] hearers into listening in spite of themselves.”22  
Thomas’s based his use of the nature of creatures as sources for moral teaching on 
an exemplarist understanding of creation. In the Prologue, Thomas argues that God’s 
                                                 
19 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 2.59-61; DNR, 19.7.8-12, p. 414; Sweetman, Dominican 
Preaching, p. 88. 
 	
20 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 93; M. Michèle Mulchahey “First the bow is bent in 
study”…: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: PIMS, 1998), p. 467. Mulchahey implies 
that she is less sure of Thomas’s intention that the work was consciously designed as a collection 
of praedicabilia, and was initially concerned more with scientific knowledge rather than morals 
drawn from this information by analogy (Ibid., p. 466, n. 204). The fact that the treatise explicitly 
moralizes, however, supports Sweetman’s contention.  
	
21 DNR, Prol. 90-96.5. Trans. by Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 95. “Hiis ergo scriptis si 
quis studium adhibuerit, ad argumenta fidei et correctiones morum integumentis mediis 
sufficientiam reperiet, ut interdum predicatore quasi e vestigio scripturarum apte digresso 
cessantibus eloquiis prophetarum ad evigilationem brutarum mentium oculata fide creaturarum 
adducat testes, ut si quem sepius audita de scripturis et inculcata non movent, saltem nova in ore 
suo pigritantium aures demulceant.” 
	
22 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 95. 
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artistic activity is revealed in creation. All creatures thus reflect the creator, and by virtue 
of this common source, the patterns of all creaturely natures provide analogies for moral 
human life, though as animate beings are particularly appropriate, these are the primary 
focus of the work.23 The description of the nature of a thing refers not only to that created 
entity but also to the human microcosm. The work is, then, a reductio omnium 
creaturarum ad hominem.24 Thomas’s method for obtaining material for preaching from 
the world of nature was first to identify significantiae—analogies between nonhuman and 
human behavior—and then draw out the moral implications of those analogies for human 
beings, creating moralitates, “moral judgments in the form of exhortation 
or…chastisement.”25 For example, Thomas wrote that the sea urchin, though very small, 
was so strong that it could stop the movement of a 200-foot ship if it attached itself to the 
hull. Though incredible, he wrote, this was a natural fact witnessed by the best 
authorities. He then addressed the devil, asking, “what would seem more unbelievable, 
that a Virgin should conceive and bear a child…or that a six-inch fish should be able to 
keep a ship at bay even against the wind’s forceful blasts?”26 The incredible nature of the 
sea urchin was thus compared to incredible doctrine, authorities on the natural world to 
theological authorities, thereby obtaining external support for scriptural claims. 	
                                                 
23 DNR, 19.7.8-12.414. Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 97. 
	
24 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 139. 
	
25 Ibid., p. 106. 
	
26 Ibid., p. 118. DNR 7.31.12-17.260. “Dic mihi, flagitiosime serpens, quid incredibilius videretur: 
aut virginem sine virili semine concipere et parere, aut pisciculum semipedalem adhesione tantum 
tantam molem navis contra validissimos flatus retinere posse immobilem?” 
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Some time between his ordination and becoming a Dominican in 1232, Thomas 
received a commission to hear confessions as the bishop’s vicar in the diocese of 
Cambrai, an event Robert Sweetman posits as occurring in 1228-9.27 The authority of this 
office entailed the power to absolve even those sins considered too grave or complex for 
the parish clergy to address, including, Barbara Newman notes, illicit sexual offences.28 
Thomas found these confessions a test of his own celibacy. The difficulties he 
experienced led him to seek the counsel of Lutgard of Aywières (1182-1246), who had a 
prophetic vision confirming his vocation as a confessor and promising constant divine 
protection while performing his office. Thomas writes that her words enabled him to 
continue with the work.29  
Inspired perhaps by James of Vitry’s relationship with Marie of Oignies and by 
his salutary encounter with Lutgard, Thomas turned his literary interests to depicting the 
lives of mulieres religiosae, writing the Supplement to the Life of Marie of Oignies from 
1229 to 1232 and The Life of Christina the Astonishing, which he began during his final 
years as an Augustinian canon and completed after professing as a Dominican at the 
priory in Louvain in 1232. Thomas claims to have written the Supplement (VMO-S) in 
                                                 
27 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 12. 
	
28 Barbara Newman, “Introduction,” in Thomas of Cantimpré, p. 5. 
 	
29 This encounter is described in the Vita Lutgardis, 2.38 from Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita 
Lutgardis Aquiriensis, ed. by G. Henschen, in AASS, 16 June, III, pp. 187-209. English 
translation by Margot King and Barbara Newman in Thomas of Cantimpré: The Collected Saints’ 
Lives, pp. 211-296. Henceforth VLA. It is also addressed in the BUA 2.30.3, p. 321. In the VLA 
Thomas writes that at the time of his writing, Lutgard’s prophecy had remained true for 16 years, 
which places this event between 1228 and 1230. See Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 12. 
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order to add material to James of Vitry’s Life of Marie of Oignies.30 James, Thomas 
writes, had left out much of the miraculous material lest he “tire his readers with excess, 
or lest the incomprehensible greatness of her miracles become an odour of death rather 
than life in the hearts of unbelievers.”31 The text is a liber miraculorum, offering accounts 
of miracles performed by Marie that were not included by James in the VMO. The vita 
focuses on those episodes that involved James, becoming, in effect, a biography of James 
as told through his relationship with Marie. The lengthy final four chapters consist of a 
querela addressed to James, who at the time of the text’s writing had been long absent 
from Liège, which he left in order to occupy the position first of archbishop of Tusculum, 
then of cardinal. According to Thomas, James’s move was against Marie’s wishes and a 
betrayal of the apostolic ideals he had professed. Marie’s Supplement thus becomes 
James’s anti-hagiography, painting a portrait of what Thomas considers his fall from 
grace by means of elaborate comparisons between James’s lost idealism and current 
materialism and ambition. 
The Life of Christina the Astonishing (VCM) is Thomas’s most unconventional 
and adventurous vita.32 Like Marie, Christina (c. 1150-1224) was an uncloistered 
laywoman who developed a novel form of piety, though unlike Marie, Christina did not 
participate in communal life, except for an attenuated attachment to the Benedictine nuns 
of St. Catharine’s in her home village of St. Truiden. As Brenda Bolton notes, Christina 
                                                 
30 VMO-S, Prologue. 
31 VJC, II.8b; VMO-S, Prologue. Thomas quotes the passage from the VJC in the Prologue to the 
Supplement. 
	
32 Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Christianae mirabilis, ed. by J. Pinius, in AASS, 24 July, V, pp. 
637-60. English translation by Margot King and Barbara Newman in Thomas of Cantimpré: The 
Collected Saints’ Lives, pp. 127-160. Henceforth VCM. 
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was “claimed by Benedictines, Cistercians, and Premonstratensians alike, but…in reality 
was not attached to any religious order nor to a beguine group.”33 A woman who is likely 
Christina appears in James’s extended Prologue to the Life of Marie of Oignies, where he 
describes a woman who “obtained from the Lord that she would endure purgatory, living 
in this world in her body,” being “afflicted for a long time by the Lord, so that sometimes 
she rolled herself in the fire, and sometimes in the winter she remained for lengthy 
periods in icy water and at other times she was driven (cogebatur) to enter the tombs of 
the dead.”34 Thomas narrates Christina’s death at a young age from “too much 
contemplation” and her encounter with God at the divine throne, writing that Christina 
was resurrected following an agreement with God to return to the flesh and “undergo 
there the punishment (agere poenitentiam) of an immortal soul in a mortal body without 
damage to it.”35 Through these sufferings, God promised that Christina would deliver 
many souls from the horrors of purgatory and would furthermore become a living 
exemplum, teaching those still alive to “turn aside from their sins.” What, Thomas writes, 
did “Christina cry out during her entire life except to do penance (agere poenitentiam) 
and be ready at every hour? This she taught with many words, with tears, with 
lamentations and boundless cries, and with the example (exemplo) of her life.”36 
                                                 
33 Brenda Bolton, “Vitae Matrum: A Further Aspect of the Frauenfrage,” Medieval Women, ed. 
Derek Baker (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 260. 
	
34 VMO, Pr. 8. 
	
35 VCM, 7. 
	
36 VCM, 56. “Vigilate ergo: quia nescitis diem neque horam, qua Dominus vester venturus 
sit. Et quid aliud in omni vita sua Christina clamavit, nisi pœnitentiam agere, & paratos 
esse homines omni hora? Hoc verbis multis, hoc fletibus, hoc ejulatibus, hoc clamoribus 
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Christina’s vita thus continues many of the themes of John’s Life, particularly its 
emphasis on preaching, teaching, the active life among the laity, and conversion. In this 
case, however, the preacher is female and the primary means of her pedagogy is not 
language but her marvelous body and the horror it inspires in onlookers.  
In 1238, Thomas was sent to St. Jacques in Paris for two years for further study. 
While there he completed work on the De Natura Rerum.37 Returning to Louvain in 
1240, Thomas stopped at Ypres, having long desired (cupiebam) to meet a fellow 
Dominican, Zeger (Siger) of Lille,38 a powerful presence among the Dominicans of Lille 
and Ypres and a friend of the Countess Johanna of Constantinople.39 At this meeting, 
Zeger told Thomas about his spiritual daughter, Margaret of Ypres (1216-1237), a 
laywoman from a bourgeois family in Ypres, and asked him to write her vita, probably 
having heard about Thomas’s reputation as a hagiographer. Thomas returned a draft of 
the work to Zeger for correction in late 1240 and completed it around 1243.40 More than 
communicating any great impression Margaret made upon him, the text comes across as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
infinitis, hoc exemplo vitæ plus docuit, plus clamavit, quam de aliquo præcedentium vel 
subsequentium scripto vel relatione percepimus.”  
	
37 Robert Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 13. On the history and development of Dominican 
education, including at St Jacques in Paris and the four studia generalia in Cologne, Oxford, 
Montpellier, and Bologna see Mulchahey, “First the bow is bent in study,” ch. 5. Mulchahey 
argues that the education someone like Thomas would have received would have been centered 
on a curriculum that served the ends of pastoral care, rather than simply reproducing a Dominican 
version of secular university education, though the term studium generale was adopted from the 
secular context (p. 352-3). 
 	
38 Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Margarete de Ypres, in “Les Frères Prêcheurs et le mouvement 
dévot en Flandres au XIIIe siècle,” ed. G. Meersseman, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 18 
(1948), pp. 106-30. Hereafter VMY. 
 	
39 VMY, Prologue. Jennifer Carpenter, A New Heaven and a New Earth, p. 162. 
 	
40 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 14. 
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gift of love to his fellow Dominican, an example of what Janet Halley calls a 
“homotextual” relation in which a male writer referred, responded, and projected desire 
upon other men by writing about a woman.41 The vita is addressed to Zeger, whom he 
calls karissimus three times in the short Prologue. 
The relationship between Margaret and Zeger structures the text. Thomas refers to 
him as Margaret’s “spiritual father,” and for much of the vita, Zeger holds the position 
that Christ occupies in Thomas’s other Lives. Thus, while Lutgard’s conversion, we are 
told, was effected by a beautiful Christ who appeared and offered Lutgard a heavenly 
marriage, it was Zeger who converted Margaret. Zeger saw the young woman of eighteen 
in church and knew by a “divine instinct” (divino instictu) that she was a “vessel of 
election” (vas electionis).42 He preached to her and she was instantly converted, taking up 
a life of chastity and devotion while remaining in her mother’s home.43  
Aware of the suspicion such intimacy between a friar and a young woman would 
inspire, Thomas has Margaret articulate anxiety about too-close a relationship and the 
divine sanction for it in order to head off inevitable critiques. Margaret, Thomas writes, 
                                                 
41 Sheila Fisher and Janet Halley, eds. Seeking the Woman in Late Medieval and Renaissance 
Writings: Essays in Feminist Contextual Criticism (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1989), p. 4.  
	
42 VLA I.2-3; VMY, ch. 6, p. 109. 
	
43 Margaret’s practices were said to include observation of the canonical hours, daily recitation of 
“four hundred Our Fathers, and as many Hail Marys and…the same number of 
genuflections…and fifty items from the Psalter.” Meersseman argues that the fifty items from the 
Psalter were not Psalms but fifty hail Marys, which made up the “Psalter of the Virgin Mary” 
(“Les Frères Prêcheurs,” pp. 73-76; also noted in Carpenter, Between Heaven and Earth, p. 163 n. 
160). According to Meersseman, Margaret’s practices were essentially the same as the primitive 
rule of the brothers and sisters of penitence, and she was, in effect, a Dominican tertiary. 
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worried that she loved Zeger too fervently. She asked Christ, whom she assured she loved 
above all others (te…super omnia diligo), whether she could continue the relationship, for  
[m]utual love and frequent conversation between a man and a woman 
seem suspicious (suspecta) to our superiors, I ask you through your 
matchless humility that you mercifully show me, your handmaid, whether 
I will incur any loss of your love (amor) by loving (dilectio) and 
conversing with your servant. I solemnly promise that if I find anything 
against your love, I will never speak to him again.44 
 
God immediately responded by confirming Margaret’s substitution of divine for human 
authority, saying, “Do not fear to trust him in my stead.” Thomas emphasizes the veracity 
of the divine response with triple alliteration, almost daring the reader to doubt him: 
“Verus Deus, et vera veritas ipse est.”  
Despite his desire to confirm Zeger’s vocation as spiritual director, affirm 
Dominican pastoral relationships with mulieres religiosae (for which the vita acts as an 
apology), and offer Zeger a worthy account of a woman so important to him, Thomas 
struggles to portray Margaret as possessing the gravitas that he saw in Marie, Christina, 
and Lutgard. Margaret remains a juvencula.45 This could in part be attributed to her death 
at the age of 24, suggesting an accurate documentation of the life of a “rebellious teen.”46 
Furthermore, Thomas deploys her simple, precocious devotion as a rhetorical device to 
shame the proud monks and nuns that Thomas presumes will read her vita, thereby using 
                                                 
44 VMY, ch. 25, p. 119. “At quia mutua dilectio et frequens collocucio viri cum femina maioribus 
nostris suspecta videtur, rogo te…si in dilectione et collocucione servi tui damnum aliquid tui 
amoris incurram, et ego spondeo, si tue caritati adversum invenero, numquam ei postea loquar.” 
	
45 VMY Prologue. 
	
46 Barbara Newman, “Introduction,” in Thomas of Cantimpré, p. 37. 
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lay piety as a corrective to the piety of professed religious.47 The depiction of Margaret’s 
naïve youthfulness is slowly assimilated to her remarkable frailty and weakness: Thomas 
describes Margaret as a young woman sustained in her extreme asceticism through 
bimonthly reception of the Eucharist, thus undertaking pious practices that would 
typically have been accessible only to monks and nuns.48  
However, the vita also represents the failure and limitations of lay piety. 
Margaret’s devotion often seems a product of a literalism that misunderstands the 
practices she has read or been told about, practices that become comical in the 
exaggerated mode of her enactment of them. Thomas writes that her vow of chastity 
made her “unable to bear the sight of men”: she goes so far as to ask her mother to 
remove a dishwasher, a boy “perhaps twelve years old,” from the home, for “her spirit 
shrank from the presence of men so much that she quivered with alarm whenever she saw 
one”—excluding Zeger, of course.49 Margaret’s horror of men contrasts with the attitudes 
of Marie, Christina, and Lutgard, who each had profound relationships with men. 
Margaret’s interpretation of the virtue of silence, in which she was “so praiseworthy that 
she surpassed…many cloistered monks and nuns,” translated awkwardly to a domestic 
setting, causing her mother to complain to Zeger that she hardly spoke to them. He thus 
ordered her to talk to her mother and sisters after eating, “for as long as it took to recite 
                                                 
47 VMY ch. 17. Thomas addresses “contemplative” men, powerful women, and “strong and 
bearded men” whom he considers weak and effeminate when compared to Margaret’s strength.  
	
48 VMY ch. 11. Dyan Elliott argues that Thomas believed that Margaret died from her chastity, 
which he thought led to a disturbance of her womb, rather than any other of her austerities. Elliott 
understands Thomas’s constant protestations that her chaste life was not the cause of her illness 
and death to be evidence of that very anxiety (private conversation, July 2011). 
	
49 VMY, ch. 12. 
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the Seven Psalms.” Afterward, she would “slump down against the wall,” her face and 
hands turning red. If conversations were burdensome, she would cry or conveniently fall 
into a trance.50 When her mother complained she did no work to help the household, 
Margaret would take up a “distaff or some such thing” to “keep the peace” and then “fall 
into an ecstasy.”51 One of the most prominent miracles in the life occurred when 
Margaret, in a state of ecstasy but seeking to “look as if she had done something useful 
and constructive on a day she had devoted to prayer,” broke a number of eggs—the 
family’s only food—only to have them divinely restored.52  
Alongside what might seem a satirical representation of a young woman’s 
enthusiastic piety, Margaret’s vita contains many of the same themes and language 
identitical to that which dominate the later Vita Lutgardis. Margaret, Thomas claims, 
“never relaxed the vigilance of her mind to commit any mortal sin,”53 even as, after 
exchanging hearts with Christ, “no temptation of the flesh nor the smallest unclean 
thought…discompose[d Lutgard’s] mind even for a moment.” Likewise, both women had 
an early experience of divine things before they acquired spiritual understanding, 
experiences that Thomas describes with verbs of sensible knowledge. Thus, when reading 
the Psalter, Margaret fell into an ecstasy in which, although she did not know the Lord 
(necdum cognoverat Dominum), for he had not yet been revealed to her (nec umquam ei 
                                                 
50 VMY ch. 13. 
 	
51 VMY, ch. 14. 
 	
52 VMY, ch. 15. 
	
53 VMY, I.1 “numquam eam ad aliquod mortale intentum animum relaxasse.” VLA I.12 “ut nec 
tentatio carnis, aut turpis saltem cogitatio, mentem ejus ad momenti spatium perturbaret.” 
	
19	
	
fuerat revelatum), she saw (vidit) Jesus, who placed a golden crown on her head in 
reward for her vow of chastity. The young Lutgard, “although she did not yet have direct 
knowledge” of the Lord (necdum cognosceret Dominum) for he had not yet been revealed 
to her (nec enim ei tunc in aliquo fuerat revelatus), was able to “sense interiorly, she 
knew not what” of the divine (sentiebat interius nescio quid divini).54 In contrast, 
Margaret ran immediately to Zeger for confirmation of her vision. Both women 
transferred their affectus from a human suitor to the new spouse, Jesus.55 Both are called 
“simple dove”56 and compared to St. Agnes, echoing the words of her vita of being 
“taken by another lover,” Christ.57 Margaret’s vita thus provided Thomas with much of 
the language and imagery that he would use in Lutgard’s life, though to very different 
effect.  
Thomas began the Life of Lutgard of Aywières (VLA), his longest and most 
complex hagiographical effort, some time following Lutgard’s death in 1246, completing 
it in 1248. Lutgard was born in 1182 of a noblewoman and a middle-class man in 
Tongeren, a Flemish town in the northern part of Liège. At approximately twelve years of 
age, Lutgard entered the monastery of St. Catherine’s in St. Truiden—the same 
community with which Christina mirabilis was associated—and was eventually made 
prioress, an act that compelled her to seek entrance to the Cistercian monastery of 
                                                 
54 VMY, I.8; VLA I.1.  
55 VMY, I.7; VLA I.2.  
	
56 VMY I.10; VLA I.3; 3.7. 
 	
57 VMY, 5 & 55; VLA, I.2-3. 
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Aywières in 1206, when she was twenty-four years old.58 On Christina’s advice, she 
transferred to the French-speaking Aywières rather than the Flemish Herkenrode, where 
she forever remained “miraculously” unable to learn French, thus preventing her from 
suffering the institutional honor of being made abbess of any of the newly forming 
Cistercian monasteries in the region.59  
The vita was composed at the request of Hadewijch, abbess of the Cistercian 
monastery at Aywières.60 For Thomas, however, it was also clearly a labor of love, 
written not only in exchange for a relic of Lutgard’s finger, which the Abbess withheld 
until receipt of the vita, but also for the sake of what he called his amor flagrantissimus 
for Lutgard.61 Of all the Lives, the Vita Lutgardis is most marked by Thomas’s 
autobiographical presence. It also contains a “gallery of remarkable characters” whom 
Lutgard knew, including Christina mirabilis,62 Mary of Oignies,63 Innocent III (who 
visited Lutgard from purgatory where, he said, he would “be tortured by the most 
                                                 
58 VLA I.20. 
	
59 VLA I.22. 
	
60 VLA Prologue.  
	
61 VLA Prologue. 
 	
62 VLA I.22. 
	
63 VLA II.9. 
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atrocious punishments until the day of the Last Judgment”64), and James of Vitry, with 
whom she was very close.65  
In her study of what she termed “mystical biography,” Simone Roisin included 
the VLA in the corpus of what she identified as a new Cistercian genre. These 
hagiographies, Roisin argued, arose in the “beguinal-Cistercian milieu” of the Low 
Countries in which the two currents of Cistercian and beguinal piety—the latter, 
according to Roisin, formed by a mingling of European spirituality with Eastern 
influences (Syrian, Palestinian, and Byzantine) brought to Liège by traders—flourished to 
create hagiographies that attended to their subject’s efforts to die to the world, a death 
cultivated by means of obedience to the Benedictine Rule, asceticism, and the search for 
union with God.66 According to Roisin, the subjects of these hagiographies represent both 
genders and all economic classes, in stark contrast to older hagiographical traditions that 
represent primarily bishops, abbots, and royalty.67 The authors deployed new 
representational strategies and novel models of sanctity and rhetorical structures in their 
attempts to narrativize new forms of religious life, describing the mystic saint with 
appropriate language, understanding the saint to be a theophany who requires an 
                                                 
64 VLA II.7. 
	
65 VLA II.3. Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, 1160/1170-1240, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Leiden: Brill, 
1960), p. 79. 
 	
66 Simone Roisin, L’Hagiographie Cistercienne dans le diocèse de Liège au XIIIe siècle 
(Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1947), p. 5, p. 274. Other mystical biographies treated by 
Roisin include the Lives of Beatrice of Nazareth, Ida of Val-des-Roses, Ida of Louvain, and 
Catharine of Parc-des-Dames.  
	
67Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
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apophatic text in order to do justice to her manifestation of divinity.68 These saints were 
remarkable for their cultivation of the interior life; their virtutes were not thaumaturgical 
deeds of marvelous power but inward qualities of humility, charity, and chastity.69 
According to Roisin, external deeds were subordinated to the greater interest in spiritual 
growth and ecstatic or rapturous union, a centering in what Roisin calls the “mysticism” 
that arose from a fusion of Bernadine doctrine and the ascetic practices of the mulieres 
religiosae.  
Indeed, the prologue to Lutgard’s vita frames the story with the Origenistic 
pattern of spiritual ascent, declaring that the life will be structured according to the 
triplicem statum in anima, namely, the states of the inchoantium, proficientium, and 
perfectorum.  The vita charts the course of Lutgard’s gradual assimilation to the figure of 
the bride of the Song of Songs, documenting her ecstasies, unions with God, and the 
growth of her desire for him, while also describing her ascetical deeds. The VLA thus 
makes the trope of the bride of a Christ that appears briefly in the VCM and again in the 
VMY a dominant motif. Like Christina, Lutgard’s spiritual labor often takes the form of 
intercessory work for souls in purgatory. Unlike Christina, her interventions occur 
primarily by means of prayer and fasting rather than through shocking bodily 
performances of purgatorial punishments.  
According to Roisin, Thomas’s hagiographical corpus demonstrates an increasing 
turn to the interior spiritual life, culminating in the VLA, which she considers his most 
mature work, written, she argues, under the influence of Goswin of Bossut—cantor at the 
                                                 
68 Roisin, L’Hagiographie Cistercienne, p. 212.  
	
69 Ibid., p. 140.	
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Cistercian monastery of Villers and author of the vitae of Ida of Nivelles (d. 1231), the 
conversus Arnulf (d. 1231), and the monk of Villers, Abundus of Huy (d. 1239)—and of 
Lutgard herself, whom he termed his spiritual mother. Roisin traces the arc of Thomas’s 
hagiographical works arguing that the Supplement and Christina’s vita emphasize 
external wonders, Margaret’s vita, the ascetic virtues, while Lutgard’s vita emphasizes 
the mystical graces.70 The trajectory Roisin outlines for Thomas’s career can have a 
teleological cast, implying that only with the VLA did Thomas create a spiritually mature 
work by virtue of his full exposure to Cistercian influence through which he learned to 
value interiority. Although Roisin’s analysis notes fundamental theological and thematic 
differences among Thomas’s vitae, it is important not to discount the narrative and 
theological sophistication of Thomas’s earlier works. As Thomas Grzebien argues, the 
“looser form” of Thomas’s vitae prior to the VLA mirrors the less structured nature of the 
religious lives adopted by his figures who demonstrated a “less patterned way to the top 
of the mystical mountain.”71 The rhetorical and theological differences among Thomas’s 
works are important indicators of his experimental spirit and the way in which his 
hagiographical corpus represents an evolving response to the religious diversity and 
innovation he encountered during his long career. The dissertation takes as a point of 
departure the theological nature of Thomas’s hagiography and the differences among his 
Lives, but it treats all of the vitae as sophisticated works of theology, not only the VLA, 
                                                 
70 Simone Roisin, “La Méthode hagiographique de Thomas de Cantimpré,” in Miscellanea 
Historica in Honorem Alberti de Meyer, 2 vols (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1946), I, 
pp. 546-7.  
	
71 Thomas Walter Grzebien III, Penance, purgatory, mysticism, and miracles: The life, 
hagiography, and spirituality of Thomas of Cantimpré (University of Notre Dame, unpublished 
dissertation, 1989), p. 375. 
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and extends consideration of Thomas’s sources from Bernard of Clairvaux, whom Roisin 
primarily treats, to Augustine, Cassian, and William of Saint-Thierry.  
Between 1248 and 1252, Thomas was sent to the new studium generale at 
Cologne for further education. There he sat under Albert the Great, likely at the time 
when Albert had taken up Aristotle’s libri naturales for commentary.72 The two men had 
a common interest in natural philosophy, and for a long period of time Thomas’s DNR 
was attributed to Albert.73 By May 1263, Thomas finished working on the massive 
Bonum universale de apibus—which translates approximately as “the common good as 
taught by bees”—sent to Humbert of Romans, then Master-General of the Dominican 
order upon its completion.74 The treatise, begun after 1256, represents the fruition of his 
30 years of Dominican pastoral duties.75 In the dedicatory letter, Thomas writes that he 
began the work in response to requests from his fellow Dominicans and that he was 
sending the work to Humbert following the latter’s call at General Chapter for friars to 
collect accounts of events in which Dominicans played an important role.76 Robert 
Sweetman argues that Thomas began the work as part of his duty as subprior of the 
                                                 
72 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 14. Sweetman notes that the evidence for this time frame 
rests upon Thomas mentioning in the BUA that he was a student of Albert the Great when he was 
regent master of theology. While it has been suggested that Thomas sat under Albert between 
1232 and 1237 in either Paris or the Cologne Priory, Sweetman argues that the title Thomas used 
for Albert suggests 1248-1252 when Albert was the regent master at the new studium generale in 
Cologne.  
	
73 M.M. Mulchahey, “First the bow,” p. 467. 
	
74 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 15. 
 	
75 Ibid., p. 163. 
	
76 BUA, Prologue, p. 56.  
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Dominican house at Louvain (an office he held from 1246), which included the tasks of 
confessing, preaching, and watching over the friars in the priory.77  
The work contains a collection of exempla organized around the extended 
metaphor of the life of bees, elaborated from a chapter, Thomas explains, of De Natura 
Rerum.78 He headlines each chapter with a statement about the natural history of the bee 
from the DNR, which he in turn relates to a quality or duty of the clergy or laity and 
illustrates with an exemplum. Book one concerns the lives of prelates (25 chapters) and 
book two, the lives of the laity (57 chapters). Thomas’s profound interest in the events of 
his day is apparent in the treatise. Each chapter, he tells Humbert, provides exempla 
aptata et appropriata that ground the abstract lessons in “our times.”79 Thomas gathered 
the exempla from his extensive work as a confessor, preacher, and exorcist, and included 
material from his own life, his pastoral experience, and tales told to him by others. T. F. 
Crane argues that the exempla are almost entirely derived from historical anecdotes, 
containing very few commonplaces, as was typical of older collections.80 Unlike one of 
                                                 
77 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 158. 
 
78 BUA Prologue, p. 56. 
	
79 BUA Prologue, p. 56.  
	
80 Jacques de Vitry, The Exempla, or, Illustrative Stories from the Sermones vulgares of Jacques 
de Vitry, ed. and trans. T. F. Crane (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1967 (1890), p. xci. Crane further 
notes that more than one hundred years later, Thomas’s treatise would inspire a similar work by 
fellow-Dominican, Johannes Nider (b. 1380), though the ant would in this case take the place of 
the bee. Nider’s De formicarius was written, he explains in the Prologue, in response to the 
sentiment that miracles and revelations were no longer manifest in Germany. Like Thomas, Nider 
writes that his treatise records contemporary instances of divine intervention that he had seen or 
heard of. These tales were organized according to the sixty qualities of the ant and are, unlike the 
De apibus, though like Gregory’s Dialogues and Caesarius of Heisterbach’s Dialogus 
Miraculorum, told through a dialogue between Piger, a dullard, and the master Theologus (p. 
xcii). 
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his predecessors in the genre, the Cistercian Caesarius of Heisterbach, Thomas uses 
personal anecdotes as material for his exempla, including the one described above 
concerning his entrance into religious life, departing from what Jean-Claude Schmitt 
identified as important to thirteenth-century exempla collections, namely the 
depersonalization of the figures, events, and places depicted in order that they may 
become universal types and circumstances.81 While Thomas writes in the dedicatory 
letter that he has removed the names of countries, cities, and towns to avoid confusion 
with individuals depicted in those places who are still alive, this is a false protestation. 
Thomas far more commonly identifies places and persons in the treatise than protects 
their anonymity. 
While Crane terms these exempla “illustrative stories,” Sweetman holds that they 
are a form of scientia experimentalis, “units of human experience to which one could 
appeal to establish the actual existence of a given principle or conclusion.” Thus, the 
exempla do not function as doctrinal window dressing but carry an authority parallel to 
quotations from the Bible or Seneca, Thomas’s favorite philosopher. Furthermore, the 
exempla provide narratives of the human consequences and reactions—joy and horror—
to virtue or vice, thus including the audience’s emotions in the work of persuasion, 
convincing “hearts to act in accord” with doctrinal norms.82 In this way, they are 
exhortative in the sense outlined by Gregory the Great, whose popular view is invoked by 
Humbert of Romans in his treatise, Liber de dono timoris: “according to Gregory, 
                                                 
81 Jean-Claude Schmitt, Ghosts in the Middle Ages: The Living and the Dead in Medieval Society, 
trans. by Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 124. 
	
82 Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 185. 
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exempla move [listeners] more than mere words do and are more easily grasped by the 
understanding and more deeply fixed in the memory.”83  
Other than the Prologue and the final chapters describing the miracles performed 
by John’s relics for the Life of Abbot John, the Bonum Universale de Apibus was the last 
of Thomas’s literary efforts. He is thought to have died around 1270.84 
 
II. The Economic and Pastoral Context of Thomas’s Ministry 
 
Beginning in the eleventh century, the Southern Low Countries underwent 
massive development and urbanization concomitant with rapid population growth. They 
were, in Thomas’s day, one of the most industrialized and urbanized regions of Western 
Europe. While Italy had the largest cities in Europe, the density of the cities in the 
Southern Low Countries, as well as the proportion of the population that lived within or 
in close proximity to cities, was unrivalled.85 An international merchant class (of which 
Lutgard’s father was a part) gained prominence in economic and political life. This urban 
revolution began in eleventh-century Flanders, whose greatest city, Ypres, was the home 
of Margaret. To the east of Flanders lay the duchy of Brabant, the center of Thomas’s 
pastoral activities, which underwent a similarly rapid urbanization in the twelfth 
century.86 It included the towns of Brussels, Louvain, and Antwerp, as well as Nivelles, 
                                                 
83 M. M. Mulchahey, “First the bow,” p. 461. “Quoniam plus exempla quam verba movent 
secundum Gregorium et facilius intellectu capiuntur et alicuius memoria infiguntur.” 
	
84 R. Godding, “Une oeuvre inédite,” p. 244; Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 15. 
 	
85 Jennifer Carpenter, Between Heaven and Earth, p. 7. 
 	
86 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Marie’s home, and the village of Aywières, where Lutgard lived out her days as a 
Cistercian.  
The political, religious, and linguistic divisions of the Southern Low Countries are 
notoriously complicated, resulting in a “patchwork of competing allegiances.”87 The 
primary political constituencies were the county of Flanders (a fief of the French king), 
the duchy of Brabant, and the prince-bishopric of Liège, the latter two of which owed 
allegiance to the German emperor. However, neither the French nor German king had 
control over these “frontier lands” after the twelfth century.88 All three of these regions 
had French and Flemish-speaking inhabitants. The dioceses did not correspond with the 
political divisions; the diocese of Liège, part of the archdiocese of Cologne, included the 
prince-bishopric of Liège and a large part of the duchy of Brabant.89  
From the twelfth century, the economic power of the Southern Low Countries 
included the urban middle class, whose growth occurred in symbiosis with the old landed 
aristocracy.90 This composition is reflected in Thomas’s vitae: of its cast of characters, 
only Lutgard had a noble mother, though her father was a merchant, while the others 
were born of parents who were artisanal or bourgeois town and city dwellers.91 This 
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urban population was remarkably literate. Beginning in the twelfth century, the merchant 
class challenged ecclesiastical control of educational institutions and provided secular 
education for boys and girls in the three ‘R’s, with subsidies for poor children.92 As 
Jennifer Carpenter argues, the urban context is important for understanding the new 
forms of piety described in vitae like Thomas’s, for cities provided new opportunities and 
offered a social milieu rooted in the mobility of a newly prosperous population. “Spurred 
by the breathtaking vision of a newly-purified church promoted by Gregorian reformers,” 
she writes, “the Christian world, which had formerly been suspicious of change, now 
began to think that innovation in religious life could be part of God’s continual changing 
plan for a changing world, and, further, that the church was obliged to provide for the 
specialized needs of the urban populations.”93  
Beginning in the eleventh century and burgeoning in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, forms of piety and spiritual aspiration that had been confined within monastery 
walls were no longer contained by them. The laity in larger numbers came to a changed 
“religious consciousness” that “no longer saw the essence of Christianity fulfilled in 
church alone” but rather “sought to realize Christianity as a way of life, binding on every 
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individual, a commitment more essential than one’s place in the hierarchical ordo.”94 
Herbert Grundmann argues that this new understanding arose, in part, through the 
Gregorian reforms. While Gregory VII attempted to consolidate and sharpen the 
distinction between lay and clerical orders, he appealed to the laity, who were asked to 
judge the worthiness of individual priests to prepare and serve the sacrament. The laity 
thereby came to possess a kind of authority in relation to clerics, of whom they could be 
critical and whose fate they could influence. Thus, although the Gregorian reforms were 
founded upon a notion that the proper ordering of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was such 
that power flowed from God through the papacy and eventually to the lowliest clerics by 
means of apostolic succession, the neo-Donatism concomitantly expounded by Gregory 
VII and his supporters—arguing ex opere operantis in their attempt to give weight to the 
removal of simoniacal priests and those who practiced “concubinage”—undermined this 
reforming effort. As priestly worthiness came to be seen to reside in behavior rather than 
sacramentally bestowed by ordination alone, the questioning of particular priests became 
more common and raised the specter of the insufficiency of ordination. The fluid urban 
marketplace of ideas and high rates of literacy enabled this growing sense of authority 
and religious prerogative among the laity to spread.95  
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Following the investiture controversy, Grundmann argues, two new ideals 
emerged as essential to Christian piety, namely voluntary poverty and the “apostolic life,” 
including itinerant preaching. These ideals would find expression in twelfth-century 
heretical movements like the Waldensians and among papally approved wandering 
preachers like Robert of Arbrissel (who was given permission to preach in 1096) in 
northern France and Norbert of Xanten, former archbishop of Cologne, who was given 
permission to preach in 1118.96  
 Robert, Norbert, and other itinerant preachers were eventually required to cease 
their wanderings that, despite papal permission, made the hierarchy nervous; the 
“unstable crowds” of male and female followers and the virulent criticisms of the clergy 
they expounded were of particular concern. Following in the tradition of the Gregorian 
reformers, many founded double monasteries: Robert in Fontevrault around 1100, and 
Norbert, Premontré Abbey at Laon in 1120, very close to Thomas’s sphere of activity. 
However, these measures to contain what Grundmann terms a “movement”—meaning 
ideals and interests held in common among different vocational paths—within the 
traditional terms of the monastic ordo did not ultimately suffice, and the innovative spirit 
and desire of an increasing number of the laity to live the ideals of voluntary poverty and 
apostolic life outside the confines of the cloister continued.  
An important witness to this shift in the spiritual center of gravity is Lambert le 
Bègue (d. 1177), a dissident cleric in Liège, wrongly credited with bestowing his name 
on the beguines. Lambert not only railed publicly against simony and the more 
generalized greed of the clergy but, with reference to apostolic writings, declared it a duty 
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for all Christians—not only priests—to exhort one another by good example. He also said 
that all Christians could enjoy spiritual union with Christ himself. The priest’s role in the 
process of spiritual advancement was one of cooperation with the laity, his function to 
enable and strengthen the inherent moral capacities of all individuals. Lambert thus 
translated the Book of Acts into vernacular verse for the laity, and St. Agnes’s vita for a 
group of virgins.97 Imprisoned for heresy, Lambert appealed to Calixtus III. Escaping 
from prison, he fled to the papal court in Rome where he composed an apologia. The 
documents from his trial reveal that there was intense lay interest in studying and 
discussing the scriptures, particularly Acts, as it articulated what they understood to be 
the apostolic ideal for the church. Furthermore, many among these groups practiced an 
intense Eucharistic piety.98 Lambert’s testimony illuminates a “startling lay religiosity” 
among men and women that straddled the border of orthodoxy and heresy, revealing 
contestation over the nature and limits of lay religiosity at the turn of the thirteenth 
century.99  
The burgeoning lay piety of Lambert’s circle centered on the ideals of the 
apostolic life and was continuous with what Grundmann terms the women’s religious 
movement, at the heart of which were gospel ideals of voluntary poverty and, often, 
chastity.100 This lay pursuit of the apostolic life can be seen in the Lives of Marie of 
Oignies, Margaret of Ypres, and Christina the Astonishing, all laywomen who lived in 
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chastity and renounced financial ambitions while pursuing an intense contemplative 
regime in a secular context. The innovative spirit of this movement is also glimpsed in 
the piety of those women James of Vitry, in the Prologue to the Life of Marie of Oignies, 
termed mulieres sanctae (also called mulieres religiosae)—women without institutional 
affiliation who nonetheless pursued a life of contemplation, chastity, and poverty. The 
Prologue witnesses to what Brenda Bolton calls a “small, like-minded, closely knit group 
of people,” primarily women, in Brabant-Flanders who practiced physical mortification, 
poverty, and contemplation.101 The Premonstratensian canons and other orders of regular 
canons offered multiple vocational opportunities for women: some women of the order, 
such as those John of Cantimpré established next to the male foundation at Prémy, 
practiced strict claustration and resembled nuns.102 Others performed menial labor rather 
than choir service, while others were recluses or, like Marie of Oignies, hospital workers 
with a loose association to a community of canons.103  
Thomas’s hagiographical corpus not only attests to the diversity of religious 
vocation available to women in the Southern Low Countries but also reveals the profound 
relationships between women in different forms of religious life, particularly recluses, 
beguines, laywomen, and Cistercians. This can be seen in the friendships between 
Lutgard and the itinerant Christina mirabilis, and between the beguine Marie of Oignies 
and the recluse Jutta of Borgloon (with whom Christina also lived for nine years). 
Simone Roisin’s work demonstrates the deep connections between beguines and 
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Cistercians in Liège. More recent research has attested to the “equally close relationship 
between the beguines and the Dominicans in the same area.”104 Thomas’s own career 
demonstrates this link, as does Lutgard’s close relationships with friar Bernard and 
Thomas, and Margaret’s relationship with Friar Zeger. Differences in vocation and 
gender did not restrain communication or mutual influence.  
Thomas’s vocation as a Dominican bore many similarities to that of the mulieres 
religiosae. Indeed, the religious innovation of these women was mirrored by innovations 
within groups like the Dominicans. Formally authorized by Honorius III in 1216, the 
Dominicans followed the Augustinian Rule, practicing voluntary poverty, chastity, and 
(as their moniker, the Order of Preachers suggests) preaching—itinerant preaching in 
particular. As a Regular Canon, Dominic of Osma was already familiar with the 
itinerancy and apostolic life of Norbert of Xanten, founder of the Canons Regular, and 
Dominic drew on these roots to create the new order, which was clerical and learned from 
the outset, retaining some features of monastic life even as it divested itself of the earlier 
monastic ideal of stabilitas.105 Dominican focus on the apostolic life arose as a way to 
persuade converts to the Cathar heresy in Languedoc—the early Dominicans having been 
impressed by the apostolic austerity of Cathar perfecti in comparison with what they saw 
as the bloated materialism of the church of Rome and the Cistercian missionaries sent to 
                                                 
104 Brenda Bolton, “Vitae Matrum,” p. 260.	
105 C.H. Lawrence, The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society 
(London: Longman, 1994), p. 65. The monastic tradition was apparent in the friars’ domestic life, 
as they organized the day according to the choral recitation of the divine office, fasting in 
monastic periods, and observing silence within the house at all times. However, the offices were 
to be sung breviter in order to leave more time for studying, and manual labor was no longer 
required (Ibid., p. 81). 
 
35	
	
preach to them.106 In their swift rise to pan-European importance the order became a way 
for the papacy to “bridge the gap” between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the multitude 
of new religious movements and the spiritually ambitious laity. The Dominicans gave 
prominence to apostolic preaching and poverty within a papally approved order and 
served the expanding needs of the laity in their role as preachers and confessors.107 
Through their pastoral ministry, the friars created a ministry focused on urban contexts, 
providing “new forms of religious expression specifically for the urban sector of society,” 
including opportunities and practices for lay participation in devotional life, thereby 
enhancing the laity’s “sense of spiritual worth.”108 As the careers of Thomas and Zeger 
attest, an important component of this ministry involved the cura animarum of women.109  
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Dominican preaching against heresy was a central means by which the papacy 
attempted to control the lay thirst for apostolic life and religious expression. However, 
papal response was not confined to wrangling existing movements; the canons of the 
fourth Lateran council attempted to govern the efflorescence of new practices and 
movements, while instituting new requirements for all Christians. The canons 
demonstrate a concern to increase the centralization and standardization of Christian 
practice. Under Innocent III, the papacy thus officially extended the requirements for lay 
participation in the religious life even as it instituted the means to supervise and control 
this participation. Canon 21 required annual communication, which in turn entailed 
annual confession, also outlined in canon 21.  
Because the Dominicans were vital to the implementation of the canons of 
Lateran IV, Thomas’s pastoral vision was deeply marked by its program of quelling 
heresy and forming the laity into religious subjects who accord with Lateran IV ideals. 
Thomas’s vitae vividly portray the “confessing subject” who is placed under surveillance 
by the requirement to confess to a priest but who, it is hoped, will ultimately learn self-
surveillance.110 Lutgard is depicted achieving such interior vigilance. Her confessor was 
not Thomas but another Dominican friar, Bernard. She was tormented, Thomas writes, by 
“inordinate scruples” in her attempt to reach “total perfection” while saying the Hours.111 
Margaret was overcome with a grief that terrified her confessor, Zeger. Thinking that she 
had done some truly horrible deed, he discovered that she had only missed saying the 
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canonical hours because she had been rapt in ecstasy.112 As Dyan Elliott observes, a 
practiced confessor, Thomas filled his hagiographies with examples of the importance of 
confession and penitence in the formation of the saintly person. Lutgard and Margaret, as 
well as others converted by John who make full penitential gestures upon their 
conversion, became model advocates of submission to priestly mediation in confession, 
counteracting the Cathar appeal to an alternative hierarchy or the heretical claim that 
confession to God alone was enough. “In the course of [Thomas’s] hagiographical 
writings,” Elliott writes, “a new kind of saint begins to emerge—one whose sanctity not 
only is revealed in but even develops through her evolving relation with her confessor…. 
The appearance of the new confessor saint was contingent upon the new role of the 
confessor.”113 Margaret of Ypres, in particular, tellingly models such dependence and 
adoration for the confessor.  
Thomas’s creation of saintly figures that resist or appropriate heretical claims 
resides not only in his portrayal of subjects who perfectly enact the requirements of 
Lateran IV. As Elliott shows, by foregrounding the ascetic practices of his subjects—
including running through brambles, fasting, raptures, illnesses, and the long and 
marvelous list of Christina’s penitential acts—as well as their Eucharistic piety and 
visions of the human Christ (which Roisin attributed to beguinal influence),114 Thomas 
produced constructions designed to counter Cathar antimaterialism, essential to the 
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“sponsored emergence” of the mulieres religiosae by clerics seeking avenues to resist 
heresy.115 The sacramental focus of the piety of the mulieres religiosae has the further 
benefit of providing yet another opportunity to demonstrate the saint’s dependence on 
and respect for the clerical caste, undermining neo-Donatist notions.116 Though the 
precise paths of Cathar influence are difficult to reconstruct, the ideas probably entered 
the Southern Low Countries with Crusaders in 1100, turning the region into a “hotbed” of 
Cathar activity and clerical counter-measures. Following the burning of Cathars in 
Cologne in 1163, their persecution, Walter Simons notes, “would be vigorous and 
unrelenting.”117 For Elliott, the hagiographical construction of these women as 
sacramentally and clerically focused penitents placed Thomas at the vanguard of a later 
medieval tendency to represent female spirituality according to the “subtle contours of 
displacement or reappropriation of heretical claims.”118 Thomas’s holy women were 
constructed essentially as weapons in a battle against heresy, the vitae compelling 
propaganda offering orthodox exemplars of the holy life as an alternative to the ideals 
proffered by Cathar and other heretical poverty movements. The figuration of the 
orthodox saint as supportive of the clergy, with a piety oriented around the sacraments, 
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the human Christ, and ascetic practices that underscored the embodied nature of the 
religious life addressed various heretical currents—antimaterialism, neo-Donatism—that 
were often attributed to those heretical movements dominated by the urban laity.119 
 As much as the desire to fight heresy drove Thomas’s strategies of representation 
in each of his vitae, this dissertation argues that the exemplarity of his subjects cannot be 
construed solely in terms of antiheretical propaganda. The reduction of the complexity 
and diversity of his hagiographical corpus to this single aim obscures the way in which 
the work changed over time and ignores the way in which a single vita often treats the 
exemplarity of the saint in contradictory ways or problematizes it in a self-conscious 
fashion. Much twentieth-century scholarship has noted that representations of 
exemplarity are not historically stable.120 Religious ideals do not arise in a vacuum but 
are formed in social contexts with which they are fully imbricated.121 However, despite 
this attention to the contextual character of hagiographical exemplars, it is still common 
for scholars to use a functionalist approach in reading hagiographical texts, whereby the 
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writer is seen as wielding a one-dimensional ideology while the saint is treated as a two-
dimensional “type” whose lack of depth facilitates her function as spiritual or political 
propaganda. Thus, while exemplarity is understood to change over time, it is still treated 
as fairly stable within a given period. 
 While Thomas (and James before him) were devoted to the cause of antiheretical 
preaching, their vocation and interests brought them into close dependence on figures 
who were sometimes accused of heresy or negative “innovation,” even as they were 
themselves members of novel movements. Moreover, as much as James or Thomas 
attempted to frame the mulieres sanctae in the traditions of desert fathers and mothers, 
virgin martyrs, and gospel models, their vitae go far beyond the emulation of these 
historical precedents, for they introduce a “mystical element” alongside their depictions 
of intense asceticism. Brenda Bolton identifies two aspects of this mystical piety, namely 
its Christocentrism and Eucharistic devotion.122 The devotion to Christ often led to an 
idealization of sharing his suffering and gave rise to profound mortification. Instances of 
such mortification abound in the hagiographies from Liège. For example, Marie of 
Oignies, “inflamed by an overwhelming fire of love” and horrified by the memory of 
eating meat when ill, cut out a “large piece” of her flesh and buried it in the ground.123 
The astonishing feats of Christina mirabilis124 and Margaret of Ypres’ extensive illness in 
which she haemorrhaged constantly—interpreted by Thomas as a purgation of sin—are 
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further examples of this extreme bodily mortification.125 In addition to these ascetic 
practices, James describes novel paramystical phenomena, including lengthy ecstasies in 
which a woman was seemingly catatonic, unable to “feel a blow” for an entire day, or the 
case of another woman who experienced twenty-five such ecstasies in a single day and, 
upon returning to her senses, showed her inner joy by a “bodily tic” and “jumping up and 
down.”126 The face of another woman was reportedly marked with the traces of tears 
from habitual weeping, while others suffered a kind of love-sickness lying “faint with 
desire” in their beds for years.127  
While, as Elliott has shown, an emphasis on the physicality of female piety was 
useful in countering Cathar antimaterialism, the excessiveness and novelty of these 
depictions complicates and undermines their function as simple propaganda or as 
exemplars easily translatable into models appropriate for a reader. The novelty of the 
spiritual practices described by Thomas and James, as well as their intimate relationship 
with women (which the VMY reveals as contentious), inspired attacks against them and 
the women they supported. Half of James of Vitry’s Second Sermon to Virgins is devoted 
to a defense of the beguines, in which he compares their detractors to dogs and spiders.128 
The Prologue to the VMO writes of those who “deride and despise those things that they 
do not understand.” Such are “animal men who do not have the Spirit of God, although 
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they are considered to be prudent among themselves. They do not want to see what they 
cannot understand by human reasoning.”129 Gregory IX, described in the Supplement as a 
devotee of Marie of Oignies whose relic and vita cured him of the spirit of blasphemy, 
advised northern bishops to protect beguines from the abuse of clerics, monks, and 
laymen.130 In the VLA, Thomas writes of one of James’s detractors, “May that vile 
slanderer blush for shame—he who said and wrote that people who record the fantastic 
visions of insignificant women should be considered profane.”131 In the early thirteenth 
century, these detractors are unnamed, though in the Second Sermon to Virgins, James 
calls them “rich men and secular prelates”132 By the mid-thirteenth century, however, the 
enemies of beguines included William of St Amour and Ruteboeuf, voices central to the 
secular-Mendicant controversy at the University of Paris.133  
Although uncloistered beguines were particularly vulnerable to suspicion, the 
Prologue to the VLA betrays an anxiety that the tale of a Cistercian nun will not be 
believed, because no vita filled with such “remarkable virtues, marvels and miracles” 
(virtutum insignia & mirabilium ac miraculorum) “has been written for many years” (a 
multis retroactis annis fuisse descriptam). Thomas may have used Lutgard’s example to 
defend the novel piety of the women’s religious movement (including that of the 
beguines) in part because her order gave her the proper credentials. However, he 
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understood this institutional provision did not render her immune from the attacks of 
skeptics. Like the uncloistered women described by James, Lutgard languished with love 
for Christ, her bridegroom (III.9; III.12); in an utterly new phenomenon, she “exchanged 
hearts” with Christ (I.12);134 she experienced a lengthy catatonic ecstasy while meditating 
on the Passion during which her hair and skin dripped with blood (II.23); and her hands 
dripped with oil while she meditated on a verse of the Song of Songs (I.16).  
Beryl Smalley has shown how the notion of novelty underwent change in the 
course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The adjective “new” was often pejoratively 
applied to the radical Gregorian reformers. In 1085, one opponent of the reformers wrote, 
“O nova lex, O dogmum novum, noviter fabricatum.”135 However, in the thirteenth-
century Italian urban and mendicant contexts, much as in the Low Countries, the novel 
acquired a more positive connotation. For instance, an encomium for St. Francis ascribed 
to Thomas of Celano praises the saint for his novelty: “Novus ordo, nova vita/Mundo 
surgit inaudita.” The “unheard of” became a marker of sanctity or, more precisely, a way 
of describing the full contemporary realization of gospel primitivism.136 Thomas and 
James’s vitae reveal the struggle to enlist the novel in defense of the ancient faith.  
                                                 
134 Thomas further articulates Lutgard’s total union with God in II.43 when he writes, in a 
Eucharistic and Bernadine image that “Lutgard’s spirit was absorbed in God and, like the Queen 
of Sheba, fainting in admiration, she ‘no longer had any spirit in her.’ Now she was wholly 
translated into God, like a drop of water in a cask of wine and mingled with him as one spirit.” 
The image is from Bernard of Clairvaux’s De Diligendo Deo, 10, 28. (“Proinde ita spiritus ejus 
absorbebatur in Deum; ut cum Regina Saba in admiratione deficiens, ultra spiritum non haberet; 
sed tota translata in Deum, instar guttæ aquæ in dolium vini, unus cum eo spiritus miscebatur”). 
	
135 Beryl Smalley, “Ecclesiastical Attitudes to Novelty,” in Studies in Medieval Thought and 
Learning From Abelard to Wyclif (London: The Hambledon Press, 1981), p. 97. 
	
136 Ibid., p. 98.	
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I will argue in what follows that Thomas’s hagiographical corpus must be 
contextualized in terms of the ambivalent status of the women’s religious movement in 
the mid-thirteenth century. At a time when religious life was necessarily tied to a papally 
approved regula, a saint such as Marie, Christina, and Margaret, who took no vow and 
obeyed a private rule was a novelty in terms of how she became saintly and how she 
manifested her holiness to others. Moreover, Roisin has shown how Thomas’s Life of 
Lutgard was a new genre of hagiographical writing that described a novel kind of female 
monasticism. In order to demonstrate and justify the sanctity of these strange figures, a 
justification that necessarily implied a critique of the old ordo and monastic practice, 
Thomas developed rhetorical techniques to describe novel behaviors in such a way that 
assured the exemplary holiness of his marginal subjects, even as he foregrounded its 
novelty to astound readers. Thus, Thomas often figures his novel saints as emblems of the 
early church and a return to the days of the New Testament. This movement of return, 
however, also points forward to the eschaton, a time marked by the emergence of “all 
things new.” Both apocalyptic and nostalgic language pervade his texts. 
 I argue that the exemplarity of Thomas’s saintly figures is greatly complicated by 
the peculiar historical situation in which he wrote. The diverse vocational possibilities 
represented in Thomas’s corpus mirror his social context, one in which great religious 
experimentation and innovation were occurring, making available a new variety of forms 
of the religious life to women and men. Thomas’s Dominican project of defending 
orthodoxy makes use of figures that participate in these novel forms of the religious life. 
These diverse types of saintly figures are represented with different rhetorical and 
representational strategies, strategies that relate to the subjects whom he treats, the 
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audiences to whom the vitae are addressed and which he hopes to form through the 
reading of his vitae and other desired effects of his narratives. The diversity that we 
encounter in this corpus, I argue, belies any attempt to reduce Thomas’s project to a 
singular aim or his saints to a single type crafted for a single end, including that of 
destroying heresy. 
The dissertation shows that although Thomas’s vitae represent novel forms of the 
religious life, they simultaneously thematize the difficulties attendant upon such novelty. 
Thomas’s writings are an arena of debate, at times revealing Thomas’s own uncertainties, 
but his experimental spirit in attempting to articulate emerging conceptions of holiness in 
the new movements treated by his corpus. The result is that, while he claims to offer texts 
that edify, instruct, terrify, or offer imitable models for readers, his saints are often 
presented in ways that undermine his stated aims.  
For instance, Thomas grapples with the problem of the credibility of the vitae, an 
issue that arises precisely because of the “unheard of” quality of many of his figures. The 
newness of saints like Christina, Marie, Margaret, and Lutgard is an important source of 
their interest for hagiographer and audience alike. However, their lack of historical 
precedent and the often-strange nature of their religiosity leads Thomas to fear that 
readers will not believe in the sanctity claimed by his texts for these figures. The vitae 
deploy various strategies to negotiate this difficulty, maintaining and foregrounding the 
novelty and strangeness of their saintly subjects even as they seek rhetorical means of 
proving the trustworthiness of their accounts. The reader’s belief is central to Thomas’s 
project: in order for the work of the narratives as inspiring exempla to be efficacious, the 
reader must believe not only in the saintly nature of those he describes but also in the 
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veracity of his tale. Thomas is not interested in writing fictions. Even the strangeness of 
Christina’s story—one he acknowledges “surpasses understanding”—is emphasized as a 
tale of true events.  
Steven Justice argues that contemporary scholarship regards belief as a “black 
box” inaccessible to modern scholars, thus “enforc[ing] an idea of the immediacy to 
faith” on the part of medieval people.137 Such a move repeats the exoticization of the 
Middle Ages that scholarship has attempted to overcome.138 Justice argues that two 
dominant accounts emerge from this bracketing, which are used to interpret hagiographic 
and miracle tales: the didactic and the perceptual. The didactic account explains miracle 
stories as exemplary tales told solely for the purpose of edification, pursuing a moral that 
can be learned without belief in the facticity of the narrative. The literal story in this case 
is simply the incidental structure upon which the moral allegory hangs its lesson.139 The 
second account, the perceptual, claims that medieval people, lacking a scientific 
worldview capable of distinguishing between the natural and the supernatural, medieval 
people easily and unconsciously explained natural events supernaturally.140 Miracles in 
this view were experienced unreflectively as real and pervasive.  
                                                 
137 Steven Justice, “Did the Middle Ages Believe in their Miracles?” Representations (103) 
Summer 2008, p. 1. 
	
138 On the prevalence of such exoticization through an appeal to medieval alterity, see Paul 
Freedman and Gabrielle Spiegel, “Medievalisms Old and New: The Rediscovery of Alterity in 
North American Medieval Studies,” The American Historical Review vol. 103 no. 3 (June 1998), 
pp. 677-704.  
	
139 Justice, “Did the Middle Ages Believe in their Miracles?” p. 4. 
	
140 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Justice’s argument that hagiographies “bare the devices of faith” and “open to 
inspection the constraints they work on themselves to maintain their credit in what seems 
scarcely credible” is evident within Thomas’s vitae as he draws attention to his narratives 
as narratives, self-consciously soliciting the reader’s belief, offering the reader strategies 
of reading that will, he argues, facilitate their belief in the scarcely credible.141 Again, this 
credibility is essential for the exemplary nature of the texts to be effective: without the 
belief of the reader, the claims the vitae make upon readers as authoritative documents 
containing directives and models for readers to follow would not exist. Chapters two and 
three will treat the very different tactics of persuasion undertaken by Thomas in the Lives 
of John, Christina, Marie, and Lutgard. These chapters take up Justice’s contention that 
the didactic and perceptual accounts, unable to cope with the problem of belief as raised 
by hagiographical texts themselves, impoverish our capacity to understand the complex 
ways they were created and received. 
Thomas’s vitae bare the devices of faith in ways that lead him to show how he 
would like the hagiographies to be read. In the process, he draws on multiple—often 
competing—discourses, including the theological, juridical, scriptural, and 
autobiographical. In chapter three, I argue that the most telling distinction in the 
Supplement and the VLA is between a corrosive hermeneutic—in which the reader seeks 
proof in a juridical sense, weighing evidence and placing the text on trial, so to speak—
and an Augustinian hermeneutic, in which the reader contemplates the text, treating it as 
an object of devotion through which the reader is affectively transformed. The two 
                                                 
141 Ibid., p. 15.	
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approaches reveal Thomas’s twin aims to convince rationally and to inspire 
transformative personal devotion. 
 
III. The Medieval Exemplum  
  
Medieval writers used the term exemplum in multiple ways. It was a medieval 
mode of argumentation particularly popular with preachers, which used vivid examples to 
illustrate doctrine, provide entertainment and edification, and offer models for imitation. 
Thomas’s use of the term reveals its malleability within a single corpus: the whole of 
Lutgard’s vita, the brief, vivid, historical narratives “illustrating our faith” in the VJC, 
and the message of purgatorial punishment and the necessity of penance preached by 
Christina’s post-resurrection existence, are all named exempla by him. For Thomas, then, 
exemplum refers to the narrativization of the exemplary person, illustrative stories, and 
edifying events. It is a narrative and a figure, a duality that E.R. Curtius argues was 
achieved in approximately 100 B.C.E. when the notion of the exemplum as an 
“interpolated anecdote serving as an example” was added the exemplum as imago or 
eikon, an incarnation of a quality in a figure.142  
Debates among medievalists about whether the exemplum constitutes a genre have 
resulted in so little consensus as to lead Vitale-Borvarone to argue that it is impossible to 
define the medieval exemplum according to a standardized typology.143 This lack of 
                                                 
142 Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. by Willard R. 
Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 59-60. 
	
143 Alessandro Vitale-Brovarone, “Persuasione e narrazione: l’Exemplum tra due retoriche (VI-
XII secoli)” in Mélanges de l’école française de Rome—Moyen âge—Temps modernes 92, part 1 
(1980), p. 95. Quoted in Lyons, Exemplum, n. 16, p. 245. 
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typological consistency had already been observed in 1890 by T. F. Crane in his 
anthology and English translation of James of Vitry’s Sermones Vulgares. He noted that 
there was no single criterion used by medieval compilers of exempla collections for 
preachers. Moral reflection, biography, and historical events were all used in providing 
material for preachers.144 In his Index Exemplorum, F. Tubach, following T. F. Crane, 
argues that the type of literature that constituted an exemplum in the medieval period was 
widely variable (including biography, history, fable) but that, in each case, it was 
determined by the same rhetorical function: “the exemplum is an attempt to discover in 
each narrative event, character, situation or act a paradigmatic sign that would either 
substantiate religious beliefs and church dogma or delineate social ills and human 
foibles.”145 This definition is in basic agreement with the most widely quoted definition 
of the sermon exemplum by Jacques Le Goff, who holds that it is “a brief narrative 
presented as truthful (that is, historical) and used in a discourse (usually a sermon) to 
convince listeners by offering them a salutary lesson.”146  
There has been much complaint among recent scholars, however, both about the 
vagueness and the restrictive specificity of definitions like Le Goff’s, itself offered as a 
solution to a persistent lack of clarity. Thus, although Larry Scanlon agrees with the 
contention that the sermon exemplum (exempla that appear in a homiletic context) is 
                                                                                                                                                 
	
144 Jacques de Vitry, The Exempla or Illustrative Stories from the Sermones Vulgares of Jacques 
de Vitry, ed. T.F. Crane, p. xlvii. Quoted in Lyons, Exemplum, n. 16, p. 244.	
145 F. C. Tubach, Index Exemplorum (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1979), p. 523. 
Quoted in Lyons, Exemplum, p. 244, n. 16. 
	
146 Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 78. 
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intended to convince an audience of a salutary lesson, not all exempla were meant to be 
inserted into another discourse.147 In his attempt to emphasize the rhetorical exemplum in 
the Renaissance, John Lyons takes issue with the restriction of the exemplum to a 
narrative form (in direct contradiction with Larry Scanlon, who argues scholars have 
generally neglected the exemplum’s “specificity as narrative”),148 and, furthermore, 
argues that an exemplum is not necessarily delivered in the service of an injunction or 
with an edifying moral purpose, which he sees as an importation of medievalist 
definitions into the early modern context. Instead, it can, as in the classical rhetorical 
tradition and the high medieval Sermones Vulgares, have the purpose of enhancing 
understanding or providing entertainment. For Lyons, an exemplary text is not 
necessarily the same as a didactic one, as many doctrinal texts do not use examples. 
Instead, an exemplary text is simply one that uses examples.149 The example in this sense 
                                                 
147 Larry Scanlon, Narrative, Authority and Power: The Medieval Exemplum and the Chaucerian 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), n. 3, p. 4. Scanlon’s argument is 
intended to contest Karlheinz Stierle, whose work has been and continues to be very influential in 
contemporary scholarship, including with such thinkers as Timothy Hampton. Stierle argues that 
the exemplum, like the fable, is a “minimal narrative form” arising from “minimal systematic 
texts,” such as the maxim, proverb, and moral precept. This narrative form, concretizing a general 
point, renders an abstract moral vivid and not only illustrates it, as is commonly said, but makes it 
“conceivable.” For Stierle, the whole purpose of an exemplum is this moral precept, which 
undergirds the exemplum’s unity. The kinship with allegory is apparent from this understanding 
of exemplum. (“Story as Exemplum—Exemplum as Story: On the Pragmatics and Poetics of 
Narrative Texts” in New Perspectives in German Literary Criticism, ed. Richard E. Amacher et 
al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp 396-7). For Scanlon, while the moral and the 
narrative are interdependent, it is vital to not understand the moral as statically confirmed by the 
narrative, but as “reproduced” in the narrative moment in such a way that opens the moral as well 
as the process of narrativization to “complex questions of power” (p. 5). 
  
148 Ibid., p. 4. 
	
149 Lyons, Exemplum, p. 23. For Jeff Dolven, however, the example in Renaissance English epic 
is a “didactic technology,” used by the humanists as a bridge between precept and practice 
(Scenes of Instruction, p. 138).  
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is “a dependent statement qualifying a more general and independent statement by 
naming a member of the class established by the general statement.” It is used most often 
to clarify or illustrate the proof of the general statement.  
The question of whether the medieval exemplum constitutes a genre has recently 
been addressed by the volume Les Exempla Medievaux. Peter von Moos’s helpful 
intervention into the thicket of definitional disagreement is that the exemplum is not a 
literary genre but an argumentative method, a “procedure of persuasion,” even if 
collections of sermon exempla constitute a sub-genre of encyclopedic literature. What 
matters in attempting to understand exempla are their context and purpose within that 
context. He argues that his definition is a union of Le Goff’s and Quintillian’s description 
of the rhetorical exemplum: “quod proprie vocamus exemplum, rei gestae aut ut gestae 
utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis comemoratio,” [what we properly call an 
exemplum is the calling to mind something done, or as if done, that is useful for 
persuading what you intend”] (Inst. Or. V 11, 6).150 Thus, a homiletic exemplum is 
different from other kinds of anecdotes (Le Goff’s “brief narratives”) by virtue of its 
contextualization within a religious argument for the purpose (intention) of delivering a 
salutary lesson. In all cases, however, following Quintillian’s definition, an exemplum has 
persuasion as its aim.151 
 Thomas’s use of the term exemplum both confirms and problematizes some of 
these proposed definitions. As a Dominican writing texts for the purpose of edifying 
different communities of readers, his hagiographies have great kinship with the sermon 
                                                 
150 Peter von Moos, “L’exemplum et les Exempla des Precheurs,” Les Exempla Medievaux: 
nouvelles perspectives (Paris: H. Champion, 1998), p. 71.  
	
151 Ibid., p. 74. 	
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exemplum. However, the narrative structure of the Lives is more complex than many of 
the above definitions would suggest. First, they are not necessarily intended to be 
intercalated into other discourses, as the exempla collected by James of Vitry in the 
Sermones Vulgares, for instance. Such a division and use of the vitae is, of course, 
possible, but not necessary. The Life of Abbot John of Cantimpré does follow this pattern, 
using the word to refer to specific historical events, such as the repentance of a usurious 
duke, intended to teach a lesson to and inspire certain behaviors in readers about 
contemporary issues. John’s Life is composed of a series of such examples, and together 
they make up John’s hagiographical body. However, John often does not figure in these 
tales at all, and when he does, Thomas seems almost to squeeze him into the tale through 
the most tenuous of links. The exemplary figure becomes the occasion for a series of 
lessons and public events that ultimately represent him by displacing him. John’s vita 
thus shares, structurally, closest kinship with Thomas collection of sermon exempla, 
Bonum Universale de Apibus.  
Lutgard’s vita (called, I have noted, an exemplum by Thomas in its Prologue), on 
the other hand, is a very long narrative which stands independently and is intended to be 
read as a whole, with each of the three books building upon the other according to a 
typology of the soul’s progression from animal stage, to the rational, to the spiritual. 
However, this narrative arc is told by way of discrete chapters, each of which is a brief 
anecdote (often with its own complex narrative integrity), which behaves as an exemplum 
in the sense suggested by Le Goff and others—as events or characters placed within a 
larger narrative for the purpose of edifying the audience and helping to compose that 
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larger narrative or sermon—and, as “examples” of Lutgard’s behavior, reactions and 
experiences.  
According to Timothy Hampton, the narrative issue for such a lengthy exemplum, 
an example composed of a tissue of examples, is that of the coherence of the parts of the 
narrative in relation to each other, as all are meant ultimately to illustrate the same lesson. 
Hampton argues that the difficulty in such a narrative situation involving complex 
characters is to maintain this consistency, vital to the efficacy of the exemplary figure, 
across the multiple parts of a text. In this view, Lutgard, for instance, is a historical figure 
whose particularities must be carefully controlled in order that her life consistently 
portrays a uniform message.  Hampton argues that the duality between the absolute 
nature of the lesson and its communication by means of contingent persons creates a 
tension within the narrativization of the exemplary figure. In an exemplary story, ideally, 
every moment of the life would be a synecdoche for every other moment, interchangeable 
and manifesting the same general lesson, even as the narrative and its hero move through 
time and change.152 The most “ideologically correct and rhetorically powerful exemplar 
would be morally unambiguous, representation reduced to absolute semiotic stasis, 
devoid of ideological ambiguity or figural play.”153 While Hampton argues that 
Renaissance texts exploit the tension between the universality of the message and the 
contingency of the narrative, it would seem that any long narrative would be subject to 
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immense difficulty in maintaining such stasis, as its very temporality undermines the 
“impetus to idealism” in the exemplar.  
Hampton’s notion of the ideological drive in exemplary literature is shared by 
many scholars. Thus Larry Scanlon cites John Burrow who writes that,  
The exemplary mode is not very attractive to modern readers…stories that 
represent themselves as ‘examples…are something of an embarrassment. 
In a fiction which merely exemplifies an ethical concept (“patience,” 
“gluttony”) or an accepted truth (“Women are fickle…”), literature 
condemns itself to an ancillary role as the servant of the moral or political 
or religious beliefs of its age…in the literal mode of “exemplification,” the 
story may do no more than illustrate slavishly idées reçues. Such is indeed 
the case with most of the illustrative stories, or exempla, to be found in 
medieval sermons and books of religious instruction.154  
 
For Burrow, the gesture of exemplification—the attempt to teach through story—
overrides narrative complexity. In an exemplary context, the story becomes simply a 
function of the moral. Rather than interrogate, destabilize, or contradict dominant 
ideological forces, the illustrative task of the exemplum recuperates the entire force of the 
moral and reiterates it in a mode more pleasing and thus seductive to listeners than a 
simple lesson would be. 
Dyan Elliott’s powerful reading of Thomas as an instrument of the papacy’s 
implementation of the policies of Lateran IV and anti-heretical campaigns—discussed in 
the first part of this chapter—can be helpfully understood in light of this discourse on 
exemplarity. According to Elliott, the Lives are stories illustrating the doctrines of early 
thirteenth-century orthodoxy, the exemplary life of the saint a living example of an 
abstract lesson. The Lives thus function as a way to render doctrine vivid and persuasive. 
The exemplary figure embodies, persuades, pleases, and models virtue as well as a 
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55	
	
program of righteous living for readers, who are expected to take up some kind of lesson 
or paradigm for moral conduct from a vita and enact it in their own life. The saint 
delineates the contours of legitimate behavior and thought; the imago of her person is 
evidence, in the strong sense of ex-videre, to show forth, of the good life. She is a 
rhetorical proof, the central example (exemplum) of the rhetorical occasion that is her 
vita; she produces persuasion in her viewers of the desirability, authenticity, and 
necessity of imitating her form of life. 
While this reading of hagiographical documents as indicative of larger historical 
and ideological battles occurring at the time of their writing points to important elements 
driving the composition of these stories and the narrative function of the example, it can 
undermine an appreciation of their narrative complexity, understanding the exemplarity 
of their figures to be simply a function of the author’s ideological program. The narrative 
dimensions of each of Thomas’s vitae are subsumed within the historical metanarrative 
that each life is said to monologically reflect. Furthermore, each of Thomas’s vitae are 
understood as performing the same function—developing a “far reaching penitential 
program”—requiring a suppression of the differences among each of the Lives.  
While it is a romantic fallacy to argue that narrative is immune from the 
depredations of ideology, or that narrative is a necessarily liberating force that always 
subverts and resists the hegemonic force of the maxim, this dissertation argues that the 
exemplary narratives of hagiography must be read with attention to the operations of 
exemplarity in the context of the individual hagiographical document and the body of the 
author’s work.155 Such a reading includes, first, a consideration of the narrative through 
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which Thomas represents his exemplary figures. Second, it entails revisiting Thomas’s 
understanding of the exemplum and how it functions.  
For Thomas, the saint is an instance illustrative not of a “general principle” or a 
“moral lesson” but of Christ, who is both a unique savior and a model for all embodied 
persons to imitate and to participate in. Lutgard imitates more than a model of virtue; she 
imitates a person whom she apprehends through scriptural narratives and visionary 
encounters. Her imitation is represented in turn by a narrative irreducible to a simple 
maxim or principle. Thus while some scholars complain that exemplarity involves the 
dogmatic subordination of a weak narrative to an overarching dogma, for Thomas, 
exemplarity is a much more complicated relation, in which the story is at least as 
powerful as any abstract formulation of a principle. 
Thomas’s theological understanding of exemplarity gives rise to a fundamental 
tension within the vitae between the singularity of Christ as unique savior and the 
repetition of his perfection in the life of the saint and the hagiographical text. On the one 
hand, Thomas desires to claim for his saints their inherently singular status even as he 
attempts to make their lives available for imitation. The texts thematize this tension, 
enabling a narrative and rhetorical richness that belies any attempt to find in his texts the 
kind of heavy-handed didacticism described by Burrow. This tension is apparent in 
Christina’s marvelous body that simultaneously manifests both a highly literal imitatio 
Christi—thus performing what is enjoined of all Christians—and a singular inimitability 
so powerful as to render her sanctity illegible to onlookers. The tension is also apparent in 
a complex theorization of what we would today call “reader response,” in which Thomas, 
aware that the portrayal of the saint who is “set apart” (sequestrata) by virtue of her 
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union with God, requires a particular mode of readerly approach in order to be 
apprehended and imitated. Finally, the tension becomes a key source of Thomas’s 
representational strategy when he appeals to apophatic theological discourse, calling into 
question the capacity of language to represent the ineffable saint.  Chapter two examines 
Thomas’s narrative of Christina’s impossible bodily feats, including her supernatural 
immersion in boiling vats of oil and freezing rivers, and in “natural” scandals, including 
her mendicancy and itinerancy. I argue that the astonishing effects the text produces in 
the reader both serve and undermine its exemplary aims. Christina’s vita presents her as 
one who is ad imitanda and ad admiranda, demonstrating the incommensurability of the 
two types of exemplarity even as it yokes them within the same person. Christina’s 
singular wondrousness, I argue, is highly gendered, standing in contrast with the 
representation of Abbott John. Chapters three and four, drawing more explicitly on the 
historical pressures to which Thomas’s work is subject, address Thomas’s thematization 
of the reader in the Supplement to the Life of Marie of Oignies and the Life of Lutgard.  
The final chapter addresses the ways in which the representational strategies of 
mystical biography affect exemplarity. It looks in particular at the use of what Roisin 
identifies as the “ineffability topos”—the acknowledgement of the inability of language 
to capture the saint who, through union with the divine, becomes unspeakable. I argue 
that Thomas attempts to use a mystical modus loquendi, effacing the representation of the 
saint. The text thus registers its failure to describe its subject. This failure does not only 
mark the weakness of language; rather, it is a purposeful failure that implicates Thomas, 
the writer, in the text, becoming a central strategy for his own act of imitation of and 
relation to Lutgard, even as it demonstrates the opacity of the saint to those who gaze 
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upon her and the limits of the externalizing strategies of hagiographical representation to 
capture the interior life of the saint.  
The difficulties of signification and interpretation in the last of Thomas’s vitae are 
not simply transcended by recourse to a clerical “fiat” but are registered by the text, as 
are the difficulties of the acts of looking and understanding, demonstrating again the way 
in which his work opens space for contestation. The ineffability topos also has the effect 
of making Lutgard unavailable to the reader for imitation. As Gregory the Great writes in 
Moralia on Job, “[r]eading presents a kind of mirror to the eyes of the mind, that our 
inner face may be seen in it. There indeed we learn our own ugliness, there our own 
beauty, for we should transform what we read into our very selves.”156 If this description 
holds, then Thomas’s portrayal of the ineffability of Lutgard obscures the way in which 
she may function as a mirror, performing her escape from hagiographical representation 
and the reader’s gaze.  
In this dissertation I hope to show that while Thomas’s work possesses particular 
didactic aims inspired by his clerical position, his gender, and the particular demands of 
his time, the Lives are more than subtly shaded versions of the same ideology. How they 
teach, what they teach, how they envision their audience, and the literary-historical stakes 
of each of the works are, in many ways, radically different. Close readings reveal that 
Thomas’s Lives not only represent different kinds of exemplary figures using a variety of 
representational strategies, they call exemplarity into question and press against the limits 
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of the hagiographer’s capacity to figure the divine within the singular being of the saint 
and thereby make it available to others for their imitation or edification. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Wondrous Horror and the Didactic Exemplar  
 
Part I  
 
Exemplary Unlikeness in the Vita Christinae Mirabilis 
 
Et reverberasti infirmitatem aspectus mei, radians in me vehementer, et 
contremui amore et horrore. Et inveni longe me esse a te in regione 
dissimilitudinis, tamquam audirem vocem tuam de excelso: “cibus sum grandium 
cresece et manducabis me. Nec tu me in te mutabis sicut cibum carnis tuae, sed 
tu mutaberis in me.” Et cognovi quoniam pro iniquitate erudisti hominem, et 
tabescere fecisti araneam animam meam…. 
 
–Augustine, Confessions, VII.16 
 
The Savior accordingly became, in a diviner way than Paul, all things to all, that 
He might either gain all or perfect them…. We must ask, too, about those things 
which the Savior became which He speaks of through the prophet David, “And I 
became as a man without any to help him, free among the dead.”  
 
–Origen, Commentary on the Gospel of John 1b 
 
Truly God is wonderful in his saints, and in this one, if I may say so, his wonders 
pass all admiration. (Vere mirabilis Deus in Sanctis suis, & in ista, ut ita dicam, 
super omnem admirationem mirabilis) 
 –Thomas of Cantimpré, The Life of Christina the Astonishing (ch. 49) 
 
 
 
 Thomas’s vita of a young virgin of Liège whom he calls mirabilis has continued 
to surprise and perplex, proving the enduring rhetorical efficacy of a text designed, as its 
title suggests, to incite astonishment in the face of its wondrous subject.157 The title given 
to the virgin, who is called not beata but mirabilis, sounds the first note of the text’s 
eccentricity; the blessed will here become astonishing, a wonder. Despite a concern that 
                                                 
157 Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Christianae mirabilis, ed. by J. Pinius, in AASS, 24 July, V, pp. 
637-60 (VCM). English translation by Margot King and Barbara Newman in Thomas of 
Cantimpré: The Collected Saints’ Lives, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), pp. 127-160. Hereafter 
chapter numbers will be cited within the body of the text. 	
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his tale will not be believed, Thomas does not back away from the strangeness of his 
story. Instead, he seeks the assent of his audience in order to turn his protagonist from 
village curiosity to saint. Insisting he is “certain” (certum) of his facts because of the 
reliability of his many witnesses, the recent nature of the events described, and the 
privileged nature of much of the material, coming “from her own mouth,” as well as 
James of Vitry’s sanction (2-3), Thomas simultaneously foregrounds his text’s 
ineffability: “I admit—and it is true—that my account surpasses all human understanding 
(omnem hominis intellectum excedere), inasmuch as these things could by no means have 
occurred according to the course of nature, yet they are possible to the Creator” (3). 
While Thomas’s contemporary document, De Natura Rerum holds that all saintly virtue 
is ordered to the realm of grace and as such is unnatural, exceeding the intellect, 
Christina’s vita, we will see, exaggerates this aspect of sanctity, such that the vita 
becomes a reflection on the implications of saintly supernaturalism.158 
In order to show a wonder that exceeds the intellect, the text both recapitulates 
and deforms hagiographical conventions, reinscribing them by means of an aesthetic of 
excess. This aesthetic does not, however, clarify the lines of allegiance in the story; 
Thomas does not construct a stark drama of good and evil. Instead he instigates a crisis of 
interpretation, the very crisis he fears.159 Thomas explicitly articulates the crisis of 
                                                 
158 Robert Sweetman, “Dominican Preaching in the Low Countries 1240-1260: Materiae 
Praedicabiles in the Liber de natura rerum and Bonum universale de apibus of Thomas of 
Cantimpré,” unpublished dissertation, University of Toronto, 1988 p. 135.  
	
159 Christina’s vita shares many of the aesthetic qualities Peter Brooks identifies as constitutive of 
melodrama, a genre he argues is essentially about the representation of the good through an 
aesthetic of excess (including hyperbole, a Manichean worldview, heroism sculpted by trauma, 
tests, victories, exaggerated gestures) that facilitates the recognition of virtue in a world in which 
the representation and apprehension of the good and the true had entered a state of severe crisis 
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interpretation that wonder effects when he writes that religious men and women among 
the crowds who gathered to marvel at Christina were “terrified that these supremely 
amazing marvels might exceed human reason, and that the beastly minds of men might 
convert these divine deeds into demonic activity” (horrentes ne suprema mirabilium 
admiratio humanum sensum excederet, converterentque bestiales hominum mentes in 
malignam operationem facta divina) (20). Indeed, the narration of the crowd’s reaction 
makes a space for the incredulous reader even as it rebukes him or her. However, 
Thomas’s own representation of Christina can be read as performing just such a 
conversion, making ambivalent the line between divine and demonic as a key rhetorical 
strategy for demonstrating a marvelousness “exceeding human reason,” thus itself 
becoming in excess of human reason. If Thomas is so concerned to be credible, why is 
Christina made so astonishing, creating the conditions of her unbelievability? While we 
could attribute to Thomas a documentary impulse, a desire to record faithfully the 
perceptions of villagers, his allowance for deep ambivalence in a vita that he intends as 
an authoritative pedagogical tool remains strange. Thomas’s text tempts readers to 
“convert these divine deeds into demonic activity.” Thus, we must ask in what way 
Christina’s excessiveness is essential to the purpose of the text.  
That Thomas is aware of the deliberate and risky nature of his rhetorical decision 
is made apparent by a curious passage in the Life of Abbot John of Cantimpré. Thomas 
writes that James left out many things from the Life of Marie of Oignies “lest he tire his 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama and the Mode 
of Excess (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 42-43. Melodrama culminates in a 
“movement of astonishment,” which is, Brooks argues, exemplary, meaning that it provides a 
clear model for spectators to admire and imitate (Ibid., p. 26). The astonishment provoked by the 
VCM, though also in service of representing the good, has the opposite effect of that described by 
Brooks insofar as it instigates confusion and misinterpretation. 	
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readers with excess, or lest the incomprehensible greatness of her miracles (prodigiorum 
incomprehensibilis magnitudo incredulorum) become an odour of death rather than life in 
the hearts of unbelievers.” The deeds that were omitted by James included Marie’s 
crossing the river Sambre with dry feet, and passing through closed doors while still in a 
“solid mortal body” (VJC, II.8b).160 These miraculous acts are deeply reminiscent not 
only of Christ, but of certain deeds attributed to Christina by Thomas, as when she 
crosses the river Meuse untouched (10), or his description of her physical body as 
seeming so entirely spiritual it floated “through the middle of the house like a spirit” (46). 
This passage demonstrates Thomas’s departure from his mentor’s rhetorical decision to 
avoid those miraculous excesses that would strain a reader’s credibility and turn a text 
meant to offer an “odor of life” into an occasion for disbelief and thus death. 
The Life of Christina the Astonishing (1150-1224) was completed in 1232, after 
Thomas had moved to the Dominicans in Leuven from the Victorine community at 
Cantimpré, and after he had cut his hagiographical teeth on the Life of Abbot John of 
Cantimpré and the Supplement to the Life of Marie d’Oignies.161 The Prologue of 
Christina’s Life contains James de Vitry’s description from the Life of Marie of Oignies 
of a woman who is likely Christina. Embedding the witness of the venerable cardinal 
authorizes Thomas’s telling of a radically unconventional life. Christina, James writes, 
                                                 
160 Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Ioannis Cantipratensis, in ‘Une oeuvre inédite de Thomas de 
Cantimpré, la “Vita Ioannis Cantipratensis”’, ed. by Robert Godding, Revue d’histoire 
ecclésiastique, 76 (1981), 257-316. Translation by Barbara Newman in Thomas of Cantimpré: 
The Collected Saints’ Lives (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), pp. 57-124. 
	
161 Vita beatæ Christinæ mirabilis virginis, ed. J. Pinius in AA.SS 32, 24 July, V, cols. 650-660. 
English translation by Margot H. King and Barbara Newman, “The Life of Christina the 
Astonishing,” in Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 
pp. 127-157. Hereafter cited as VCM. For reference, chapter numbers will be given within the 
text.	
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was an example of the “holy virgins in the lily gardens of the Lord who scorned carnal 
enticements for Christ, despised the riches of this world for the love of the kingdom of 
heaven, clung to the heavenly Bridegroom in poverty and humility, and with the work of 
their hands, earned a sparse meal.”162 According to James, some of these women were 
despised by those who scorn spiritual people, “thinking them to be either insane or idiots” 
(VMO Pr. 10). However, despite the astonishing ascetic feats, intense piety, and 
transgressive lifestyle of these mulieres religiosae (who undertook suspect behaviors 
such as begging, living chastely yet uncloistered, and divesting themselves of familial 
wealth),163 Christina’s actions alone merited the title “mirabilis.” James writes,  
I saw (vidi) another in whom God worked so wondrously (mirabiliter) that 
after she had lain dead for a long time—but before her body was buried in 
the ground—her soul returned to her body and she lived again (revixit). 
She obtained from the Lord that she would endure (sustineret) purgatory, 
living in this world in her body. It was for this reason that she was 
afflicted for a long time by the Lord…But after she had performed 
penance in so many ways, she lived in peace and merited grace from the 
Lord and many times, rapt in spirit (rapta in spiritu), she led the souls of 
the dead as far as purgatory, or through purgatory as far as the kingdom of 
heaven, without any harm to herself (VMO, Pr. 8).164 
                                                 
162 Jacques de Vitry, Vita Mariæ Oigniacensis, ed. D. Papebroeck, in AASS, 23 June, V, cols. 
542-572. English translation by Margot H. King, in Mary of Oignies, Mother of Salvation ed. 
Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), Pr. 3. Hereafter cited as VMO. 
	
163 See Walter Simons, Cities of Ladies: Beguine Communities in the Medieval Low Countries, 
1200-1565 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 7; Herbert Grundmann, 
Religious Movements in the Middle Ages: The historical links between heresy, the Mendicant 
Orders, and the Women’s religious movement in the twelfth and thirteenth century, with the 
historical foundations of German mysticism, trans. by Steven Rowan (Indiana: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1995), p. 91. 
	
164 “Vidi etiam aliam, circa quam tam mirabiliter operatus est Dominus, quod cum diu mortua 
jacuisset, antequam in terra corpus ejus sepeliretur, anima ad corpus revertente revixit; & a 
Domino obtinuit, ut in hoc seculo vivens in corpore, purgatorium sustineret. Unde longo tempore 
ita mirabiliter a Domino afflicta est, ut quandoque se volutaret in ignem, & quandoque in hieme 
in aqua glaciali diu moraretur, quandoque etiam sepulcra mortuorum intrare cogeretur. Tandem in 
tanta post peractam pœnitentiam vixit pace, & tantam a Domino gratiam promeruit, ut multoties 
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Thomas elaborates James’s description of Christina’s revivified body, giving it the 
miraculous ability to suffer impossible pains yet not die or be marked by its tortures. 
Unlike James, he understands Christina’s sustaining of purgatorial punishment on earth 
not as a penitential act for herself, but for others, her soul having already achieved 
perfection.  
 According to Thomas, Christina was orphaned along with her two sisters in St. 
Trond (Sint Truiden) in the diocese of Liège. The sisters decided to construct their family 
life according to a semi-monastic model. The eldest lived in contemplation, and the 
middle sister became a housekeeper, while Christina, the youngest, took the humblest 
office of shepherdess. In the isolation of this task, however, Christina was given “the 
grace of an inward sweetness” and Christ “often visited her with heavenly secrets” (4). 
However, her contemplative life was hidden from all, “known to God alone,” (4) a 
privacy that contrasts with the radical exposures of her later life. 
This quiet, rather conventional life changed when, as a result of “excessive 
contemplation,” she died and ascended to heaven. Along the way she passed through a 
place of such great horror and suffering that she thought it was hell, only to be told it was 
purgatory, a place of atonement (6). Arriving at the divine throne, she spoke with God, 
who offered her the choice of remaining in paradise, or returning to the flesh in order to  
undergo there the punishment of an immortal soul in a mortal body 
without damage to it, and by these your sufferings to deliver all those 
souls on whom you had compassion in that place of purgatory, and by the 
example (exemplo) of your suffering and your way of life to convert living 
men to me and make them turn aside from their sins, and after you have 
                                                                                                                                                 
rapta in spiritu, animas defunctorum usque in purgatorium, vel per purgatorium sine aliqua 
laesione usque ad superna regna conduceret.”	
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done all these things to return to me, having accumulated for yourself a 
reward of such great profit (7).165  
 
Her return involved three elements: First, an intercessory function, as Christina’s earthly 
sufferings substituted for the purgatorial efforts of those souls already dead. Second, an 
exemplary—in the sense of didactic—function, as Christina’s enactment of the pains of 
purgatory taught the living about purgatory and warned of purgatory’s impending 
afflictions, thus goading her public to conversion away from their sinful lives. Third, the 
desire to win for herself a great reward (even though she was destined for immediate 
entry into heaven at the time of her first death). 
Choosing to return to the flesh, Christina embarked on a program of bodily 
mortification that included rolling in fire, remaining in icy water, and living among the 
tombs of the dead.166 Thomas tells us that she “act[ed] the part of her own torturer,” 
subjecting herself to judicial instruments of punishment like the wheel and the gallows 
(13). Christina was able to survive these afflictions because of the divine subtlety with 
which God endowed her resurrected body. Thus, while these various practices caused her 
immense pain (necessary for their penitential efficacy, in the exchange of agony for 
forgiveness), her body remained visibly uninjured (9; 11; 19).  
Other remarkable properties of her flesh included a sparrow-like lightness that 
enabled it to hang from the slender branches of trees and to endure walking and standing 
at “dizzy heights” (15), echoing her initial flight “like a bird” into the rafters of the 
                                                 
165“aut ad corpus reverti, ibique [agere pœnas] immortalis animæ per mortale corpus sine 
detrimento sui, omnesque illas animas, quas in illo purgatorii loco miserata es, ipsis tuis pœnis 
eripere: homines vero viventes exemplo pœnæ & vitæ tuæ converti ad me, & a sceleribus resilire, 
peractisque omnibus, ad me tandem multorum præmiorum mercede te cumulatam reverti.” Col. 
0652A.	
166 VMO, Pr. 8; VCM, Pr. 1.	
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church following her resurrection (5). She was able to roll her limbs into a formless ball 
“as if they were hot wax” while praying (16). Her body, “like a phantasm,” entered deep 
rushing water and came out untouched. She was able to feed herself with oil and milk 
from her virginal breasts (9; 19). The shocking excesses of her actions, as well as the 
miraculous properties of her body, led family, friends, and the community to believe that 
Christina was possessed by a demon (9; 10; 17), a belief that resulted in her further 
torment at the hands of her sisters. They locked her up in a dungeon (18) from which she 
escaped only to be tied to a yoke and starved (19). Christina’s deeds, then, “were not 
done in narrow corners (Acts 26:26) but openly among the people” (Pr. 2). These deeds, 
Christina told her friends, “have not been seen among mortals” (Nec enim talia visa sunt 
inter mortales), and while they are performed “for the improvement of men,” they are 
“beyond understanding” (super intellectum).  
The story then quickly turns to an account of the upheavals, disgust, and 
astonishment of the social body, which responded to Christina with horror. In Lutgard’s 
vita, we are told that a single priest viewed her body bloodied by contemplation of the 
passion; in Christina’s case the “many people” who saw her run through thorns “were 
astonished (mirati sunt) that there could be so much blood in a single body” (14). As 
news of this and other deeds spread, “[m]any people from far and near, even from the 
furthest regions, clustered around her every day to see the wonders God had wrought” 
(multi pro videndis mirabilibus) (20). Thus, Thomas introduces the semantic and 
conceptual field of “wonder” and its related terms into the vita, foregrounding wonder’s 
centrality to the telling of this story and its presence as a key effect that Christina’s life—
in particular, her body—has on others.  
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André Vauchez notes that the ancient notion of saintly virtus, in which a kind of 
holy energy (virtus) manifested itself in bodily signs such as incorruptibility, healing 
relics, and a pleasant smell after death, was increasingly attributed to living saints in the 
later Middle Ages. From the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, the “supernatural aura” 
previously ascribed to saintly remains was now credited to earthly bodies.167 The saintly 
human body became identified with the “glorious body,” including, by the thirteenth 
century, the body of Christ.168 This glorious body was believed to escape the limitations 
of human nature, and it was marked by certain signs, such as a beauty revelatory of the 
soul’s inner reality, luminosity,169 and the gift of tears.170 With the inclusion of 
stigmatization as a sign of sainthood in the thirteenth century, a new lexicon of bodily 
signs appeared, one in which physiological similarity to the person of Christ became 
proof of the authenticity of sanctity. This shift, Vauchez argues, increased the marvelous 
aspect of sainthood, and gave rise to a new form of the marvel, namely, physiological 
marvelousness.171  
Christina’s body participated in the trend noted by Vauchez in two ways. Through 
suffering, her body became identified with Christ’s; it was also an extreme instance of the 
physiological marvelousness characteristic of thirteenth-century hagiography. However, 
Christina’s body did not mimic the vulnerability of Christ’s body: while enduring infinite 
                                                 
167 André Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, trans. by Jean Birrell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 435.  
	
168 Ibid., p. 439. 
 	
169 Ibid., p. 435. 
  
170 Ibid., p. 438. 
 	
171 Ibid., p. 439. 	
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pain, she remained unmarked, while Christ’s resurrected flesh bore the marks of his 
crucifixion. Furthermore, although resurrected, Christina obtained only two of the 
qualities attributed by scholastics to resurrected bodies, those of subtilitas and agilitas, 
having neither impassibilitas nor claritas.172  
It seems that Thomas was attempting to portray a purgatorial soul by means of 
Christina’s purgatorial body, describing in an earthly context the strange enfleshment of 
the soul undergoing physical torment. While theologians debated the precise nature of the 
soul’s suffering in purgatory, it was generally agreed that the soul suffered by means of a 
“corporeal fire.” Thus the Supplement to Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, 
incorrectly attributed to the saint, cited Gregory’s Dialogues and Julian of Toledo as 
proof for the sensible suffering of the soul in purgatory; both asserted that the soul is held 
in hell by physical flames in the same way it is contained or imprisoned on earth by the 
body.173 Thomas Aquinas argued that the pain of purgatory is twofold: psychological, 
involving both the agony of the delay of the divine vision, and sensible, for although the 
                                                 
172 On these qualities of the resurrected body, see the Summa Theologiae, Suppl. Q. 82-85, a. 1. 
Impassibilitas is immunity from pain and death. Claritas occurs when the glory of soul is 
completely visible in the body, making it beautiful and radiant. Agilitas gives the resurrected 
body complete freedom of movement as the soul perfectly directs the body. Subtilitas entails the 
freedom of the body from material restraint while it remains palpable. While the Summa was 
composed approximately thirty years after the VCM, Steven Justice argues that Thomas Aquinas 
is a useful source for uncovering late medieval views because his writings were an attempt to 
systematize the instruction, preaching, dogma, and sacraments essential to pastoral care and to 
“excavate [its] presuppositions.” Thomas is not, then, prescribing a view of belief but describing 
in systematic terms what is already operative in practice. See Steven Justice, “Did the Middle 
Ages Believe in their Miracles?” Representations (103) (Summer 2008): 13. 
	
173 ST Suppl. Q. 70 a. 3. 
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purgatorial soul is separated from the body, “pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt.” The 
bodily sensation of pain is, in fact, of the soul.174  
In addition to speculative theological traditions, Thomas may have partly drawn 
on the highly popular Visions of Tondal (ca. 1149) for his description of Christina’s flesh. 
Though this account describes bodies in hell suffering transformation through 
putrefaction, becoming “food” for fire and worms (an experience foreign to Christina), it 
also depicts the soul as a bird and a bubble, reminiscent of Thomas’s multiple references 
to Christina as a bird and her spherical shape when ecstatic.175 However, Thomas altered 
these traditions insofar as he attributed the qualities of a purgatorial soul suffering 
corporeal fire to the body of a living saint on earth. Thus, while the Shades of the 
Purgatorio, including Virgil, were “aerial bodies,” existing between the states of death 
and resurrection, Dante, a living man, was differentiated from them by means of the 
shadow he cast.176 Despite Christina’s purgatorial body, she, too, cast a shadow that 
horrified (46).  
                                                 
174 ST Suppl. App. 1, Q. 2 a. 1. “In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be the pain of 
loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain of sense, namely punishment by 
corporeal fire...since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the 
greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sensible parts 
cause the greatest pain. And, because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity 
that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the soul itself.”  
	
175 Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 293-4.  
	
176 The phrase “aerial bodies” is Bynum’s. Resurrection, p. 300-1. See Purgatorio, III.16-30 for 
Dante’s realization “the light was shattered” by resting on his body, but Virgil’s cast no shadow. 
Echoing the theological traditions I have noted here, while reflecting on the shadowless forms of 
Purgatory Virgil tells Dante “[t]he Power has disposed such bodiless/bodies to suffer torments, 
heat and cold;/how this is done, He would not have us know” (III.31-33). The Divine Comedy, 
trans. by Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Knopf, 1984). 
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Scholars have offered multiple readings of this Life, seeking a key to unlock and 
perhaps reconcile the difficulties posed by her bizarre piety and flesh. Christina has been 
dubbed an hysteric whose illness was translated into the terms of religious intercession by 
a local clergy person.177 She has been called a preacher of memorable bodily 
“sermons”178 and a representative of the rise of the doctrine of purgatory and its female 
prophets.179 Her strange flesh has been interpreted as an example of the bodily (and often 
grotesque) nature of high medieval women’s spirituality, which proceeded through an 
identification with the suffering Christ,180 and, in contrast, as a prime example of the 
disembodied spirituality of elite clerical culture which constructs the grotesque female 
body as one that remains unwounded by affliction and thus is radically different than the 
tortured Christ.181  
                                                 
177 Barbara Newman, “Possessed by the Spirit: Devout Women, Demoniacs, and the Apostolic 
Life in the Thirteenth Century,” Speculum vol. 73 no. 3 (July 1998): 733-770. 
	
178 Robert Sweetman, “Christine of Saint-Trond’s Preaching Apostolate: Thomas of Cantimpré’s 
Hagiographical Method Revisited” in Vox Benedictina 10 (1) (July 1992), p. 68. Retrieved July 
17, 2010 from GenderWatch (GW). (Document ID: 1001164971). 
	
179 Barbara Newman From Virile Women to WomanChrist: Studies in Medieval Religion and 
Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), pp. 108-136; JoAnne 
McNamara, “The Need to Give: Suffering and Female Sanctity in the Middle Ages,” in Images of 
Sainthood in Medieval Europe, ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), pp. 199-221. 
	
180 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987), pp. 30, 115, 120, 203, 274; Walter Simons, “Reading a Saint’s Body: Rapture and Bodily 
Movement in the vitae of Thirteenth-century Beguines,” in Framing Medieval Bodies, eds. S. 
Kay and M. Rubin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994). 
 	
181 Laurie Finke, “Mystical Bodies and the Dialogics of Vision,” in Maps of Flesh and Light, ed. 
Ulrike Wiethaus (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), pp. 37-8. One could construct an 
interesting paper by arguing that rather than being a somber presentation of a saintly figure and 
the horrors of purgatory offered in earnest, the vita is an entertainment text, meant to amuse its 
readers by satirizing contemporary women’s piety.  
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As the multiplicity of these compelling, though often mutually incompatible 
readings attest, the strangeness of this text makes interpretation difficult. By mixing the 
fantastical and the mundane, citing and subverting hagiographical conventions, the vita 
elicits and refuses readers’ attempts to interpret it. In this chapter, rather than attempt to 
reconcile or choose from among these interpretations, I am interested in the wonder itself, 
the astonishment that the text both represents, in the person of Christina, and quickens in 
its readers. By what rhetorical means is this wondrousness represented and performed? 
What are its effects? If the text is, in Mark Jordan’s phrase, a “scene of instruction,”182 
how does such spectacle serve Thomas’s pedagogical interests? What are the functions of 
wonder in an exemplary text? What kind of reading practice did Thomas hope to inspire 
and form in his readers with this strange tale?  
In this chapter, I will address the pedagogical function of wonder by way of a 
twofold consideration. First, I will examine the implications of the wondrous for 
exemplarity and its representation. I will argue that Christina’s wondrousness is a result 
of her unlikeness to saintly precedents and the sinful humanity of her audience. I will then 
refract the question of representation and rhetoric through the issue of practice. If, as 
Edith Wyschogrod argues, the life of a saint is to be comprehended not in terms of an 
analysis of its meaning, but as a “practice” in which “the addressee is gathered into the 
narrative so as to extend and elaborate it with her/his own life,” how did Thomas intend 
                                                 
182 Mark Jordan, “Missing Scenes,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin, vol. 38, no. 3&4 
(Summer/Autumn 2010). http://www.hds.harvard.edu/news/bulletin_mag/articles/38-
34/jordan.html. Accessed July 6, 2011.  
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the reader to elaborate the miraculous, seemingly unobtainable strangeness in his or her 
own life?183  
Robert Sweetman has noted the important pastoral function of the wondrous in 
the Life, essential to the didactic message of her post-resurrection activities, which 
become, Sweetman argues, an extended exemplum. Unable to preach verbally, Christina 
preached “by example,” and her grotesqueries worked to provoke in her audience the 
“salubrious shudders that save.”184 Christina preached purgatory by performing the pains 
that await sinners after death in her own flesh on earth. Sweetman further argues that 
Christina’s implausible and shocking deeds accorded with a Dominican theory of 
preaching, which held the fantastical, the hyperbolic, and the grotesque to be excellent 
tools for memory, penetrating the heart and mind more effectively because of their 
outrageousness. For Sweetman, Thomas’s mirabilia are edifying, peculiarly effective, 
memorabilia. However, as Barbara Newman notes, while persuasive, this explanation 
does not sufficiently account for the bizarreness of Christina’s acts. Sweetman diminishes 
the extremism of Thomas’s text, which is in continual danger of being derailed by the 
same marvelousness that gives its subject her divine authorization. Nor, I would argue, 
does Sweetman’s reading adequately describe the complex dynamics between observer 
and wonder, student and teacher, audience and saint.  
In order to consider Thomas’s representation of Christina, I will turn to Pseudo-
Dionysius’s theory of dissimilar similarities. I am here building on the work of David 
Williams who argues that insofar as it transgresses the limits of form and thus 
                                                 
183 Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. xxxv.	
184 Robert Sweetman, “Christine of Saint-Trond’s Preaching Apostolate,” p. 68. 	
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intelligibility, the monstrous in medieval aesthetic, literary, and philosophical discourses 
parallels the dissimilar image in theology, serving as a critique of rational discourse. 
Williams argues medieval grotesques and certain deformed saints are apophatic in the 
same way as is the dissimilar image: as a signifier, the monstrous “shows forth” (in the 
sense of monstrare as opposed to repraesantare) transcendence, its distortions pointing to 
a plenitude of meaning that cannot be captured by the mimetic representation of the 
natural (or divine) world.185 Likewise, I will argue that Christina is a “dissimilar 
similarity.” I will argue that while Thomas made Christina as dissimilar as possible from 
models of female sanctity—going so far as to represent the saint as a demoniac—this 
dissimilarity ultimately became a mirror, and the distancing tactic of difference revealed 
a horrifying intimacy between Christina and her audiences, a horror essential to the 
practices of reading and behavior that Thomas hoped to inspire with this Life. 
 
Dissimilar Similarities 
The theory of dissimilar similarities is outlined in The Celestial Hierarchy, a text 
which considers the anagogical function of a variety of “sacred veils” that “upliftingly 
conceal” (121B) both the heavenly ranks and God, so as to make the soul’s return to its 
divine source possible. This concealment is anagogical, for the material veils—including 
odors, lights, the Eucharist, biblical images, and examples—simultaneously conceal and 
reveal divine truths in a form apprehensible by embodied humans. In their appearing, 
they act as a goad to the soul, which “interprets” (anagogies) such signs, these “material 
                                                 
185 David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Medieval Thought and 
Literature (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996), p. 4. 
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means capable of guiding us” (121D), and thus ascends to the heavenly realm. Return 
(epistrophe) to the divine source through the activities and objects of ecclesiastical life 
(and in fact, through all created things, which are theophanies)186 is possible because the 
earthly hierarchy is “modeled on the hierarchies of heaven” (121C). By virtue of this 
similitude, the texts, rituals, and objects of the church’s earthly life have the anagogic 
power to lift up and eventually “assimilate” the soul to the simplicity and inexpressibility 
of divine life. The devout move through the many—those specially placed “means”—to 
return to the triune One. 
However, while material signs are able to lift the soul “from the perceptible to the 
conceptual” through a chain of similarity such that “appearances of beauty are signs of an 
invisible loveliness” (121D), Dionysius suggests an alternative anagogic function, one 
that radically attenuates the human capacity to approach God by way of an analogy 
between earthly and heavenly. This alternative anagogy he calls “dissimilar similarities.” 
He argues that while there are many names that seem to represent the divine majesty in a 
seemingly more appropriate manner due to their obvious connection to intelligible 
qualities (beauty, light, love, and life) the most appropriate names for God are those that 
are dissimilar to attributes human beings readily associate with divine majesty. As God is 
“far beyond every manifestation of being and of life…light…reason or intelligence” 
(140C), the name “worm” is more suitable for God than “being,” for it marks this divine 
difference. Those names which present a stubborn, intensified materiality “pay [the ranks 
of heaven] honor by describing them with dissimilar shapes so completely at variance 
                                                 
186 See Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), p. 101 for an explanation of Dionysius’s notion of being as 
theophany.	
76	
	
with what they really are that we come to discover how those ranks, so far removed from 
us, transcend all materiality” (141A). In a word, dissimilar similarities perform a kind of 
apophasis, for they mark a breach in what is otherwise figured by Dionysius as the 
mimetically constituted chain of being reaching from heaven to earth, a breach which is 
cognitively apprehended by the person contemplating such dissimilarity.  
Despite this breach, the dissimilar image remains anagogical; it is one form of the 
“uplifting veils” the treatise considers. The dissimilar image, like the similar, enables a 
dynamic of revelation and concealment that elevates the soul. As Paul Rorem puts it, 
while similar images reveal the divine in its similarity and relation to materiality, but 
conceal the distance between the creation and creator, dissimilar images reveal the 
transcendence of God, a revelation that conceals by ‘showing’ divine ineffability. Thus 
every divine name, every sacred veil, is both similar and dissimilar, a bridge and an 
abyss, an affirmation and a negation, though the dissimilar image is “more suitable” 
(141B) because dissimilarity confounds the expectations of the intellect, showing the one 
who speaks God’s name that human language cannot capture the divine essence.187 All 
signs, whether sensible or intelligible, similar or dissimilar, are “relativized vis-à-vis God 
who infinitely transcends both.”188  
 
Dissimilar Similarity and Sanctity 
                                                 
187 Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to their 
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 56. 
 	
188 Eric Perl, Theophany, p. 101. Perl is here referring to the distinction between the sensible 
symbols and intelligible names, but this distinction parallels and is structurally the same as that 
between the dissimilar and similar images. 	
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In relation to what standard was Christina dissimilar? To what was she similar? 
As an uncloistered woman making claims to divine inspiration and practicing extreme 
bodily disciplines in public, Christina embodied a novel form of sanctity, one that needed 
to be framed in terms of older, already licit models of holiness in order to become legible, 
acceptable, and thus persuasive. As a kind of citational practice, Christina’s sanctity 
iterated available models of holiness, both ancient and contemporary. However, this 
citation was performed in such a way as to emphasize Christina’s departure from these 
models, rather than her participation in them. Thus her actions, while often continuous 
with those of saintly women, were either radically exaggerated versions of their 
behaviors, or were fundamentally recast by Thomas so as to be transformed and thus 
become “dissimilar” to that with which his audience is familiar. The models Thomas 
invoked include the virgin martyr, the desert mother, and the high medieval beguinal holy 
woman. I will here examine each of these types, showing Christina’s continuity and 
discontinuity with them in order to ultimately demonstrate the atopic nature of her saintly 
practice.  
 
The Virgin Martyr  
Virgin martyr tales were highly popular in the Middle Ages, adapted throughout 
the period more frequently than those of any other female saints.189 Generally the stories 
involve a young girl who makes a vow of virginity, which antagonizes her family and the 
powerful pagan man who is in love with her. When she refuses to retreat from her 
resolution or will not make a sacrifice to the pagan gods, the girl is persecuted and killed. 
                                                 
189 Karen A. Winstead, Virgin Martyrs: Legends of Sainthood in Late Medieval England (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 5.	
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The stories display explicit, often sexual, violence, as frequently the virgin is stripped 
naked in the course of her persecution or, like Agatha, has her breast torn off with 
pincers.  
The most significant debt the VCM owes to the virgin martyr tradition is the 
graphic depiction of horrifying violence performed on virgin flesh. Like her predecessors, 
Christina was a young virgin who underwent tortures, and so became a spectacle for her 
community, who witnessed a female body distorted and bloodied for the sake of her faith. 
She was tormented on the wheel made famous by St. Catherine. She echoed St. Agatha’s 
healing by Peter in prison when she refused the ministrations of a human doctor and 
allowed only Christ to cure her (18). Like Thecla, she baptized herself (21). Like the 
martyrs, a key component of Christina’s ascesis was her suffering persecution by her 
community, including her own family.190  
However, unlike the virgin martyrs of late antiquity, Christina became her own 
torturer; her actions were the performance of God’s will, arising because of an agreement 
with him. The virgin martyr legend was thus reframed within a theology of 
substitutionary atonement. Rather than submit to martyrdom as a witness to the virtue (in 
the sense of both power and goodness) of a victimized community and their God, 
Christina’s agonies made visible the power of God who was now the persecutor. To those 
                                                 
190 While Laura Finke argues that Christina’s sufferings are self-inflicted and thus very different 
than a virgin martyr’s death at the hand of the state, questions of agency are difficult to neatly 
compartmentalize in these situations. A common trope of virgin martyr tales is the insistence of 
the virgin to refuse clemency that is repeatedly offered, so that the martyrdom can be said to be 
“chosen,” even as Christina’s tortures, though chosen and executed by her, are typically described 
as being the result of a divine agent by whom she is driven to undertake painful acts. This 
drivenness can in part be understood as a quality of her resurrected flesh which, like that of the 
elect whose resurrected bodies manifest claritas by virtue, as the author of the Supplement to the 
Summa Theologica puts it, of the overflow of the soul into the body, is said by Thomas to be 
almost entirely “controlled” by the spirit (46). Whether that spirit is God or Christina’s own is not 
specified by the text. On claritas, see ST Suppl. Q. 85 a. 1. 	
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who observed the wracked flesh of his “most beloved,” she revealed the depth of his 
wrath and the promise of further torment. Christina’s sufferings were both pedagogical 
and substitutionary, teaching those who witnessed her pain of the suffering that awaited 
them in purgatory, even as she decreased purgatorial penance for others.  
The exposed female flesh that dominates both the ancient tales and Thomas’s text 
is also fundamentally different in each context. The VCM transplants the virgin martyr 
into a resurrected body, one that can experience pain yet not die. Thus, unlike the martyr 
whose agonies are subsumed in the exaltation of sacrifice (which was often described 
having an anaesthetic effect), or who is dispatched relatively quickly, Christina’s pain 
takes on a supernatural magnitude, as no mortal wounds interrupt her torments. Pain, not 
death, is the focus of the tale. The semi-divine body, which cannot be wounded or die 
from its torments, paradoxically becomes the site and spectacle of human vulnerability. 
Thus the sign of Christina’s supernature—her suffering yet unwounded body—marks her 
distance and difference from the rest of humanity, but also most deeply connect her to the 
human condition. Conversely, Karen Winstead argues that constant assurances that the 
virgin martyr feels no pain in passages that explicitly describe macabre tortures was used 
in the legends as a distancing technique, mitigating the compassion readers feel for the 
martyr. The mortal flesh of young virgin martyrs displays the armor of faith, the miracle 
of body so subsumed by the confidence of the soul it does not flinch, and in this 
imperviousness—apatheia—enters a miraculous space, one unreachable by the 
astonished crowd who marvel, are edified, but do not pity.191 The alignment of soul and 
body in Christina, on the other hand, is governed by an affect not of triumph or 
                                                 
191 Karen Winstead, Virgin Martyrs, pp. 73-75.  
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confidence, but of penitential sorrow and empathic suffering. It gave rise to a similar 
empathy in her community, and presumably the readers of her vita, who came to see her 
as holy.  
 
The Desert Mothers and Fathers  
The language of wilderness is prominent in the vita, echoing not only the desert 
tradition of ascetics like Antony or Syncletica, but the early Cistercian vision.192 Christina 
is said to flee “into deserted places, to trees, or the tops of castle or church towers, or any 
lofty structure,” as she “desired to remain alone with God in her hiding place in the 
desert” (9).193 Like both Antony and Syncletica, whose vitae were popular in medieval 
Europe, Christina retreated to the tombs (13) and practiced rigorous renunciation, 
including giving away all her possessions, fasting, and practiced strict celibacy. She also 
spent time with the recluse, Jutta. Margot King has argued that the description of 
Christina floating up to the tops of trees is a continuation of dendrite and stylite practices 
of late Antiquity.194 However, as we saw with virgin martyrs, the site of repetition is also 
the place of difference. Withdrawal to the wilderness occupied only one pole of 
Christina’s movements, contrasting with her wandering through the public square, 
exposures of her flesh, and subjecting herself to the gaze of the crowd, a performative 
note that is indebted to the virgin martyr legends.  
                                                 
192 See, for example, the Exordium Parvum, ch. 3, which speaks of Citeaux as a “desert.” 	
193 Brenda Bolton first noted the connections between Thomas and James of Vitry’s work and the 
desert tradition in her essay “Vitae Matrum: A further aspect of the Frauenfrage,” in Medieval 
Women: Essays dedicated and presented to Prof. Rosalind M.T. Hill, ed. Derek Baker (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1978), pp. 253-275. 
 
194 Margot H. King, “The Desert Mothers,” in Vox Benedictina 5/4 (October 1988), pp. 325-354. 
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Desert ascetics taught those who sought them out (often despite their own best 
efforts to flee). Athanasius depicted Antony returning to Alexandria in order to seek 
martyrdom,195 and described his illuminated form emerging from his tomb to amaze 
crowds of people.196 Similarly, Symeon acted not only as a figure ascending ever more 
closely to heaven but a savvy political advisor and negotiator.197 Syncletica was depicted 
teaching women interested in the ascetic life, as are the Abbas of Cassian’s Conferences. 
Yet the ideal articulated by the desert literature is anachoresis, for the flight from worldly 
interaction is an essential mark of humility. In the Life and Regimen of Blessed 
Syncletica, the hagiographer Pseudo-Athanasius emphasizes the relation between 
humility, withdrawal, and secrecy and the resulting difficulty of his writerly task: “We 
cannot speak, then, of her actual ascetic life, since she did not allow anyone to be an 
observer of this. Nor did she wish her associates to be heralds of her heroic virtues. For 
she did not so much think about doing good as she did about keeping her good works 
private and secret.”198 Conversely, the very purpose of Christina’s works and Thomas’s 
writing is to display them in all their terror to act as a lesson to “[t]he many people who 
had frequently seen” her acts of mortification. The performance of abjection further 
served as an occasion for the penance of others, as a wicked man from whom she begs a 
                                                 
195 Athanasius of Alexandria, “The Life of Antony,” in The Life of Antony and the Letter to 
Marcellinus, trans. by Alan C. Gregg (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), ch. 46, p. 65. 
	
	
196 Ibid., ch. 14, p. 42.  
	
197 See Peter Brown, The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity in The Journal of 
Roman Studies, vol. 61 (1971), pp. 87-88. 
	
198 Pseudo-Athanasius, The Life and Regimen of the Blessed and Holy Teacher, Syncletica, trans. 
by Elizabeth Bryson Bongie (Toronto: Peregrina Publishing, 1997), ch. 15, p. 15. 	
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drink was “moved by an unaccustomed pity” and thus redeemed himself (23). Christina’s 
acts of self-mortification were not so much ascetical practices, then, as simulacra of 
ascetic practices, insofar as she gained nothing nor learned anything for herself but  acted 
as tableaux for spectators.  
It is not only Christina who was displayed as a bizarre and baffling image. Her 
public mission entailed her exposure to horrifying sights. This is in dramatic contrast to 
the behavior prescribed for virgins and ascetics by Syncletica, who argued that it was 
“imperative” for ascetic women that  
sallies out into the marketplace be avoided. If we consider it troublesome 
and oppressive to see our brothers and parents naked, how much more 
harmful it will be for us to view on the streets people indecently clad and, 
even worse, speaking licentious words? For it is from these experiences 
that disgusting and virulent images arise.199  
 
As teacher and counselor, however, Christina suffered knowledge of the sins of others: 
“She always walked about as if she were dying or grieving, for God daily revealed to her 
whether those who were near death merited salvation or destruction” (26). She saw the 
“hidden sins” of others whom she admonished (29).  
Finally, the purpose and end of Christina’s askesis was radically different than 
that of desert fathers and mothers. Having been perfectly purified in the solitude of 
contemplation and then dying, the self-mortification Christina underwent was not for the 
purpose of cleansing her soul and body as Syncletica “trimmed the thorny offshoots of 
her thought,”200 nor for attaining God in solitude, but to teach and intercede. The agon 
with the murderous pagans in virgin martyr legends, which became the agon with the 
                                                 
199 Ibid., ch. 25, p. 20b. 
	
200 Ibid., ch. 17, p. 16. 
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thoughts in the case of the desert mothers (thus Syncletica is compared to Thecla),201 
became with Christina, instead, a struggle with the sins and punishments of others, a 
struggle notable for its unabashed passion. Christina’s perfection, then, was not like 
Antony’s, who, his body having been “worded” (logisesthai) and assimilated (idiopoieon) 
to the divine, manifested remarkable equanimity when it emerged from the fortress where 
he had encased himself for twenty years.202 Again, Christina’s story subverts the logic of 
asceticism, assimilated to the work of Christic substitution, a perfect being who exceeded 
even Christ in the variety and duration of her suffering. Thomas’s version of Christina’s 
life explicitly emphasized this shift in contrast to James of Vitry, whose description of 
Christina described her mortifications as acts of personal penance that only later become 
intercessory.203  
 
Mulieres sanctae 
Thirteenth-century male-authored hagiography of holy women tended to 
foreground the body of the female saint as the site of divine manifestation. While intense 
asceticism and physical piety was present in some high medieval male Lives, a focus on 
paramystical practices and bodily acts such as trances, levitations, fasting, miraculous 
                                                 
201 Ps. Athanasius, The Life of Blessed Syncletica, ch. 8, p. 11-12. “One could consider her the 
true disciple of the blessed Thecla as she followed her in the same teaching. Indeed, Christ was 
the one suitor of the two women, and for them both Paul was himself the ‘leader of the bride.’” 	
202 Athanasius, Vie D’Antoine, Sources Chretiennes, vol. 400. Introduction and 
translation by G.J.M Bartelink (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2004), §14, p. 272. “The 
state of his soul (psyche) was one of purity (katharon), for it was not constricted by grief, 
nor relaxed by pleasure, nor affected by either laughter or dejection…He maintained utter 
equilibrium, like one guided by reason (hypo tou logou) and steadfast in that with accords 
with nature (en to kata physin).” 
 
203 VMO, Prologue 8. 
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exudings and lactation were more common and played a more central role in the 
construction of models of female sanctity.204 Male hagiographers inscribed the spiritual 
on the flesh of female saints, making the woman’s body—particularly in states of 
abjection and pain—sites at which the divine became discernible in the world.205 
According to Dyan Elliott, the emphasis on eucharistic devotion and penitential practices 
in such hagiographies was an essential part of the Dominican program against heresy, in 
which the saint was “sculpted” to “confound the [Cathar] heretic,” who critiqued the 
Catholic Church’s sacramental system and propounded doctrines of dematerialization.206 
The incredible acts of Christina’s resurrected body, particularly its tortures, pain, 
exudings, ecstasies, and rapturous songs, conform to this general trend of emphasizing 
the bodily nature of women’s piety noted by scholars. Christina’s bodilines, however, is 
an extreme instance of this broader somatizing trend.  
The VCM is unimaginable apart from its predecessor, James de Vitry’s Life of 
Marie of Oignies. The vita was written for Fulk of Toulouse who, fleeing the “Egypt” of 
his own city taken over by Cathars, found the Promised land in Liège, drawn “in 
particular” by the “holy women who venerated the Church of Christ and the sacraments 
                                                 
204 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast Holy Fast, pp. 260-76; Bynum, Fragmentation and 
Redemption, pp. 181-238; André Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 433-443; 
Rudolph Bell and Donald Weinstein, Saints and Society: The Two Worlds of Western 
Christendom, 1000-1700 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 123-27, 153-57, 236-
7. 	
205 See the work of Amy Hollywood for extensive discussion of this hagiographical practice, 
including The Soul as Virgin Wife, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 26-
39; Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 241-253; “Breaking the Waves and the Hagiographical 
Imagination,” Unpublished talk,” p. 1.  
	
206 Dyan Elliott, Proving Woman: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the later 
Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 2. 
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of the holy Church” (Pr. 1). According to James, these devout women practiced celibacy, 
fasts, prayers, vigils, poverty, maintained a devotion so intense that some were “wasting 
away with such an intimate and wondrous state of love,” while others were rapt with 
inebriation, held immobile or jumping up and down ecstatically,207 or were possessed by 
a violent need for the Eucharist. Marie, whose story stands pars pro toto of the somatic 
feminine piety of the region, was offered as a counter-example to the Cathar perfecti (Pr. 
9), and the vita was intended to be used as a source for anti-Cathar preaching.208 
Thomas’s vita not only borrowed James’ authority for the defense of his tale, but 
intensified the somatic, dramatic, quality of Marie’s ascetic piety. Elements of this piety 
that Thomas imitated included the marginally unorthodox practice of begging—from 
which Marie was convinced to desist by her friends, while Christina carried it out209—
                                                 
207 VMO, Pr. 6, 7, 8.	
208 Carolyn Muessig, The Faces of Women in the Sermons of Jacques de Vitry (Toronto: 
Peregrina Publishing, 1999), p. 42.  
	
209 Female mendicancy inspired profound suspicion and was a major cause for suspicion of 
beguines, which is why Marie’s friends encourage her to refrain from it (VMO, II.45). That 
Thomas depicts Christina begging in no less than four chapters (22-25) is further evidence of his 
flagrant courting of suspicion. Furthermore, although theological justification is given for her 
activities, carried out as a form of substitutionary atonement and in order that she may become an 
occasion for good works, Thomas also writes that she would take things that were refused her 
without offering explanation for it. As Jennifer Brown asks, if this criminality is an exemplum, 
then how is it to be read? (Three Women of Liège: A Critical Edition of and Commentary on the 
Middle English Lives of Elizabeth of Spalbeek, Christina Mirabilis and Marie d’Oignies 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), p. 238). A similar ambivalence underlies Thomas’s presentation of 
Christina hearing Count Louis’s confession (44). Although he is eager to point out that she does 
not offer absolution, for she has no such right, the text does not say that he received any other last 
rites. In hearing his final confession, Christina performs what was the official prerogative of 
priests and, furthermore, does in some sense ‘absolve’ Louis of half of his sins through her bodily 
torment (45). While commentators have argued that this passage distresses Thomas, it seems to 
me he could have massaged the tale far more than he has (or left it out entirely) in order to 
mitigate the centrality of Christina in the death scene. As things stand, she is represented in a 
tableau with Louis draped at her feet recounting his sins from his eleventh year to the present. He 
then disposes of his goods according to Christina’s advice. Thomas’s presentation of priests is 
ambivalent in general in this vita. While he has Christina proclaim her devotion to the clergy (40), 
he also notes that they persecuted her “often,” misrecognizing her sanctity. On the whole, 
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purgatorial piety involving intercession and substitution for others, preaching indirectly 
whether through deeds or, in Marie’s case, James, and most dramatically, rapturous 
states—meaning those encounters with divinity in which the soul is separated from the 
bodily senses—that extended for unprecedented lengths of time.210 Bernard McGinn 
notes that while earlier monastic literature, including that of authorities such as Gregory 
the Great and Bernard of Clairvaux, stressed the impossibility of the body sustaining 
states of alienation from the senses in an encounter with God for long periods of time, 
The Life of Marie described beguinal women remaining enraptured, sometimes for days 
on end.211  
However, while the bodily emphasis of these vitae was essential to the 
ecclesiastical fight against Catharism undertaken by James and Thomas, it was not 
without controversy. Thus in the Prologue to the Life of Marie of Oignies, James, 
addressing Fulk of Toulouse, writes there were “shameless men…hostile to all religion, 
[who] maliciously slandered the religious life of these women and, like mad dogs, railed 
against customs which were contrary to theirs.212 In the VLA Thomas writes that James 
was attacked by a “vile slanderer” who “said and wrote that those who record the 
fantastic visions of insignificant women ought to be considered profane.” This slander, he 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christina performs their office more efficaciously than they, counseling (29, 30, 41), preaching 
sublimely (27, 28, 29, 40), offering not the Eucharist but her own body as substitution, and 
hearing the confession of a great sinner. As Barbara Newman notes, and as my argument attempts 
to show, Thomas is primarily invested in demonstrating the novelty and even unintelligibility of 
Christina, and he does this through such controversial representations, some of which remain un- 
or under-theologized, and thus unintelligible. See Newman, Possessed by the Spirit, p. 765. 	
210 For an account of late medieval understandings of rapture see Dyan Elliott, “The Physiology 
of Rapture,” in Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, eds. P. Biller and A. Minnis (Rochester 
NY: York Medieval Press, 1997). 
	
211 Bernard McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism, p. 38.  
	
212 VMO, Prologue, 10.	
87	
	
continues, was inspired by James’s writing “the blessed life of the blessed woman Mary 
of Oignies in an elegant style” (VLA 1.5). Thomas thus knowingly courted further disdain 
from certain quarters with his portrait of a woman whose body and behavior 
foregrounded without reserve the qualities of a controversial piety. Rather than mitigating 
his rhetoric in the face of maligners and doubters, Thomas placed Christina in a 
resurrected body, thus removing mortal limits to her practice. The effect of such 
extremism was to make a further outlier of the already marginal figure of Christina. She 
became a figure for an alterity best figured by Thomas in the terms of the demonic. 
Walter Simons argues that Christina’ raptures are represented in such a way as to 
open themselves to demonic interpretations. He shows that in beguine Lives of the 
southern Low Countries, a corpus that includes the VCM, there is a new “grammar” of 
movement in the representation of virginal ecstasy. When Marie of Oignies (d. 1213), Ida 
of Louvain (d. c. 1300), Elizabeth of Spalbeek (d. 1304), or Christina moved into an 
enraptured state, proportion was said to be lost as limbs swelled and elongated, or they 
were described as becoming as wax, molded into a round ball or whirling like a hoop. 
The gestural palate expanded and the body departed fundamentally from the ideals of 
bodily moderation, grace, modesty, and balance extolled by Ambrose in his treatise on 
virginity.213  
Simons argues that the vitae placed descriptions of rapture alongside conventional 
deeds and virtues that were indicative of sanctity as well as her conformity with older 
ideals of bodily propriety. In other words, however shocking these depictions of rapture 
                                                 
213 Walter Simons, “Reading a Saint’s Body: Rapture and Bodily Movement in the vitae of 
Thirteenth-century Beguines,” in Framing Medieval Bodies, eds. S. Kay and M. Rubin 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 14. See Ambrose, De Officiis I.108, ed. PL 
XVL, col. 16. 	
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may have been, they existed discretely within the vitae, contextualized by behaviors that 
would be recognizably saintly to readers, behaviors that served to mark as holy the 
ambivalent acts of rapture. Such a contextualization is apparent in the Life of Margaret of 
Ypres. Although Margaret underwent constant and prolonged raptures, she had the 
comportment and face typical of the ideal virgin, for “[she] ordered [her] outward 
appearance after the example of all the blessed ones. Her eyes were downcast, her head 
bent, her bearing subdued, her gait light and moderate. Her countenance was so reverent 
that angelic grace and a hint of majesty glimmered in her face” (VMY I.12). This sort of 
contextualization was vital, as Simons notes, for beguinal ecstasies were indiscernible 
from those produced by demons. Ecstasies could be deemed divine only by locating the 
outrageous, bizarre, or offensive behaviors of the putatively holy person within the wider 
context of their behavior, reputation, and spiritual gifts. Thus charisms, including 
clairvoyance and the stigmata, the experience of a person’s virtue by others in the 
community over an extended period of time were essential to the determination of 
sanctity. Most important, Simons notes, was the interpretation of the female saint’s 
hagiographer, who acted as the ultimate arbiter of discretion, investing these acts with 
their authoritative interpretation and approval.214 Vitae were written after the struggle 
over the discernment of a person’s status, and the hagiographer’s writing of a Life sought 
to confirm the meaning of such actions.  
There is, then, a persistent tension in these Lives. The novel bodily evidence of 
divine presence that was used to forward an anti-heretical program, acting as both 
embodied dogma (of the goodness of creation and therefore the sacramental system 
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governed by the church), and as proof of a woman’s sanctity, authorizing her visionary, 
prophetic, or theological claims, needed to be accompanied by recognizable virtues to 
become legible and safe.215 Paramystical practices (such as trances, levitations, stigmata, 
and the alienation from the senses that rapture entailed), and claims of visionary 
experiences could not, Simons argues, stand alone as signs of divine favor.  
However, in the VCM, the disharmony and disruption Simons ascribes to states of 
rapture obtain for a great proportion of the vita and occur not only in those states 
specifically described as rapturous, but mark Christina’s general habitus. For example, 
even after God “moderated his miracles” in her in order to make her less scandalous to 
the community (21), Thomas writes that when Christina lamented the fate of those in hell 
and purgatory, she “wept and twisted herself and bent herself backwards and bent and re-
bent her arms as if they were pliable and had no bones” (26). Similarly, she twisted her 
limbs and rolled around when asking why the world did not “recognize its Creator” (37). 
She danced with abandon when saved souls died (26). She wore gowns made of 
unmatched pieces of cloth sewn together with the bark of a linden tree, and went 
barefoot, becoming a spectacle in direct transgression of traditional direction to virgins 
(and women in general) to practice modesty of dress and speech and to avoid the gaze of 
                                                 
215 Thus Lutgard is given various observable physical graces, such as being suspended in the air 
(I.10), and having the sun descend upon her in the night (I.11) in order to prove her unique status 
to fellow nuns. The literal cracking, breaking apart, and burning up of Beatrice of Nazareth’s 
body is presented as an apt “translation” of her interior spiritual life by her hagiographer 
(Compare Beatrice’s Treatise, “There Are Seven Manners of Loving,” p. 203, trans. by Eric 
Colledge, in Medieval Women’s Visionary Literature, ed. Elizabeth A. Petroff (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), and the anonymous Life of Beatrice of Nazareth, trans. by Roger 
DeGanck (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1991), p. 308-11. Elizabeth of Spalbeek enacts 
horrifying representations of the passion, becoming, as the Middle English translator has it, 
“booth the persone of Criste suffrynge and the persone of the enmye turmentynge,” but this 
performance is observed with no attempted intervention by fascinated clerics. See “The Middle 
English Life of Elizabeth of Spalbeek,” in Three Women of Liège, ed. Jennifer Brown, p. 105.  
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others.216 Finally, in the last year of her life, the anti-social strangeness that characterized 
the beginning of her intercessory career returned and “solitude and the wilderness were 
frequently her home.” When she did return to human society,  
People could scarcely tell whether a spirit or a material body had passed 
by, since she barely seemed to touch the ground….the spirit so controlled 
almost all the parts of her corporeal body that scarcely could human minds 
or eyes look at the shadow her body cast without horror and a trembling of 
spirit (46).217 
 
This pervasive weirdness means that the scandal of Christina’s body was not confined to 
discrete moments of rapture, which might trouble but ultimately not capsize the more 
fundamental value of moderation and proportion Simons finds in the other vitae he 
studies. The VCM does not provide a wider context of normalcy against which 
Christina’s more bizarre behaviors could be judged or by which their power might be 
attenuated.218  
                                                 
216 See for example Ambrose of Milan, On Virgins, Book One, 8.53-10.57; Tertullian, On the 
Veiling of Virgins, 16.4-17.5. 	
217 “Cum reverteretur, nemo eam salutare, nemo aliquid interrogare audebat. Vespere enim 
aliquando revertens transibat per mediam domum quasi spiritus super terram: vixque discerni 
poterat si spiritus transibat aut corpus, cum terram vix tangere videretur. Adeo enim in illo 
extremo vitæ suæ anno in omnibus fere partibus animale corpus sic spiritus obtinuerat, ut 
humanæ mentes vel oculi vix possent ejus corporis umbram sine horrore & tremore spiritus 
intueri.” 
	
218 Christina is not limited to the bodily sphere by Thomas and her preaching is often verbal, such 
as when she tells townspeople about purgatory (28), reproaches the unrepentant (37), speaks 
“with wondrous grace of speech” in front of the knights of Count Louis, and acts as confessor to 
the same Count (44). However, these deeds are themselves ambivalent and do not serve to make 
her strange body less transgressive or necessarily intelligible as a holy rather than a demonic 
force. As R. Sweetman argues (“Christine of St. Trond’s Preaching Apostolate,” p. 68), such 
verbal preaching by a woman outside the confines of the cloister was a violation of canon law. 
Furthermore, Jennifer Brown and Anneke Mulder-Bakker note Thomas’s ambivalent 
representation of Christina hearing Count Louis’s confession (see Brown, Three Women, p. 240). 
While Christina hears his full confession on his deathbed, and at other times would “obtain from 
him whatever was owing for the satisfaction of justice,” (41) a function uncomfortably close to 
assigning penance for post-Lateran IV sensibilities, leading Thomas to say that she understood 
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Thomas thus brought to a point of crisis the covert tensions of contemporary 
Lives by foregrounding the ambiguity implicit not only in the ecstasy of other holy 
women, but the representation of female holiness through bodily abjection. He displayed 
the difficulty of reading the body by showing the community’s aggressive reaction to 
Christina; the first half of the tale is shaped by the dynamic of a spectral Christina 
entering and again fleeing human community as she, like a dystopic version of the bride 
of the Song of Songs, was pursued and captured multiple times by her sisters, the 
community, and a bounty hunter. The unlikeness of ecstatic beguines is thus radicalized 
in Christina’s excesses, a central means by which Thomas emphasized her alterity to her 
public. She became an abject alien, straining to be elsewhere, a grotesquerie of the 
anachoretic impulse repeatedly performed for crowds of onlookers and skeptics.  
While Thomas’s belief in Christina’s sanctity is implied by the very fact of his 
writing her Life, he does not describe the hostility of the community as taking place 
against an obvious innocent. Instead, Thomas’s rhetoric in some ways colludes with and 
justifies the cruelties of Christina’s enemies. Their reading of Christina as possessed is 
repeated in Thomas’s representation of Christina through the language of the demonic 
and the horrifying, forcing the reader to undergo the same act of interpretation as the 
villagers of Liège. She was said to have been “kept in check” (constricta) by the 
sacrament and “forced” (coacta) to come down from the rafters after her resurrection (5); 
she ran from dogs like a “fleeing beast” (bestia fugiens) (14), paralleling the “beastly 
minds” (bestiales mentes) of her persecutors. All of this behavior is typical of demoniacs, 
                                                                                                                                                 
that she did not inhabit a priestly role and did not offer an absolution “she had no power to give.” 
However, as I argued above, the ambivalence of the story occurs because Thomas’s depiction 
flirts with her giving exactly what she had no power to give. 	
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as is the language of being seized (commota), stirred (agitata spiritu) or driven 
(cogebatur) that Thomas ascribed to her (10, 21, 22, 24). Again, she fled humans because 
of their stench (9), and ran from the priest after receiving communion, which Barbara 
Newman notes was “reminiscent of an angry demon resisting an exorcist,”219 and crossed 
the dangerous river, though “in a real body” (in vero copore) as if a “phantasm” (quasi 
phantastico). Newman further includes her distortions of limb and voice and her bodily 
mortifications as emblematic of demoniacal behavior, as was the horrified response of the 
townspeople who captured, beat, starved, and later, fled from her.220 While Newman 
offers conjectures that the description of Christina as a demoniac was indicative of 
historical realities—arguing that her mental illness was “consecrated” by priestly 
translation into the terms of intercessory suffering for the debt of sin owed by others—the 
rhetoric of demonic possession can also be understood as the essential component of 
Thomas’s construction of Christina as a dissimilar image, a bearer of hyperbolic 
unlikeness for the purpose of attaining particular rhetorical effects with his readers.  
Thomas thus drew on multiple models of female sanctity in order to construct 
Christina. In each case, however, he fundamentally altered the inherited models, making 
them unlike themselves. This strategy placed Christina within the tradition in such a way 
as ultimately to reinforce her difference from it. In each case, the point of contact and 
divergence from the paradigm was located in her body. In the case of the virgin martyr, 
Christina’s resurrected flesh turned the equanimity of the martyr to pathos, adding the 
essential component of pity to the crowd’s marveling. In the case of the desert mother, 
the withdrawing ascetic was simultaneously a public spectacle, exposed to the gaze of the 
                                                 
219 Barbara Newman, “Possessed by the Spirit,” p. 764.	
220 Ibid., p. 764.	
93	
	
crowd even as it was exposed to her gaze, disrupting the equanimity of both. In the case 
of the mulieres religiosae, Christina’s difference occurred by means of a radical 
exaggeration of their somatic piety. This exaggeration rendered Christina the other of an 
already marginal group ultimately best captured by Thomas’s use of the discourse of the 
demonic.  
 
Miracle as Mirror: Two readings of the Dissimilar Image  
Having considered the extent and nature of Christina’s unlikeness to the very 
models on which Thomas draws in telling her story, I will now turn to the question of the 
rhetorical effects on the reader who observes and must interpret the dissimilar image that 
is Christina. I will first return to the theory of the dissimilar image, arguing that there are 
two ways in which it can be read that can, in turn, be applied to a reading of the VCM. I 
will then consider in detail the category of wondrous horror in the vita.  
The unresolved tension between analogy and abyss, between the connection of 
God with creation and the absolute divine the hierarchy mimetically derived from the 
exemplar and the exemplar in se, enables two possible readings of the effect of dissimilar 
similarities. On the one hand, if the distinction between like and unlike remains stable, 
the contemplation of a dissimilar image will deliver the intellect up to an experience of its 
failure; the observer regards the unlike in order to apprehend his or her distance from 
God and inability to approach the intelligible through material means. This would be an 
apophatic practice of capsizing the intellect, breaking it through contemplation of the 
unlike. David Williams argues that the monstrousness of medieval grotesques and certain 
deformed saints performs this apophatic function, acting as dissimilar images in a 
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properly expansive application of theology. The monstrous reveals or affirms 
transcendence by concealing or negating similarity to the natural world, thwarting the 
mind’s ordering and analogical capacities. Monstrous deformations point to the 
deformation of the intellect necessary to the pursuit of understanding divinity. The 
“Middle Ages made deformity into a symbolic tool with which it probed the secrets of 
substance, existence, and form incompletely revealed by the more orthodox rational 
approach through dialectics.”221 
In mixing the categories of the living and the dead, of past, present, and 
apocalyptic future,222 being both herself and yet another insofar as her actions were the 
result of being “driven by the spirit,” and in the deformations of her flesh in rapture and 
lamentation, Christina’s body can be identified as monstrous—revealing to the mind that 
contemplates her ineffability its limits. The observer could be said to look on her 
unlikeness and contemplate it as such, thus confronting the limits of the human 
understanding of divine things, a confrontation in which she or he nevertheless maintains 
his or her position in relation to the observed object. In other words, the observer would 
remain “similar” insofar as she or he is unlike the dissimilar saint. The ineffable other 
would, by virtue of its excessiveness, remain distinct.  
                                                 
221 David Williams, Deformed Discourse, p. 3.  
	
222 On the connection between temporal deformity and ontological deformity, Williams notes the 
work of Geoffrey Galt Harpham, who argues that the creation of the grotesque occurs by 
attaching in one moment the different phases of a creature’s being, “with the intervening temporal 
gap so great that is appears that species boundaries, and not mere time, has been overlapped.” 
Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 11. Quoted in Williams, Deformed Discourse, p. 
5. As resurrected, Christina’s body is both a realized eschatology, attaching the flesh of earthly 
life with the qualities of the afterlife, even as her terrifying practices open the door between this 
world and the next, unveiling the future in the present, a future caused by the sins and virtues of 
the past. 	
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However, there is a second way to read the effect of dissimilar similarities, one 
that takes account of the fact that all images are dissimilar to God as all names mark and 
instantiate a distance between God and the world. This interpretation would argue that the 
dissimilarity of all images from God undoes the very particularity of the saint as 
dissimilar, thus implicating the observer in the unlikeness of the contemplated image. 
Christina’s bodily vulnerability becomes the observer’s bodily vulnerability, her 
monstrousness their monstrousness. The observer not only scrutinizes the strange 
spectacle but is rendered strange by it. The apophasis of the intellect that obtains in the 
first explanation for dissimilar similarities is therefore extended, in this second reading, to 
an apophasis of the subject, an undoing and refiguration of the viewer as he or she is re-
placed within a landscape newly recognized as a regio dissmilitudinis, a world rendered 
apocalyptic by Christina’s performances of coming punishment. It is this extended 
apophasis, I would argue, that drove Thomas’s attempts to turn Christina from the 
amazing but not impossibly miraculous beata of James’s prologue to a figure who is 
purely mirabilis.223  
Such an understanding of dissimilar similarity can be considered “prophetic.” 
Prophets stand over and against the social order and are not to be emulated. Instead, the 
prophet satirizes his audience by imitating it. Thus the prophet Hosea performed Israel’s 
“adulterous” relation to God by marrying a prostitute, at God’s command naming his 
daughter “not loved,” and his son “not my people” (Hosea 1:2-9). The actions of the 
prophet, though bizarre and seemingly utterly outside of typical social behavior, hold up 
a mirror to society. Their seeming unlikeness is in fact a critical likeness. The wonder 
                                                 
223 Thanks are due to Charles Stang for helping me formulate this second reading of the dissimilar 
similarities.	
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they inspire has its source in the likeness the lies under the veil of unlikeness, and the 
horror when this likeness is registered is the impetus for conversion.  
Like the Hebraic prophets, the VCM repeatedly shows such a mutual imbrication 
of saint and community. The vision of the saintly other refracts back onto the observer, 
becoming mirror rather than spectacle. Christina’s mission was marked by both dramatic 
lamentation for human sin (13; 26; 37; 45; 50) and by “becoming” sin, in her enactments 
of purgatorial pain in which she is both example and substitute (7). Christina took on the 
sinner’s debt of others, including the souls she first saw in purgatory, and her spiritual 
child Count Louis, with whom “she suffered torments in turn according to what the soul 
of the count was suffering,” having taken on half of his purgatorial punishments (45).224 
Her role as substitute was extended in her mendicancy, in which her body became the 
body of the publicans, a becoming figured literally by her ingesting of the scraps from 
their table.225 The sight of an emaciated woman dressed in white rags sewn together with 
bark or twigs (25), revealing the torments the purgatorial body undergoes at the hands of 
demons (28), not only warned viewers of their looming future, but revealed to them their 
present state. Her body became the body and soul of usurers. After eating alms wrongly 
                                                 
224 On the “apostolate to the dead” of female saints, and the theological underpinnings of 
substitution, see Barbara Newman, “On the Threshold of the Dead,” in From Virile Woman to 
WomanChrist, pp. 108-136.  
	
225Christina’s ingestion of publican garbage, such that her body is made by their trash, becoming 
as trash, and thus revelatory of their souls is reminiscent of a passage from Margaret’s Laurence’s 
novel, The Diviners, in which Christie, the town garbage collector (and as his name indicates, like 
Christina’s, a Christ figure), speaks of the way that a person’s garbage reveals their private 
information: “You know how some have the gift of second sight?....Well, it’s the gift of garbage-
telling which I have myself now. Watch this…Now you see these bones here, and you know what 
they mean? They mean Simon Pearl the lawyer’s got the money for steak. Yep, not so often, 
maybe, but one day a week. So although he’s letting on he’s as hard up as the next—he ain’t, no 
he ain’t, though it’s troubling to him, too. By their christly bloody garbage shall ye know them in 
their glory, is what I’m saying to you, every saintly mother’s son…” (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974, p. 61).	
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acquired that tasted as the “bowels of frogs and toads,” she uttered a plea that shows the 
complex relation of possession, desire, and subjectivity arising from her mission. Crying 
out first to Christ, she asks, “What are you doing (agis) with me?” reflecting the text’s 
view that it is God who drives her actions and performs the punishments that she endures. 
She then addressed her own soul, saying, “O miserable soul! What do you want? Why do 
you desire (concupiscis) these foul things?” suggesting that it was not only her body that 
requires food, but that her soul was in some sense infected by the sinners’ carnal desire 
for ill-gotten gains. The confession of her soul’s desire, which was really the desire of the 
other, thus ventriloquized the prayer of a penitent publican (24), performing the 
fulfillment of her mission that such sinners “might thereby be called to a horror of their 
sins and a penitent life.” Christina’s proleptic verbal penance thus paralleled her 
substitutionary purgatorial penance of the flesh. 
Christina’s piety was also shown to have a contagious effect, not only generating 
fear in the face of her multiple prodigious performances, but also sympathy in those 
exposed to her. Thus her wild grief for the damned dead, in which she “wept and twisted 
herself and bent herself backwards and bent and re-bent her arms and fingers as if they 
were pliable and had no bones,” could not be ignored by those around her. Rather, “[a]ll 
who saw her found her sorrow so intolerable that even the hardest-hearted could not 
endure it without the greatest contrition and compassion” (26). Again, in her bridal 
ecstasy, in which she sought to “praise Jesus for the great liberality of his miracles,” she 
would call the nuns of St. Catherine’s to her and they would sing together the Te Deum 
Laudamus and “rejoiced in Christina’s solace” (36). As Christina was “moved” 
(commota) by the spirit to flee the town (10), so her wretched appearance moved 
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(commoto) a “most wicked man” to an “unaccustomed pity,” and he gave her wine 
against all expectation (23). The charity of sinners inspired by Christina’s appearance 
was thus paralleled by her possession by the Holy Spirit. The interiority of Christina’s 
interlocutors was transformed by means of her contagious presence.  
The primary movement Christina’s presence inspired, however, was not charity or 
renunciation, but horror. Astonishment in this text occurs in the register of the horrifying, 
one that from its initial appearance among the villagers was experienced as threatening. 
Astounded by the horror of the torments of hell, a place that is “dark and terrible” 
(horridum) (6; 28), she agreed to be driven by the divine and thus was horrified 
(horrebat) by human smell (5) and human sin. Her own horror turned Christina into a 
horrifying sight, terrifying (horrentes) her audiences by means of her horrifying 
(horrifice) cries, deeds, and voice (11; 20; 43) up until the very end of her life, when even 
the shadow cast by her body caused “horror and trembling of the spirit” (horrore et 
tremore) (46). The contagion of horror moving from Christina to her audience and back 
again is most apparent in chapter nine when she is said to flee human presence “with 
wondrous horror” (miro horrore), the horror here being both that which she felt for other 
humans, and that which she inspired in her onlookers. 
 Such horror is essential to her mission, according to Thomas, and a key effect 
that he seeks by means of his hyperbolic, astonishing, atopic representation. Begging, we 
saw, was intended to call sinners “to a horror (ad horrorem) of their sins and a penitent 
life” (22), and her exhortations called the dying to a “fear (horrorem) of the destroying 
fire.” This fear is central to the pastoral aims of the book, for it is the origin of the 
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structure and reformed behaviors of a pious life, including confession, penance, and the 
“hope of everlasting joy” (27).  
The audience’s horror is also Thomas’s solution to the conundrum of credibility 
raised in the beginning of the vita. The wondrous horror that provoked the bewilderment 
of villagers and readers, leading them to acts of misinterpretation in which they read 
Christina as demonic (9; 10; 17; 19; 20) or to disbelief in the story as simply outlandish 
fabrication, was also the means by which Thomas attempted to achieve resolution to the 
problem of the text’s credibility. As I have shown, the story turns around Christina’s 
body, the site of her unlike likeness and her fearsome wonder. Although she preached 
with both words and deeds,226 it was her body that is “example” and her deeds that had 
substitutionary power. While her body as resurrected was singular, the bodily effects of 
her acts depended on the common ground between her miraculous flesh and that of her 
community and her readers. As Amy Hollywood notes, Christina’s suffering not only 
provided a theological justification for God’s torture of sinful human beings and proof of 
the capacity of some to bear the sins of others, but is a “process of validation” that occurs 
in the bodies of readers. She writes,  
The reality of the immaterial divine is made evident through the suffering 
body of the saint. The reader’s horrified bodily response to her suffering in 
turn becomes a bodily manifestation of God’s presence and the reader’s 
belief.227 
 
Christina’s body, shaped by a vision of horror even as it becomes such a vision, inspired 
a similarly physical horror in her viewers. Furthermore, as I have argued, Thomas 
believed his desired effect would be contagious because Christina showed the audience 
                                                 
226 See Robert Sweetman, “Christine of St. Trond’s Preaching Apostolate,” p. 68.  
	
227 Amy Hollywood, “Breaking the Waves and the Hagiographical Imagination,” p. 24. 	
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themselves as they already are. The vision is a recognition. Thomas’s melodramatic tale 
with its heroine’s excessive materiality seeks bodily effects in its readers that become the 
living proof, if not of Christina’s historicity or even sanctity, then of the reality of 
purgatorial punishments and the wrath of God. The physical piety of women, typically 
used in order to justify visionary claims or find kinship with the human Jesus, was here 
placed in service of proving the threat of damnation and, by that fear, reforming behavior. 
Belief was thus “inscribed” on the bodies of penitents, as horror and belief were united in 
Thomas’s penitential theology,228 and the divine bridegroom who fleetingly appeared in 
the fourth chapter of the vita was replaced by a vengeful God who is “driven” 
(cogebatur) to punish sinners.229 However, the text continues to register the difficult 
circularity of the proving body. This difficulty points to a broader problematic, 
highlighted by the excessiveness of the VCM, of the representation of female sanctity 
through the suffering body.  
I have demonstrated how female sanctity in the thirteenth century was often 
depicted in highly somatic terms, as wracked and tormented female flesh was pressed 
into service as the site of God’s visible earthly manifestation. Much of Thomas’s work 
followed this trend. For instance, The Life of Margaret of Ypres admiringly cites the 
extreme askesis of a young woman who died at twenty-one as a result of her practice. 
Margaret was a teenager when the Dominican friar, Zeger, “cast his eyes on [her]” as she 
                                                 
228 Ibid., p. 8.  
	
229 God’s action upon Christina (both in terms of “driving” her deeds and in showing her his 
purgatorial realm) is often described with the verb cogere, which contains the sense of force 
acting upon someone or something. In using the verb to describe the necessary punishment God 
inflicts on sinners, Thomas implicitly suggests that God is the actor in a drama played out on the 
stage of necessity, in some sense not responsible for the tortures he inflicts, merely obeying the 
dictates of a law that requires the careful balance of mercy and justice.	
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sat in secular clothing with other women in church. He saw with “divine instinct” her 
election as God’s “chosen vessel” (6). Zeger persuaded Margaret to abandon thoughts of 
marriage and family and pursue a life of virginity. Though she began to “relapse” a day 
or two following her conversion, she, like Lutgard, was able to turn her stirrings of 
“affection” (motu animi affectum) for a young man to the “lasting affective knowledge” 
(perseverantem cognicionis affectum) that began to flow into her at her conversion (7), 
and she made a private vow, becoming “espoused (sponsata) to Christ” and “escaped the 
nuptials of the world” (8). She began to live the life of a tertiary, undertaking an ascetic 
and contemplative regimen in the confines of her mother’s home but under the watchful 
eye of her confessor, Zeger. Of her deeds, Thomas writes:  
She very frequently scourged herself even to the shedding of blood. A 
child of three could barely have lived on the food she ate…If any table 
companion urged her to take a morsel, she seemed quite unaware of the 
food, and when her mother rebuked her and asked why she paid no 
attention to it, she would sigh and say, “I have many things to think about 
which distract my mind elsewhere.” Often she fasted continually for two 
or three days, eating nothing, and she scarcely ever had anything to drink 
(16).230 
 
In addition to her fasting, scourging, and concentration on otherwordly things, Thomas 
writes that Margaret practiced extensive vigils and perpetual prayer (17), that she wore 
“wretched clothing” (22), begged for alms on behalf of the lepers (22), had an intense 
eucharistic devotion (24), and performed scrupulous confession (28). Despite his 
                                                 
230 “Frequentissime quidem accipiebat usque ad effusionem sanguinis disciplinas. Vix puer 
annorum trium vivere cibo posset, quo illa degens in carne vivebat, et tamen oportebat quod a 
circumsedente socia ad unamquamque fere bucellam, quasi cibi nescia, moveretur, et cum 
corriperetur a matre, cur non intenderet cibo, illa suspirans: “Multa, inquit, habeo cogitare, que 
me alias distrahunt.” Sepe diebus duobus aut tribus continuabat ieiunia, quod non comedit. De 
potu vero fere continuum erat, quod non bibebat. A vino et carnis et cibis delicatis penitus 
abstinebat” (ch. 16, p. 114). 
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assurance that her askesis “proves that the human body can do and endure many great 
things without harm to itself, far beyond what carnal people believe, but especially when 
love endures them all” (17),231 and that her deeds were endured “without self-
destruction” (17) (a principle he took to miraculous ends in the VCM), a dominant note in 
Thomas’s depiction was Margaret’s persistent weakness and weariness (19; 21; 26; 40). 
This frailty acted as a foil to the virility of her asceticism, and rhetorically serves to 
shame the complaining “powerful woman” and “strong and bearded man” to whom, 
along with Friar Zeger, he addresses the vita (17).  
Despite Thomas’s assurances that her way of life caused her no harm, Margaret’s 
weakness culminated in the definitive ascetic act of her life—the extensive illness she 
endured with longsuffering (48). Like Christina, Margaret performed the entirety of her 
purgatorial penance while in the flesh. In addition to her ascetic practice, Margaret’s vita 
details her multiple paramystical experiences. She experienced ecstatic raptures that 
persisted for many hours (18; 20; 28; 30; 44), visions (24; 31; 32; 35; 37; 39), and was 
“ravished every day by an ardent desire for contemplation” (cum aviditate 
contemplacionis cotidie raperetur) (21).  
Dyan Elliott has shown how the identification of female sanctity with the body 
ultimately served to detract from women’s claims to holiness, for the body that acted as 
proof of sanctity and warrant for certain claims and deeds was (as indeed the VCM 
shows) difficult to interpret. She argues that Thomas, with an “intense appetite for 
supernatural marvels” remained “optimistic” about the capacity of the body to give 
                                                 
231 “tenella iuvencula evidentissimum signum invenio, quod corpus humanum, super id quod 
carnales credunt, sine detractione sui multa potest et magna, maxime vero ubi amor omnia 
tolerat” (ch. 17, p, 114).	
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obvious marks about its source of inspiration, whether demonic or divine.232 The 
theological tradition became increasingly apprehensive about the evidentiary status of the 
body, and by the end of the fourteenth century the genre of spiritual discernment was 
ascendant, and typically introduced physical markers of spirituality only to discredit 
them. This shift left women, still identified with the body, without its previous authority 
and ultimately open to accusations of witchcraft.233 However, while Thomas confidently 
uses topoi of the holy female body and its paramystical feats, his corpus reveals the 
problematics of such representations of contemporary female sanctity, and, I would 
argue, his own discomfort with it. 
This discomfort is registered in Thomas’s acknowledgement that the wondrous 
horror that is the source of the text’s believability is also the cause of its unbelievability, 
and of the persecution that Christina suffered at the beginning of her new life. Her pain 
was registered as a threat by witnesses, and, despite the rhetorical and bodily force of her 
suffering, it required an act of interpretation to understand that threat as being in the 
service of salvation. Thus, the vividly rendered body, which irresistibly engendered 
bodily effects in readers still required interpretation by villagers and by readers. Perhaps 
out of the anxiety concerning the way in which the body is both problem and solution, 
Thomas repeatedly represented such interpretive moves on the part of the villagers, in 
both their misrecognitions and their recognitions. While the message of purgatorial 
punishment, the sinfulness of humanity, and the wrath of God stands forth clearly in the 
text, their visibility depends on the suffering flesh of a female saint in a way that renders 
                                                 
232 Dyan Elliott, “The Physiology of Rapture,” in Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, ed. 
Peter Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Medieval Press, 1997). p. 154. 	
233 Ibid., p. 164. 	
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them unstable, as God’s activities could be the devil’s, and the effects of horror inspire 
not a flight from sin, but from the saint. This instability in the VCM intensifies that which 
is found more generally in the use of bodily proof in the lives of holy women.  
By the time of the Life of Lutgard, written fourteen years after the VCM, Thomas 
had retreated from such representations of holy women and, I would argue, offers an 
autocritique of his previous representational strategies. Mirroring the increasing 
cloistering of his figures, with Lutgard’s vita, composed in 1246-8, he writes about a 
cloistered nun rather than an itinerant saint, and in passages I will discuss in the final 
chapter of the dissertation, he locates the wondrous primarily in the interior life of 
contemplation rather than the body. We move from spectacle in the public square to the 
hidden recesses of the cloister, unavailable to the gaze. When Thomas does describe 
bodily spectacles in the VLA, he is careful to offer allegorical readings that delimit the 
interpretive scope of a reader (thus solving the interpretive conundrum of the VCM) and 
that spiritualize the physicality of the event. The bridal language that governs the 
representation of Lutgard appears only briefly in the VCM when it is used to describe her 
first incarnation as a shepherdess who contemplated God in privacy and innocence, as 
God’s “secret” lover.  
Margot King argues that the bodiliness of the VCM must be understood 
“sacramentally,” its physicality performed ad significandum gratiam (a scholastic phrase 
Thomas uses in the VLA to explain why oil flowed from Lutgard’s fingertips) (I.16), and 
thus is reducible neither to a pure literalism or spiritualism, but rather proof that “through 
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the material universe…God works for the salvation of humanity.”234 King understands 
Thomas’s tripartite structure of the Life, divided, he says, into stages telling of how she 
was nourished (nutrita), educated (educata) and her deeds (eius gesta), to be a version of 
William of St. Thierry’s animal, rational and spiritual stages in the growth of a soul, 
mirroring Thomas’s explicit invocation of William in the Prologue to Lutgard’s Life.235 
King offers her argument as a refutation of what she terms Simone Roisin’s “literal” 
reading of the VCM, in which Roisin contrasts the bodiliness of the VCM with the 
“mature” spirituality of the VLA.236 However, while I have noted that the physicality of 
thirteenth-century hagiographical depictions of female saints was intended both to make 
the divine visible, and to act as a defense of the sacramental system, King’s reading 
obscures important differences between the Lives of Christina and Lutgard, differences 
that indicate not only a shift in the status of the protagonist—from beguine to Cistercian, 
and from the God who is driven by wrath and justice to one who is a lover obeying the 
rules of courtly etiquette—but also, perhaps, a discomfort with the mode of 
representation that dominated his previous works. Unlike Roisin, however, I would not 
account for this discomfort in terms of a new maturity arising from exposure to the 
greater sophistication of the Dominicans or scholastics, for as I have argued, it seems that 
the difficulties with such representation are registered within the VCM itself, particularly 
                                                 
234 Margot H. King, “The Sacramental Witness of Christina Mirabilis,” in Peaceweavers, ed. 
Lillian Shank et al. (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1987), p. 158. 
	
235 King, “Sacramental Witness,” p. 149	
236 Simone Roisin, “La Méthode Hagiographique de Thomas de Cantimpré,” in Miscellanea 
Historica in Honorem Alberti de Meyer I (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1946), pp. 546-
7.	
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around the issue of belief, proof, and interpretation whose circularity Thomas is 
ultimately unable to escape. 
Therefore, when Thomas does occasionally offer proof of Lutgard’s sanctity by 
means of the shedding of her blood or spectacular ascetic and contemplative feats, he 
qualifies them with reference to her interior state. For example, when a vein in Lutgard’s 
heart burst, turning her into a “second Agnes,” (I.21), Thomas transforms the red 
martyrdom of the virgin martyr into the Cistercian’s “white” one for, God told her, “by 
your desire you have equaled her martyrdom in blood.” This same passage also notes that 
this miraculous flow of blood was “witnessed” to by the “termination of the nuisance 
with which God tamed the pride in the sex of Eve.” Thus not only is Lutgard’s blood 
made efficacious by her “desire,” requiring the participation of the will in order for it to 
become a “martyrdom,” but it led to the erasure of that blood that was a vital mark of her 
femininity. The blood that was central to the representation of the asceticism of female 
saints, including Christina and Margaret (whose hair, like Lutgard’s, seeps blood, and 
whose most powerful relic was her bloody head dress) (VMY, 45), is made dependent on 
Lutgard’s interiority. Likewise, when a spying priest watched Lutgard’s skin and hair 
become “bedewed” with blood as she contemplated the Passion, he was able to cut off a 
piece of her hair as proof of the astonishing phenomenon. However, Thomas oscillates in 
this passage between describing the voyeur’s experience in active terms, such that he 
“sees” the blood (video) in a physical sense, and only seeming to be seen (videor). This 
tension arises as Thomas attempts to narratively capture and defend his contention that 
her “body outwardly drew its likeness” from the “intellectual consideration of her mind” 
(ex intellectuali enim consideratione mentis, interius, similitudinem traxit corpus 
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exterius) even as he needs to provide external proofs of sanctity (VLA II.23).  
Part II 
Modeling the Impossible: Exemplarity, Astonishment, and the Singular 
 
Contemporary medievalists and medieval pastoral guides have long had recourse 
to the distinction of those saintly actions that are ad imitanda and ad admiranda.237 For 
pastors, the distinction safely bracketed for their flock the transgressive and even 
dangerous quality of some saintly actions. Scholars follow clerical lead here, offering the 
distinction as a way of neatly classifying the bizarre acts of certain saints. The 
“admirable” is read as an edifying spectacle, while its extremism or miraculousness holds 
it at a safe distance from ordinary people who are meant to regard it with awe, but 
understand it as not having any purchase on the practice of everyday life. Yet I have 
shown that, paradoxically, the same wondrousness that makes Christina a horrifying 
specter draws her closer to her audience, for it is in fact she who imitates them, and they 
who must imitate her abject penance in order to ultimately avoid looking like her. The 
horror she inspires is horrifying precisely because of what is shared between the 
prophetic saint and the sinful community. The VCM thus shows the distinction and 
relation between what is imitanda and admiranda to be far more complex than the 
                                                 
237 See for instance James of Vitry in his Life of Marie of Oignies where the distinction is invoked 
as a way of coping with the intense anxiety some of Marie’s ascetic practices cause for him. He 
writes, “I do not say these things to commend the excess but so that I might show her 
fervour….Necessary things are not to be taken from the poverty of the flesh, although vices are to 
be checked. Therefore, admire rather than imitate what we have read about the things certain 
saints have done through the familiar counsel of the Holy Spirit” (VMO, II.12). James thus leaves 
the tricky issue of discernment for the reader who must decide, “through the familiar counsel of 
the Holy Spirit” what is to be imitated and what is to be admired. 	
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simplicity of the binary would suggest. The need to articulate a separation between 
admiration and imitation may in fact be taken as evidence of an anxiety that these 
categories are not easily separable and that saintly ideals are inherently destabilizing and 
dangerous. In the first part of this chapter, admiration means, as its etymology suggests, 
looking into a mirror, one that in its radical dissimilarity from expectations of sanctity, 
hagiographical traditions, and social order, reflects a horrifying and yet moving image. 
Hence the pathos Thomas wrests from the equanimity of the types of the virgin martyr 
and the desert mother. Christina’s peculiar type of horrifying marvelousness does not 
distance her, but depends on and ultimately reveals her nearness to her audience. 
Christina’s bizarre unlikeness, so seemingly singular and thus admirable in the sense 
intended by clerics, in fact makes a general claim upon the social body. 
In its unrestricted use of astonishing horror as both a theoretical category and 
rhetorical strategy, exemplarity in the VCM occupies a unique place in Thomas’s corpus. 
While the exemplars offered by Thomas typically function as a model for self-fashioning, 
Christina performs a warning, becoming not what her viewers aspire to imitate, but a 
manifestation of the human present and its concomitant future. In the VCM we have seen 
an instance where the imago is deformed by exaggeration, monstrosity, and unlikeness, in 
order to imitate the deformity of its audience who, having renounced their likeness to 
God, wander in the regio dissimilitudinis. However, while the tale clearly manifests a 
classic use of the exemplum as warning, Christina is not only a prophetic instance of 
dissimilar similarity but also saint. In her resurrection and miraculous intercessions, she 
performs a more literal imitatio Christi than any other saint, including Francis. What 
then, of the imitation of her audience?  
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The literal, complete, showing forth of divine goodness is, strictly speaking, 
impossible. Thus the first reading of dissimilar similarity I offered also applies to the vita, 
insofar as divine distance requires that any representation of divinity fail. No 
verisimilitude is possible in the signification of God, hence the appropriateness of the 
monstrous figuration of the saint, for whom the saintly vocation always requires, in Edith 
Wyschogrod’s phrase, to “show unrepresentablity itself,” displaying “how impossible it 
is to bring divine life into plenary presence.”238  
For Wyschogrod, this impossibility is due to the fact that the paradigmatic power 
of Christ and his saints derives from their transcendent ground, an infinity to which finite 
beings have no access, thus making the injunction to imitate Christ one that can never be 
fulfilled in its entirety. Thomas’s text would agree with this view, though the rhetorical 
form by which it is expressed is radically different: the vita suggests that to perform the 
literal imitation of Christ is to be formed according to that image and, in some very real 
sense, deformed, inhuman, monstrous. The stakes of divine and human interest are 
presented by the vita as radically opposed. One exists at the expense of the other. The vita 
thus shows the unlikeness of humanity and God and the irreconcilability of the two 
realms. 
While I have examined the way in which Christina’s unlikeness is in fact a critical 
likeness, her monstrosity remains. The realization of Christina’s prophetic likeness does 
not dissolve her horrifying difference from her audience, as the description of her spectral 
body in its last days attests (46). Thomas not only portrays a saint who is admirable in the 
sense of being a mirror, but one who is admirable in what I have called the clerical sense 
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of being an inimitable wonder. Thus, in terms of the question of the imitation of 
Christina, she remains largely singular. In addition to the scandalous nature of much of 
her practice, which I have discussed above—including her mendicancy, itinerancy, as 
well as her acting as confessor and preacher—her imitation of Christ is miraculous, 
miming (and even outdoing) not only his human life, but his resurrection and physical 
sacrifice, becoming a sin offering for others. Thomas’s text thus participates in the 
practice of placing a fence around sanctity through the turn to the category of the 
admirable (in this text explicitly marked by the semantic field of the marvelous 
(mirabilis) and wonderful (admiranda, mira), as that which is singular and thus 
inimitable. In her miraculous imitation of Christ, Christina partakes of that transcendent 
ground Wyschogrod notes would typically apply only to the Son of God. 
However, because Christian sanctity is a mimetic practice based ultimately on the 
imitation of Christ enjoined of all Christians, the binary between imitation and 
admiration is ultimately incoherent. The instability that inheres within this distinction is 
the cause of the persistent danger and potential radicality of texts such as the VCM. At 
which point and in what regard is a person to be named admirable, a safe spectacle, and 
not imitable? Who defines such limits, particularly at a time like Thomas’s, when the 
practices of piety are undergoing great change in the wake of Lateran IV, the upsurge of 
lay piety begun in the Gregorian reforms, the new demographic and economic realities? 
Those qualities that render Christina astonishing are the sources of her authority as 
cultural critic and prophet of purgatory even as they are what most fundamentally 
marginalize her, perhaps to the point of rendering her tale irrelevant to readers. 
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I would argue that Christina’s singularity is the primary place where Thomas 
genders her sanctity. Christina’s singular wondrousness makes her worthy of being 
remembered in hagiographical form, even as her singularity renders her less dangerous to 
the status quo. Insofar as she is admirable in the clerical sense, rather than as a mirror, she 
may become something like an amazing curiosity.  
 
Gendering Particularity: A Comparison with The Life of Abbot John of Cantimpré  
The other of Thomas’s Lives that focuses on the figure of a preacher, and his sole 
Life of a man, is that of Abbot John of Cantimpré. A comparison of the two Lives reveals 
important features of the gendering of particularity and the formation of sanctity in 
Thomas’s corpus. This gendering, I will show, is most importantly apparent in the 
construction of the singularity (and thus inimitability) of Christina and the imitability of 
John. Both John and Christina are master preachers, but while Christina preaches 
primarily through a marvelous body, John is figured as one who inspires horror, 
compunction, and mercy primarily through “marvelous eloquence” (c.f. VJC II.9), though 
bodily performance and language are important to both. Christina’s singularity will be 
shown to be a function not of the mission of preaching or its message, which is the same 
for both Christina and John, but of the means of such preaching and its effects. While 
both John and Christina inspire compunction, horror, and wonder, the relation of each 
preacher to their message is vitally different. Christina's message is tied to the 
particularity of her person, in particular, her body. John’s message, I will show, is very 
differently related to his body, and the vita constructs him, in some ways, as incidental to 
the telling of his own vita.  
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Thomas’s tale of the itinerant priest is a wandering one; the narrative structure of 
the text recapitulates the traveling of John’s word throughout the region of Brabant. 
Putatively arranged around the figure of John, the vita is oriented not around the titular 
hero, but according to an associative logic that collects exemplary tales directly about 
John, those whom he has converted, institutions with which he was connected, and 
edifying tales Thomas relates by virtue of his own desire to preach that have nothing to 
do with John at all. Proof of John’s sanctity is manifested the depiction of multiple 
figures converted by his holiness, preaching, and counsel. The life is constructed by 
means of a series of examples that describe the “fruits” of his public mission. The 
example of the saint is proven by other examples. This structure of repetition generates a 
proliferation of John’s figure by means of his preaching, but it is also the means of his 
displacement. While the Life of Christina concerns the ecstasies of its peculiar subject, 
Thomas presents the Life of John as an ecstatic narrative: “Since I have strayed 
(excessimus) very far from the purpose of my narrative—albeit fittingly and usefully—let 
me now return to the story I set out to write” (At quoniam propositi nostri narrationem, 
licet congrue et utiliter, longe ualde excessimus, ad id tamen ad quod singulariter stilum 
intendimus reuertamur) (II.8b). Such straying occurs repeatedly, as does Thomas’s 
tendency to draw attention to the wandering nature of his tale, a wandering he contrasts 
with the intent of focusing “singularly” on John.  
However, while this digressive structure displaces John from the center of the 
narrative, it paradoxically demonstrates the power of his preaching. John’s presence and 
actions may not always be explicitly named, but the content of the preaching of this 
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“exemplar of the twelfth-century evangelical movement”239—humility, poverty, 
penance—remains the implicit referent of each exemplum. It is this reference that 
governs the content of the text. Thus Thomas justifies one instance of his narrative 
itinerancy, writing: “The marks (insignia) of our holy father sparkle in and through 
everything” (II.5).240 The singularity of John as a figure and a body is translated or 
dissolved into the general terms of the evangelical message he preached. This translation 
means that the exemplarity of John’s vita is found less in the details of his particular 
biography (though such details are richly offered) and more in the content of his 
preaching, made available to and imitable by all his hearers. It is this treatment of 
singularity and the parameters and possibility of imitation that constitute the key 
difference, I would argue, between the Lives of John and Christina.  
The associative quality of John’s life shows his to be a life that is ultimately 
replaceable. Exemplarity is figured as a type of repetition. John’s preaching is 
represented as being so transformative that his listeners become worthy of having their 
own mini-vitae and encomia inserted into his own. Thus the center of the VJC consists of 
an extensive life of Lord John of Montmirail, with most of the material derived by 
Thomas from the Vita Ioannis de Monte-Mirabili by a monk of Longpont. If not precisely 
converted by John, for Thomas had only heard that his conversion had come about 
through a “horrible sign” (horroris signum), John of Montmirail was led “by constant 
exhortation…to such a sublime degree of perfection that he restored all the goods and 
riches he had violently extorted from his subjects, and the fragrance of his humility and 
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240 “per omnia et in omnibus sancti patris micant insignia.” 	
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sanctity wafted throughout France and Germany” (II.8b).241 Despite their differences—
John of Montmirail is a nobleman who renounces worldly wealth, while John of 
Cantimpré is a man of humble beginnings whose artisanal parents somehow managed to 
send him to Paris for an education242—Thomas creates a palimpsest in the stories of the 
two Johns. One the preacher, the other the convert, who, like his spiritual father, becomes 
poor and humble and by means of his conversion, preaches through dramatic displays of 
restitution and humility. Thus he kisses a leper so that the “noble prince’s face [was] 
smeared with blood and pus,”243 and returns all his ill-gotten gains to his victims with an 
elaborate public ritual that includes a symbolic suicide. In a final layering of sanctity and 
mutual witness, Thomas appends a description of Marie of Oignies, “whose life was 
written by the venerable James…with outstanding eloquence,” though it left out many 
miracles enumerated by Thomas. Thomas justifies the inclusion of Marie by claiming 
that John of Montmirail’s death was divinely revealed to her. 
We see a similar instance of biographical displacement when Thomas recounts 
the foundation of the woman’s house at Prémy. Thomas breaks into an extended 
description of Iueta, who had, like John, “renounced worldly riches and pleasures 
because of [John’s] preaching” (II.3). Iueta, in turn, was imitated by other noble matrons 
and virgins, including Anastasia de Croisilles and Mathilda de Fontaine, whose activities 
at Prémy are then related in two subsequent chapters. A further instance of this 
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242 Ibid., p. 23. See VJC II.1. 	
243 “De hoc, illud insigne admirationis refertur piaculum quod, leprosum horrenda facie fedum, 
sanie per ora scantentem suppliciter osculates, propria exutus ueste contexerit.”	
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embedding of narratives occurs when Thomas includes elaborate biographies (“for the 
sake of posterity”) of the seven men who first joined John at the priory (I. 15-16), 
detailing their qualities, tasks, gifts, miracles, and, in the case of Hilliard, perfidy.  
The description of John the vita purports to offer is thus often performed by 
means of the descriptions of others who are the “fruits” his preaching (II.8b), offshoots of 
the “seeds of his word” (II.9) (semina uerborum). Conversely, descriptions of others can 
become descriptions of John. Thus his mother’s epitaph depicts her as the “happy mother 
of this church’s father,” and tells that “as vision shows” she was released from purgatory 
by John’s prayers. John is “a faithful son,/True in life as in belief.” The poem acts as an 
exemplum illustrating John’s virtue even as it proves the possibility of intercessory 
prayer for those in purgatory (II.2).244 
A second structure that contributes to the itinerant narrative of the VJC occurs in 
the exempla intended to illustrate and attest to John’s manifold virtues. Insofar as these 
anecdotes are meant to describe John, they are somewhat dependent on the frame of the 
vita for their intelligibility. However, despite this dependence, the majority of these 
exempla could stand alone as compelling narrative units illustrating doctrinal lessons as 
much as John’s gifts. For example, the story told to illustrate John’s power as a confessor 
and counselor relates a tale of a murderer who, stricken with compunction, confesses her 
guilt to John before undergoing the ordeal (II.6). Having compassion, John absolves her, 
whereupon she passes the ordeal even as her brother, either unrepentant or confessed by a 
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less saintly priest (the text is unclear), is shown by the fire to be guilty. This tale is proof 
of John’s compassion and priestly efficacy, but it is also an exemplum illustrating the 
mortal importance of confession, for “there is nothing covered that will not be revealed, 
nothing hidden that will not be made known” (c.f BUA 1.24.3; II. 27.2; Luke 12:2).245  
In another exemplum, intended to illustrate the fruit of John’s fasting and prayers, 
Thomas tells of the noble Walter of Flos, victim of the “contagion of heretical depravity” 
(prauitatis male propagata contagia) in Cambrai, who disbelieved the doctrine of 
transubstantiation. Hearing of this, John interceded with prayers and fasting, with the 
result that Walter “suddenly beheld (vidit) in the priest’s hand a boy of such elegant 
beauty that he could by no means doubt (ut neququam posset ambigere) that this was the 
newborn child…this was nothing and no one other than the One who is daily hidden 
beneath the veil of the bread” (I.10).246 The story not only provides signs of John’s virtus, 
but acts as a “proof” of transubstantiation and as a lesson in how to understand the 
meaning of the Eucharist, addressing the doubt and ignorance of readers.  
As these examples show, as a good preacher, John is entirely in the service of his 
penitential message. These examples are used to paint John’s portrait, but John is so 
entirely congruent with their lessons of Eucharistic piety and the necessity and power of 
confession, that no gap exists between John and the message he preaches. There is no 
remainder beyond the borders of his priestly function. Entirely aligned with the dogmatic 
lessons he expounds, his authority derived ex officio, he is in some way absorbed by these 
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lessons. John thus tends to become a medium or occasion for the illustration of a larger 
moral, and is in some sense incidental to his own story. He becomes entirely his office. 
In contrast, in the Life of Christina, such an alignment between office and 
character is impossible. Christina’s excessive, atopic body renders her ever in excess of 
what she preaches, and this excess is the source of her wondrousness. Her deeds, 
putatively in support of orthodox practice, such as her promotion of confession, are 
ambiguous if not explicitly heretical because her body is the wrong gender and 
unordained. Likewise, as Sweetman notes, her most fundamental practice of preaching is 
suspect insofar as it exceeds the bounds of her “office” as woman.247 The marvelousness 
of her body in regard to her pastoral functions consists not only in its miraculous 
properties, then, but its sex. Furthermore, her life of poverty and penance is so hyperbolic 
as to become possible folly, and this poverty is the cause of her controversial itinerancy 
and theft.  
The itinerancy of the vita Ioannis structurally performs the notion of preaching 
Thomas celebrates. John’s erasure and reiteration in the figures of others who are the fruit 
of his word enacts the humility and poverty that are the center of his mission as a 
follower of the vita apostolica’s call to preaching, poverty, and penance. John “gets out 
of the way” of his own tale, so to speak, appearing only insofar as others appear. This 
performance of humble character recapitulates the nature of the Pauline principle Thomas 
argues is central to John’s preaching “with kindness and humility of spirit” in “imitation 
of Christ”: “He [Christ] has chosen what is weak in the world to confound the strong. He 
has chosen what is abject and contemptible (abiecta et contemptibilia) to overturn the 
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powers that be as if they had never been” (II.9).248 John’s particularity is systematically 
effaced as the text shows the dispersal and resurrection of its hero in his followers. Such 
an erasure is a form of humility. John is represented by those whom he converts, 
confesses, and leads, both the nobility and the masses, and though Thomas’s book is 
addressed to the canons at Cantimpré, its intended readership was likely much broader 
than that small community if its lessons on transubstantiation and against usury are any 
indication.249 At the very least, the vita would have provided the canons with materia 
praedicabiles for preaching to larger audiences on these pressing contemporary issues. 
Both Christina and John are figured as representatives of the evangelical tradition: 
both preach penance to the community at large, live lives of poverty, and practice 
itinerancy, the primary setting of both tales being not the cloister, but the cities and rural 
haunts of the nobility. Furthermore, the language of wonder and horror, which I have 
shown to be essential to Christina’s mission, also appears in the Life of John. However, in 
general, the VJC focuses on John’s speech, which is described as having the marvelous 
and horrifying power Thomas will later attribute to Christina’s marvelous body. Like 
Christina flesh, John’s words have bodily effects, particularly horror, compunction, and 
identification. Thus when he preached against heretics in Cambrai, the people, 
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249 One important later reader of the VJC was Jean Mauburne, a canon regular (1460-1501), 
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the VJC in this context shows the persistence of ideals of reform as articulated by the vita. See the 
introduction by R. Godding in “Une oeuvre inédite,” p. 248-250. 
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“thunderstruck by his urgency…were in such ecstasy that their hair stood on end. 
Without delay this divine horror, transfused into their souls, brought a great many to 
eternal salvation through compunction” (diuinis horror in animas transfusus) (II.11).250 
John’s prayers and tears for the disbelieving Walter of Flos enabled the nobleman to have 
a vision of the Christ child being elevated at the altar. Seeing “this wonder, the man fell 
prostrate in fear” (horrore prosternitur) (1.10). Again, when attacking usurers, Thomas 
says that “With such remarks he provoked the whole people to astonishing compunction” 
(ad compunctionem mirabiliter prouocabat) (II.13). The prince Robert Mauvoisin 
“marveled at John’s holiness and eloquence” after hearing John speak, and turned inward 
with “vehement self-reproach” (II.9).251  
The emphasis on John’s linguistic gifts does not, however, preclude the 
importance of bodily performance in the VJC, even as one cannot ignore Christina’s 
verbal abilities. John’s preaching sometimes employs physical spectacle, though in this 
case, it is the penitent who becomes spectacle, usually through John’s skillful handling, 
rather than John himself. These spectacles are described by Thomas as persuasive 
techniques that move the audience to imitate the renunciation of the performing penitent, 
and are offered as proof of the power of John’s preaching to the reader of his vita. Such 
displays include John’s “shrewd” encouragement of the priest Alard’s ritual suicide and 
resurrection to signify his death to usurious and fraudulent behavior (II.13), a dramatic 
                                                 
250 “Cuius stupore et extasi omnes in subitatione peruasi, pilis carnis quasi quibusdam hisutiis 
inhorruerunt. Nec mora, diuinus horror in animas transfusus, interius uirtutem eterne salutis per 
compunctionem operatur in pluribus.”	
251 “His dictis, uehementi in se animaduersione conuersus sanctitatem uiri et facetitiam 
mirabaturr, cepitque eum intimo affectu cordis excolere eiusque uerbis et admonitionibus 
inherere.” 
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performance carried out before a “great crowd” who wept “abundantly” at the 
melodramatic display. Thomas offers a detailed description of rich penitents stripping 
themselves in response to John’s preaching, leading John to ask the crowd, “Who will 
clothe my children who have made themselves poor and naked for Christ’s sake?” In 
response, other nobles threw off their garments. Thomas describes such scenes vividly 
(implying such events happened more than once) writing, “You would see tunics and 
cloaks flying through the air from the violence of those who threw them, naked men 
clothed and overwhelmed, and the people shouting to heaven with a mighty voice,” and 
in their midst a weeping John, showing himself to have the gift of tears (II.12).252  
Thomas’s depiction of John’s virtues draws heavily on the Cistercian tradition of 
feminine images for describing the authoritative male’s relation to God and his 
community.253 While John, as a man, is able to perform his preaching duties ex officio, 
unlike Christina’s improvised and scandalous activities, Thomas is careful to describe his 
authority by means of feminine metaphors, making his powerful presence and practice 
appropriate for someone who exemplifies the vita apostolica and its principle of 
inversion. Although the brilliance of John’s mind was noted, as was his education in 
business and scripture (I.3), like Lutgard (VLA I.3; III.17) he was said to have a dovelike 
                                                 
252 “’Quis filios meos paupers pro Christo effectos et nudos cooperiet?’ Ad hanc uocem, uideres 
nobiles et insignes uestibus se certatim exuere, tunicas et pallia iactantium uiolentia ferri per aera, 
uestiri ac cumulari nudos, altisonis uocibus populum conclamare.” As Barbara Newman notes, 
John’s vita bears astonishing similarities with Francis’s, and the VJC was completed the year of 
Francis’s canonization and the appearance of Thomas of Celano’s vita prima (B. Newman, 
Thomas of Cantimpré: The Collected Saint’s Lives, p. 6). This similarity has to do with the 
common urbanization, mercantile wealth, and the concomitant disparities between rich and poor 
that arose, leading to protest poverty movements inspired by the vita apostolica (Ibid., p. 11).  
	
253 For a close analysis of this language and tradition, which she traces back to Anselm of 
Canterbury, see Caroline Walker Bynum, “Jesus As Mother, Abbott as Mother: Some Themes in 
Twelfth-century Cistercian Writing,” in Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High 
Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 	
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simplicity (columbina simplicitas) (I.14), echoing the description of his mother as 
columba simplex (II.1), in keeping with the text’s upholding of an apostolic ideal of 
simplicity. As in Thomas’s accounts of Lutgard, Margaret, and Christina, John suffered 
to remain in the flesh, and the outward affliction of his ascesis was matched by the 
inward torment of his desire to be with Christ: “inwardly his ardent spirit was tormented 
(torquebatur) the more keenly (anxius) the more he longed (cupiebat) to be dissolved 
(dissolui) and be with Christ” (II.22). However, while this language of the desire to be 
dissolved often raises the problem of suicide in women’s texts, as the choice is between 
life and death, the flesh and the spirit (see for instance the VLA, III.9), this language of 
torment is most elaborate in Thomas’s description of the split between John’s vocation as 
a community leader and as a contemplative:  
He was urgently constrained on the one hand by concern for neighbours, 
among whom scandals were increasing, and on the other by the desire to 
see Christ…Suspended (suspensus) thus between hope and fear in an 
agony of spiritual martyrdom (spiritalis martirii agone) he found himself 
exalted on one side on the rack of expectation, burned on the other by the 
fires of scandal. In this way he afflicted (afflictio) his body outwardly and 
his spirit inwardly. Since the age of physical martyrdom is now over, there 
remained to him only spiritual affliction of the will (uoluntatis spiritalis 
afflictio) (II.22).254 
 
The language of martyrdom that so permeates Christina’s vocation is here entirely 
interiorized and made a function of the proper exercise of a canonical office. The rack on 
which Christina was stretched becomes for John the expectation of his community; while 
                                                 
254 “Sed ab una parte sollicitudine proximorum in quibus scandala crebrescebant, ex altera uero 
desiderio uidendi eum quem memoriter retinebat, instantius angebatur. Inter hec duo, spe 
quodammodo metuque suspensus, spiritalis martirii agone, ut hinc expectationis eculeo 
sublimatus, illinc scandalorum ignibus ureretur. Sic corpus foris, sic spiritum affligebat interius. 
Corporalis martirii iam tempus abierat, restabat solius uoluntatis spiritalis afflictio.” 
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Christina creeps into fire, John suffers the scandals of his community. Like William of St. 
Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux, John is an abbot with an ambivalent relationship to his 
own leadership as it removes him from constant contemplation. The office of abbot and 
priest is represented not as a source of unmitigated power but as a site of continual 
askesis, one that John was able to eventually renounce (II.24). Furthermore, like the 
Cistercians studied by Bynum, the feminine became a vital supplement to the exercise of 
a powerful office, as Thomas writes that John behaved to those in his charge not as a king 
or Lord, but as a “father” and “more than a mother, and like a hen who clucks to summon 
her chicks” (II.24).255  
Like all saints who tended in thirteenth-century hagiography to possess a 
“glorious body,” one that expresses the virtus of the soul, John’s body was remarkable.256 
Unlike Christina’s, however, which bore witness to the deformity of the human condition 
even as her soul was perfect, John’s body revealed his soul, for a “kind of apostolic 
dignity shone out in him” and a “certain angelic majesty in his eyes displayed the grace 
of wonder-working virtue” (II.9).257 Gazing on his face would cause his audience to be 
stricken with compunction as soon as he ascended the pulpit, before he had uttered a 
word.  
                                                 
255Bynum, “Jesus as Mother,” p. 115. She notes that Bernard, in particular, uses the image of the 
Abbot as a suckling mother who pours out affectivity and instruction, unable to turn away from 
her child whatever happens. The abbot is not only bride but mother, one who must do more than 
lie with the groom, but must busily raise her needy children, i.e. preach, counsel, and perform 
administration.  
	
256 André Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 437-438. 
 	
257 “Erga uero plebeias multitudines, adeo sanctus et extra humanum modum mirabilis apparebat, 
ut apostolica quedam in eo dignitas reflorescere uideretur. Predicaturus enim in populo statim, ubi 
ascenso pulpito seu exedra primam in themtate sermonis uocem dabat, omnes pene in lachrimis 
resoluti compungebantur.” 
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The beauty and persuasive power of the saintly face is a topos that gained 
ascendency in the thirteenth century among both male and female saints. This 
hagiographical commonplace was articulated in systematic form by Aquinas, who held 
that the illumination of the soul was reflected in the body; insofar as the saints exist in 
union with Christ, who is light, their bodies are irradiated, reflecting the divine light.258 
While both John and Christina’s bodies inspired compunction, the former did so through 
its harmonious beauty, the latter by means of the shock of its abjection. John’s body, 
soul, and speech existed in a harmonious union while the horror of Christina arose 
through the asymmetry of her soul and body. The abjection and humility that are 
hallmarks of the vita apostolica were attributed in the VJC to John’s words, not his body. 
The power of his speech, particularly with nobles whom he handled especially gently, 
was said by Thomas to be a function of its humility and moderation, a manifestation of 
the “abject and contemptible” (abiecta et contemptabilia) power of the heavenly kingdom 
(II.9). Thus, the principle of abjection and humiliation we find in the poverty and 
suffering of Christina’s body was here attributed to John’s preaching. 
Body and speech thus have an inverse relation in the two vitae. While in the VJC 
John’s body was present, it served to confirm his word, which was the primary means of 
his mission. In the VCM, Christina preached by her words, but her most dramatic and 
memorable testimony was that of her strange flesh, which occupies a much greater 
portion of her vita than her verbal witness. The imitation of Christ performed by both 
saints followed the tradition of the vita apostolica, but the hyperbolic nature of 
Christina’s bodily imitation of Christ rendered her inimitable and deformed, an eruptive 
                                                 
258 André Vauchez, Sainthood, p. 435. See Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, IV.86.	
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force that insisted on its singularity, while John’s body was beautiful and his words, 
manifesting the abjection and humility of Christina’s flesh, were gentle, simple, and 
persuasive.  
 
Conclusion 
Thomas’s portrayal of Christina is an example of the use of women as powerful 
signs and proof of orthodoxy, particularly the doctrine of purgatory and the importance of 
penitential suffering for sin. In order for women like Christina to be effective agents of 
persuasion and teaching, it was necessary that they have access to an authority that would 
make their message compelling despite their exclusion from traditional sources of 
authority, particularly priestly office. The work of Bynum and others has shown how 
women’s bodies in the thirteenth century were enlisted as the site and source of spiritual 
authority, as they identified their flesh with that of Jesus in his suffering humanity. 
Through this identification, they obtained a power and influence otherwise inaccessible to 
them.259 As I have shown, Thomas follows this trend in his portrayal of Christina. As we 
have seen, Christina’s body is foregrounded in a way that John’s is not, and has radically 
different qualities. However, it is not Christina’s body itself that is persuasive, but its 
astonishing qualities and its wondrous effects. These effects, I have shown, are 
exemplary in two opposed but related ways: first, the horror her monstrosity inspires acts 
                                                 
259 See Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: On the Religious Significance of 
Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); John Coakley, 
Women, Men, and Spiritual Power: Female Saints and their Male Collaborators (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006). In Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, André Vauchez, p. 438 
argues that women had only the “language of the body” at their disposal for the expression of 
their religious experience, and in the later Middle Ages this discourse was increasingly inflected 
by the suffering body of Christ. 	
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as a mirror, its seeming difference revealing a terrifying similarity between her body and 
the bodies of her spectators. The horror of her body compels belief in purgatorial 
punishments and the reality of sin. Second, her flesh, in its excessive, again monstrous, 
suffering, is the locus of her imitatio Christi, and thus becomes a place to apprehend the 
divine, but in its ineffability. In order to embody this ineffability, Christina’s flesh not 
only acts as a mirror but also remains other by virtue of its scandalous particularity. That 
Christina’s imitatio points to divine ineffability thus reveals a limitation to exemplarity, a 
way in which the mimetic chain by which Christian sanctity is conceived and 
communicated breaks down.  
The Life further emphasizes this tension inherent to the structure of sanctity by 
showing Christina’s imitatio as an encroachment upon the dogmatically declared 
singularity of Christ. While Christ died once, Christina died three times; he was 
resurrected once, she twice. She suffered supernatural pain for a much greater length of 
time. Her imitation was based not only on Christ’s human life, but also on his 
supernatural ability to become sin and to be resurrected. Insofar as her monstrous flesh 
reveals the incommensurability of the divine and human realms, becoming a deformed 
and singular spectacle of divine presence, it points to divine distance or dissimilarity. It is 
an apophatic strategy. Insofar as her body is recognized as a mirror of the human 
condition and a warning of future things, it points to the pedagogy of the incarnation, of a 
God who, in Origen’s phrase, becomes all things in order to transform them.  
The doubleness of Christina’s sanctity can, in part, be attributed to Thomas’s 
theological views articulated in the contemporary document, De Natura Rerum (DNR). 
The text lays out a pastoral dualism by virtue of which the saints are held to be humans 
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who live contra naturam, their virtue the result of the ordering of their lives to grace. The 
DNR holds monks, nuns, and other religious persons to this ideal, while the virtuousness 
of the laity is understood to arise from an alignment with nature.260 In the DNR, 
preaching to the laity thus involves a focus on the recognition of sin and penance, rather 
than the modeling of the cultivation of virtue and purgations of ascesis, as the recognition 
and removal of sinfulness is understood to enable the natural virtue of the soul and body 
to arise. By virtue of her resurrection, Christina enacts, though in a fashion more literal 
than other saints, the way in which saints are contra naturam. The astonishing, 
unbelievable quality of Christina’s post-resurrection existence depicts the invasion of the 
order of nature by the order of grace and narrativizes the incommensurability of the two 
spheres. However, in making his exemplar of supernatural virtue a laywoman, and 
addressing the text to a general audience (“whoever reads these things”), Thomas 
complicates the dualism that Robert Sweetman has identified as essential to this phase of 
Thomas’s career.  
Christina’s construction as one-who-must-be-admired is not only an apophatic 
strategy but also a pragmatic political tactic. While Christina’s astonishing nature 
obtained for her an authority disallowed by her gender, the same gesture that bestowed 
this authority built a fence around the female saint, making her safe by delimiting the 
sphere of her influence, placing a boundary around her exemplarity. This boundary, I 
have shown, is not present in Thomas’s Life of John, which narrates a figure who is 
radically imitable, such that he dissolves into the persons whom he converts and 
influences. The radical singularity of Christina’s outrageous wondrousness acts as a kind 
                                                 
260 Robert Sweetman, Dominican Preaching, p. 135. 	
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of cloister for the itinerant saint, as Thomas attempts to delimit the frontiers of her 
influence. 
However, the distinction between Christina’s imitability and her admirable 
wondrousness ultimately leaves the reader with the difficult task of interpretation: How to 
determine what to imitate and what to admire? What is shared and what remains other? 
As both elements inhere in her body, such discernment is particularly difficult. The 
binary of imitation and admiration, the similar and dissimilar, contains the constant 
potential of its own collapse and can be mediated only by the reader’s interpretive act. In 
giving Christina’s divinely directed deeds demonic lineaments, Thomas shows the 
ambivalence of the appearance of sanctity, particularly in women, and the fraught nature 
of the interpretive endeavors this appearing requires. Furthermore, Christina’s marvelous 
imitation shows the impossibility of the audience’s own imitation and interpretation. The 
Life of Christina turns to monstrous figuration and the singularity of its wondrous saint in 
order to offer an apophatic logic, to show how “impossible it is to bring divine life into 
plenary presence.”261 Christina’s monstrosity evades ultimate signification, its otherness 
causing a crisis of response and multiple interpretations that may frame Christina’s 
strangeness, but never exhaust it. 
                                                 
261 Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism, p. 13. 	
	 
 
Chapter Three 
 
A Question of Proof: Augustine and the Reading of Hagiography 
 
 
Introduction: Example, Relic and Text  
 
 
In the Supplement to the Life of Marie of Oignies (VMO-S) (1230), Thomas of 
Cantimpré writes that James of Vitry realized from long experience that a mind 
overwhelmed by the temptation of blasphemy does not easily grasp (capiat) an argument 
(rationem) from scripture “unless it is buttressed with the most telling examples” (nisi 
exemplis evidentissimis confirmetur).262 James’ description figures example as a kind of 
proof, for it provides the evidence that is able to render an elusive argument not only 
visible, but that establishes its veracity and thereby makes it compelling for an audience. 
Example, according to James, is central to the work of religious persuasion. The context 
in which Thomas invokes James is a story that relates a crisis of faith suffered by 
Hugolino, then bishop of Ostia, later Pope Gregory IX, providing in its course a vivid 
instance of the importance of example for a man for whom traditional sources of 
persuasion—particularly the scriptures—were no longer effective in the face of demonic 
persuasion. Thomas describes the reception of James of Vitry’s vita of Marie of Oignies 
by Hugolino, enabling us to see more clearly how, in 1230, Thomas understood the 
persuasive power of example to function.    
                                                 
262 Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Mariae Oigniacensis, Supplementum, in AASS, 23 June, XXV, 
572-81. English translation in Mary of Oignies, Mother of Salvation, ed. Anneke B. Mulder-
Bakker, trans. by Hugh Feiss OSB (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), ch. 16. Hereafter VMO-S. Passages 
will be cited within the text. “Sed quoniam ipse Acconensis, vir prudens & expertus, in talibus 
fieri sæpe sciebat, ut mens talium maxime tentationum fluctibus obruta, subito rationem non 
capiat, nisi exemplis evidentissimis confirmetur.” 
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According to Thomas, when Hugolino confessed to James that he suffered from 
the temptation of blasphemy, James first proclaimed “things that seemed to be apt and 
suitable for temptations of this kind,” but his “reasoning” (rationem)—those “ungrasped” 
arguments James refers to in Thomas’s quotation—remained ineffective, as did James’s 
wise pastoral strategy of “mingling his sighs” with Hugolino’s.263 James finally gave him 
Marie’s vita, confident that this saint who so often cured others of the spirit of blasphemy 
would soon cure the bishop.264 The book, James told Hugolino, contained “many 
examples” of Marie’s “special grace” of expelling blasphemous spirits, a gift, James 
insisted, she retained in death. Hugolino then asked James if he could also borrow the 
relic of Marie’s finger that James wore always around his neck and which, as Thomas 
describes in chapter twenty, helped to save James’s life during a shipwreck. Hugolino 
took the book along with the relic and “devoted himself” to reading her Life (lectioni 
vigilanter incubuit). He found “wondrous hope and peace” in the vita, and from the relic, 
he derived a “great mental confidence.”  The transformation wrought in Hugolino by 
James’s gifts culminated in a secret vision in which, “with the palate of his heart he tasted 
how sweet is the Lord” (gustansque palato cordis quam suavis est Dominus), and 
attained a lasting security (securitas), free from his old temptations.265  
Thomas portrays James’s intervention by means of example and relic as being 
remarkably efficacious, having an almost instantaneous, irresistible effect. However, by 
the time he wrote The Life of Lutgard of Aywières (VLA) thirty-two years later (1262), 
                                                 
263 “ingressus Scripturarum misericordiæque divinæ thesauros, prædicabat (sed non ignaro 
talium) ea quæ in hujusmodi tentationibus apta & congrua esse videbantur.” VMO-S, ch. 16.  
	
264 VMO-S, ch. 16.  
	
265 VMO-S, ch. 17.	
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Thomas’s confidence in the power of hagiographical example to persuade, increase 
understanding, and thereby transform readers was greatly mitigated. The Prologue to the 
VLA foregrounds his concern that the vita would not be believed and thus would not be 
adopted by readers as an exemplary text, concerns elaborated as part of an extended 
humility topos. Hugolino’s idiosyncratic, blasphemous doubt becomes, in the Prologue to 
the VLA, the doubt of all readers in the truth of Thomas’s tale. In contrast to Hugolino’s 
experience with Marie’s vita, the Life of Lutgard is not represented as irresistible, nor 
does the text portray itself as conferring an immediacy of saintly presence on the reader. 
Instead, the Prologue emphasizes the rhetorical situation of writer and resistant reader—
the reader who considers the merits of an argument, weighing the legitimacy of offered 
proofs—positing the necessity of the participation of the reader’s reason in the work of 
belief and interpretation. The reader must, in Thomas’s language, “take up” (suscipiant) 
the tale and the saint, without which taking up, the exemplarity of its saintly figure would 
remain ineffective. The exemplar is adopted as such only after a process of deliberation. 
The contrast in attitude towards hagiographical example between the Supplement and the 
Life of Lutgard can be seen in Thomas’s recapitulation of the trope of finger and text in 
the later vita: Thomas wrote the Life of Lutgard in exchange for Lutgard’s finger. While 
Thomas needed to earn a finger by writing a Life that was a performance, incitement, and 
proof of his love and belief, Hugolino graciously received Marie’s finger, and was thus 
given the capacity to believe.  
The question of exemplary proof and the ways in which it solicits readers’ belief 
in thirteenth-century hagiography is an important one, for it was a time when Catholic 
and Cathar alike proffered novel and contemporary forms of sanctity as models for pious 
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practice and as evidence for the truth of theological claims. Hagiographies like Thomas’s, 
Dyan Elliott argues, were key documents for “proving” the sanctity of women whose 
piety was sculpted in order to refute Cathar claims.266 Such vitae were the initial stage in 
a juridical process that culminated in an orderly inquisitio undertaken by the papacy that 
determined the validity or spuriousness of a claim to sanctity. Elliott thus identifies a 
double dynamic of proof: holy women were proven saintly by hagiographical evidence; 
these women, in turn, became proofs of orthodoxy, living instances of the truth of 
Catholic dogma. According to Elliott, both Thomas’s and James of Vitry’s vitae are 
exemplary illustrations of this kind of hagiographical writing.267 The saints of these Lives, 
she argues, with their elaborate somatic and Eucharistic piety, submission to clerical 
authority and its sacramental and penitential program, acted either as a kind of argument 
refuting the claims of heretics (including the denial of the goodness of the body, the 
materiality of the sacraments, the humanity of Christ, and the validity and efficacy of the 
Catholic priesthood), or as consummate performers of those saintly behaviors idealized 
by Catholics and Cathars, thus affirming the presence of apostolic values such as poverty 
and charity within a Catholic context derided as corrupt and greedy by many 
dissenters.268 The hagiographical representation of contemporary holy women thus 
affirms Catholic sacramentalism, their examples functioning as compelling rhetorical 
                                                 
266 Dyan Elliott, Proving Woman: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the Later 
Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 2. 
 
267 Ibid., ch. 2. 
 
268 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
 
132	
	
devices, rendering the saints vivid, comprehensible instances of abstract doctrine so 
effectively that they become forms of living proof.   
The probative, juridical function of these Lives as noted by Elliott is indeed well 
established. The vitae are pervaded by the vocabulary of proving and witnessing that 
accord with the context of inquisition and trial to which both potential saints and heretics 
were subject. The verb probare, exceedingly common in ecclesiastical Latin and 
Thomas’s vitae, translates variously as “to test, to judge, to inspect,” referring to acts of 
adjudication and meaning to “make credible, to represent, to prove, or to demonstrate,” 
referring to forensic acts of defense and representation within a legal context.269 
However, Thomas’s understanding of the nature of hagiographical proof and the way in 
which credibility, representation, and saintly example work within his vitae is more 
complex than the juridical model discussed by Elliott, and, as I have briefly noted, 
changes in the course of his career. Questions about how the saintly female example 
works as a persuasive device to solicit readers’ belief, and how the texts themselves 
understand the rhetorical power of example, thus remain. In this chapter, I will seek to 
address these questions by examining the ways in which Thomas understands the 
function and capacity of saintly example to convince readers of the truth and theological 
probity of his hagiographical texts and the sanctity of their protagonists in The 
Supplement to the Life of Marie of Oignies and the Life of Lutgard of Aywieres, texts 
separated by a span of more than thirty years.  
According to Aristotle, rhetorical arguments persuade hearers by producing belief  
(pistis) following the hearer’s deliberation and subsequent choosing between alternative 
                                                 
269 Charlton T. Lewis, A Latin Dictionary, “probo” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1449.		
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arguments.270 Example serves these arguments as “a kind of epilogue,” providing 
“evidence” of the truth.271 However, for Thomas—working within an Augustinian 
lineage—the reader of scripture has the complication of being subject to the fall, to 
temptations that interrupt the capacity of truth to work upon the mind and, once 
persuaded, for that reader to act on that which has been decided. The deliberation and 
choice that Aristotle understands to mark the rhetorical situation are, for those working 
within an Augustinian tradition, fundamentally complicated and undermined by the fall. 
Augustine had effected a revolution in rhetorical theory with his doctrine of the fallen 
will: what is it to convince human beings who do not do the good they know or, even 
more fundamentally, cannot understand or believe the truth because of the because of 
demonic influence? The interdependence of intellect, will, and body, between knowledge, 
desire, and action, led Augustine to yoke the affective and intellective elements of 
                                                 
270 Wendy Olmstead, Rhetoric: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 
p. 13.  See Also Hannah Arendt’s discussion in The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 89-102. Thomas’s access to Aristotle’s Rhetorica is 
uncertain. Hermannus Allemanus translated a gloss on the Rhetoric from Arabic in 1240. The 
oldest translation of the Rhetoric from Greek was completed before 1250 but was, James J. 
Murphy notes, never used in the Schools and survives in only three manuscripts. William of 
Moerbeke’s translation, commissioned by Thomas Aquinas and completed ca. 1270 was 
obviously too late to have been used by Thomas of Cantimpré. James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the 
Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974), pp. 91-94. The point of mentioning Aristotle here, 
however, is not to make a case for what of Aristotelian rhetorical theory Thomas may or may not 
have had acces to, but simply to contrast Augustine’s rhetorical theory with Aristotle’s.  
	
271 Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, trans. and introduction by John Henry Freese (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1926 [1947), 2.20.1394a (p. 279). If, on the other hand, there is 
no syllogism to draw upon, Aristotle argues that a rhetor must emply many examples as 
demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these; but if we have them, examples must be 
used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes” (Rh. 2.20.1394a). James’s 
extensive list of the holy women of Liege in the Prologue to the Life of Marie of Oignies is an 
instance of this second use of example. The multiplicity of figures described leads the reader to 
conclude that something important and strange is afoot in Liège. According to Aristotle, this type 
of argument is weaker than one in which example is used as an illustration of an abstract 
argument.  
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rhetoric in unprecedented ways, for if persuasion is to be truly effective, he believed that 
it must engage the whole person, making the listener or reader not only able to 
understand the good, but to do it, despite the fallen will. Such action is possible only 
when the will desires to act in accord with that to which the intellect has acceded. 
Eloquence, for Augustine, arises from the combination of logos and pathos, for the 
audience must not only be made certain of the truth of an argument, but they must desire 
to act upon what they have heard.272 Augustine perhaps best represents the holism of this 
view of persuasion in his description of transformational reading in Book 8 of the 
Confessions. Here, successful engagement with the biblical text is depicted as a physical 
act of “putting on” or being clothed in the body of the text. The converted reader not only 
understands intellectually but incorporates the Pauline command to live chastely.273  
In Thomas’s story about Hugolino, we see the continuation of this Augustinian 
understanding. Temptation—the demon of blasphemy—negatively affected the capacity 
of Hugolino’s mind to “grasp” (capiat) an argument. The “grasping” of understanding 
Hugolino sought involved more than ratiocination leading to a choice. It was connected 
                                                 
272 Wendy Olmstead, Rhetoric, p. 35. For example, Augustine writes, “in this grand style of 
eloquence which can be done to move (ad commovendos) the minds of listeners, the purpose 
being not to make known to them what they must do, but to make them do what they already 
know (sciunt) must be done.” DDC IV.75. Augustine is building upon Cicero’s argument that 
eloquence ideally instructs (doceat), delights (delectet), and moves (flectat) listeners (IV.74). 
Augustine quotes Cicero that to move the audience is a “matter of conquest” (flectere victoriae) 
and elaborates that a hearer is moved if “he values what you promise, fears what you threaten, 
hates what you condemn, embraces what you commend, and rues the thing which you insist that 
he must regret” (IV.75). 
 
273 Augustine, Confessions, VIII.29. See “The Word, His Body,” in Seducing Augustine, ed. 
Virginia Burrus, et al, which disccuses Augustine’s “dissolution into texts” as “Augustine’s own 
body is overwritten by a Pauline verse about Jesus’ body” (p. 53). Here, however, the author 
argues that the literal presence of Jesus’s incarnate body recedes under the pressure of 
Augustine’s ambivalence about figuration. Augustine does not encounter a vision of Jesus, but 
reads a Pauline commandment to live chastely. What Augustine’s body “puts on,” in other words, 
is very different than Hugolino’s act of taking up Marie’s relic and vita. 
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with the will, the faculty that, in being tempted, arrests understanding and, once healed, 
enables a transformation not only of the intellect now acceding to belief, but the affect 
and the body, such that the newfound understanding is figured in the tale as tasting within 
the heart. The story intimately links belief and understanding, the will, the intellect, and 
the flesh, and example is means of their union and thus essential to successful persuasion.  
Furthermore, the pairing of text and relic, of hagiographical example and saintly 
body, leads to a fundamental opacity in the story concerning what, precisely, was the 
agent and source of Hugolino’s transformation. Was it the bishop’s engagement with the 
text, or Marie’s finger?  What is the relationship between them? Although Hugolino 
assiduously read the vita, his final transformative vision occurred when, following a time 
of reading, he was again tempted by a particularly violent demon of blasphemy, and, 
leaving the vita aside, grasped Marie’s relic, invoked her, and was instantaneously 
relieved of his burden. Although it could seem that the relic ultimately purged him of his 
doubt, the story carefully couples relic and text, given as they were by James to Hugolino 
in the same moment. While the relic is a fragment of a literal body, the vita is a narrative 
that carefully and in great detail depicts the bodily form and exemplary deeds of the saint, 
and this depiction is, furthermore, not read but “incubated” (incubuit), as a hen broods 
over her eggs, or the bride reclines in the inner chamber. This engagement gives rise to an 
understanding described with the gastronomic participle, gustans, in a heart that is made 
a mouth able to taste the “sweetness” of God, much as Augustine was able to enfold his 
body in the garment of Christ. Both hagiographical example and relic bear saintly virtus, 
confer an immediacy of presence, each enabling Hugolino to “invoke that saint just as if 
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she were present” (praesentem).274 In Thomas’s full account of hagiographical example 
in the Supplement, then, example does not only buttress an argument by means of 
figuring abstract ideas or dogma according to the lineaments of a particular person or life, 
making them vivid and comprehensible. Rather, the ekphrasis of textual example is a 
form of living bodily presence that, like a relic, exercises an irresistible force upon 
another body and its desires, and is assimilated to the understanding by means of a 
reading conceived in highly somatic terms. Thomas’s tale of the power of saintly 
example thus no longer conveys an understanding of rhetoric simply conceived, nor of 
proof as a function of rational evidentiary corroboration of an argument. 
The VLA continues the Augustinian holism of the VMO-S with a notable 
difference. By depicting Hugolino’s broken will and mind as healed by a hagiographical 
example that exercised an inevitable transformation, Thomas obscures the deliberative 
function of rhetoric in which the reader considers arguments presented and chooses 
between them, and thus downplays the role of a reader’s skepticism when engaging with 
hagiography.  Rather than be delivered through the mediations of interpretive exercise, 
Marie’s exemplarity is represented as irresistible—we could say coercive—and 
immediate, Hugolino becoming primarily a site for the working of divine power. In 
contrast, the VLA does not present the same optimism about the efficacy of example and 
                                                 
274 The language of presence recalls Peter Brown’s argument in The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise 
and Function in Latin Christianity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), that from its 
inception, the relic cult “gloried in particularity,” making the sacred present on earth in physical 
form, thereby bringing “a sense of deliverance and pardon into the present” (92). Enshrined relics 
offered holy presence in tangible form in specific locations, marking and differentiating 
geographical loci (86), while those who possessed relics—a form of portable presence—could 
share them and thus their gracious power with others. Brown argues that such “gestures of 
concord” solidified networks of sociality and patronage (90), as occurs in Thomas’s high 
medieval story between James and Hugolino, who enjoyed an extensive alliance.  
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wrestles with the problem of the reader’s doubt, “baring,” as Stephen Justice writes, “the 
devices of faith” from the outset of the text.275   
Thomas’s concern about his text’s credibility leads him to explicitly theorize the 
act of reading the vita of a wondrous saint in the VLA, providing a methodology for his 
readers’ lectio and their deliberative engagement with the text. While the Augustinianism 
of the VMO-S was implicit, in the VLA Thomas directly appeals to and recontextualizes 
Augustinian rhetorical and hermeneutical theory as articulated in the De Doctrina 
Christiana (DDC). Augustine’s theory of hermeneutics and rhetoric as articulated in the 
DDC is the correct context for understanding the notion of hagiographical proof and the 
belief it solicits in the VLA. Thomas’s use of Augustine’s rhetorical treatise marks 
Thomas’s hagiography as a self-conscious work of persuasion in the tradition of Christian 
reading and preaching. Through Augustine, Thomas develops a theological hermeneutic 
to deal with the dilemma of belief he outlines in the Prologue. This hermeneutic 
transforms both the figure of the witness-reader and the location of auctoritas, which 
rests less in the text as an independent object, and more in the practice and will of the 
reader who engages with it and is thereby transformed. Deliberation makes space for 
doubt and the reader. However, this emphasis on the reader’s engagement does not mean 
that Thomas theorizes correct hagiographical reading as one in which the reader controls 
the text or performs deliberative action upon an object that remains external to the reader. 
As in Hugolino’s story, engagement with hagiographical example involves more than 
assent conceived in purely intellective terms; deliberation requires affective engagement 
with the text and has implications for the reader’s body insofar as the exemplary life of 
                                                 
275 Steven Justice, “Did the Middle Ages Believe in their Miracles?” Representations (103) 
Summer 2008, p. 15.		
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the saint makes claims upon a devotee’s actions. Belief is a matter of practice. Thomas 
represents ideal reading in his last vita in some ways as an act vulnerability to a text, 
recapitulating Hugolino’s readerly posture, but in the VLA this incorporation is depicted 
explicitly as giving rise to understanding and emerging from love rather than fear. As the 
VLA has it, the reader of hagiography is drawn into an intimate relationship with the 
saintly exemplar that ideally transforms him or her into its likeness, as the body of the 
communicant assimilates and is assimilated to the Eucharistic host. This assimilation 
moves through doubt and deliberation by means of love and faith in order to arrive at 
understanding. 
The Augustinian language of love, faith, and incorporation does not erase the 
juridical discourse from the vita. I will show that Thomas draws upon two discourses and 
two hermeneutics to construct his theory of hagiographical reading and rhetoric in the 
VLA. First is the juridical or probative one in which his task as a writer is to convince 
readers of the truth of his text by offering proofs—visible and verified examples that 
solicit a reader’s intellectual assent—of saintly character that satisfy the doubts and 
curiosity of readers. In the second discourse of reading and rhetoric, which Thomas 
develops by means of Augustine, belief in the saint is a function of the reader’s love; the 
reader believes in order to understand, and belief and understanding entail the adoption of 
the saint as an exemplum for the reader’s own life. Thomas thus joins the juridical 
hermeneutic of proving and convincing with a hermeneutic that emphasizes moving the 
heart and changing practice to accord with belief.276 As a result of this connection, the 
                                                 
276 Aristotle’s notion of the rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme (from enthumesthai, meaning “to 
take heart,” “to conclude,” or “to infer”) draws near to Augustinian formulations on this score in 
the sense that he understood a good rhetorical argument to be one that enters the thumos, the 
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semantic and conceptual field of “proof” in the VLA is much richer than that of evidence 
given in a courtroom by a writer conceived of as a lawyer, a saint conceived of as 
defendant, and readers conceived of as jurors.277 At stake in the expansion of the category 
of proof is not only an acknowledgement of the complexity of the concept of proof and 
the texture of discourses by which Thomas composes his texts, but a more robust notion 
of the ways in which Thomas understands exemplarity to function within his texts and the 
ways in which exemplarity is bound up with rhetoric.  
In addition to his use of the DDC, Thomas theorizes the ideal reader’s lectio by 
means of the narrative presence within the vita of different sorts of readers whose 
reactions and interpretive work variously enact Augustine’s rhetorical theory.  These 
readers perform the incredulity and credulity of the vita’s readers, enabling the tale to 
become explicitly a space of deliberation and a reflection on the nature of that 
deliberation. Most notably, Thomas himself is represented as a resistant reader who 
undergoes a moral purgation of incredulity, moving from doubt to belief and love, a love 
                                                                                                                                                 
heart. See Wendy Olmstead, Rhetoric, p. 13.  
 
277 The rich conceptual field of the notion of “proof” was present very early in Christian 
monasticism. For example, Cassian writes that a monk fully imbued with the language and affect 
of the Psalmist from a practice of constant recitation is able to anticipate the Psalmist’s words, 
becoming, in effect, the author of the Psalm, so that “the meanings of the words are disclosed to 
us not by exegesis but by proof” (documenta). John Cassian, The Conferences, trans. by Boniface 
Ramsey (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), X.xi.5 p. 384. Documentum contains the sense not only 
of proof as in a specimen, but, as its derivation from doceo suggests, may mean an example that 
teaches by offering a pattern for imitation or warning. Documentum and probatus/probo share the 
sense of demonstrating or showing the truth of something, but probatus carries a greater 
connotation of judgment, not only in the juridical context, where it is the term for what has been 
offered as proof in a trial, but more generically, it tends to indicate that which has been tried, 
tested, often by the fires of experience, and is thus approved, esteemed, or recommended. 
Charlton T. Lewis, A Latin Dictionary, “documentum” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 	
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that ultimately issues in the writing of his tale. The vita also portrays the good and bad 
“readers” who were Lutgard’s fellow nuns. Finally, Lutgard is made a figure of the ideal 
reader of scripture, a subject that I will examine in detail in the next chapter. 
  
Audience and Proof  
Thomas’s employment of two discourses of proof in the Life of Lutgard was in 
part driven by considerations of audience. The reception of the Supplement would have 
raised radically different issues than the VLA. First, as supplementary to the VMO, the 
vita garnered the authority of the primary text, written by an established preacher—now 
cardinal with powerful papal connections. Furthermore, Marie’s reputation was already 
well established. The VLA, in contrast, though commissioned by Lutgard’s community 
and addressed to them and the nuns of Brabant, entailed multiple audiences. The nuns of 
Aywières likely sought both a memorial of their sister and an exemplary text for private 
use. They would, moreover, have likely been seeking to develop a cult around Lutgard in 
order to garner prestige and perhaps financial reward from pilgrims and devotees. The 
hagiography would then potentially become an integral part of a dossier on Lutgard’s bid 
for sanctity, which is in part why Thomas attends to the power of her relics in the final 
chapters of the vita, as this would be essential material for any inquisitio.278 
 For Thomas, the issue with regard to the audience of Lutgard’s fellow nuns is not 
only whether or not she is believable in and of herself, but whether the life that she 
                                                 
278 On this role for hagiography, see James Howard-Johnston, ed., The Cult of Saints in Late 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 7; Barbara Newman’s Introduction in Thomas of Cantimpré, The 
Collected Saints’ Lives, p. 18.  
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represents is possible for those who read her vita. In other words, the question posed by 
the VLA is whether readers can believe that Lutgard could be a model for their own life. 
Can the virtue she represents be taken up as exemplary, and thus performed in the 
reader’s own life?279  
Another audience implied in the Prologue’s concern for doubting readers—
inevitable should the vita have been part of a canonization dossier—were clerics, men of 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy who, it was noted in the Introduction, often read vitae of 
mulieres religiosae with skepticism and disgust. 
A final potential audience was the laity. Although the vita was written in Latin, 
thus radically circumscribing its readability, all of Thomas’s vitae are filled with materia 
praedicabiles to be used by preachers.280 As Robert Sweetman has shown, by the time he 
                                                 
279 A. Deboutte, De Heilige Lutgart (Tentoonstelling uitgave van de Gilde van Sint Lutgard, 
1963), pp. 19-29. Ms 8609-20 of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek in Brussels contains the Lives of 
Lutgard, Christina, Mary Magdalene, Elisabeth of Hungary, Alice the Leper, Ida of Nivelles, 
Margaret the Lame, Elisabeth of Schönau, the de gloriosis sodalibus sanctae Ursulae and 
excerpts from Sermo de XII fructibus sacramenti by Guyard van Laon. The ms was owned was 
La Cambre Abbey, a Cistercian monastery. A second ms (4450-70 from the Koninklijke 
Bibliotheek in Brussels) was commissioned in 1320 by Jan van Sint-Truiden, a Cistercian monk 
from Villers and confessor of women at Vrouwenpark te Rotselaer. It likewise contained the 
Lives of Christina and Lutgard, as well as those of Cistercian nuns Beatrice of Nazareth and Alice 
the Leper, anchorite Margaret the Lame, and Franciscan tertiary, Elizabeth of Hungary. An ms 
from 1300 containing Thomas’s Latin Life of Lutgard and a rhyming adaptation in Middle Dutch 
attributed to the Benedictine monk Willem van Affligem, was owned by his monastery at St. 
Truiden went to the Rooklooster Priory of Regular canons in 1368. This manuscript history 
shows that the Lives of the astonishing laywoman Christina, Cistercian nuns, and women of other 
vocations were read together, and had great interest for monks of multiple orders. The question of 
how a reader could understand a saint’s life to be adoptable and adaptable to their own existence 
would perhaps be even more difficult for male monastic readers of the vita. While it seems that if 
we take Thomas at his word, the text was intended for nuns, the circulation of the life in male 
monastic houses is clearly attested to by the historical record. 
 
280 Barbara Newman, “Introduction” in Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives, p. 18. 
The vernacular translation of Lutgard’s Life into Middle Dutch verse less than thirty years later 
indicates that the vita did indeed have a much broader appeal. There are two rhyming versions in 
Middle Dutch. The first, attributed toWillem van Affligem, was meant to be sung by minstrels. It 
is quite free with Thomas’s version. The second is attributed to a Franciscan named Geraert. See 
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composed the Bonum Universale de Apibus (1256-63), Thomas wrote with no trace of 
pastoral dualism; the devotional life of the laity was elaborated according to the ideals of 
regular life, and the regular life was described in terms of the secular life. Like the 
cloistered, secular people were taught to live according to the order of grace rather than 
nature.281 This rapprochement between secular and regular life can be seen as early as the 
Life of Christina the Astonishing (1232) and the Life of Margaret of Ypres (1240-1243), 
in which laywomen lived exemplary lives contra naturam. Lutgard’s vita circulated with 
Christina’s as early as the second half of the thirteenth century, along with the lives of 
other female saints, such as Mary Magdalene, Margaret the Lame, and Beatrice of 
Nazareth. Furthermore, Lutgard’s Life recapitulates a number of the events of Margaret’s 
vita in the same language. For example, like Lutgard (VLA 1.12), Margaret “never 
relaxed the vigilance of her mind to commit any mortal sin” (VMY 1.1); like Lutgard 
(VLA I.2), her “affectus” for a man is translated into love for a new spouse, Jesus, 
resulting in a divine gift to never feel temptation again (VMY 1.7); like Lutgard, she is 
called a “simple dove” (VMY 1.10; VLA 1.3; 3.7). Given his commitment to pastoral 
duties to the laity expressed in such elevated terms, it seems highly possible that Thomas 
intended the VLA to be used in sermons for the laity as an expression of his Dominican 
vocation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Erwin Mantingh, Een monnik met een rol: Willem van Affligem, het Kopenhaagse Leven van 
Lutgart en de fictie van een meerdaagse voorlezing (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000); Simone Roisin, 
L’Hagiographie Cistercienne, pp. 52-3, n. 8.  
	
281 Robert Sweetman, Dominican Preaching in the Southern Low Countries 1240-1260: Materia 
Praedicabiles in the Liber de Natura Rerum and Bonum Universale de Apibus of Thomas of 
Cantimpré (University of Toronto, unpublished dissertation, 1988), pp. 245-6. Sweetman notes 
that this view was common in Dominican sources and explains the increasing assimilation of 
traditionally monastic practices by devout laity beginning in the thirteenth century. 
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Juridical rhetoric and hermeneutics would have been necessary to address those 
clerics adjudicating Lutgard’s sanctity, as well as those skeptics seeking proof of the 
sanctity of a woman whose form of life was in many ways novel and thus deemed 
potentially dangerous or unacceptable. Lay listeners with heretical views would likewise 
require such proofs. However, the nuns to whom the text was addressed would have been 
seeking to use the vita as a devotional text, looking to Lutgard for inspiration and 
motivation in their spiritual life, attempting to have those unconverted aspects of their 
soul further transformed. Furthermore, as the laity was held to the same ideals as those in 
regular life, such a transformation of the soul and body by means of the exemplary figure 
of Lutgard would have been held out as an ideal for all those who came into contact with 
her Life.  
 
The Crisis of Credulity in the Prologue to the Life of Lutgard of Aywières  
 
 The Prologue of the Life of Lutgard of Aywières introduces the question of belief 
as a dilemma that necessarily faces the writer of a wondrously virtuous life. The Prologue 
lays bare a set of anxieties, inviting the reader to reflect on the nature of the text and his 
or her relation to it. Thomas fears that his story will not be believed: 
Not for many years, I believe (credo), has there been written (descriptam) 
the life of any person so filled with remarkable virtues (virtutum insignia) 
and so privileged by marvels and miracles (mirabilium ac miraculorum 
praerogativas). If you ask how I am to convince readers [to render my 
readers faithful to] (fidem faciam) of the truth of all these things, I briefly 
say (and may Christ himself be my witness and judge) that I received 
many of them from Lutgard’s own mouth as one of her closest friends 
(sicut familiarissimus). In these matters no one, I believe, would be so 
bold as to contradict her testimonies (testimoniis). I acknowledge that I 
collected the rest from people of a kind who would never stray from the 
path of truth. There were many things—splendid ones in fact—which I 
have not consented to write, either because they would not make sense to 
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(non intelligibilia) the uncultivated (rudibus) or because I did not find 
suitable witnesses.282 
 
Thomas thus opens the vita with a literary problem: the Life he has written (descriptam) 
is threatened from the outset by an irony necessarily arising from its subject. The same 
remarkable nature and miraculous deeds that compelled its writing strain the credibility 
of the narrative, undermining the reader’s capacity to believe the text, its author, or its 
subject. Thomas must write of the incredible mirabilia ac miracula witnessed to in 
Lutgard’s life even as he attempts to create a rhetorically persuasive narrative, one that is 
able to convince his audience (fidem faciam) of its truth, thereby fulfilling the 
hagiographical task of preserving Lutgard’s memory as a bearer of divine gifts. The 
wondrous compromises the text’s persuasiveness even as it is the condition of its 
existence. The power of the example to render an argument vivid and convincing by 
stirring the affections and giving rise to understanding is challenged by the 
miraculousness that both justifies the example’s use and gives it its vividness.  
These wonders and miracles not only compromise the vita’s credibility, but render 
Lutgard, by virtue of her special grace and ability to represent the seemingly impossible 
(and therefore wondrous) ideal of divine life, singular (or, as Thomas puts it, “set apart” 
[sequestrata], and thus worthy of being written about), but singular in an exemplary tale, 
meaning that that story offers Lutgard’s singularity to others for their adoption. While the 
                                                 
282 “Nec credo vitam alicujus, quae tot virtutum insignia & mirabilium ac miraculorum 
praerogativas in se contineat, a multis retroactis annis fuisse descriptam. Si autem quaeritis, 
quomodo legentibus fidem faciam de iis omnibus, quae conscripsi: breviter dico, quod ipse 
Christus testis & judex sit, quod plurima ex iis ab ore ipsius piae Lutgardis, sicut familiarissimus 
ejus, accepi: & in iis nullum ita temerarium credo, qui ejus testimoniis contradicat: caetera vero a 
talibus me percepisse profiteor, qui nequaquam a veritatis tramite deviarent. Pleraque etiam, & 
revera magnifica, scribere non consensi; vel quia non intelligibilia rudibus essent, vel quia 
testimonium conveniens non inveni.” [Col. 0234C-D] 
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gap between the real and ideal, what is and what ought to be, between the saint who is set 
apart and the saint who is imitated, is always an issue in the reader’s taking up of the 
exemplarity of the saint, the Prologue to the VLA explicitly addresses this gap, asking 
what happens to those who must dwell in this space and how they might succesfully 
navigate it. The doubt that concerns Thomas is thus a concern about whether Lutgard’s 
wondrous sanctity renders her singular in such a way that she is not believed to be 
exemplary on the part of readers.  
Thomas believes that Lutgard’s Life contains the greatest signs (insignia) of virtue 
and wonders seen for many years. In this opening passage his belief is set against the 
anticipated skepticism of his readers. By opening the passage with “credo” Thomas 
subtly introduces himself as the model believer and reader of the saint’s Life. A model 
reader, he implies, is one who is sicut familiarissimus with Lutgard, brought near to hear 
her testimonies by virtue of an intimacy which, we will see, is both the enabling 
condition and result of such belief.  
 Lutgard’s wondrous deeds and supremely virtuous character are problematic both 
because they defy belief in their own right, and because they are the site and source of 
Lutgard’s novelty. While Thomas’s statement that a saint such as she has not appeared  
“for many years” suggests that Lutgard is not absolutely without precedent, and, later in 
the vita, he calls her “another Agnes” and claims for her a merit equal to the virgin martyr 
by virtue of a hemorrhage in her chest (II.21),283 he asserts in the Prologue that no saint 
                                                 
283 “[S]he began in a wondrous and ineffable way to desire to endure martyrdom for Christ like 
the most blessed Agnes. As she burned with such great longing that she expected to die from 
desire alone, one of the outer veins opposite her heart burst, and so much blood flowed from it 
that her tunics and cowl were copiously drenched…and at once Christ appeared to her with a 
joyful countenance and said, “For the most fervent yearning for martyrdom that you experienced 
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of recent memory, and definitely no “living saint,” manifested holiness quite as she did. 
Thomas’s hagiographical efforts are therefore, he writes, similarly unprecedented, and 
despite his efforts to ground Lutgard’s claim to sanctity within the authority of tradition, 
it is her novelty that he desires to underscore, even as it creates the rhetorical difficulties 
here outlined. As much, then, as Thomas attempts to frame the holy women of whom he 
wrote in terms of the traditions of desert fathers and mothers, virgin martyrs, and other 
historical precedents, this vita cannot be read simply as a recapitulation of older 
hagiographical conventions. In particular, the VLA diverges fundamentally from earlier 
hagiographical models in its introduction of what Simone Roisin terms a “mystical 
element”—narratives detailing encounters with Christ, union with God, ecstatic states of 
prayer, and visionary experiences—alongside depictions of intense asceticism. According 
to Roisin, such portrayals of mystical union were “riskier” than detailing physical feats. 
She ascribes Goswin of Bossut’s ironically erudite humility topos in the Life of Ida of 
Nivelles—absent from his Lives of Arnulf, a conversus who practiced extreme bodily 
mortification, and Abundus, a monk of Villers—to the presence in Ida’s vita of “mystical 
facts” that occurred in the female saint’s interior life, “facts” absent from the two male 
Lives.284 The novel wonders and miracles of Lutgard’s vita, it becomes clear in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in shedding this blood, you will receive in heaven the same reward that St Agnes earned when she 
was beheaded for her faith. By your desire you have equaled her martyrdom in blood.’” (II.21) 
[“cœpitque miro & ineffabili modo desiderare, ut pro Christo, sicut Agnes beatissima, martyrium 
sustineret. Cumque tantum in tali desiderio æstuaret, ut jam se mori præ desiderio crederet; rupta 
est ei vena contra situm cordis extrinsecus; & exinde tantum sanguinis fluxit, ut tunicæ ejus & 
cuculla copiosissime rigarentur. Debilitata ergo resedit paululum: & statim apparuit ei Christus, in 
vultu congratulantis, & dixit: pro desiderantissimo fervore martyrii, quem in effusione istius 
sanguinis habuisti; idem martyrii meritum in cælo recipies, quod Agnes beatissima, pro fide mea 
in capitis abscissione suscepit: quia martyrium ejus tuo desiderio in sanguine compensasti”]. 
	
284 Simone Roisin, L’Hagiographie Cistercienne, p. 56. Goswin writes, “I have undertaken to 
write the Life of Christ’s virgin, Ida, undistinguished though I am by any oratorical fluency and 
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course of the VLA, are likewise its detailed depictions of Lutgard’s intimate friendship, 
visionary encounters, and union with God. Parallels like this one lead Roisin to attribute 
Goswin’s influence upon Thomas’s writing of the VLA.285 
Thomas’s literary problem outlined in the prologue, then, is a result of the clash 
between his desire to witness to the unprecedented nature of the saint and the 
unintelligibility and skepticism this novelty yields.286 His constant references to the 
wondrousness of Lutgard’s piety and to the fact that he is about to “speak marvels” (mira 
dicturus sum) (VLA I.12), contextualizes the VLA within Thomas’s broader project, which 
aims to show that an unusual outpouring of divine grace is occurring in Liège, and is 
visible particularly, though not exclusively, among women.287 As with Christina 
                                                                                                                                                 
unaware of any imaginative subtlety adequately equipping me to couch it in fitting words. What 
largely excuses me is an order from my abbot, obliging me to set out the Life in a fairly simple 
style. In doing this, I have relied, not only my own limited imagination, but on that almighty Lord 
who opens the dumb mouth and makes infant tongues fluent of speech (Wisd. 10.21). Little 
wonder that my mind trembles to begin a task it can scarcely carry through, especially in that the 
admirable conversatio of this blessed one involves a saintly affectivity difficult to describe and 
those many kinds of luminous contemplations graciously lavished on her by her Bridegroom.” 
The topos continues for three lengthy paragraphs. (The Life of Ida of Nivelles, trans. by Martinus 
Cawley O.C.S.O., in Send Me God (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), Prol. b, c, p. 29). 
	
285 Simone Roisin, L’Hagiographie Cistercienne, p. 222. 
 
286 I am here breaking with Simone Roisin’s account of the deep interest in the marvelous among 
Cistercian hagiographers in Liège. Roisin argues that they had a “naïve and perpetual 
amazement” that “spontaneously” arose in the face of their subjects (L’Hagiographie 
Cistercienne, p. 260). This view is odd given the rhetorical and literary sophistication Roisin 
finds in the vitae, and her argument that the language of the Lives is an attempt to reveal the 
inability of language to “catch a glimpse of the divine” (p. 212). Thomas’s explicit concern about 
the credibility of this text, a concern that is repeated in the Life of Christina the Astonishing, 
demonstrates that the eruptions of marvelousness depicted by the vitae are not a result of 
Thomas’s naiveté, but a saintly effect that he understands places him in a particular and often 
awkward position as hagiographer.  
	
287 Thomas’s sense of an apocalyptic shift occurring in Liège is apparent in his first hagiography, 
The Life of Abbot John of Cantimpré. He writes that John had arisen as “a new daystar amid the 
shadows of twilight,” (VJC I.I) as “the present world draws near to its setting.” In this work, the 
secular world is represented as filled with heresy, which John is sent to counter. 
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mirabilis, is not only the fact of Lutgard’s piety but its unusual nature that is important to 
him and his rhetorical construction of their vitae. He notes in the Prologue and 
throughout the tale that what he tells are “still greater wonders follow[ing] 
upon…wonders” (mirandis plus miranda succedunt) (I.17), wonders both that she 
experienced (I.13; I.15; I.16) and that others witnessed working in her (I.19; II.2). These 
wonders are offered as proofs of Lutgard’s sanctity even as they give rise to the 
skepticism that seeks such proof.  
The doubleness of the marvel is apparent throughout the first book where, 
Thomas relates, Lutgard’s devout way of life was unable to be imitated by her fellow 
nuns (quam poterant non imitari) who slandered her in their jealousy. Their disbelief lead 
to a series of publically manifested divine proofs, including Lutgard’s suspension in the 
air before the whole community (I.10); her illumination by the sun in the night (I.11); her 
mouth being made to taste like honey long after she had a vision in which she sucked 
“much sweetness” from Christ’s side wound—a savor that others tasted in her saliva, 
making them able to certify (probaverunt) the vision and its effects as true (I.13); the 
mystical placement of a golden crown on her head (I.17); her singing voice “marvelously 
stirred” those who heard it “to devotion” (corda audientium ad devotionem interim 
mirabiliter movebantur) (I.19). These external manifestations of Lutgard’s divine favor 
eventually convinced the nuns of St. Catharine’s of Lutgard’s special status. They had not 
recognized, as Thomas puts it, the way in which she was “set apart” from them 
(sequestrata) (I.8) or “singularly honored” (eam prae aliis singulariter honorare) (I.17). 
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As Thomas tells it, these proofs ultimately led to her recognition and being elected as 
Prioress (I. 20).288 
To elicit belief in the veracity of the wonders recounted by the vita is essential to 
Thomas’s reputation as an effective author and to Lutgard’s attainment of a reputation as 
the saint Thomas holds her to be. The skeptical reader is subtly reflected in those jealous 
nuns who read Lutgard’s singular holiness as a demonstration of impious arrogance. This 
belief is also necessary if the vita’s primary audience, the nuns of Aywières and the 
Brabant, are to be able to adopt it as an exemplary instance of the virtuous life, one that 
could be used by them to further their own spiritual path. Thomas hopes, he writes, that 
not only you [Hadewijch, the Abbess of Aywières], but the virgins of all 
the monasteries of Brabant should receive (suscipiant) this life of the 
gracious Lutgard so that she, whose reputation for virtue (fama virtutis) 
was known to all, should become even more widely known (innotescat) by 
the publication of this little book (libelli). May it increase virtue and merit 
in its readers, to whom it will provide a lesson (praescriptum) and 
example (exemplum) of virtue.289 
 
The verb suscipere is the implicit synonym and supplement of credere. Suscipere means 
to take up, accept, and defend. However, as the origin of the English “suspicion,” it refers 
to the Roman practice of the father “taking up” a new child from the ground after 
overcoming his suspicion that the infant may not be his own. The taking up thus occurs 
after a process of doubt and distrust. Thomas hopes the nuns will overcome their 
                                                 
288 The text explicitly models this suspicion early in the life when she escaped an attempted rape 
by one of her suitors, and yet “the innocent girl [became] an object of suspicion” (in suspicionem 
innocens puella devenit) among the townspeople who did not believe that she had fended off his 
attack (I.5).  
	
289 “non solum vos, sed omnium monasteriorum Brabantiae coetus virginum, Vitam piae 
Lutgardis suscipiant; ut quae in fama virtutis notissima omnibus fuit, ipsa brevi libelli hujus 
insinuatione plenius innotescat; augeatque legentibus virtutem & meritum, quibus praescriptum 
aderit virtutis exemplu” (Pr). 
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suspicion of the vita’s excesses and “take it up.” The verb implies that this taking up is 
not only a matter of overcoming doubt, but of an affective identification with, recognition 
of, and caring for, as if it were one’s own, that which was regarded with suspicion. To 
believe is, then, to acknowledge the text as authoritative such that the claims it makes 
upon the reader are acknowledged as requiring a response, a “taking up” that is the 
necessary precondition for “increas[ing] virtue and merit” in the reader. Yet how is 
Thomas to persuade his readers to do this? The dilemma stands; the excessive wonders 
that are the content, justification, and often proof of the text undermine narrative 
credibility. 
 The Prologue first responds to the problem of disbelief with a turn to the terms of 
juridical discourse. Thomas emphasizes his dependence on reliable witnesses, those who 
knew Lutgard personally, including Thomas himself. He claims further that he left things 
out because he did not wish to court disbelief or the confusion of those too “rude” to 
understand the mysteries of his subject. He writes that the vita will contain examples of 
her virtues as well as miracles and marvels. The promise of providing signs of Lutgard’s 
virtue accords with what André Vauchez has shown to be papal attempts in the thirteenth 
century to prioritize a saint’s virtus morum over the more popular virtus signorum, or 
marvelous manifestations of divine favor in canonization policies.290 In his promise to 
also reveal many miracles and marvels, Thomas in effect plays to both audiences, the 
papal and the “popular.”  
                                                 
290 André Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, trans. by Jean Birrell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 140.  
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  In the Prologue’s salutation Thomas appeal to the authority of his office, an 
authority he says transcends the interests and corruptions of his “personal name”:  
Instead of a proper name, I have put the author’s office (officium) and his 
order in this salutation, so that the office and the order might commend 
(commendetur) the authority (autoritas) of the work, rather than making it 
worthless by the intrusion (insinuatione) of my personal name.291 
 
This is an argument from the authority of the office of the Order of Preachers, an 
authority held here to be free from the sullying influence of the individual interests of a 
personal name. The autoritas of the Dominican order as a whole stands as a buttress for 
the truth claims made by the text. It is a mode of proof belonging to the juridical sphere.  
However, Thomas immediately undermines this claim to the authority of the 
impersonal, writing that he, personally, was incited to write this text not only out of love 
for the monasteries of Brabant, but for that singular person, Lutgard: 
Since it was not only your charity (caritas) which incited (incitavit) me, 
but also that of many monasteries, as well as the most burning love (amor 
flagrantissimus) I had for this most special personage (specialissimum 
personam) I have described in writing the life of the gracious (pia) 
Lutgard.292 
 
The source for the vita was not the office and order of the author, but Thomas’s “most 
burning love” (amor flagrantissimus) for the particular person, Lutgard. Thus, 
immediately following his appeal to the authority of the order and office, invoking the 
humility topos by means of the marked absence of the author’s name, the text calls upon 
                                                 
291 “Officium personae & Ordinis; & si non nomen proprium, in salutatione posui; ut 
scilicet autoritas in Officio & Ordine commendetur; nec tamen opus sequens nominis 
insinuatione vilescat” (Pr.). Interestingly, the contemporary Life of Ida of Nivelles, which 
Simone Roisin argues was a vital influence on Thomas, also contains an extensive 
humility topos in its prologue but did not, unlike Thomas, include the personal name, 
remaining anonymous (L’Hagiographie Cistercienne, p. 56).  
 
292 “Sicut me non solum vestra, immo multorum monasteriorum caritas & amor, quem 
specialissimum erga personam habebam flagrantissimus incitavit” (Pr.). 
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the authority of Thomas’s personal claims. He has already implied that these claims do 
not assist with the narrative’s credibility, and yet they appear forcefully with the use of 
the superlative to describe his love, and the marking of this love not as the generalized 
Christian caritas, but the more personally charged amor.293  
 Thomas’s second strategy for answering the doubts of his readers is an appeal to 
the common hagiographical topos of the eyewitness. He writes that he has conveyed only 
those stories that he heard from Lutgard herself and those who are trusted friends. He 
claims that he left out things that, though wonderful and presumably painful to lose, were 
not adequately accounted for by witnesses. Furthermore, these human witnesses—
Lutgard’s friends, Thomas himself—are watched over by the looming authority of Christ, 
the witness who will judge what is written here, test its honesty, and hold the author and 
his sources accountable.  
These two strategies of proof do not satisfy Thomas. In a drastic shift of tone and 
discourse, he moves from those proofs proper to a trial to an invocation of the rhetorical 
theology of Augustine. Quoting from De Doctrina Christiana, 4.11 he writes:  
For as the most glorious Augustine says, ‘it is a mark (insignis) of good 
and distinguished minds to love (amare) the truth in words and not the 
words themselves. For gold is no less precious for having been taken from 
                                                 
293 Though Augustine treated caritas, amor, and dilectio interchangeably, particularly in his 
homilies, early Christian writers generally did not use amor or amare because of its connotation 
of passionate physical love. Amor and amare do not appear in the Vulgate, and in other Latin 
translations when these terms were used, they never referred to “brotherly love” in “the religious 
sense.” Thomas was an avid reader of Augustine, but his use of amor in this context would still 
have carried the force of its difference from the caritas he applies to his relation with Hadewijch 
and the monasteries of the Brabant. See John W. Rettig’s commentary on Augustine’s Tractates 
on the Gospel of John 112-24, trans. by John W. Rettig (Washington: Catholic University Press, 
1995), pp. 115-6.  
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the earth; nor is wine less sweet for being extracted from worthless 
wood.294 
 
The distinction between the truth in words and the words themselves relies on 
Augustine’s categories of signum and res, signs (the words themselves) and things (those 
entities signified by the word), which he outlines in Book One of De Doctrina 
Christiana.  
Thomas’s invocation of this Augustinian distinction is, first of all, a creative use 
of the humility topos, a rather showy way of denigrating his writing while rescuing his 
subject. However, Thomas’s appeal to Augustine’s treatise is more than a rhetorical 
flourish. Instead, the hermeneutical and rhetorical theory of the De Doctrina Christiana 
(henceforth DDC), founded upon the fundamental distinction between things and signs 
and the proper relation between them, underlies Thomas’s understanding of what it is to 
successfully read the signs of his hagiography, particularly the living sign of the saint.  
Thomas’s turn to Augustine is necessary because, no matter what kinds of 
evidence are provided, the Prologue indicates that the tension between intellectual 
certainty and the saint who is both manifest by means of miracles and practices as-yet 
unheard of is, in fact, irresolvable. The excesses of the miraculous cannot be 
domesticated, either by offices or eyewitnesses, and a reader who seeks to adopt the 
saint’s Life as exemplary must exist in the gap between the credible and the incredible. 
This gap cannot be traversed simply by recourse to the use of a compelling example that 
would somehow give the reader intellectual certainty, for the example of Lutgard’s life, 
                                                 
294 “Bonorum enim ingeniorum, ut dicit gloriosissimus Augustinus, insignis est indoles, 
in verbis verum amare, non verba. Neque enim aurum minus pretiosum est, quod de terra 
tollitur; neque vinum minus sapidum, quod de vilibus lignis excipitur” (Pr.). 
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with its miracles and marvels, necessarily exceed comprehension and the dynamics of 
juridical proof (even as they are Thomas’s proof of Lutgard’s holiness). However, while 
the Prologue registers this impasse as an anxiety, the hagiography exploits this tension 
throughout its telling by refiguring it in terms of a particular—what I have identified as 
Augustinian—mode of reading and writing the saint’s Life. In short, it is a way of reading 
defined by taking up a relation to the wondrous in belief enabled by and defined as love.  
 
Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana 
 
Written for all those “with the will and wit to learn” (Preface, 1), not merely 
preachers, the DDC was intended to be a systematic exposition of the principles of 
biblical interpretation required for understanding a complex and foreign canon.295 
Augustine paints himself as a teacher of the alphabet who provides the skills to his 
students that enable them to read, interpret, and teach this canon (Preface, 18). The need 
for interpretation exists for the majority of the faithful who are not, as Abba Antony, 
divinely inspired (Preface, 8), or as Paul, caught up into the third heaven to there hear 
“words that cannot be expressed” (Preface, 11). Furthermore, even those interpreters who 
are divinely inspired rely on the conventional human language they learned as children. 
Thus, even those who are divinely inspired require human teachers and the mediation of 
human language for the apprehension of the divine message. To argue otherwise and 
disavow the need for rules governing exegesis, Augustine argues, is to give in to pride 
and can lead to the view that one lacks any need for the mediation of the Church (Preface, 
11), or of human love in which, when learning from one another, “souls overflow and as 
                                                 
295 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, trans. and ed. by R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995). 
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it were intermingle with each other” (Preface, 13). The human condition, Augustine 
writes, “would be wretched indeed if God appeared unwilling to minister his word to 
human beings through human agency” (Preface, 13). 
The participation of human agency in the creation of scripture necessitates human 
rules for its interpretation, for although—along with the entirety of the “temporal 
dispensation”—it was “set up by divine providence for our salvation” (I.85) and 
ultimately authored by God, scripture is subject to human distortion, including 
complications that come with translation (II.43), and divergences among manuscripts 
(II.41). The contingency of scripture means that ongoing interpretive effort is required in 
order to find, in and through its human media, the divine will.  Rita Copeland argues that 
the emphasis on the necessity and centrality of the interpreter in Augustine’s theological 
rhetoric means that the role of the interpreter acquires a status unheard of in classical 
rhetoric, as “textual power” resides not in the author’s intention but the reader. Augustine 
moves “responsibility for making meaning from the writer to the reader.”296 Divine 
authorship is indeed ultimately responsible for scripture’s meaning—and entails the 
boundaries of that meaning—but as it is expressed in ambiguous ways, and is subject the 
limits of human language and historical vicissitudes, the reader must judge and determine 
what that meaning is with the assistance of doctrinal guidelines and exegetical rules.  
                                                 
296 Rita Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pres, 1991), p. 158.  See also Geoffrey Galt Harpham, “The Fertile Word: 
Augustine’s Ascetics of Interpretation,” Criticism 28:3 (1986: Summer), p. 243; James J. Murphy 
who argues that the “metarhetoric” underlying Book Four of the DDC (as well as De magistro 
(389) and De catechizandis rudibus (399) places “great stress upon individual judgment” and 
holds that “rhetors do not persuade, but that hearers move themselves; that teachers do not teach, 
but instead that learners learn.” Rhetoric in the Middle Ages (University of California Press, 
1974), p. 289. 
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The text immediately states that there are two things “on which all interpretation 
of scripture depends” (I.1). First, the discovery of what must be learned (modus 
inveniendi) (books 1-3), and second, the presentation of what has been found (the modus 
proferendi) (Book Four). The majority of the treatise, up to the end of Book Three, 
(3.78), was written in the mid-390s, perhaps before Augustine’s election as the bishop of 
Hippo, though after he had much experience as a preacher.297 The remainder of Book 
Three and all of Book Four were not taken up again for thirty years. Despite the 
significant temporal gap between the inception and completion of the treatise, however, 
R.P.H. Green notes that had Augustine himself not noted the break, it would have been 
undetectable,298 and David Tracy contends that the work constitutes an “authentic 
whole.”299 Moreover, the structure of the work is comparable to contemporary rhetorical 
compendia and treatises, treating style and presentation in a much more condensed 
fashion than invention, which comprises the greater part of most such works.300 While 
Thomas only quotes from Book Four a passage that he could have read within a 
florilegium, it is not unlikely that he had access to the entirety of the fourth book (if not 
the whole treatise), which was a central text for those learning and teaching the art of 
preaching,301 and often circulated separately from the rest of the DDC for use as an ars 
                                                 
297 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, “Introduction,” pp. x-xi.  
 
298 Ibid., p. xii. 
  
299 David Tracy, “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity,” in The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De 
Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, ed. Richard Leo Enos, et 
al. (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008), p. 272.  
 
300 Rita Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages, p. 155. 
 
301 Humbert of Romans, for example, quotes Book Four of the DDC multiple times in his Treatise 
on Preaching, ed. Walter M. Conlon, O.P. Trans. Dominican Students (Newman Press, 1951). An 
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praedicandi.302 Most importantly for our purpose here, the theorization of eloquentia in 
Book Four to which Thomas refers in his Prologue depends upon and is consonant with 
the distinction between res and signum examined in the first three books of Augustine’s 
treatise. I will thus briefly outline the background of the first three books of the DDC 
insofar as it elucidates Thomas’s invocation of Book Four in his Prologue.   
Book One of the DDC opens by naming the distinction between res and signum, 
thing and sign, a distinction that became central throughout the Middle Ages).303 
Knowledge of both things and signs is necessary, Augustine argues, to understand 
scripture, for “all teaching is teaching of either things or signs.” (I.4). A thing “in a strict 
sense” is that which is never a sign of anything else. A sign, in contrast, is a thing that 
refers to something else, a “thing which of itself makes some other thing come to mind 
(in cogitationem) besides the impression it makes to the senses” (praeter speciem quam 
ingerit sensibus) (II.1). Thus the substance “wood” is a thing, while the wood that Moses 
cast into the water to make it sweet is both a sign and a thing insofar as it signifies 
                                                                                                                                                 
earlier example of the popularity of Augustine’s treatise for is Rabanus Maurus’s ninth-century 
treatise, De institutione clericorum (important for Augustine’s medieval influence), which 
summarizes the DDC and quotes extensively from Augustine’s text. See James J. Murphy, 
Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, ch. 2. 
 
302 The first (known) printing of the DDC (Strasbourg, 1463) only published Book Four, which 
seems to be in keeping with the medieval tradition. See Sr. T. Sullivan, S. Aurelii Augustinin 
Hipponiensis Episcopi de Doctrina Christiana Liber Quartus: A Commentary, with a Revised 
Text, Introduction and Translation, The Catholic University of America Patristic Series, 23 
(Washington D.C., 1930), p. ix. Citation from Robert Sweetman, Dominican Preaching in the 
Low Countries, p. 147, n. 25. Demonstrating that his knowledge of the DDC extended beyond 
Book Four is the fact that Thomas appeals to Augustine in his earlier work, the De Natura Rerum, 
where he writes in the Prologue and Book 19 that his treatise answers Augustine’s call in Book 
Two of DDC for the classification and description of plants, stones, and other natural things in 
scripture for exegetical purposes (DNR 19.7.8-12, p. 414. See Robert Sweetman, Dominican 
Preaching in the Low Countries, pp. 86-95). 
 
303 R.A. Markus, “St. Augustine on Signs,” in Phronesis, vol. 2 no. 1 (1957), p. 71.	
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something other than itself (I.4). While all signs are things, for all that exists is a thing, 
not every thing is a sign. Things, Augustine writes, “are learnt through signs” (I.4), and in 
relation to these signs, the rei are the content or subject matter to which the signs refer.  
Augustine’s discussion of things immediately departs from a treatment of the res 
strictly in relation to scriptural interpretation to a consideration of the human relationship 
with all things. Book One primarily concerns the practice of ordering love such that all 
created things become signs that refer the soul to its divine, immaterial, eternal 
“homeland.” Augustine introduces the distinction between enjoyment (frui) and use (uti), 
to describe two possible modes of relating to things. Enjoyment refers to the type of 
relation a person should have to that which is the final end of the human soul, “eternal 
and unchangeable things” (I. 39). Use refers to proper action performed with regard to 
things that are not ends in themselves, but “are to be used so that we may attain the full 
enjoyment of those things” (I.39). Enjoyment entails “hold[ing] fast to [something] in 
love for its own sake” (1.8). Augustine then specifies that the only things that are to be 
enjoyed are the Father, Son, and Spirit—the Trinity—“a kind of single supreme thing” 
(una quaedam summa res) (I.10), while all other things are to be used in order to refer the 
individual to the supreme divine thing who is source and aim of the Christian life. If 
disordered desire leads the soul to enjoy that which should be used it is, in effect, turning 
sign to thing, interrupting its capacity to transport the traveler from the estranged land of 
materiality to the immaterial homeland, disabling the capacity of signs to reveal “the 
invisible attributes of God, which are understood through what has been made [Rom. 
1:20] or, in other words, to ascertain what is eternal and spiritual from corporeal and 
temporal things” (I.9). For the person who loves in an ordered fashion, created things act 
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as “conveyances” rather than final resting places. Augustine describes this capacity of 
things “we use” to act as vehicles by virtue of their being “related” to the “aim of 
enjoying God’s goodness” (I.75), as the treatment of things in a “transferred” rather than 
a “literal” sense: “For when the object of love is present, it inevitably brings with it 
pleasure…If you go beyond this pleasure and relate it to your permanent goal, you are 
using it, and are said to enjoy it not in the literal sense (proprie) but in a transferred 
(abusive) sense” (I.80). The “use” rather than enjoyment of earthly things allows them to 
become catechretic, revealing that which is not “proper” to them, by “relating” the 
created to the creator and thus allowing those created things to become forces of 
transferral that convey the soul to its heavenly dwelling.  
Augustine elaborates his discussion of signa in books two and three. He 
distinguishes between “natural” (naturalia) signs, which signify without intention—for 
example, the footprint of an animal signifies its passing (II.2)—and “given” (data) signs, 
which are, in contrast, those signs governed by human convention, which “living things” 
produce in order to “express and transmit to another’s mind what is in the mind of the 
person who gives the sign” (II.3). These include verbal and non-verbal signs, such as 
gestures or facial expressions that are “visible words” (II.4-5). Augustine distinguishes 
between two uses of given signs, “fitting” or “literal” (propria) signs—the use of a sign 
to signify the thing for which it was invented, as when the word “ox” (bovem) is used to 
signify the animal—and “transferred signs” (translata)—the figural use of signs whereby 
the signifying chain is extended in order that a sign may signify not only its literal 
referent, but some other thing, as when “we say bovem and not only interpret these two 
syllables to mean the animal normally referred to by that name but also understand, by 
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that animal, ‘worker in the gospel’” (II.32-34). Book Two addresses “unknown signs,” 
both fitting and transferred, while Book Three addresses ambiguous signs, both fitting 
and transferred, and provides interpretive strategies for exegeting these difficult signs.  
Like Thomas’s Prologue, the DDC opens by addressing the problem of 
recognition. While Thomas faces the problem of the non-recognition of Lutgard’s 
sanctity, Augustine grapples with his diagnosis of the human condition as one beset by 
the problem of having an eye that, in the wake of the fall, is “weak and impure,” unable 
to perceive the creator through the creation. Christ’s incarnation and scripture were two 
solutions to this problem, each a form of divine speech. In the Incarnation, the divine res 
became signum, the end became the means, as immaterial divinity appeared to the “carnal 
eye” to compensate for the weakness of the “inner eye,” for, as Augustine quotes Paul, 
“the world was incapable of recognizing God through wisdom” (I Cor. 1:21) (I.25). 
Scripture, too, is a privileged means of healing the impure eye, a different kind of divine 
flesh. Although the divine res is ineffable, making of scripture a “conflict between 
words,” for it speaks the “unspeakable” God (I.13-14), the divine referent is nevertheless 
made available to the reader in its pages, which authoritatively witness to the revelation 
of God. Correct interpretation of scripture is purgative, an encounter with soteriologically 
placed signs that reforms and orders desire by “conform[ing it] to the truth” (I.37).   For 
this encounter to be salutary, a reader requires the skills for approaching and correctly 
interpreting the various types of signs a reader finds in scripture, for it contains many 
obstacles, including the question of whether to interpret transferred and ambiguous signs 
in a literal or figurative manner. In order to be efficacious, the body of the sign must be 
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read in such a way that the reader sees “the truth in words” and “not the words 
themselves.”  
Difficulties with signs occur not only at the level of interpretive dilemmas 
concerning obscure or ambiguous passages, but in relation to the eloquence of scripture. 
Book Four of the DDC addresses both the role of eloquence in the work of persuasion 
undertaken by the preacher who must instruct, delight, and move (persuade the listener to 
act upon that which she or he believes) an audience and the eloquence of the scriptures. 
Augustine asserts that he can conceive of nothing more eloquent or wise than scriptural 
writings. However, this eloquence is unique, for the authors of scripture “used our 
[pagan] eloquence side by side with a rather different eloquence of their own…” (IV.29). 
The singular quality of scriptural language arises from the fact that God has presented the 
mysteries of faith in simple language. Thus, unlike other literature, “the humbler 
(humilior) [scripture] seems the more thoroughly it transcends (transcendit) [the 
eloquence] of others” (IV.26).304 This form of eloquence, which Eric Auerbarch argues 
gave rise to the “Christian sublime,” a style in which the great is revealed in the humblest 
of language,305 and the sublime becomes that which is most lowly, the most lowly the 
most sublime.306 To recognize scriptural eloquence as such requires that one first 
“understand these authors” (IV.25). “Indeed,” Augustine writes, “I venture to say that all 
who correctly understand what these writers are saying realize at the same time that it 
                                                 
304 “Ipsis enim congruit; alios autem quanto videtur humilior tanto altius non ventositate sed 
soliditate transcendit.” 
	
305 Eric Auerbach, Literary Latin and its public in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 22. 
	
306 Ibid., p. 41.	
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would not have been right for them to express it in any other way” (IV.25). However, 
when he lacks understanding, “their eloquence is less clear” (IV.27).  
   Augustine’s acknowledgement that the recognition of scriptural eloquence occurs 
in the wake of understanding begs the question of how a reader might be convinced of 
and understand wisdom that does not seek to persuade by means of classically eloquent 
speech. Similarly, the question that arises from the first three books of the DDC is how a 
reader is to use the signs of the scripture in order to know and enjoy God, the true res, if 
that reader has no knowledge of God, no understanding that would make the signs 
intelligible, and in a postlapsarian state, confuses signs and things, enjoying, as if they 
were final ends (rei), what should be used as a means to that end (signa). For the 
converted reader, the renovation of the soul and its desires is necessary for reading 
scripture in such a way that its signs are understood to refer to God, and thus to function 
as vehicles for the return journey to the divine source. Even as the Christian ethos is one 
that uses and does not enjoy the finite things, so the interpreter’s transformed ethos is 
required that he or she might recognize that the referent of scripture is the rightly ordered 
love of God for God’s own sake and the neighbor for God’s sake (II.18-21). The “truth 
behind the signs” that is the subject of Thomas’s quotation is this love, and the interpreter 
who properly distinguishes between signs and things is able to see “the truth in words and 
not the words themselves,” to see love and not pay attention to the putatively awkward—
ineloquent—surface of the vita, or to be caught forever within a net of ambiguity. As 
David Tracy notes, the initial distinction between the res and the signum liberates 
Augustine from his prior disdain for the “vulgarity” and “obscurity” of the scriptures in 
contrast to the clarity and sophistication of the pagan classics. It allows Augustine to 
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recognize the biblical writings as having their own kind of eloquence in service to their 
own topic, the love of God and neighbor.307 
 Thomas cites that portion of the DDC that argues the eloquence of a teacher must 
be simple. Augustine writes that  
[i]n a word, the function of eloquence in teaching is not to make people 
like what was once offensive, or to make them do what they were loth to 
do, but to make clear what was hidden from them. If this is done in a 
disagreeable way, the benefits reach only a few enthusiasts, who are eager 
to know the things they need to learn no matter how dull and unattractive 
the teaching may be. Once they have attained it, they feed on the truth 
itself with great delight; it is the nature of good minds to love the truth in 
the form of words, not the words themselves [in verbis verum amare, non 
verba]. What use is golden key, if it cannot unlock what we want to be 
unlocked, and what is wrong with a wooden one, if it can, since our sole 
aim is to open closed doors?” (IV.72-73)308 
  
The eloquence of the good teacher is subordinate to his wisdom, as words are subordinate 
to the reality (res) they represent. Delighting and moving an audience are secondary to 
the requirement to teach clearly. Eloquence should not be utterly dispensed with, lest the 
teaching lack all appeal, but unlike schoolmasters who regard eloquent figures as 
“something great…bought at a great price, and sold with great showmanship” (IV.45), 
Christian teachers should use a prose that divests itself of such ornament in order to teach 
                                                 
307 David Tracy, “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity” in The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo: De 
Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, ed. Richard Leo Enos, et 
al. (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008),” p. 283.  
 
308 “Prorsus haec est in docendo eloquentia, qua fit dicendo non ut libeat quod horrebat aut ut fiat 
quod pigebat sed ut appareat quod latebat. Quod tamen si fiat insuaviter, ad paucos quidem 
studioissimos suus pervenit fructus, qui ea quae discenda sunt, quamvis abiecte inculteque 
dicantur, scire desiderant. Quod cum adepti fuerint, ipsa delectabiliter veritate pascuntur, 
bonorum ingeniorum insignis est indoles in verbis verum amare, non verba. Quid enim prodest 
clavis aurea, si aperire quod volumus non potest, aut quid obest lignea, si hoc potest, quando nihil 
quaerimus nisi patere quod clausum est?”  
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the most serious of subjects. Rhetoric does not exist for its own sake; an instrument, it is 
to be used for the return of the soul to its source, rather than enjoyed.  
When Thomas invokes this passage, however, he does so not in order to draw 
attention to the clarity of his writing. Rather, the passage is part of an extended humility 
topos. This rhetorical gesture does two things. First, Thomas draws a parallel between the 
vita and scripture, which has a similarly humble style (c.f. DDC, IV 26-27). Secondly, 
this paralls suggests a mode of reading the vita: as Augustine instructs readers of 
scripture, so Thomas asks readers to look not at his ostensibly poor prose, but at the truth 
behind it. He is asking them to take up the vita as an exercise practiced upon what we a 
text that can be read as “obscure” insofar as its subject resists understanding because of 
its incredible and novel claims. Thomas wants readers to look past the “wood” of his 
words, to see the “truth” that is Lutgard (and according to the logic of signs here, Lutgard 
as Christ), and not those mediating vehicles that compose the text.  
Such a reading of his work would be a proper “use” of the text. Thus Thomas 
refigures Phillipians 4:8, which he renders “believe such things are holy as are useful 
[utilia].” The Pauline verse commands the community at Phillipi to “think about such 
things as are true, noble, right, pure, admirable, excellent or praiseworthy.” While 
Lutgard is represented as being all these things, Thomas tells readers to believe it insofar 
as it is “useful,” in other words, insofar as it allows them to look past the text and towards 
the figure of Lutgard who re-fers the reader to God. The reader of the VLA is like the 
interpreter of scripture in Augustine’s DDC. Through the use of the humility topos, 
Thomas thus makes enormous claims for the vita. 
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However, the obscurity that Thomas addresses by means of the humility topos 
remains a source of anxiety. The obscurity of his language arises, we have seen, from the 
novelty and unintelligibility of Lutgard’s sanctity. The call to readers to read “beyond” 
language does not satisfy his concern. Why should a reader undertake such an exercise 
upon an unintelligible text and unauthoritative text? The vita is not, after all, the Bible 
(though it stands in complex relations of imitation to it). Thomas’s task is to make 
Lutgard legible and thus acceptable and exemplary for a community of readers. At the 
same time, however, he must foreground the power of her wondrousness and novelty, for 
this strangeness energizes and justifies his text even as it threatens it. Without such 
legibility, the reader would remain unsure whether the life represented in the text is in 
fact a “possible” one, to use the happy phrase of Allison Frazier. By possible, I mean not 
only for Lutgard herself, or believable on the part of the reader, but desirable. How can 
such strangeness be placed in the space where a reader could “take it up”? What is 
required for a reading to be taken up such that it is efficacious, able to “increase merit and 
virtue” in its readers? How might reading itself be transformative? 
Thomas’s recognition that his hagiographical document is one that must persuade 
disbelieving readers—those who approach his subject not with faith and love, but a 
skepticism borne of what he claims is his poor prose and the incredible nature of its 
claims—mirrors Augustine’s problem of recognition in the DDC that I have already 
discussed. As we have seen, to recognize the eloquence of scripture behind its humble 
style requires that the reader have understanding of the message of the text. Yet how is a 
reader to gain this understanding if the text seems inelegant, offensive, or simply 
unintelligible, its obscurities an opaque veil rather than a site for productive interpretive 
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exercise? How might Thomas convince readers of—render them faithful to (fidem 
faciam)—the truth of his text? 
The solution offered by the DDC to the dilemma of understanding is that God 
must graciously give the capacity to discover him.309 Augustine’s declared reliance on 
grace for inner transformation and understanding does not, however, end in quietism; 
rhetorical persuasion and teaching remain central tasks in Christian life. Truth requires, 
he asserts, persuasion to turn the soul towards its proper end, and clever language to 
defend it. Yet the dilemma remains acute in the treatise, as it is for Thomas and the 
readers of his vita, for in the realm of the fallen will, the unconverted soul suffers a 
fractured relation between sign and thing, and the good that would repair this relation is 
no longer irresistible. Real eloquence for him is that which stirs listeners to “lend their 
assent to matters which they admit to be true,” and to “act decisively on the knowledge 
that they have” (4.15).310 In other words, persuasion must engage the will and the body. 
Although a person may know and desire to do the good, it is impossible because 
humanity has been sold into sin. The divided will that resulted from the fall renders 
knowledge powerless.311 The function of proof and belief in contexts of persuasion, then, 
aims for more than intellectual assent to a proposition. It seeks an enlistment and 
agreement of desire. Thus, love and belief are deeply entwined for Augustine: “For if 
                                                 
309 David Tracy, “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity,” p. 276.  
	
310 Debora K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in The English Renaissance 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 46. Quoted in Olmstead, Rhetoric, p. 35	
311 Eric Auerbach, Literary Latin, p. 32. 
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someone lapses in his faith, he inevitably lapses in his love as well, since he cannot love 
what he does not believe to be true” (DDC, I.90).312 
If love enables belief and belief, in turn, is required for love, the issue is less one 
of certainty than of the assent of the will in love. The will healed by an infusion of charity 
is able to act upon its desires, a radical change from the broken will’s alienation from 
potestas. In the Prologue to the VLA, this action of the united will is conceived as the 
“taking up” of Thomas’s tales “as are useful.” This use is, I would argue, the adoption of 
the exemplary figure of Lutgard by the nuns who are to incorporate her vita into their 
reading practice and thus into their cultivation of a spiritual disposition modeled on 
Lutgard’s life. 
In Book One of DDC, Augustine provides some clues to the pragmatics of how 
reading and interpretation might transform and persuade the unconverted or disbelieving. 
Addressing the moment when an interpreter encounters a passage that clashes with his 
old thoughts, he acknowledges that the reader’s first impulse is to disagree with the text. 
This initial gesture is dangerous, and “[i]f he encourages this evil to spread it will be his 
downfall.” This is so because in negating the demand of the text and thus disavowing the 
gap between the mind and the scripture, the reader no longer reads with faith. He writes,  
For ‘we walk by faith, not by sight’ (2 Cor. 5:7), and faith will falter if the 
authority of holy scripture is shaken; and if faith falters, love itself decays. 
For if someone lapses in his faith, he inevitably lapses in his love as well, 
since he cannot love what he does not believe to be true. If on the other 
hand he both believes and loves, then by good conduct and by following 
the rules of good behavior he gives himself reason to hope that he will 
attain what he loves. So there are these three things which all knowledge 
and prophecy serve: faith, hope, and love (1 Cor 13:13). But faith will be 
                                                 
312 “Nam si a fide quisque ceciderit, a caritate etiam necesse est cadat. Non enim potest diligere 
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replaced by the sight of visible reality, and hope by the real happiness 
which we shall attain, whereas love will actually increase when these 
things pass away. If, through faith, we love what we cannot yet see, how 
much greater will our love be when we have begun to see! And if through 
hope, we love something that we have not yet attained, how much greater 
will our love be when we have attained it! (I.89-91)313 
 
Faith consists, in part, in the submission of the intellect to the authority of scripture (or to 
God, as some advanced souls do without recourse to the mediations of scripture, see 
I.93). This submission is not an act of the intellect based on things seen. It is, rather, love 
of that which is not yet attained or seen, a love that seeks in hope, and which enables a 
person to behave in such a way that it is possible “he will attain what he loves,” 
eventually arriving at the consummation of that faith, hope and love in the beatific vision 
after death.  
Yet how does such a submission of the intellect occur except through a faith and a 
love (an act of the will) that the text itself engenders (or the prior illumination of God)? 
In other words, if the will resists the demands of faith, then faith and love are impossible 
from the outset.  
In book 8 of the Confessions, mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Augustine 
offers a powerful example of this problematic. Having already been transformed by “the 
books of the Platonists,” which converted him to a belief in the immateriality of God, 
                                                 
313“Per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem; titubabit autem fides, si divinarum scripturarum 
vacillat auctoritas; porro fide titubante caritas etiam ipsa languescit. Name si a fide quisque 
ceciderit, a caritate etiam necesse est cadat. Non enim potest diligere quod esse non credit. Porro 
si et credit et diligit, bene agendo et praceptis morum bonorum obtemperando efficit ut etiam 
speret se ad id quod diligit esse venturum. Itaque tria haec sunt quibus et scientia omnis prophetia 
militat: fides, spes, caritas. Sed fidei succedet species quam videbimus, et spei succesdet 
beatitudo ipsa ad quam perventuri sumus, caritas autem etiam istis decedentibus augebitur potius. 
Si enim credendo diligimus quod nondum videmus, quanto magis cum videre coeperimus? Et si 
sperando diligimus quo nondum pervenimus, quanto magis cum pervenerimus?” 
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Augustine continued to struggle with the submission of his will. His mind was “certain” 
(certum) of the truth of what he needed do, but his will was broken and weighed down by 
chains of habit the certainty of his mind could not shatter. Augustine describes himself in 
a state of extreme agitation, disgusted with his own recalcitrance and yet unable to give 
himself over to that part of his will that desired chastity. Fleeing to a garden at his 
Milanese house, he read Romans 13:13-14, “not in carousing and drunkenness, not in 
sexual excess and lust, not in quarrelling and jealousy. Rather put on (induite) the Lord 
Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh.” What it meant for him to be 
“convinced” or persuaded of this text was to acquire the capacity to act upon that to 
which his intellect had assented, to submit to the authority of a text that did not comport 
with his prior habits or disposition. In order to acquire this new disposition and capacity, 
he assumed—clothed himself in—the person of Jesus. The struggle for conversion, for 
submission to the code of scripture, is depicted here as the result of grace, but a grace that 
works in and through the text.  
Commenting on the scene of conversion in the garden, Brian Stock notes that 
Augustine did not simply align himself with the directives of the text but first 
experienced a horrifying distance between his own state and that of the ideal stated in the 
text.314 This experience of the gap enabled his repentance (precisely what was missing for 
Augustine in the Platonic writings), and through this, a submission of his will (and thus 
his body) to the divine command of chastity. The scripture was not only a sign of the 
invisible, absent res, but a mark of the distance between reader and the text. While 
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reading in agitation because of this gap he writes, “a light of freedom infused my heart, 
dispelling all shadows of doubt” (luce securitatis infusa cordi meo omnes dubitationis 
tenebrae diffugerunt). While Stock renders securitatis as “certainty,” the word carries 
connotations less of intellectual confidence, and more a sense of freedom from anxiety, 
safety, and composure—an emotional state that stands in contrast to the agitation that 
introduces the scene. This securitatis contrasts with the “certainty” of book 7, a certainty 
arising from intellectual assent that was able to bring him only so far on his road to 
conversion. This security was what ultimately dispelled “doubt,” demonstrating that the 
persuaded reader is one whose will has been reconfigured and whose body has been 
transformed, not only convinced of a series of propositions.  
 If we return to the series of Pauline quotations that appear immediately before 
Augustine in Thomas’s prologue, we see that these passages together constitute a view of 
reading designed to address the vita’s implausibility in a deeply Augustinian way. 
Thomas writes, 
Since ‘charity believes all things, bears with all things’ (1 Cor. 13:7) I 
plead with those into whom ‘God has poured (infudit) the spirit of his 
charity’ (c.f. Rom 5:5)315 that, in these matters, they believe ‘such things 
as are holy, such things as are useful’ (utilia) (c.f. Phil. 4:8), such things as 
are consonant with the truth, and at the same time patiently bear with such 
things as I might have put down in a less rhetorically pleasing or 
discerning (indiscrete) style.316 
 
                                                 
315 The Vulgate is “caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris…” Thomas’s use of infusa rather 
than diffusa may be a subtle allusion to Confessions 8.  
	
316 “Cum ergo caritas omnia credit, omnia sustinet; peto ab iis, quibus Deus spiritum suae 
caritatis infudit, ut credant his siqua sunt sancta, siqua utilia, siqua veritati consona 
proponuntur; simulque sustineant patienter, siqua minus apte, siqua minus litteratorie vel 
indiscrete posuero.” 
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One must read in love for this love believes “all things.” Love also enables the reader to 
“bear with” (sustinet) the allegedly bad grammar and poor style of Thomas’s writing. 
Thomas thus gives a strangely grand theological pressure to the humility topos; the 
reader’s capacity to accept the humble style of the text is evidence of an operation of 
grace working in them.  
 Romans 5:5, to which Thomas appeals, is an essential text for Augustine in his 
debates with the Pelagians, appearing in both On the Spirit and the Letter (412) and On 
Grace and Free Will (427). In both treatises it acts as a proof-text for the necessity of 
prevenient grace, that love that is first “shed abroad” in human hearts, transforming the 
will so that it is able to love the law rather than obey it in fear, and to act upon this 
transformed ontology.317 By invoking Romans 5:5, Thomas circumscribes his addressees 
as those “into whom God has poured the spirit of his charity.”  
This demarcation of audience by appealing to his readers’ status as those who 
have been infused with the love of God is the key rhetorical strategy Thomas uses in 
attempting to solicit the belief of his readers. Thomas appeals to readers’ status as already 
converted. Successful readers of the vita are those, he writes, who have received divine 
illumination necessary to recognize that the true topic of his hagiography is the caritas 
manifested in Lutgard. The corollary of this appeal is that the conversion of those who do 
not accept his text is called into question. Accepting Thomas’s text becomes proof that a 
                                                 
317 Augustine, “Grace and Free Will,” trans. Robert P. Russell in The Teacher. The Free Choice 
of the Will. Grace and Free Will (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1968), 
ch. 38, 39; On the Spirit and the Letter, trans. W.J. Sparrow Simpson D.D. (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1925), ch. 56.  
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reader has been infused with grace. He borrows, for his own text, his reader’s presumed 
prior acceptance of and submission to the authority of scripture.  
Thomas thus uses the authoritative work of Augustine, initially elaborated for the 
interpretation of the scriptural canon, in the service of a new hagiographical, 
extracanonical text. He attempts to convert already-converted Christians to a new type of 
text and example. His elaborate humility topos implicitly places his work, if not on an 
equal footing with scripture, as having a comparable revelatory status, claiming for it the 
same necessity of grace on the part of the interpreter, and the same true topic, namely the 
love of God and neighbor as it is manifested in Lutgard.  
 
Desire, Interpretation, and Proof  
 
To read in love is, first, to submit to the authority of the text in an act of faith that 
Thomas argues is coterminous with his readers’ faith because it draws upon their prior 
infusion of gracious love. Such a reader “bears with” or “endures” the implausibility and 
simplicity of the tale’s narration as well as Lutgard’s strangeness. The reader’s passion is 
a key means to their identification with Lutgard, for it enables her “virtue and merit” to 
become models “taken up” by the reader, effectively increasing their own virtue and 
merit. Suspicion is overcome by a belief that is a work of love in faith.  
However, the reader’s identification with Lutgard, which could be understood to 
be—much like Augustine’s taking up of Romans in the Confessions—submission to the 
authority of the textual exemplar, whether Lutgard or, in Augustine’s case, Christ, is not 
one, I would argue, that Thomas understands to be the end of readerly desire and 
interpretive practice, but their incitement. Martyrdom to the text does not entail the 
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cessation of the reader’s interpretive work. Despite the alignment of his text with 
scripture, Thomas is not setting himself up as an authority delimiting the interpretive 
scope of the reader. Rather, by assimilating the mechanics and topic of the vita to 
Augustine’s understanding of scripture, Lutgard becomes the res, that referent that can be 
captured only by means of language that inevitably falls short of the capacities of the 
text’s signa.  
The type of reading Thomas’s text suggests and Augustine’s theory of 
signification allows, I would argue, is similar to that which Roland Barthes terms the 
“writerly text” (le scriptable). It contrasts with the juridical notion of the saint-as-proof 
that Dyan Elliott argues is fundamental to Thomas’s hagiographical corpus. According to 
Barthes, the writerly text is one in which the reader is “no longer a consumer, but a 
producer of the text.”318 The reader as producer is, he argues, the goal of “literary work.” 
In contrast to the writerly text, the “readerly” text (le lisible) is one in which the reader is 
made idle:  
Our literature is characterized by the pitiless divorce which the literary 
institution maintains between the producer of the text and its user, between 
its owner and its customer, between its author and reader. The reader is 
thereby plunged into a kind of idleness—he is instransitive; he is, in short, 
serious: instead of functioning himself, instead of gaining access to the 
magic of the signifier, to the pleasure of writing, he is left with no more 
than the poor freedom to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more 
than a referendum. 319  
                                                 
318 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 4.  
	
319 Ibid., p. 4. “Notre littérature est marquée par le divorce impitoyable que l’institution littéraire 
maintient entre le fabricant et l’usager du texte, son propriétaire et son client, son auteur et son 
lecteur. Ce lecteur est alors plongé dans une sorte d’oisiveté, d’intransitivé, et, pour tout dire, de 
sérieux: au lieu de jouer lui-même, d’accéder pleinement à l’enchantement du signifiant, à la 
volupté de l’écriture, il ne lui reste plus en partage que la pauvre liberté de recevoir ou de rejeter 
le texte: la lecture n’est plus qu’un referendum. En face du text scriptible s’établit donc sa 
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The aim of literary work according to Barthes is to turn the reader into a “writer,” having 
an active engagement with the text, in contrast to those intimidated or lazy readers who 
simply “accept or reject” the text in a reading that is a “referendum.” The referendum is 
not unlike the juridical notion of persuasion in which the aim is to lead listeners to give a 
verdict of true or false, guilty or not guilty. The referendum attempts to determine the 
nature and status of the referent, that to which the signs refer, in an absolute and single 
moment that enables the reader to stop working.  
The way that Thomas has framed his tale such that Lutgard is the res complicates 
the nature of reading hagiography in relation to the question of belief and doubt. The res 
to which the signs refer stands always in excess of the text’s signifiers. The referential 
work of signs is never resolved, and neither, then, is reading completed. Thus, 
interpretation must be more than assent to or dissent from the claims of the text. Thomas 
himself provides the best example of this notion of reading as writing. He appears in the 
vita not only as a superlative lover of Lutgard, but as an instance of the doubting reader 
he addressed in the Prologue.  
The last chapters of the vita elaborate the surprising nature of the agreement 
between Thomas and the Abbess Hadewijch that Thomas says gave rise to the writing of 
the Life. Though Thomas claims that it was his love for the Abbess, the nuns of the 
Brabant, and Lutgard herself that impelled his writing, at the end of the vita, he describes 
how he wrote the tale in order that he might obtain her relic. Thomas arranged to receive 
Lutgard’s entire hand upon her death. Hearing this, however, Lutgard told Thomas that 
                                                                                                                                                 
contrevaleur, sa valeur négative, réactive: ce qui peut être lu, mais non écrit: le lisible. Nous 
appelons classique tout texte lisible.” (Barthes, S/Z, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970), p. 10).	
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he would receive the little finger of her right hand. Thomas, disbelieving her prophecy, 
protested that he intended to get the entire hand. When Lutgard died and Thomas 
approached Hadewijch for the agreed-upon relic, she refused to give it to him unless he 
first wrote her Life. He agreed to write it and in due course, received the very finger 
Lutgard had indicated he would. Thomas believed, he writes, that this trial was according 
to the  
dispensation of God’s counsel, for the Almighty had arranged a test 
(ordinabat probare) so that I might obtain Lutgard’s finger according to 
her promise—the finger that my ignorant simplicity had once refused 
(nescia simplicitas denegarat). Once again I came to Aywières and, 
promising to write Lutgard’s life, I received with immense and heartfelt 
joy the gift I desired more than gold or silver (III.19).320 
 
Thomas had doubted Lutgard’s words, insisting on his claim to her entire hand. He had to 
undergo a purgation of his incredulity and misplaced desire—by means of the test that is 
his writing and bearing with the disappointment of his hope for her hand—in order to 
obtain that which Lutgard herself had allowed. Thomas’s testing had the further virtue of 
“proving” Lutgard to be a prophet (si vere Prophetes pia Lutgardis esse probabitur) 
according to her earlier prediction that only the little finger of her right hand would be 
amputated. 
 Thomas’s account of how he came to write the vita also demonstrates the way in 
which a juridical discourse of proof and doubt are assimilated to an Augustinian one that 
is articulated in terms of love and the transformation of the subject who believes. Both 
                                                 
320 “Super eo ergo Abbatissam adiens preces supplices cum lacrymis fudi: sed cum magno dolore 
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digitum obtinerem, quem nescia simplicitas denegarat. Iterato autem secundum tempus in 
Aquiriam veni, vitamque piæ Lutgardis scribere promittens, cum ingenti cordis lætitia super 
aurum & argentum optatum munus accepi.” 
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Thomas’s belief and Lutgard’s prophetic powers are tested and proven (probare). The 
hagiography is, furthermore, meant to be proof of Lutgard’s sanctity, containing tales like 
this one in which her prophecy is carefully attested to by worthy witnesses. However, the 
writing of hagiography does not only prove Lutgard. It is also Thomas’s test in which he 
proves his love, devotion and belief. His writing was born of desire, most immediately 
for her finger, and more generally for the sake of his amor flagrantissmus and caritas for 
Lutgard, Hadewijch, and other nuns of the Brabant. Thomas, the reader of Lutgard, 
becomes a writer. The text that proves him is a work of desire, a space in which he is 
placed as a character and undergoes purgation and transformation.  
Thomas justifies his desire for the finger of an as-yet uncanonized woman 
(nondum adhuc canonizatæ) with reference to the story of Hugolino accepting the finger 
and vita of Marie of Oignies from James (VMO-S, 15-17). In these doubled stories of 
doubt—Hugolino’s blasphemous doubt and Thomas doubting of Lutgard’s prophecy—
relic and text act as proofs of orthodoxy and saintly power. Marie’s relic and vita are 
presented in the Supplement as efficacious because of Hugolino’s great desire for them to 
work. Hugolino was, despite his blasphemous doubt, an already-converted soul, for he 
desired his own cure and was able to act upon that desire in reading—“incubating” 
(incubuit)—with the devotion of the bride of the Song of Songs, and clinging to Marie’s 
relic with confidence.  
Hugolino’s story is, in part, an exemplum for the preachers to whom the text is 
dedicated. James gave Hugolino the vita and relic as a supplement to his counsel. James 
realized, as I noted at the outset of this chapter, that he needed to buttress the biblical 
words of comfort and arguments he spoke to Hugolino with examples of others cured of 
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the spirit of blasphemy. Such examples were to be found in Marie’s vita, and they 
provided both illustrations of more abstract doctrine and, like her relic, effected 
Hugolino’s cure by virtue of Marie’s power, made present in the vita, to dispel 
blasphemy after her death (VMO-S, 16).  
However, behind Hugolino lies the true addressee of the Supplement, James of 
Vitry. While Thomas writes in the Supplement’s Prologue—addressed to Giles, a founder 
and Prior of St. Nicholas at Oignies—that he wrote the vita for Marie’s admirers, who 
knew that James left many things out from his account for the sake of brevity and 
credibility, the vita was, in fact, an occasion for Thomas to write James’s Life through his 
encounters with Marie. The text culminates in a querela (VMO-S, 24-27) in which 
Thomas berates James for quitting the apostolic life and his community in Liège for the 
grandeur of Rome. Marie’s Supplement is, in effect, James’s anti-hagiography. If 
Lutgard’s Life was written for the sake of Thomas’s love of his spiritual mother, the 
Supplement was written for the sake of his disappointed love in his spiritual father, 
James. The account of James’s abandonment of Liège provides a second narrative of 
proof and disbelief within the Supplement. In it, however, James models the failure of 
love and belief, issuing ultimately in his falling away from what Thomas perceived to be 
his sanctity. 
 James’s transfer to Rome was, Thomas argues, against the wishes of Marie, who 
made her desires clear to James. He, her most devout follower, discounted them. 
Hugolino’s conversion from doubt to belief is thus a foil for and inversion of James’s 
conversion from belief to disbelief. James becomes a figure for the failure not only of 
hagiographical but visionary rhetoric, as even Marie’s persuasive efforts were to no avail. 
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James thus enacted the Augustinian problematic of the fallen will in the work of 
persuasion in a way that was much more pronounced than Hugolino. For Augustine, as 
we have seen, the rhetorical encounter does not only involve deliberation and choosing 
among various truth claims. Successful eloquence engages the desire of the will to act in 
accord with that to which the mind has assented. Successful rhetoric is a mode of 
speaking that unifies the fissured subjectivity of the fallen person. The preacher’s task, 
according to Augustine, is to “reach people who know what they should do but do not do 
it.”321 According to Thomas, James knew what he should do—return to Liège—but his 
will was recalcitrant, and he refused—or was unable—to act on his knowledge.  
James not only wrote about the life of poverty and penance he witnessed, but 
lived it as a canon at St. Nicholas priory in Oignies, where he met Marie when she retired 
there at the end of her life. However, his gifts as a preacher and eminent connections to 
people like Gregory IX led eventually to his being made the bishop of Acre (1216-27) 
and then the cardinal of Tusculum (1229-40). For Thomas, this entailed abandonment of 
his responsibility to the people of Liège and the simplicity of the apostolic life. The 
Supplement expresses Thomas’s view that this humble life was not only what Marie 
desired for James while alive, but what she attempted to ordain from beyond the grave.  
Thomas relates a tale of Marie’s intercession on James’s behalf. Once, when he 
was bishop of Acre and sailing to Rome, a terrible storm threatened the ship. Terrified of 
drowning, James clung to her relics suspended at his neck, pleading for her help, calling 
upon her merits and reminding her of the “special love” (amore præcipuo dilexisti) she 
bore him while on earth and promising to change his way of life (VMO-S, 21). Marie 
                                                 
321 Wendy Olmstead, Rhetoric, p. 35. C.f. DDC IV.28. 
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dutifully appeared to James, telling him that he would be saved. She then predicted that 
James would consecrate five altars at Oignies, the last to the Trinity, and that there, “if 
you wish” (si ipse volueris), Christ will give you the peace that you [have] sought.” 
However, she ominously tells him “you are a man with a will of you own (Sed tu, homo 
voluntatis tuæ) and you have never wanted to accede to my counsels and the counsels of 
those who loved you spiritually” (VMO-S, 21).  
Thomas writes that James “wished to test” (probare volens) this vision. He thus 
asked the Pope to release him from his episcopate and returned to Oignies, where the 
vision was confirmed. Two years later, however, James was again invited to Rome. 
When Prior Giles importuned Marie to keep James in Liège as it was likely he would 
become “entangl[ed] in some dignity” in Rome, she told him that because she was 
opposed to the journey, she would not accompany James. When Giles told James of his 
vision, he laughingly told him that not only had she told him the same, but that he “was 
not moved,” and said “I don’t believe it: indeed I certainly presume that…the pope will 
not detain me with him if I am unwilling” (Præterea non credo, imo certus præsumo 
quod me…) (VMO-S 23). James thus became an unbeliever. His certainty was pitted 
against the word of the saint, as the dignity of Rome was pitted against the apostolic 
ideals of the small community at Oignies. Thomas paints James as a man whose will, 
which could have given him the “peace he sought” in Oignies if he had acted on that 
desire delivered him instead to the alternative desire for the satisfactions of the 
cardinalate. “Unmoved” by Marie’s appearance, the querela of chapters 24-27 addressed 
to James and written in the grand style—which according to Augustine is the style 
necessary for addressing an audience which cannot do the good it knows—full of 
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unmitigated pathos, allusion, repetition, the hortatory subjunctive, and the central stark 
image of two “beautiful dead birds” that represent James’s ministry, is Thomas’s 
desperate attempt to convince James to return to Lotharingia. Addressing James, he 
writes,  
So now I must turn to you, bishop of Tusculum and cardinal of the Roman 
curia. Anyone can see that the handmaid of God spoke most truly when 
she said you are a man with your own will. You were so obstinate in the 
face of the clear revelation of the handmaid of Christ that there was no 
way you could be turned from your own will. Brothers, let the bishop of 
Tusculum look and see if he has gained through his own will, if he has 
incurred damage from this, if he has omitted things which could have 
promoted the honour of Christ and the salvation of abandoned souls….O 
most honourable bishop, this is what you saw by divine revelation when 
you were located in our land…you testified that you saw in a divine 
revelation that blessed Gregory [Gregory IX] gave you two very beautiful, 
but dead, birds. Bishop Lambert, the martyr and bishop of Liège gave you 
one, but much prettier and alive. This is also what the most blessed 
woman Mary of Oignies, a prophetess without deceit, once foretold to you 
when she was alive: the blessed Lambert himself put a mitre on your 
head….The holy martyr Lambert…through the holy prayers of saintly 
men and women, does not cease offering you each day this bird of 
spiritual administration, stretched forth on the wings of contemplation, 
bright with the feathers of virtues, live with holy action…O man 
especially chosen by the Lord from among mortals, and yet remiss in such 
things, we are confident that you still burn inside with the divine fire…O 
beautiful and dead birds! The birds, I repeat, are dead….If they are dead, 
why are they favoured in place of the living one? Take care holy father, 
take care most reverend bishop, lest the dead birds provide you with 
stench rather than honour. The nature of things is known to be such that 
however pretty the birds are dead, when they are dead, they cannot last 
without decaying. (VMO-S, 24-27)322  
                                                 
322	“Nunc igitur ad te mihi redeundum est, Tusculane Præsul, Romanæ Curiæ Cardinalem. 
Verum quidem, ut in his quisquam potest advertere, verissimum Dei famula dixit, hominem 
voluntatis tuæ te esse contestans, qui utique ad tam evidentissimas ipsius Ancillæ Christi 
revelationes obstinatus ita fuisti, quod nullo modo moveri a voluntate propria potuisti. Videat 
ergo, Fratres, videat Tusculanus ille, si mediante effectu voluntatis suæ profecerit, si ullum ex eo 
damnum incurrerit, si aliqua interim prætermisit, quæ ad honorem Christi & salutem animarum 
desolatarum proficere potuissent: quas scilicet animas salutis nostræ Princeps Jesus proprio 
sanguine & ignominiosa Crucis morte redemit… Hoc est enim quod vos, Optime Præsul, 
aliquando in nostris partibus positus divina revelatione vidistis. Diu antequam venerandus ille ac 
vere dignus Dominus Hugo, Ostiensis Episcopus, in dignitatem Apostolicam attolleretur; visum 
tibi in revelatione divina testatus es, quod B. Gregorius Papa, qui hunc utique qui modo est, & 
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Because visionary and historical experience of the saintly woman could not “move” him, 
Thomas attempted to use the grand style of rhetoric to do so. However, his rhetoric could 
not persuade James’s recalcitrant will. The good, in this instance, was highly resistible. 
James thus became the embodiment of the bad reader, one whose love for Marie and the 
community at Oignies did not persist. He stands in opposition to Hugolino, who began in 
a state of doubt and was cured by means of his devoted reading and relic. James on the 
other hand, began one whose hidden sanctity and capacity to save souls “forcefully 
impelled” Marie to kiss the places where he walked when they first met (VMO-S, 2).  
Thomas wants readers to believe that the truly incredible wonder of the 
Supplement is not the material Thomas included about Marie that James had left out of 
his vita “lest…by including too much of the incomparable magnitude of revelations and 
miracles which is the fragrance of life in the hearts of believers but the odour of death [in 
the hearts of the unbelieving]” (VMO-S, Prologue). Rather, he declares it an 
“unprecedented wonder” (incognitum monstrum) that a bishop “of his own free will” 
renounced his episcopate, performing a true imitation of Christ (VMO-S, 25), a wonder 
that is recapitulated in deformed shape when he remained unmoved by Marie’s desire 
                                                                                                                                                 
nomine & actione demonstrat, duas tibi aves pulcherrimas, sed mortuas; beatus vero Lambertus 
Martyr & Episcopus Leodiensis, unam quidem, sed multo pulchriorem & vivam dedit: hoc est 
etiam quod ipsa beatissima mulier Maria de Oignies, Prophetissa quidem non fallax, tibi olim in 
vita prædixit, ipsum scilicet B. Lambertum Martyrrem mitram tuo capiti imposuisse... Hanc 
autem spiritualis administrationis, alis contemplationis exertam, pennis virtutum fulgidam, sancta 
vividam actione, sanctus adhuc Martyr Lambertus & Leodiensis Episcopus, per sanctas 
Sanctorum Sanctarumque preces, tibi quotidie offerre non cessat... O virum specialiter inter 
mortales a Domino præelectum, in talibus cessantem; qui licet in se ardeat, ut omnino 
confidimus, amore divino; tamen super candelabrum positum omnibus non lucentem! O aves 
pulchras & mortuas! Mortuæ sunt, inquam, aves…Cave igitur, Pater sancte, cave Reverendissime 
Præsul, ne aves mortuæ fœtorem tibi magis pariant quam honorem. Rerum enim natura habere 
dignoscitur, quod quantumlibet aves pulchræ, si vita careant, durare sine fœtore non possunt.” 
(Cols. 0675B-0676D) 
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that he remain in Lotharingia. Thus Thomas tells the reader to “be stunned” and “gaze on 
a miracle” (Obstupesce, Lector, intuere miraculum) (VMO-S, 23), namely James’s 
unmoved will in the face of his saintly mentor’s advice. 
 
Conclusion  
Thomas’s narrative of Hugolino’s conversion by means of the vita and relic (ca. 
1230) demonstrates not only a great confidence in the power of these objects to effect a 
cure, but in the will of a converted soul to act upon that which it desires. When writing 
The Life of Lutgard of Aywières in 1246, Thomas reveals a greater insecurity about the 
capacity of a vita and its examples to convince and thus transform its readers. Thomas’s 
strategy for dealing with his sense of the resistibility of the vita and the recalcitrant nature 
of the broken will is to explicitly theorize the act of reading the life of a wondrous saint, 
providing a methodology for his readers based on his claim that their faith in the 
hagiography is an extension of their faith in scripture and is thus should be subject to the 
same readerly strategies. Thomas’s understanding of what it is to properly read a life does 
not change: Hugolino was an ideal reader in the terms of both the Supplement and the 
VLA. He approached the vita with love and faith, meditating on the text “vigilantly,” until 
he was able to “taste and see the sweetness of the Lord.” Testing and proving became a 
tasting that transformed. However, I would suggest that Thomas’s disappointment with 
James (who never did return, despite Thomas’s efforts to persuade him) and subsequent 
awareness of the limited capacity of hagiographical example to effect a change of the 
will, stand behind the self-conscious concern of the inherent (in)capacity of the VLA to 
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inspire belief, or, more properly, of the sufficiency of the proof of the example to render a 
reader faithful to a text.  
Thomas’s solution to this problem is to invoke the authority of Augustine and his 
rhetorical and hermeneutical theory in order to provide a theory of how to read the text. 
In the Augustinian understanding, the very obscurity of the vita and of Lutgard—her 
novelty and marvelousness—may become, Thomas implies, sites at which the reader can 
“exercise” his or her faith and in this exercise, “take up” the saint as an exemplar. 
Furthermore, by asking readers to treat the vita as scripture, Thomas in effect argues that 
belief in and understanding of the life requires the grace and love readers already possess 
by virtue of their faith. Only through such belief can the proofs offered by the text 
become truly convincing.  
Therefore, while juridical proof occupies an important place in the VLA, the 
notion of reading articulated by Augustine as the education and engagement of love 
through grace is given priority by the Prologue, as it is the only sufficient solution to the 
problem of the text’s credibility. Deliberation—engaging with and interpreting the vita 
while weighing its claims—in the rhetorical space of what Thomas conceives as an 
hagiographical psychogogy, then, leads to more than intellectual assent to an argument; 
the knowledge that arises from being convinced of the text’s truth is dependent on and 
productive of love that issues in both the understanding and behavior of the reader. To be 
convinced is to be rendered faithful, not certain.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Language, Literacy, and the Saintly Body 
 
Introduction  
 
Many years before her death, Thomas approached some nuns and lay brothers in 
order to arrange for the disposal of Lutgard’s relics should she die during his absence. 
Thomas wanted her hand as “a sacred memorial” (sacram memoriam). The abbess 
Hadewijch agreed to his request. However, Thomas writes, repeating a medieval 
misogynistic commonplace, “since it is women’s nature (natura) to be unable to keep 
secrets (as the vernacular proverb says, ‘be quiet, woman—if you can’), the nuns told 
Lutgard how I had ordered her hand to be cut off.”323  
There follows a scene that demonstrates Lutgard’s wit and authority with a 
vividness unprecedented in the Life. Thomas, who had just pled for the silence of woman, 
portrays himself coming to Aywières in order to have a conversation with Lutgard. Their 
speech turns quickly into a gentle duel. Thomas casts the scene as a kind of gruesome 
hohe Minne, one in which the castle is an abbey and the noble knight of God, who asks 
for the (dead) hand of his heroine, is granted only a small finger after proving himself 
with the labor of his writing, a token accepted as a sufficient reward for his ardor.  
Making the first thrust in their conversation, Lutgard turns to him with a serious 
expression and says, “I have heard, dearest son (fili carissime), that you are already 
planning to cut off my hand after I die. (manum mihi post mortem abscindere jam 
                                                 
323 Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Lutgardis Aquiriensis, ed. by G. Henschen, in Acta Sanctorum, 16 
June, III, pp. 187-209. English translation by Barbara Newman in Thomas of Cantimpré, The 
Collected Saints’ Lives (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), III.19. (Hereafter I will use the abbreviation 
VLA for this life and cite passage references within the body of the text).  
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disponis). I cannot imagine (multum miror) what you plan to do with my hand!” Thomas, 
blushing (rubore perfusus), responds, “I believe your hand would be good for my soul 
and body (bonum animæ & corporis), if I manage to get it—as I intend” (si eam 
consequar, ut intendo). After temporarily retreating, Thomas quickly recovers to boldly 
reassert his wish.  
Although the language of the passage contrasts Lutgard’s baffled “wonder” with 
Thomas’s intentional “pursuit” (consequar), Thomas is not in control of the situation; 
Lutgard seems to be teasing him, displaying what he seeks and cannot have. “Serenely 
smiling,” she places her finger into Thomas’s view; it rises into the narrative field of 
vision, punctuating the scene of conversation with its still presence: “she laid the little 
finger of her right hand on the windowsill where we were speaking and said, ‘It will be 
enough for you if you are able to have this finger after my death” (Tunc illa, sereno, ut 
erat, vultu subridens, & auricularium digitum dextræ manus in subliminari fenestræ, in 
qua colloquebamur deponens, Satis, inquit, tibi sufficiet, cum istum digitum post mortem 
meam habere potueris). Gaining confidence (confidentius), Thomas, echoing Lutgard’s 
words, offers subtle flattery while insisting on his original aim: “No part of your body 
could be enough for me, mother (Nihil, inquam, mihi ex tuo, Mater, corpore sufficere 
poterit), unless I had your hand or head to comfort (relever) me when I am bereft 
(orbatus) of your whole self.” The comfort provided by the relic, as the verb suggests, is 
a lifting up, a kind of resurrection, giving back to Thomas Lutgard’s presence, which 
death had stolen (orbatus).  
 As I related in the previous chapter, the little finger that Lutgard laid upon the 
windowsill was later removed, fulfilling her prediction. Thomas attempted to retrieve the 
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relic as promised by Hadewijch, but was refused, as she realized that some mutually 
beneficial negotiations were possible. So Thomas made another journey to Aywières, 
promising the abbess that he would write Lutgard’s Life in exchange for “the gift I 
desired (optatum) more than gold and silver.”324  
For Alexandra Barratt, Thomas’s anecdote displays the dichotomy of language 
and the body that she sees operating throughout the vita. It was she argues, “across 
[Lutgard’s] mute and speechless body that her Latin Life was negotiated.” Text was 
exchanged for body, a body whose gestures, raptures, and silence provide female 
                                                 
324 Annis pluribus ante mortem ejus plures Moniales & conversos Fratres instanter rogaveram, ut 
si contingeret, sicut heu! contigit, me in morte piæ Matris Lutgardis non esse præsentem; manum 
ejus abscissam mihi, ob sacram ejus memoriam, reservarent: & in hoc licentiam venerabilis 
Hawidis ejusdem loci Abbatissæ obtinueram. Ut autem feminarum natura est, celanda penitus 
celare non posse, secundum illud vulgare proverbium, Scilicet ut taceas femina, si qua potest; 
Moniales piæ Lutgardi, quid de abscindenda manu illius ordinaveram; indicarunt. Nec multo post, 
cum in Aquiriam veniens cum ea habere colloquium incepissem; ipsa me vultu intuens serioso, 
dixit: Audivi, fili carissime, quia manum mihi post mortem abscindere jam disponis: tu autem 
quid de manu mea facere cogites multum miror. Ego igitur rubore perfusus; Credo, inquam, quod 
in bonum animæ & corporis mei tua mihi manus obveniet, si eam consequar, ut intendo. Tunc 
illa, sereno, ut erat, vultu subridens, & auricularium digitum dextræ manus in subliminari 
fenestræ, in qua colloquebamur deponens, Satis, inquit, tibi sufficiet, cum istum digitum post 
mortem meam habere potueris. Tum ego confidentius jam invectus: Nihil, inquam, mihi ex tuo, 
Mater, corpore sufficere poterit, nisi manum aut caput habeam, quo tunc relever te orbatus. His 
dictis ad alia verba descendimus, nihil alicui inde dicens, nihilque ponderans aut advertens. Ergo 
illa defuncta, ubi nondum adhuc elato in ecclesiam corpore in infirmaria servabatur, quidam 
Guido devotissimus juvenis, & alius socius suus, Fratres Conversi piæ Lutgardi manum 
abscindere cogitabant; sed cum hoc præsumere non auderent, eumdum digitum dextræ manus, 
quem mihi sufficere dixerat, amputarunt, & dentes de ore ejus numero sexdecim extraxerunt. 
Cognita autem morte ejus, & digitum amputatum audiens, nec quis digitorum esset intelligens; 
Nunc, inquam, videbo lucidius, si vere Prophetes pia Lutgardis esse probabitur: quæ dextræ 
manus suæ auricularium mihi sufficere ante annos plurimos jam prædixit. Veni ergo in Aquiriam 
& eumdem, sicut prædixerat, amputatum inveni, & per omnia mihi sufficere eum, & felicem me 
fore, si hunc obtinere possem solicitus cogitavi. Super eo ergo Abbatissam adiens preces 
supplices cum lacrymis fudi: sed cum magno dolore meo solam ipsam Abbatissam inexorabilem 
mox inveni: credo tamen quod non sine dispensatione superni consilii: probare enim Omnipotens 
ordinabat, ut secundum promissum piæ Lutgardis ejus digitum obtinerem, quem nescia 
simplicitas denegarat. Iterato autem secundum tempus in Aquiriam veni, vitamque piæ Lutgardis 
scribere promittens, cum ingenti cordis lætitia super aurum & argentum optatum munus accepi. 
(VLA, cols. 0261B-0261F).  
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substitutes for linguistic competence in that very text.325 According to Barratt, the 
anecdote of Lutgard’s finger is representative of the vita’s general attitude towards 
women. Lutgard’s silence could be read as essential to her transcendence of her feminine 
nature (like the cessation of her menstruation, given to “tame the pride of Eve”), which, 
according to the proverb invoked by Thomas, makes it difficult for a woman to remain 
quiet. According to Barratt, Lutgard was (despite her winning way with words in this 
passage) a “mute body” insofar as it is her dead flesh that motivates Thomas to write her 
Life. What’s more, within her own narrative, she figures as illiterate and capable of 
expression primarily through gestural rather than verbal means. The literate Thomas thus 
contrasts with the illiterate Lutgard, whose image he sculpts through a repetition of the 
illiteracy topos, a feature Barratt sees as “crucial to the demonstration of her sanctity.”326 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Thomas implicitly equates Marie’s relic and 
vita—Thomas’s other tale of a finger and a Life—in his description of Hugolino’s 
conversion from blasphemy. Hugolino’s story portrays the power of Marie’s vita as 
metonymic, a means of grace that confers the immediacy of the saint’s presence in a way 
that parallels her relic, providing an instantaneous and irresistible cure. I argued that in 
contrast that the VLA depicts hagiography as rhetorical: reader and writer enter a situation 
of persuasion and interpretation that Thomas acknowledges has uncertain outcomes. At 
stake in the vita’s persuasive efforts is whether readers will “take up” (suscipiant) 
Lutgard as an “exemplum.” This taking up, I argued, is conducted through reading. The 
reader is a necessary partner in the author’s work of persuasion. However, Thomas also 
                                                 
325 Alexandra Barratt, “Language and the Body in Thomas of Cantimpré’s Life of Lutgard of 
Aywières,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly, vol. 30.3 (1995): 346. 
	
326 Ibid., p. 346. 	
188	
	
believed that “suspicion” of the wondrous and novel nature of his subject could 
compromise readers’ capacity to “take up” his text. He attempted to assist his audience 
by theorizing the act of reading. The prologue shows that the reader reads this book in 
order to learn how to read. As the figure whose exemplarity manifests itself to readers 
only through a complex hermeneutics, it would seem that Lutgard herself should model 
the ideal reader. Why, then, would a text so self-consciously concerned with inculcating 
proper reading practices portray its exemplum as illiterate?  
In this chapter I will argue that despite this depiction of Lutgard as illiterate, a 
portrait that according to Barrett depends upon a gendered dichotomization of text and 
body, male literacy and female illiteracy, the picture when read in its totality is more 
complex than Barratt suggests. As Barratt acknowledges, the Life demonstrates a 
fundamental ambiguity within the category of literacy as Lutgard shifts among what 
Barratt considers incompatible relations to Latinity and language more broadly: a “sense 
pervades [Thomas’s] text of an uneasy and paradoxical relation between Lutgard, 
language, and languages, of which Thomas himself fails to make sense.”327 On the one 
hand, Thomas has Lutgard confess herself to be an “unlettered, uncultivated, and 
uneducated nun” (idiotae et rusticae et laicae moniali) (I.12) and Thomas calls her 
“rather uncultivated (rudis) and very simple (simplicissima) in common speech” (I.15). 
Elsewhere, he makes her abjectly dependent on the learned Sybille de Gages for the 
interpretation of scripture and her own visionary experiences, such that Lutgard almost 
becomes the incidental channel for divine presence, her mind irrelevant to her sanctity 
(II.33). On the other hand, Thomas depicts Lutgard as capable of expert interpretation of 
                                                 
327 Barratt, “Language and the Body,” p. 340. 	
189	
	
divine messages, whether by virtue of miraculous intervention or by her own successful 
engagement with the ruminative meditation upon and allegorical interpretation of 
visions.328  
It is not, I would argue, sufficient to hold, as does Barratt, that Thomas simply 
offers a contradictory portrait of Lutgard’s linguistic and literacy skills. Nor should we 
collapse the tension between literacy and illiteracy by prioritizing Thomas’s 
representation of Lutgard as illiterate, indelibly marked as one having “trouble with 
language,” while ignoring the ways in which he presents her as an exemplary reader. 
Neither approach attends to the complexity of her relation to language, textuality, and the 
body. While Barratt is correct to note that Thomas’s presentation of Lutgard’s literary 
and linguistic activity was multifaceted, his treatment is a generative tension within the 
vita, not a result of the sloppiness produced by misogynistic commonplaces. However, 
profound questions remain about Lutgard’s actual level of literacy and the symbolic 
function of her simultaneous representation as illiterate and as a reader.329 What does 
                                                 
328 Including I.12; 1.15; I.16; II.23; II.32; II.40; II.43; III.9. 
 
329 Based on the vita’s representation of Lutgard’s literacy, Barratt concludes that Lutgard had 
neither the education required for deeper interpretive exercise of the scriptures nor a literal 
understanding of Latin beyond the “passive” knowledge acquired from the repetition of certain 
passages in the daily rounds of monastic life (Barratt, p. 347). Barratt’s contention that Lutgard 
had passive knowledge of Latin is based on Thomas’s use of adjectives like idiotae, rusticae, and 
laica to describe Lutgard’s relation to literacy. These descriptors contrast Lutgard with the 
litteratis monialibus surrounding her, and the magis litterata Sybille de Gages. However, it is 
unlikely that the prioress of a monastery would be illiterate in the most profound sense of the 
word, as she would presumably have correspondence to keep up and would be constantly 
participating in the complexities of the full monastic liturgy, which is far more extensive than 
repeated recitation of the Little Hours. Thus, even if we grant that her Latin was acquired aurally 
and used verbally, which in itself is doubtful given her responsibilities as Prioress, the term 
“passive” to describe such acquisition does not sufficiently capture the amount of Latin she would 
need to perform her liturgical duties. See Anke Passenier, “Women on the Loose,” in Female 
Stereotypes in Religious Traditions, ed. Ria Kloppenborg and Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leiden: 
Brill, 1995), p. 80, n. 62. 
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Thomas’s narrative stand to gain in its construal of Lutgard’s relation to language? How 
do the complexities of his representation fit our understanding of the illiteracy topos?  
In what follows I will argue that Thomas’s ambiguous representation of Lutgard’s 
relation to textuality makes sense only when we understand that he was employing 
Cistercian monastic authors to portray, in a hagiographical mode, a theology of 
reading.330 The monastic understanding of reading, I will argue, offers a key to 
understanding Thomas’s seemingly contradictory representation of Lutgard as illiterate, 
and yet also a masterful reader. The monastic theorization of the performativity of 
reading—the way in which devotional reading practices inculcate an understanding that 
is affective, bodily, and intellective, such that the reader’s body and soul become 
homologous with the scriptures—demonstrates that we cannot assume that Thomas’s 
work reproduces dichotomies between literacy and bodiliness, textuality and experience, 
literate men and illiterate women, knowledge obtained from a book and that which is 
divinely infused. As Benedicta Ward notes, this mode of engagement with the scripture 
was: 
an action of the whole person, by which the meaning of a text was 
absorbed until it became prayer. It was frequently compared to eating—
‘Taste by reading, chew by understanding, swallow by loving and 
                                                 
330The Cistercian order was founded as a reformed monastic order in 1098 by Robert of Molesme. 
Believing that Benedictine monasticism no longer reflected the simplicity or austerity demanded 
by the Rule of Benedict, he founded a “New Monastery” in the “wilderness” at Cîteaux. A 
balance of manual labor and prayer, asceticism, poverty, and charity were cornerstones of the 
monks’ vocation, practices that they understood to be necessary for the observance of the Rule ad 
apicem litterae. The entrance of Bernard of Clairvaux in 1113 marked the beginning of a period 
of international expansion for the order. The movement was established in 1132 in the Low 
Countries in Cambrai, and found immense success there. The monastery of Villers was 
established in 1146, and at Aulne in 1147. See J.C.H Blom, ed. History of the Low Countries, 
trans. by James Kennedy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), and Simone Roisin, “Sainte 
Lutgarde d’Aywières dans son Ordre et son Temps,” Collectanea Ordinis Cisterciensum 
Reformatorum, vol. 8 (1946), pp. 161-2.  
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rejoicing’ [citation from Anselm’s Meditation on Human Redemption], 
and the text ‘O taste and see how gracious the Lord is’ was applied more 
often to the reading of the scriptures than to the Eucharist before the 
twelfth century.331 
 
The monastic understanding of devout reading that underlies Lutgard’s representation, 
further complicates the notion of “literacy” as Latinity. Lectio divina introduces another 
set of criteria determining the successful reader, and these criteria are, I argue, operative 
in Thomas’s representation of Lutgard. For Thomas, literacy is best understood as the 
capacity to engage with scripture in a way that overcomes any division between text and 
reader, engaging body and mind such that the reader comes to embody the text.  
Building on the work of twelfth-century theologians who developed an analogy 
between scripture and that which is inscribed on the interior of each person (liber 
conscientiae and liber cordis), Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) was an important 
witness to the performative notion of meditative reading of scripture in the Cistercian 
tradition.332 Bernard opens Sermons on the Song of Songs with the statement that the 
Song “is learned by experience alone” (sola addiscit experientia).333 Readers of the Song 
                                                 
331 The Prayers and Meditations of St. Anselm, trans. and introduction by B. Ward 
(Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 43-4. Quoted in V. Gillespie, “’Lukynge in huly bukes’: Lectio in 
some Late Medieval Spiritual Miscellanies,” Analecta Cartusiana 106 (1984), p. 2. 	
332 For an account of some of these twelfth century texts, including the works of Pierre de Blois, 
Pierre Comestor, and Guigo II, see Jean Leclercq, “Aspects Spirituels La Symbolique du Livre au 
XIIe Siècle,” L’Homme Devant Dieu: Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac, vol. 2 
Théologie, 57 (1964), pp. 63-72. Leclercq argues that whereas the notion of the book of 
conscience was understood by patristic authors to contain the list of one’s deeds to be opened at 
the Last Judgment, in the twelfth century, the metaphor was reprised and extended to apply to the 
entirety of the moral life, as the conscience and heart were described as books that must be 
continually opened in order to be read and written by the living person in accord with the Book of 
Life, which the (probably Cistercian) author of Sur la demeure interieure identified with Christ, 
the soul’s exemplar (p. 66). 
	
333 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs, Sermon 1, V. 11. Latin from Migne, 
Patrologia Latina, “Sermones in Cantica Canticorum”, 0794A.	
192	
	
must look in their “book of experience” (liber experientiae) in order that a new 
experience, one constituted in and through the Song, may occur:  
Today we read the book of experience (Hodie legimus in libro 
experientiae). Let us turn to ourselves and let each of us search his own 
conscience about what is said. I want to investigate whether it has been 
given to any of you to say, “Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth” 
(Song of Songs 1:1).334 
 
Turning first to his own “book of experience,” the monk discerns where he stands in 
comparison to the ideal lover of God, the bride. The goal is “to see the gap between one’s 
own experience of God’s love and one’s own love for God and then to meditate on, chew 
over, and digest the words of the Song so that one might come more fully to inhabit 
them.” 335 While Guibert of Nogent (d. ca. 1124) wrote that all Christians should be able 
to read within themselves, as though within a book, the temptations and sin described in 
sermons and scripture,336 Bernard promised another field of experience for the select few 
who assimilated their desire and practice to that of the bride through an examination of 
conscience, asceticism, and devout reading of the Song: the monk might ultimately 
become the bride, able to say with a fullness of desire, “let him kiss me with the kiss of 
                                                 
334 Sermons on the Song of Songs, Sermon III, I. “Hodie legimus in libro experientiae. 
Convertimini ad vos ipsos, et attendat unusquisque conscientiam suam super his quae dicenda 
sunt. Explorare velim, si cui unquam vestrum ex sententia dicere datum sit: Osculetur me osculo 
oris sui” (Cantic. I, 1). 
	
335 Amy Hollywood, “Spiritual but not Religious,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin, vol. 38, nos. 1 & 2 
(Winter/Spring 2010), p. 24; Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism. The Presence of God: A 
History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol 2. (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1994), p. 
26; McGinn notes that the mutual imbrication of text and experience undermines a view of 
mysticism as spontaneously autobiographical or a result of “direct experience” that somehow 
stands independently from a theological matrix. See also Jean Leclercq, “Aspects Spirituels,” p. 
70-71. 
	
336 “Cum unusquisque intra seipsum, quasi in libro, scriptum attendat quidquid de diversis 
tentationibus praedicatoris lingua retractat,” PL 156, 26. Quoted in Leclercq, “Aspects 
Spirituels,” p. 70. 
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his mouth.”337 The ritual of ruminative reading along with the other tasks of monastic life 
are intended to cultivate this capacity to stand in the place of the bride, to experience her 
agon of desire and union with the bridegroom. Understanding, then, is a matter not of 
scientia but of experientia, and the readerly method of attaining to such an experience 
involves not only a turn to the book of experience in which is contained memories of 
bodily actions and desire, but requires a reading that is traditionally figured as a bodily 
practice.  
In the VLA, the illiteracy topos does not function as a means to bifurcate the 
realms of textuality and experience, but to demonstrate, in a Bernadine manner, their 
interdependence. Furthermore, by using tropes of illiteracy and literacy, Thomas 
represents Lutgard as both a masterful reader yet eminently humble. We will see that the 
vita represents a profound relationship between reading, experience, and the body, a 
relationship driven by Cistercian theologies of reading. Lutgard was, indeed, a model 
reader, but one who read according to Cistercian ideals. 
My argument builds upon Simone Roisin’s contention that the VLA is 
theologically and generically indebted to the Cistercian milieu, which so fascinated 
Thomas.338 His interest in Cistercian theology and hagiography, Roisin argues, is most 
explicitly apparent in the VLA, his final hagiography (though it can be seen as early as the 
                                                 
337 Leclercq, “Aspects Spirituels,” p. 70.	
338 Simone Roisin was the first to identify the VLA as emerging from a “Cistercian milieu,” and 
engaging with the concerns and themes dominant in Cistercian spirituality. See L’Hagiographie 
Cistercienne dans le Diocèse du Liège au XIIIe siècle (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 
1947), and Roisin, “La méthode hagiographique de Thomas de Cantimpré,” in Miscellanea 
Historica In honorem Alberti de Meyer. Universitatis catholicae in oppido lovaniensi iam annos 
XXV professoris (Louvain: Bibliothèque de L’université, 1946). 
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Life of Margaret of Ypres, 1237).339 This Cistercian influence is evident in a new focus 
on the internal dynamics of piety, a “drama of God in the total conquest of the soul”340 
and the concomitant representation of sanctity as a matter of interiority rather than a 
succession of extraordinary paramystical deeds manifest in the body (such as levitations, 
trances, preservations from physical danger, and the traversing of dangerous rivers) that 
mark his earlier works.341 Roisin’s thesis thus directly counters Barratt’s contention that 
the VLA represents the saint primarily through bodily means. However, this chapter will 
show that the positions of Barratt and Roisin can be partially reconciled by a closer 
examination of the Cistercian theological milieu that Roisin identifies as central to the 
VLA and the performative nature of the reading practices undertaken by monks and nuns 
within this milieu.  
The ambiguities surrounding female literacy are not unique to this vita. Scholarly 
engagement with the question of medieval literacy, particularly in relation to women, is 
ongoing and elaborate.342 In what follows, I will briefly outline some of the most recent 
arguments concerning literacy, women, and the representation of reading in the later 
                                                 
339 Except for the finishing touches he placed on the Life of Abbot John of Cantimpré at the end of 
his life. 
	
340 Roisin, “La méthode hagiographique de Thomas de Cantimpré,” p. 554.	
341 Ibid., p. 553.  
	
342 For consideration of the subject, see for example Thérèse de Hemptinne and María Eugenia 
Góngora, eds. The Voice of Silence: Women’s Literacy in a Men’s Church (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2004); Diane Watt, Medieval Women’s Writing: Works by and for Women in England, 1100-1500 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007); Anneke B. Mulder-Baker and Liz H. McAvoy, eds. Women 
and Experience in Later Medieval Writing: Reading the Book of Life (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). The locus classicus for this discussion is Herbert Grundmann, “Litteratus-
illitteratus: Der Wandel einer Bildungsnorm vom Alterum zum Mittlealter,” Archiv für 
Kulturgeschichte 40 (1958) (Köln: Böhlau Verlag): 1-65.	
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Middle Ages. I will then consider the theory of reading in the Christian monastic tradition 
and turn to Thomas’s depiction of Lutgard’s relation to language and the text.  
 
Litteratus-illitteratus and the topos of the illiterate holy woman in the Middle Ages 
As a Dominican hagiographer, Thomas addressed his work to multiple audiences. 
In the case of Lutgard’s Life, the most obvious audience is the nuns of Aywières, who 
commissioned the vita, and more broadly the “nuns of Brabant,” including, for instance, 
the Benedictine nuns of St. Catherine’s who did, in fact, have a copy of the vita Lutgardis 
among their possessions.343 The Cistercian nuns of Lutgard’s convent (and all other 
Cistercian convents, given the great concern for uniformity of practice within the order) 
would have undertaken the same liturgical practices as Lutgard, practices that included 
the reading and singing of the Psalms and other prayers during the eight offices of the 
day, daily Mass, as well as the extra liturgical offices on feast days and at burials.344 A 
fairly high level of Latin would be required to fulfill these daily liturgical tasks.345 There 
would, however, be gradations of literacy in a convent, as Thomas shows in his portrayal 
of the magis litterata, Sybille de Gages.  
                                                 
343	A. Deboutte, De Heilige Lutgart (Tentoonstelling uitgave van de Gilde van Sint Lutgard, 
1963), pp. 19-29. 
	
344 Julie Kerr, “An Essay on Cistercian Liturgy,” pp. 5-12. 
http://cistercians.shef.ac.uk/cistercian_life/spirituality/Liturgy/Cistercian_liturgy.pdf.  
	
345	Perhaps in response to these grades of literacy within the monastery, and in order to facilitate 
the use of the text as an exemplum for the sisters, Martinus Cawley suggests that the Old French 
version of the vita was composed by Sybille de Gages herself. (Martinus Cawley, osco, ed. The 
Lives of Ida of Nivelles, Lutgard and Alice the Leper (Lafayette OR: Our Lady of Guadalupe 
Abbey, 1987), on the unnumbered page, “Important note on the Latin text.”) A transcription of 
the Old French version is available in G. Hendrix, “Primitive Versions of the Vita Lutgardis,” 
Cîteaux 29 (1978): 153-209.	
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The nuns living in the convents of the Southern Low Countries would have been 
beneficiaries of the availability of education to children, male and female, in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries. As I noted in the introduction, accessibility to education in the 
three “R’s” was encouraged by the rise of the merchant class, which beginning in the 
twelfth century wrested exclusive pedagogical control away from the church, and cities 
provided subsidies for impoverished elementary-school aged children in many urban 
centers. These schools were typically co-ed, and even when differentiated by gender, 
there was no apparent difference between levels of education. When a gendered 
difference in education did appear, it was at the higher levels. Most girls did not become 
fluent in Latin, although there were some schools dedicated to the higher education of 
women, and further teaching in Latin would have occurred when a woman entered a 
convent.346 An ability to read and write the vernacular was thus deemed important for 
both genders in the Southern Low Countries. Below, I will examine in detail the category 
and term “litteratus” in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, at which time, we will see, 
meant a person able to read and write in Latin. However, as Walter Simons’ work 
indicates, in the Southern Low Countries in the twelfth century the gravitational force 
exercised by Latin began to give way to the vernacular. This effects of this shift can be 
seen not only in the secular urban schools training the future citizens for the new 
economy, but in devotional contexts as well. Lambert le Bègue’s trial documents reveal 
that practices of lectio divina were emerging from the monastery in the twelfth century 
and being taken up by the laity. His followers read portions of vernacularized scripture 
                                                 
346 Walter Simons, Cities of Ladies: Beguine Communities in the Medieval Low Countries 1200-
1565 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 7.  
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with techniques derived from monastic practice.347 Writing in the midst of this shift, 
Thomas’s depiction of a nun born of a merchant father in the important town of 
Tongeren—and thus certainly educated in vernacular literacy, and who, furthermore, 
became a nun in an order that highly valued Latin literacy— renders the terminological 
terrain more ambiguous. 
The adjective laica, often applied to Lutgard, can be understood as a substitute for 
illiterata. The antithesis of illitteratus and litteratus is Roman in origin and referred not 
only to the ability to read, but, in writers like Cicero, to the condition of being learned. 
Over the course of the medieval period, the antithesis was slowly aligned with a 
distinction between laicus and clericus.348 The association of the clerical caste with the 
literate, meaning those who had the ability to read Latin, was a means for the clergy to 
institute their privileged status over and against an illiterate laity. By the twelfth century, 
however, the antithesis did not necessarily correspond to the ordained and lay states; a 
knight who was literate could be called clericus, while a priest who was illiterate could be 
termed laicus.349 M.T. Clanchy argues that for medieval people, literacy did not refer to 
the minimal ability to read and write in the vernacular or Latin, nor was the ability to sign 
one’s name a mark of literacy. He argues that until 1300, literacy meant Latinity 
(vernacular grammars were not yet sufficiently codified to be systematically taught), 
including the ability to read, understand, compose by dictation, write verse, and express 
                                                 
347 Ibid., p. 31. 	
348 Herbert Grundmann, “Litteratus-illitteratus: Der Wandel einer Bildungsnorm vom Alterum 
zum Mittlealter,” Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 40 (1958) (Köln: Böhlau Verlag): 7-8. 
	
349 M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record. England, 1066-1307 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), p. 180.  
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oneself in Latin. Until the fourteenth century, then, there was a “high” view of literacy, 
one that did not refer to the capacity to write (which Clanchy argues, against Grundmann, 
was aligned with the artisanal crafts and considered an entirely separate skill from 
reading)350 or to read and speak vernaculars. Literacy, furthermore, implied an ability to 
interpret what one has read. “Idiots” were those who could speak only their mother 
tongue; the Lexicon des Papias, ca. 1050, defines idiota as “propria vel rustica lingua 
contentus.”351 
Thomas shares the “high” view of literacy outlined by Clanchy. The criteria for 
naming Sybille de Gages—Lutgard’s fellow nun and supporter—“literate” seems to be 
her ability to read, interpret, compose verse, and presumably express herself in Latin. 
Despite the deployment of the classic antithesis of literata/illiterata and the related terms 
rustica, idiota, and laica to describe Lutgard, however, Thomas’s representation of 
Lutgard’s relation to language cannot be summed up by such neat terminological 
considerations. Likewise, D.H. Greene has argued that Grundmann’s genealogy of 
litteratus/illitteratus and clericus/laicus cannot explain the shifting terminology of the 
later Middle Ages, when, for instance, a literate knight might be called clericus; nor, 
more importantly, can it provide an account of vernacular literacy as its status changes in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and which I have noted was occurring in the 
Southern Low Countries as early as the twelfth century.352  
                                                 
350 Ibid., p. 181. 
	
351 Herbert Grundmann, “Litteratus-illitteratus,” p. 8.	
352 D.H. Green, “Orality and Reading: The state of research in Medieval Studies” in Speculum 
vol. 65 no. 2 (April 1990): 275-6. 
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The significance of the term illitteratus only became more complex when applied 
to women in the later Middle Ages. Despite its illustrious male exemplar, Antony of 
Alexandria, the illitteratus topos came to be marked as feminine in the later Middle Ages. 
Anke Passenier has shown how, when applied to “simple” holy women, the topos was 
used in the thirteenth century to create a distinction between religious women 
(particularly, for Passenier’s interests, beguines), whose knowledge came from a divine 
source, and clerics who learned through books. Such a division of authority functioned in 
two ways. Some, like Robert of Sorbon, favorably compared beguine simplicity to the 
learnedness of the clerics. He said that on the Day of Judgment, a simple beguine would 
have more assurance of her salvation than a learned theologian or magistrate.353 The 
topos, however, also served to protect the priestly sphere of authority from the 
encroachment of the mulieres religiosae. By emphasizing the charismatic nature of 
women’s authority, rather than that derived ex officio (an office increasingly obtained 
through accreditation by a male-only university), clerics were protected from female 
intrusion on their privileged space.354  
The feminization of the illiteratus topos was used as a marker not only of gender 
and as form of male protectionism against female encroachment, but also as a mark of 
class. In her study of thirteenth-century Brabantine male conversi, Martha Newman 
demonstrates that these vitae complicated the traditional association of woman with body 
and man with spirit, of literacy with masculinity and illiteracy with femininity. Literacy, 
she argues, was the dominant means to distinguish between groups of people within a 
                                                 
353 Ernest McDonnell, The Beguines and Beghards in Medieval Culture, with special emphasis on 
the Belgian Scene (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 420. Quoted in 
Passenier, “Women on the Loose,” p. 80.	
354 Passenier, “Women on the Loose,” p. 80.	
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Cistercian monastery and a key way in which hagiographers maintained a hierarchy of 
privilege between choir monks and lay brothers. Conversi like Brother Arnulf (d. 1228) 
who were forbidden from learning to read, followed a radically different liturgical and 
devotional life than choir monks, and were understood to be best fit for manual rather 
than intellectual labor. Like many women in mendicant-authored hagiographies, male 
conversi were said to manifest their spiritual practice through somatic means. Choir 
monks participated in a “textual community” based on a common interpretation of the 
Song of Songs, in which the male monk took up a feminized position in relation to God, 
and thus lived out the Cistercian ideal of loving submission to God as a bride to the 
divine groom. Conversi, in contrast, were represented not as brides of Christ but as virile 
ascetics who performed literal imitations of Christ’s suffering. Thus, although the male 
conversus occupied a “feminine” position according to the terms of the illiteracy topos, 
this was in order to assign him a masculine position in relation to God, even as the choir 
monk used nuptial imagery of the passive bride from scripture to feminize himself in 
relation to God, a feminization that proceeded from his access to the reserved texts of 
scripture.355 Newman argues that early Cistercian hagiography depicted women using the 
nuptial imagery of the choir monks but slowly assimilated nuns to conversi, describing 
them in terms that were increasingly somatic and focused on physical askesis rather than 
reading.356 
                                                 
355 “Crucified by the Virtues: Monks, Lay Brothers, and Women in the thirteenth-century 
Cistercian Saints’ Lives,” in Gender and Difference in the Middle Ages, ed. Sharon Farmer et al., 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 182-209. 
	
356 Ibid., p. 184. 
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Not all holy women of the thirteenth century, however, were described as 
illitterata. We will see below the importance given to the literacy of the nuns of Aywières 
in the Vita Lutgardis, particularly the extremely learned Sybille de Gages. The biographer 
of Juliana of Cornillon (b. 1153) says that she was able to read the Bible in Latin and 
French as well as Augustine and Bernard, and that she could infer the spiritual meaning 
of various passages.357 Such literacy on the part of some saintly women was not 
represented as performing the same function as it did for men in late medieval vitae. 
Katrien Heene has shown that in a much greater proportion than men, women were said 
to read in order to build up their virtue and piety, while male literacy was usually 
connected with the knowledge required to perform the office of a priest, preacher, or head 
of a noble household.358 Heene argues that the vitae did not explain such a gendered 
difference with misogynistic rationale drawn from the contemporary rhetoric of the 
universities. Following Prudence Allen, she notes the rise of a misogynistic discourse of 
sex polarity adopted from Aristotle in the schools of the thirteenth century.359 According 
to this view, men and women were conceived as different and hierarchically graded, with 
man superior. Applying such an understanding to the lives of nuns in De eruditione 
praedicatorum, the Master General of the Dominicans, Humbert of Romans (d. 1277), 
wrote that as women were less intelligent than men, literacy should not be an issue of 
                                                 
357 Vita Iulianae AASS April 1 (1675), pp. 435-75. Quoted in Katrien Heene, “’De litterali et 
morali earum instruccione’: Women’s Literacy in thirteenth-century Latin Agogic Texts,” in The 
Voice of Silence, ed. Thérèse de Hemptinne and María Eugenia Góngora, p. 155. 
 
358 Heene, “’De litterali et morali earum instruccione,” p. 163. 
	
359 See Prudence Allen, The Concept of Woman. [v. 1] The Aristotelian revolution, 750 BC-AD 
1250. 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdman’s, 1997). 
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great concern for Dominican nuns.360 However, while university discourse was extremely 
powerful (and many of the male hagiographers Heene studies, including Thomas of 
Cantimpré, were trained in the schools), she shows that the vitae did not explain women’s 
learning as divine condescension miraculously provided as compensation for feminine 
deficiencies. While gendered, literacy and illiteracy were not buttressed by scholastic 
misogyny. However, the use of literacy for the building up of virtue within an individual 
life, as distinct from the public, institutional power of men—whether or not this split is 
figured in Aristotelian-inspired misogynistic absolutes—is an instance of the division of 
power between public and private, official and charismatic learning, in which the sphere 
of public influence is politically privileged.  
Furthering Passenier’s observation that the vitae often contrast learning through 
experience with book learning, Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker and Liz Herbert McAvoy have 
explored in depth the relation between learning from experience and the topos of the 
illiterate woman. They note that thirteenth-century male hagiographers often described 
their female subjects as learning through trial and error (experimento docta) in relation to 
their description as illitterata.361 While men produced and expounded on written 
materials, having been trained from the twelfth century onwards in the university, women 
                                                 
360 Joan Ferrante argues that thirteenth-century Dominican nuns were, in fact, highly literate. 
Humbert of Romans’ declarations and the reality of actual practice did not coincide. See “The 
Education of women in the Middle Ages in Theory, Fact, and Fantasy,” in Beyond their Sex: 
Learned Women of the European Past, ed. Patricia H. Labalme (New York: New York University 
Press, 1984).  
361 Thomas Aquinas argued that learning from letters, as any acquired knowledge, is empiric, thus 
troubling the distinction between experience and the book made by clerics and hagiographers. See 
STh, IIIa.9.2. 
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were “experts in nonintellectual, experiential ways of knowing.”362 Rather than read, 
women were said to learn from the “book of experience,” as in the vita of the anchoress 
Yvette of Huy (d. 1228) by Hugh of Floreffe, a Premonstratensian canon who wrote that 
“events taught her rather than words as she learned from the book of experience” (rebus 
potius, quam verbis edocta, prout in libro experientiae didicerat).363 In the case of 
religious wisdom, knowledge was said to be divinely infused, as in Beatrice of 
Nazareth’s Latin life, and imprinted on the body in states of ecstasy.364 Thus, the notion 
that women know through experience, whether of the quotidian or exalted spiritual 
variety, was buttressed by the medieval association of women with the body.365  
 Insofar as my consideration of the performative nature of monastic reading 
undermines the distinction between textuality and experience, my argument bears a 
family resemblance to Mulder-Bakker and McAvoy’s observation in Women and 
Experience in Later Medieval Writing that the dichotomy between learning-by-the-book 
and experience as presented in many late-medieval vitae is undermined by information 
within those same texts; women who were said to be unable to read were also shown to 
                                                 
362 Anneke B. Mulder-Baker and Liz H. McAvoy, eds., Women and Experience in Later Medieval 
Writing: Reading the Book of Life (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 1.  
	
363 Vita Beatae Juettae sive Juttae, viduae reclusae, AASS, 13 January: vol. 2, cols. 145-169, 2.14. 
Trans. by Jo Ann McNamara (Toronto: Peregrina, 2000), 44. Quoted in Anneke B. Mulder-
Bakker, ed. Women and Experience., p. 2.  
	
364 Beatrice’s hagiographer wrote that her mother taught her to read the Psalter when she was only 
five. Beatrice was represented by the topos of the “diligent pupil.” However, she was said to only 
understand deeper theological mysteries when in ecstasy, and these insights did not remain 
present in her mind once she returned to a state of consciousness. See Katrien Heene, “De litterali 
et morali earum instruccione,” pp. 153-5. 
 
365 On the pervasiveness of this association, see Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy 
Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987), p. 217.	
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be reading, writing, and teaching others, in part through the authority and knowledge they 
were said to garner from their learning by experience. The editors’ concern is to 
undermine the distinction between women as illiterate who through experience and the 
definition of literacy as book learning (for the volume, vernacular or Latin); they show 
that women of experience do, in fact, produce literature. However, their volume does not 
explore the medieval theological background of the term “experience” or its relation to 
reading in monastic practice. In their volume, experience remains an entirely separate 
category from textuality. Experience is treated as prior to textual production, which is 
understood to express experience, a view incompatible with Cistercian understanding. In 
order to understand the relation of reading and experience in the VLA, then, the question 
of their relation must be considered in light of their Cistercian conceptualization. 
 
 “That what we read may be performed in us”: Reading in a Monastic Milieu 
 
The Cistercian conception of monastic reading first entered the West primarily 
through the work of Cassian (ca. 360-430), a vital source for the Rule of Benedict (ca. 
500), which was the rule Cistercians attempted to follow “to the letter.” Reading the 
scriptures was understood to be a painstaking cultivation of affective states through 
repeated recitation, rumination, and meditation on the words of the Bible.366 Benedict 
prescribed the gathering of monks eight times a day for the collective recitation of the 
Psalms and other prayers, a cycle of repetition based on the Psalmist’s words, “Seven 
times a day have I praised you” (Psalm 119:164) and “At midnight I arose to give you 
                                                 
366Jean Leclercq, Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture, trans. 
by Catherine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1961), p. 73.  
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praise” (Psalm 119:62).367 The monks also had carefully regulated private reading 
practices in which they read the scriptures, as well as Cassian, Basil, and other Patristic 
authors.368 Such repetition was not aimed at the cultivation of listless drones. The monk’s 
task was to develop and intensify his own experience of God through the words of the 
Psalmist; “the monk was called on to feel what the psalmist felt, to learn to fear, desire, 
and love God in and through the words of the Psalms themselves.”369 The words of the 
scripture would thus come to seem as though they were written specially for and by the 
reader, so perfectly assimilated that they would come to “belong to him,” turning the 
monk from lector to auctor.370  
In “On Prayer,” Conference Ten of Cassian’s Conferences, which teaches the 
technique of perpetual prayer by repeating simple biblical phrases until they become 
embedded in the heart, Abba Isaac outlines for Cassian and Germanus the way in which 
the monk as reader becomes the author of the scriptural text:  
Thriving on the pasturage [of the prophets and the apostles] that they 
always offer and taking into himself all the dispositions of the psalms, he 
will beging to repeat them and to treat them in his profound compunction 
of heart not as if they were composed by the prophet but as if they were 
his own utterances and his own (propriam) prayer. Certainly he will 
consider that they are directed to his own person, (ad suam personam) and 
he will recognize that their words were not only achieved by and in the 
prophet in times past but that they are daily borne out and fulfilled in him.  
                                                 
367 Benedict of Nursia, The Rule of St. Benedict 1980, ed. Timothy Frye, O.S.B. (The Liturgical 
Press, 1981), ch. 16, p. 211. My account of Benedict’s ritualization of reading through Cassian is 
indebted to Amy Hollywood’s reading in “Spiritual but not Religious,” pp. 18-26. 
	
368The Rule of St. Benedict, ch. 73, p. 297. In Love of Learning, p. 13-14 Leclercq conjectures that 
the library of Benedict’s monastery would also have contained Donatus, Priscian, Quintillian, and 
perhaps a few classical authors.  
	
369 Amy Hollywood, “Spiritual but not Religious,” p. 22.	
370 John Leclercq, Love of Learning, p. 76.  
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For divine Scripture is clearer and its inmost organs, so to speak, 
are revealed to us when our experience (experientia) not only perceives 
but even anticipates its thought, and the meanings of the words are 
disclosed to us not by exegesis but by proof.  When we have the same 
disposition (affectus) in our heart with which each psalm was sung or 
written down, then we shall become like its author, grasping its 
significance beforehand rather than afterward. That is, we first take in the 
power of what is said, rather than the knowledge of it, recalling what has 
taken place…in daily assaults whenever we reflect on them…For we find 
all of these dispositions expressed in the psalms, so that we may see 
whatever occurs as in a very clear mirror and recognize it more 
effectively. Having been instructed in this way, with our dispositions for 
our teachers, we shall grasp this as something seen rather than heard, and 
from the inner dispositions of the heart we shall bring forth not what has 
been committed to memory but what is inborn in the very nature of things. 
Thus we shall penetrate its meaning not through the written text but with 
experience leading the way (sed experientia praecedente penetremus).371 
 
According to Abba Isaac, it is not enough to learn second hand what the Psalmist teaches. 
Rather, through assiduous, repetitive reading, the monk attempts to be incorporated into 
                                                 
371 Cassian, The Conferences, trans. by Boniface Ramsey, O.P. (New Jersey: Paulst Press, 1997), 
X.11, pp. 384-5. “quorum jugi pascuo vegetates, omnes quoque psalmorum affectus in se 
recipiens, ita incipiet decantare, ut eos non tamquam a Propheta compositos, sed velut a se editos, 
quasi orationem propriam profunda cordis compunctione depromat, vel certe ad suam personam 
aestimet eos fuisse directos, eorumque sententias non tunc tantummodo per Prophetam aut in 
Propheta fuisse completas, sed in se quotidie geri implerique cognoscat. Tunc enim Scripturae 
divinae nobis clarius perpatescunt, et quodammodo earum venae medullaeque panduntur, quando 
experientia nostra earum non tantum percipit, sed etiam praevenit notionem, sensusque verborum 
non per expositionem nobis, sed per documenta reserantur. Eumdem namque recipientes cordis 
affectum quo quisque decantatus vel conscriptus est psalmus, velut auctores ejus facti, 
praecedemus magis intellectum ipsius, quam sequemur; id est, ut prius dictorum virtutem quam 
notitiam colligentes, quid in nobis gestum sit, vel quotidianis geratur incursibus, superveniente 
eorum meditatione quodammodo recordemur, et quid in nobis vel negligentia nostra perpererit, 
vel diligentia conquisierit, vel providentia divina contulerit, vel instigatio fraudaverit inimici, vel 
subtraxerit lubrica ac subtilis oblivio, vel intulerit humana fragilitas, seu improvida fefellerit 
ignoratio, decantantes reminiscamur. Omnes namque hos affectus in Psalmis invenimus 
expressos, ut ea quae incurrerint, velut in speculo purissimo pervidentes, efficacius agnoscamus, 
et ita magistrantibus effectibus [affectibus] eruditi, non ut audita, sed tamquam perfecta 
palpemus, nec tamquam memoriae commendata, sed velut ipsi rerum naturae insita, de interno 
cordis parturiamus affectu, ut eorum sensus non textu lectionis, sed experientia praecedente 
penetremus.” (Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. 049, cols. 0838A-0839B). 
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the text, enabling its words and emotions to become his own and thus transform his 
disposition as he acquires new aptitudes for desiring God and feeling compunction.372  
Abba Isaac thus described nothing less than the total re-formation of the monk’s 
experience through his experience of the text. Reciting the Psalms, the monk translates 
memories of past experiences—including deeds performed, the moral conclusions drawn 
from these actions, and the emotions and dispositions (affectus) that arise from this 
historical existence—into scriptural terms, recontextualized and refigured as prayer. 
Abba Isaac goes so far as to say that the scriptural text remains unfinished until it has 
been “fulfilled” by its encounter with a monk’s experience, even as that experience is 
completed by its absorption into the Psalmic world, such that the monk is instructed not 
by the scriptures, but by his own transformed affectus. The monk, then, is read by 
scripture as he reads it, and in this reading he becomes its author, as the biblical text 
becomes “his own private prayer,” emerging from the intimate depths of his own 
experience. The distinction between the exterior text and interior experience, the outer 
behavior of reading and the monk’s inner motivation, is thus negated.373  
 Behind Cassian’s theorization of reading lies Origen of Alexandria (d. ca. 254), 
who was a fundamental influence on Cassian’s teacher, Evagrius. Origen inaugurated the 
Christian tradition of the allegorical reading of the Song of Songs, one that continued in 
Gregory of Nyssa, Bernard of Clairvaux, and William of Saint-Thierry. In the preface to 
his work Peri Archon (De Principiis) Origen elaborates the anthropology and cosmology 
                                                 
372 For the language of aptitudes derived from ritual repetition see Talal Asad’s account of Marcel 
Mauss in “On Discipline and Humility in Medieval Christian Monasticism” in Genealogies of 
Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 75. 	
373 See Talal Asad on the problem of distinguishing between inner motivation and ritual behavior 
in Benedictine monasticism in Genealogies, p. 63. 
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behind his understanding of interpretive work. He argues that there is a Rule of Faith 
handed down from the Apostles, dealing with the essentials of correct faith, without 
which one could fall into heresy.374 However, he acknowledges that much contained in 
scripture is not addressed by the Rule of Faith and was presented in an obscure fashion by 
the divine will, in order the exegete might have material upon which to exercise 
(exercitium) his or her mind (DP, Bk.1.Preface, 3). As with Isaac’s reader, the end of 
such exercise, however, was not simply to avoid the boredom of clarity, but to transform 
the entire human person.  
Origen’s anthropology held humans to be composed of body, soul, and spirit, 
though this tripartite structure was often rendered more simply as a dualism of the “outer” 
and the “inner” person, the corporeal and the spiritual, each of which has analogous 
sensory faculties (for example, DP Bk. III.6.7; Comm. Sg. Prologue. 2).375 This reduction 
was not an alteration of the first model but an assimilation of the middle term, the soul, to 
either the literal or the spiritual, depending on which direction it chose to turn in its moral 
life. The former has as its object the mortal and corruptible, while the latter perceives that 
which is incorporeal, immutable, and divine. According to Origen’s account of creation, 
souls occupied themselves with perfect contemplation of the divinity in their original 
state of beatitude. However, growing bored, they cooled and fell into congealed and 
heavy bodies. Encumbered by these “coats of skin,” the spiritual faculty of the inner 
                                                 
374 Origen, On First Principles, Being Koetschau’s Text of the De Principiis, trans. by G. W. 
Butterworth (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), Bk. 1. Preface, 2. Hereafter the text will be 
cited [DP] within the body of the chapter. The Latin edition cited is Vier Bücher von den 
Prinzipien, ed. Herwig Gorgemanns and Heinrich Karpp (Darmstadt: Wissenschatliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1976).	
375 Origen, “The Song of Songs Commentary and Homilies,” trans. by R. P. Lawson (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co, 1957). Hereafter cited within the body of the chapter [Comm. Sg.].	
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person is less able to “see” the divine, the vision that is the birthright of all rational souls 
(DP, Bk.1.4.1). The corporeal acts as a veil on the spiritual, blurring its contours, 
obscuring its image, even as the scripture is a treasure contained in the earthen vessels of 
language and the corporeality of the literal meaning (DP, Bk. IV.1.7; Comm. Sg. Prol. 2).  
Through the ascesis of allegorical exegesis in which the interpreter exercises the 
mind upon the obscurities of the literal sense of scripture, the reader begins to lift the veil 
of the corporeal, not only from the literal body of the text but also from the reader’s own 
body, homologized to the literal sense of scripture (DP, IV.2.2). Allegorical reading is 
that interpretation that enables the literal to speak “otherwise,” revealing not the 
activities, desires, or plots of embodied figures, but the soul’s desire and search for God 
and God’s love for the soul. Allegory is a key means for the soul to turn towards God and 
become spiritual. Thus Origen writes in Book Four of On First Principles,  
Each one must therefore portray (describere) the meaning (intelligentiam) 
of the divine writings in a threefold way upon his own soul (anima); that 
is, so that the simple (simpliciores) may be edified (aedificentur) by what 
we may call the body of the scriptures (corpore scripturarum) (for such is 
the name we may give to the common and literal interpretation); while 
those who have begun to make a little progress (proficere)…may be 
edified by the soul (anima) of scripture; and those who are perfect 
(perfecti)…may be edified by the spiritual law…Just as [a human being] 
therefore, is said to consist of body, soul, and spirit, so also does the holy 
scripture, which has been bestowed by the divine bounty for [humanity’s] 
salvation (Bk. IV.2.4).376 
 
                                                 
376“describere oportet in anima sua unumquemque divinarum intelligentiam litterarum: id est, ut 
simpliciores quique aedificentur ab ipso, ut ita dixerim, corpore scripturarum (sic enim 
appellamus communem istum et historialem intellectum); si qui vero aliquantum iam proficere 
coeperunt et possunt amplius aliquid intueri, ab ipsa scripturae anima aedificentur; qui vero 
perfecti sunt…tales a ipsa ‘spirtali lege’…aedificentur. Sicut ergo homo constare dicitur ex 
corpore et anima et spiritu, ita etiam sancta scriptura, quae ad hominum salutem divina largitione 
concessa est.” 	
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The corpus of the exegete and the corpus of the text are thus imbricated; any operation on 
one is an operation on the other. 
While the three senses of scripture and the constitution of the human person are 
homologized in De Principiis, the tripartite structure described as the basis for a 
transformative exegetical itinerary is charted elsewhere by Origen according to the 
pattern of the trilogy attributed to Solomon: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of 
Songs. Each book corresponds to the three educative moments of the soul in its ascent to 
God. As in De Principiis, adepts read according to their level of advancement. Proverbs 
corresponds to the fleshly person who is a “beginner” on the spiritual path and must read 
texts that offer an edifying literal reading. Ecclesiastes, in which one discovers the truth 
of material reality (“all is vanity”), corresponds to the “psychic” person, one 
“progressing” on the spiritual path, who is neither fleshly nor spiritual. The Song of 
Songs is reserved for those who have passed through the paideia of the earlier stages, 
completing the purifications of the first two books, and able now to engage in the 
spiritual enterprise of allegorical interpretation, which delivers the soul to the state of 
perfection.377 The Song is considered dangerous because it speaks in the language of 
                                                 
377 “Wishing, therefore, to distinguish one from another those three branches of learning…the 
moral, the natural and the inspective, and to differentiate between them, Solomon issued them in 
three books, arranged in their proper order. First, in Proverbs he taught the moral science, putting 
rules for living into the form of short and pithy maxims…Secondly, he covered the science 
known as natural in Ecclesiastes…[the] inspective science likewise he has propounded in this 
little book…the Song of Songs…it behoves him who desires to know wisdom to begin with 
moral instruction, and to understand the meaning of the text: Thou hast desired Wisdom: then 
keep the commandments, and God will give her to thee. This then, was the reason why this 
master….put at the beginning of his work the Book of Proverbs….when a person has progressed 
in discernment and behaviour he may pass on thence to train his natural intelligence and, by 
distinguishing the causes and natures of things, may recognize the vanity of vanities that he must 
forsake, and the lasting and eternal things….And so from Proverbs he goes on to Ecclesiastes, 
who teaches…that all visible and corporeal things are fleeting and brittle; and surely once the 
seeker after wisdom has grasped that these things are so….he will surely reach out for the things 
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erotic love in a literal manner and could, if read with coarsened physical eyes rather than 
the purified eyes of the “inner” person, lead to lust and falling away from contemplative 
union with God (Comm. Sg. Prol.1). However, if read correctly, as an ascetic exercise 
impelled by allegoresis, the text will enflame the love of the heart for God and further 
purify the soul, as the epithalamium becomes the love song of the human soul and her 
divine lover.  
Origen’s typology of the spiritual journey had a long afterlife, circulating with 
particular alacrity amongst Cistercians.378 It was William of Saint-Thierry (d. 1148), a 
Benedictine-turned-Cistercian monk and friend of Bernard, however, who most 
elaborately adopted Origen’s typology in his two most popular works (which circulated 
under Bernard’s name), Exposition on the Song of Songs and The Golden Letter, as well 
as The Enigma of Faith. It is likely, given Thomas’s extensive use of William’s work in 
the vita, that when he wrote that the VLA would be structured according to the three 
                                                                                                                                                 
unseen and eternal which, with spiritual meaning verily but under certain secret metaphors of 
love, are taught in the Song of Songs.” (Comm. Sg. Prol.3)  
	
378 “But that carnal love [of Christ in his humanity] is worthwhile since through it sensual love is 
excluded, and the world is condemned and conquered. It becomes better when it is rational, and 
becomes perfect when it is spiritual. Actually it is rational when the reason is so strong in faith 
that in all things concerning Christ it strays in not even the slightest degree because of any false 
likeness of truth, nor by any heretical or diabolical deceit does it wander from the integrity of the 
sense of the Church. In the same way when speaking on its own it exercises such caution as never 
to exceed the proper limits of discretion by superstition or frivolity or the vehemence of a too 
eager spirit. This is loving God with the whole soul, as we said before. If, with the help of the 
Spirit, the soul attains such strength that it remains steadfast no matter what the effort or 
difficulty, if the fear of death itself cannot make it act unjustly, but even then it loves with the 
whole strength, this then is spiritual love.” Bernard of Clairvaux, On the Song of Songs, vol. 1, 
trans. by Kilian Walsh. [Cistercian Fathers Series 4] (Spencer, MA: Cistercian Publications, 
2005). For other Cistercian adaptations of Origen’s scheme, see Benedicta Ward’s comment in 
William of Saint-Thierry, Exposition on the Song of Songs, p. 11, n. 34 and p. 11, Preface 13. 
Most notably, in the twentieth sermon on the Song of Songs, Bernard speaks of the ordo caritatis 
in terms of carnal, rational and spiritual love. 
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stages of the “beginners” (inchoantium), the ones “progressing” (proficientium), and the 
“perfect” (perfectorum), he derived his use of the Origenistic typology from William. 
Although it is not possible to determine whether Thomas had access to the entirety of the 
Exposition, The Golden Letter and other of William’s writings, or knew only portions of 
them through florilegia, the VLA borrows profoundly from William’s oeuvre.379 
Simone Roisin identified the threefold structure of spiritual ascent and 
hagiographical emplotment as a key characteristic of mystical hagiography. She argues 
that this typology is a primary means of marking the centrality of the interior life in the 
VLA, as opposed to the external miracles that drive the plots of Thomas’s first two vitae 
of women, Christina and Marie.380 Contesting this view of the importance of the 
typology, Barbara Newman argues that Thomas introduces this structural principle only 
to forget it and that the text is in fact constructed of loosely connected anecdotes.381 I will 
argue that in adopting this typology, Thomas was not simply giving exalted terms to the 
                                                 
379 In addition to William’s terminology in the preface, Thomas’s description of Lutgard’s 
exchange of hearts with Christ (VLA I.12) is very close to the Expositions 94, and his description 
of Lutgard as a dove meditating on Christ’s wound as on the arc (VLA 1.3) echoes William’s 
description in De contemplando Deo 3 of Christ’s wound as the ostium archae. On these 
comparisons, as well as Thomas’s debt to Bernard and William for his image of the saint as the 
“bride of Christ” see Bernard McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism, p. 401, n. 49, 51, 52.  
 
380 Roisin, “La Méthode Hagiographique,” p. 554. She argues that Thomas’s use of these terms to 
organize the hagiography show his adoption, late in life, of a “mystical point of view.” While the 
VCM also uses a threefold division to describe the stages of Christina’s life—how she was 
nourished (nutrita), was educated (educata), and her deeds (gesta) (VCM 3)—Roisin argues that 
this division is chronological while Lutgard’s beginner-progressing-perfect is atemporal and thus 
accords with Thomas’s turn to the interior and mystical (Roisin, p. 554). However, it is not only  
a different temporality in play here. Christina’s division is blatantly physical, emphasizing the 
somatic nature of what is to follow.  
	
381 Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives, Introduction by Barbara Newman, p. 18. 
She writes that, “this [threefold] structure bears less theological weight than one might think. His 
main organizing device is simply a loose chronology, aided by the clustering of thematically 
related anecdotes…Thomas has a religious agenda, but it is to be found more in his individual 
anecdotes than in any ambitious theological scheme imposed on his material.”	
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discrete stages of childhood, adolescence, and old age. Nor does the typology serve only 
to describe Lutgard’s transition from the Benedictine to Cistercian orders and the 
perfection she realized, according to Thomas, eleven years before her death, in her dying, 
and after her death (VLA, Pr). Nor was he supplying an organizational schema for a 
random collection of anecdotes. Rather, the typology marks the vita from the outset as a 
text concerned with ways of reading and inhabiting a monastic practice, reading that is 
performed by and realized in the soul and the body. 
As we have just seen, the spiritual stages of ascent derive from the Origenistic 
tradition of reading scripture in a threefold manner, such that each stage of the exegete’s 
soul—a soul that is inextricably tied to the state of the body—corresponds to the type of 
reading undertaken. Reading enables the soul’s progressive transformation. Thus, 
Lutgard’s seemingly contradictory relation to language, so central a concern of the vita, 
cannot be understood apart from this governing Origenistic-Thierrian pattern and the 
readerly practice it implies.  
In what follows, I will outline William’s understanding of the threefold ascent of 
the soul according to his Exposition on the Song of Songs. William adapts this typology 
in other works, namely The Golden Epistle and The Engima of Faith. However, as the 
VLA could be understood to be yet another commentary on the Song of Songs, in which 
Thomas figures Lutgard as the soul becoming Christ’s bride, the Exposition seems the 
most appropriate place to consider William’s theological psychology. I will then address 
Barbara Newman’s contention that the Life is structured as a series of random anecdotes 
organized loosely around particular themes, holding instead that Thomas’s narrativization 
of Lutgard’s Life is essential to his construction of her as a bride and as a reader, and that 
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this narrativization follows the typology he offers in the Prologue. Finally, I will consider 
how this typology relates to the vita’s conception of reading.  
 
William of Saint-Thierry and the Three States of Prayer 
William adapts Origen’s schema in the Exposition to describe the three states of 
those who pray (orantium). The states (status) refer to the kind of person praying as well 
as to the kind of prayer offered. He names these the animal, rational, and spiritual 
(animalem, rationalem, spiritualem).382 While this terminology differs from Thomas’s, 
his terms basically accord with those found in The Golden Letter, where William writes 
of beginners, (incipientium), those making progress (proficientium), and the perfect 
(perfectorum). The vocabulary of The Golden Letter aligns with that of the Exposition, 
however, when he writes that the state of beginners may be called “animal” (animalis) 
the state of those who are making progress “rational” (rationalis) and the state of the 
perfect “spiritual” (spiritualis).383  
The Exposition opens with a statement of basic anthropological principle, namely, 
that the human person was created ad imaginem et similitudinem (Exp. Sg. Pf. 1). 
According to William, to be in the image of something is to participate in it, to have 
                                                 
382 The Latin edition is Exposé sur le Cantique des Cantiques, ed. J.-M. Déchanet, O.S.B. Sources 
Chrétiennes, no. 82 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1998). English translation from William of St. 
Thierry, “Exposition on the Song of Songs” in The Works of William of St. Thierry vol. 2. Trans. 
by Mother Columba Hart, OSB. [Cistercian Fathers Series 6]. (Cistercian Publications: Spencer 
MA, 1970). Preface, 13. Hereafter cited within the body of the chapter [Exp. Sg].  
	
383 Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, Lettre aux Frères du Mont-Dieu (Lettre d’or). In Sources 
Chrétiennes, no. 223. Ed. Jean Déchanet (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1976) §41. English 
translation by Theodore Berkeley OCSO. The Golden Epistle: A Letter to the Brethren at Mont-
Dieu. (Cistercian Publications: Kalamazoo, 1980).  
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reality by virtue of that relation. Participation in the image is the birthright of all humans, 
and it is that original sharing in the divine nature makes possible the human search for 
God. The likeness is the perfecting activity of divinity in the daily practices of life. While 
both image and likeness have been damaged by sin, likeness suffers the more serious 
injury.384  
The three stages of life refer to the progression of the soul in its quest to purify the 
image and likeness in order to reach the “fruition” (fruendum) of God in the face-to-face 
vision after death. This vision is inextricably wed to the state of the soul, for “as the one 
who prays is, so the God to whom he prays appears to him” (Exp. Sg.13). A reciprocity 
exists between the similitude and its vision, for “no one who contemplates you reaches 
fruition of you save insofar as he becomes like to you” (nemo usque ad fruendum 
contemplatur, nisi in quantum similis tibi efficitur) (Exp. Sg. I).  
The prayer of the animal state is more complex than it initially appears. At first, 
William attributes the category to those who ask something of God apart from God’s own 
self, such as prosperity or prudence, but not a clean conscience (Exp. Sg. 14). Such 
prayer, he argues, “finds no acceptance in the song of love,” for the bride singularly 
desires the presence of the groom. Such animal persons must clothe God in a human form 
(secundum formam humanam) (Exp. Sg., 16). The animal person lacks understanding of 
divinity and “the God to whom he prays is ever in the dark cloud” (Exp. Sg., 14). 
However, William asserts that the simplicity of the animal soul, if “religious” (meaning 
that he or she prays to the human Jesus with much devotion), though dominated by bodily 
concerns and conceiving of God in corporeal terms, can arrive through these “bodily 
                                                 
384 See Bernard McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, v. 2: 
The Growth of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1994), p. 229.	
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imaginings…without knowing how, at understanding certain mysteries of piety…. For he 
loves much, and therefore much is granted him…” (Exp. Sg., 16).385 Saints, too, may 
perform a kind of animal prayer when asking for help for this world, but their petitions 
are offered with true piety (Exp. Sg. 15). 
William derives the biblical warrant for the rational state by referencing the 
Ascension of Jesus, who departed from the view of his disciples so that the Holy Spirit 
would descend on them (Exp. Sg., 17). Likewise, the rational seeker must dispel all 
images and seek God “beneath the mask of many faces,”386 for “as long as he who prays 
thinks of anything bodily in him to whom he prays, his prayer is indeed devout, but not 
entirely spiritual” (Exp. Sg., 17).387 Here, the good will of the animal stage, which desires 
God without comprehension, sees with understanding (intellectum) and finds fruition in 
love (amorem) (Exp. Sg., 19).  
The spiritual state is the most elusive of the three. The fruition sought in the 
spiritual life—the face-to-face vision of God that is the prayer of the perfect—is not 
possible while in the body: 
 Now [one] cannot see God’s face and live, cannot, that is, attain in this 
life full knowledge of him (plenam ejus cognitionem in hac vita 
apprehendere). God, then, in his divine greatness, places in the 
understanding of his lover and entrusts to him a certain quasi-knowledge 
(effigiem) of himself—consisting not in an imaginary phantasm 
(praesumpti phantasmatis), but in a certain devout affection (affectionis), 
                                                 
385 …modo quodam sibimet incognito, de imaginationibus ipsis corporesi, quaedam sibi 
concipiens sacramenta pietatis…Diliget enim multum, et ideo praestatur, veil dimittitur ei 
multum. 
	
386 Ex multarum personis facierum. 
	
387 Quia quamdiu ab orante, in eo quem orat, corporeum quid cogitatur, pie quidem, sed non 
omnino spiritualiter oratur.	
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which a [person] yet living in the flesh is able to grasp and endure” (Exp. 
Sg., 20).388  
 
While this affection given by grace (in contrast to a corporeal image of the divinity) is not 
the fruition of the beatific vision, it is the mark of the spiritual state on earth, a state 
towards which the rational person always tends. A person is rational “insofar as he is 
guided to his goal by reason” and spiritual “in the measure of his attainment once he has 
attained it” (Exp. Sg., 22). This attainment, however, is not absolute. As arrival must wait 
for death, the rational and spiritual stages engage in a continual oscillation:  
While this [one] is working out his purification, he is rational; but when he 
is purified, he is spiritual. But as the rational state (statum) should always 
progress (proficere) toward the spiritual, so the spiritual state must 
sometimes revert to the rational. That a spiritual [person] should always 
act spiritually is something never to be attained in this life; nevertheless 
the [person] of God should always be either rational in what he seeks or 
spiritual in what he loves (Exp. Sg., 23).389 
 
Furthermore, even the carnal images of the animal state may, if directed correctly, obtain 
in the rational state (Exp. Sg., 23); the rational soul may still use and encounter God 
through the use of images.  
While these states are in some sense discrete, progressing according to the logic 
of increasing perfection, we see that the lines between them are imperfectly drawn. Even 
the saints partake of all three types of prayer, and the spiritual state is attained only 
intermittently in this life. The one who seeks wisdom continuously moves among these 
                                                 
388 Et quoniam non potest homo faciem ejus videre et vivere, hoc est plenam ejus cognitionem in 
hac vita apprehendere, collocat in sensu amantis, et commendat aliquam cognitionis suae 
effigiem, non praesumpti phantasmatis, sed piae cujusdam affectionis; quam vivens adhuc in 
carne, capere posit homo vel sustinere.  
	
389 Hic, ut dictum est, quamdiu purgatur, rationalis est; purgatus autem jam spiritualis est. Sed 
sicut expedit rationalem statum semper in spiritualem proficere, sic necesse est spiritualem 
nonnumquam in rationalem redire. Semper quidem spiritualem spiritualiter agi, non hujus vitae 
est; semper tamen debet esse homo Dei, vel rationalis in appetitu, vel spiritualis in affectu. 	
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stages, and arrival at the spiritual state is deferred until death. Thus, while the word status 
implies “static,” derived from the Latin stare “to stand,” referring to physical attitude, 
social standing, as well as the “characteristic mark” of a thing, the middle term 
(proficientes)—those progressing from the beginner toward the spiritual state—implies 
continual movement, one that moves between the poles of the spiritual itinerary.  
The Song’s drama of the bride and bridegroom, consisting of the fluctuations of 
presence and absence between the lover and beloved, the bride’s abandonment and 
subsequent search for the groom, offers the best way to understand the temporal relation 
between the three states in the context of the Exposition. The suspensions, twists, and 
reversals of the plot serve to subvert notions of either static occupation of a single stage 
or a temporal progress that moves solely forward, even as a notion of progress as 
increasing perfection—a perfecting that occurs as the rational soul completes the lessons 
and purifications of the animal stage, enabling it to move into the spiritual stage—is 
posited by the typology.  
The oscillation in the Song is the meaning of the “wound” of charity, a love that 
renders the absence of the lover visible and painful. Déchanet notes that William 
distinguishes four acts in the song: incitement to love, purgation, the repose, and the 
epithalamium, each of which “revert[s] to an identical scenario, but in a higher key than 
before.”390 The progress thus proceeds as a spiral rather than a straight line, as each 
consummation reverts to distance, inciting the desiring soul to seek the next moment of 
union. In each song (although William only completed commentary on two), the bride 
and groom enjoy a mutual repose. However, the drama of each song is constituted by the 
                                                 
390 William of Saint-Thierry, On the Song of Songs, Introduction by J.M. Déchanet, p. xiv. 
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bride’s abandonment and subsequent search for the groom, a search that William 
understands to be a process of purgation (Exp. Sg. 10). Thus, in the prelude to the first 
song, William writes that the “argument” of the first song is this structure of desire 
incited by a connection that leads to absence. The bride, he writes, was brought into the 
groom’s storerooms after her initial conversion from the animal to the rational stage and 
there learned many things about him and herself, receiving gifts of perfume as well as his 
favor, all of which acted as an “incitement to love” (irritamen amoris). However, 
following this wooing, he “went forth and withdrew” in order that “she might be trained 
(exercendum) and purified (purgandam) but not utterly abandoned (deserendam)…and 
thereupon she was wounded by charity, enkindled with desire of him who was absent 
(desiderio absentis aestuans) drawn by the charm of a holy newness (sanctae novitatis 
suavitate affecta)…she is cast aside and left to herself” (destituta ac derelicta ) (Exp. Sg. 
29).391 In this first contact, the bride was given an intimation of fruition with a kiss at her 
conversion, but did not yet recline in the mutual repose that will occur when the bride 
acts in co-operation with her divine lover, following her purgation.392  
In the second song, distance is figured by William as the separation from heaven 
demanded by the mortal life and the impossibility of sustaining contemplation while in 
the body. The bride is sent from “contemplation (contemplatione) of the bridegroom’s 
                                                 
391 “In cellaria ergo introducta Sponsa, multa de Sponso, multa didicit de seipsa. Ubi quaecumque 
ei collata sunt, primo accessu ad Sponsam, irritamen amoris…Deine vero actus eam excipit 
purgatorius, exercendam, purgandam, non usquequaque deserendam. Egresso enim et abeunte 
Sponso, vulnerata caritate, desiderio absentis aestuans, sanctae novitatis suavitate affecta, gustu 
bono innovata, et repente destituta ac derelicta sibi.”  
	
392 McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism, p. 242.  
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riches to the house of her poverty” (Exp. Sg. 146), the flesh.393 While the starting point of 
the second song is the bride’s return from a state of ecstasy, and thus begins, as Déchanet 
notes, in a higher key than the initial incitements to love in the first song, both songs 
share the same structure, a movement of “desire becom[ing] a crucifixion” (cruciante 
desiderio) (Exp. Sg. 146) and the temporary relief from grief through union.  
It would seem, then, that the three stages of prayer correspond to William’s 
understanding of the plot of purification, one that proceeds through advance, retreat, and 
repetition, while the pain occasioned by this deferral is punctuated by interludes of repose 
or union. It is the very agony of these postponements and the momentary suspensions of 
this pain that maps the plot of the Song; it is the shape of desire, and the means of 
purification. This plot belongs not only to the bride and bridegroom of the text but also to 
the reader of the Song. In performing the askesis of allegory, the exegete’s own soul 
becomes the bride, undergoing the same incitement, crucifixion, and purgation of desire. 
“The meaning (intelligentiam)” of the Song is, as Origen wrote, “portrayed (describere) 
in a threefold way upon [the exegete’s] own soul” (DP Bk. IV.2.4), so that even as the 
carnality of the literal level of the Song reveals the spiritual, so the exegete’s carnal desire 
is purged and redirected towards its heavenly bridegroom. An allegorical operation upon 
the text becomes an operation upon the exegete’s own soul and body.  
William introduces the Exposition with an account of allegorical reading in the 
Origenist and Bernardine tradition. The ideal reader, according to William, is a 
performer, one who inhabits the role of the bride by taking up her script so completely 
                                                 
393 “Citius remittitur in domum paupertatis suae, a contemplatione divitiarum Sponsi.”	
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that the text is given a second life as the reader-performer enters conversation with the 
divine lover (Exp. Sg., 3). He writes,  
[W]e beseech you, O Holy Spirit, that we may be filled, O Love, with your 
love, in order to understand (ad intelligendum) the canticle of love. Thus 
may we also become in some measure participants (efficiamur participes) 
in the holy conversation of Bridegroom and Bride, that what we read may 
take effect in us (ut agatur in nobis quod legitur a nobis) (Exp. Sg., 4).394 
 
This passage has been noted by other commentators to be an exceptionally strong 
statement of the performative knowledge granted by a particular kind of devotional 
reading. Ineke van ’T Spijker translates agatur in nobis as “may be performed in us.” The 
reader, she argues, becomes the “scene of the drama,” compelled by his reading to turn 
inward and “when he finds these stages [the threefold division of the spiritual life] 
recognize them in himself.” Van ’T Spijker’s notion of the performance of the bride and 
groom occurring within the exegete is drawn from her further argument that William’s 
use of intelligendum here could be drawing on the classical etymology of intellectus, 
which is intus legere, or as William glossed it in his work, Speculum Fidei, “when he 
who believes reads in the affect of his heart what he believes.”395  
In this notion of the text as a site of self-recognition as well as a drama in which 
the reader becomes a participant in the story, William rearticulates Cassian’s notion of 
Psalmic reading, in which “[t]he meaning of the words comes through to us not just by 
way of commentaries but by what we ourselves have gone through” and “brought to birth 
                                                 
394 [S]ancte Spiritus, te invocamus, ut amore tuo repleamur, o amor, ad intelligendum canticum 
amoris; ut et nos colloquii sancti Sponsi et Sponsae, aliquatenus efficiamur participes; ut agatur in 
nobis quod legitur a nobis. 
 	
395 Ineke van ’T Spikjer, Fictions of the Inner Life: Religious Literature and Formation of the Self 
in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), p. 209. Bernard McGinn also 
notes the etymology of intus legere in The Growth of Mysticism, p. 230. 
	
222	
	
in the depths of our hearts” as though “a part of our being.”396 Taken up in faith and 
ruminated upon, the understanding (intelligendum) of the text comes about by its 
inscription on the heart through a devoted reading such that the reader is eventually able 
to “read within” the conversation of the bride and bridegroom, their drama of love having 
become the reader’s own. 
 William’s account of reading and understanding is dominated by the term 
affectus. For monastic authors like Cassian and William, the term captures the curious 
relation between activity and passivity, practice and grace, in the human relation with 
divinity. The monastic understanding of cultivated passivity complicates the gendering of 
literacy as male. Derived from the verb afficio (adficio), which means to exert influence 
on the mind or body of another, even to afflict another, the passive participle affectus, 
which often means, simply, love, arises from God’s action upon the heart (afficio), which 
produces the human affectus. Human love thus emerges from divine initiative. Divine 
activity effects a change in the human subject, rendering him or her receptive to God’s 
transformations even as such receptivity is carefully cultivated by the monk, in the case 
we are considering, through practices of reading. As Amy Hollywood notes, the 
“acquisition of proper spiritual dispositions through habit is itself the operation of the 
freely given grace that is God’s love.”397  
According to William, the transformation of the monk’s affect by divine affection 
is necessary for understanding the Song, for the Canticle teaches love, and “where 
affections are concerned, only persons possessing like affections can readily understand 
                                                 
396 Cassian, Conferences X.11, p. 137. 
	
397 Amy Hollywood, “Spiritual but not Religious,” p. 23. 
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what is said” (Ubi enim de affectibus agitur, non facile, nisi a similiter affectis, capitur 
quod dicitur) (Exp. Sg., 4). The text remains “uncaptured” by the understanding if the 
affect of the reader is not a full participant, enabling the reader to experience the text 
within his or her disposition, being affected by it and, through it, God. So the activity of 
understanding requires the reader’s passivity, which allows the divine action to transform 
him or her, turning the reader, as William puts it, into a “God-affected person” (homo 
Deo affectus) (Exp. Sg. 94). The central place given to passivity (which arises, 
paradoxically, by means of a cultivated abasement), is perhaps another reason for the 
Cistercian counter-cultural gendering of literacy as feminine, for the monk attains to a 
stance of bridal humility, desire, and knowledge through a mode of reading figured as an 
expression of “humble love” (humilis amor) (Exp. Sg. 94).  
Thus, for William, to know is to be “affected.”398 To be “literate” in this view—
though this is not a term William uses—would be the capacity to set the text to work 
within the reader such that it is understood by being “read within” the experiencing heart. 
Such a transformation of the person by means of inhabiting textual space, becoming the 
scene where its drama is enacted, ultimately effects the transformation of the resemblance 
(similitudo) of the soul, so that it may undergo its purgative migration and move through 
                                                 
398 Our contemporary understanding of the term “affected” is in direct contradistinction to the 
medieval. This difference points to the difficulty of explaining the complexity of passivity and 
activity, inner and outer, in the monastic notion of practice. To a contemporary ear, to be affected 
is to simulate something that is not indicative of the true state of one’s inner life. It is a kind of 
docetism in which the subject is dressed in the clothes of something that is other than him or 
herself. In contrast, the medieval notion of being affected, though it likewise indicates the action 
of an agent upon a recipient, does not indicate a counterfeit subjectivity, but is understood to be, 
in the monastic context, the ideal to which the monk aspires. See Talal Asad, Genealogies of 
Religion: discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), p. 68. 
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the stages of the spiritual life.399 The further the soul turns “in humble love” (humilis 
amor) towards its source, the more it is “conformed” (conformatur) to that source, a 
growth in resemblance that ultimately moves towards the unity of spirit (unitas spiritus): 
“When a person is made to the likeness of the Maker, he or she becomes a ‘god-affected’ 
person, that is becomes one spirit with God, beautiful in Beauty, good in the Good. Such 
a one…exists in God through grace as what God is by nature.” (Cumque efficitur ad 
similitudinem facientis, fit homo Deo affectus; hoc est cum Deo unus spiritu; pulcher in 
pulchro, bonus in bono…existens in Deo per gratiam, quod ille est per naturam) (Exp. 
Sg. 94).400  
 
Plotting the VLA: Thomas of Cantimpré and the Monastic Model of Reading  
 Thomas’s foregrounding of the typology of the threefold ascent of the soul in the 
Prologue of the VLA situates the vita in the monastic lineage beginning with Origen. It 
sounds the first note of the bridal mysticism of the vita, introducing Lutgard not only as a 
figure for the bride of the Song, but also for the exegete whose textual practices seek for 
the text to “be performed” within her. The emplotment of the vita, I argue, is a key means 
for Thomas’s assimilation of Lutgard’s narrative to that of the Song of Songs and her 
desire for God to that of the bride.  
Yet the Life contains a multiplicity of plot structures. The first is that posited by 
the Prologue and repeated in II.43, of the threefold ascent of the soul as it moves from 
animal to rational to spiritual stage, a model Thomas suggests will determine the content 
                                                 
399 Odo Brooke, Studies in Monastic Theology, p. 24. 
	
400 This translation is from Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism, p. 231. 	
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of each of vita’s three books. A second plot is the temporally determined progression of 
childhood, adolescence, and old age. A third tracks her movement from early life with 
her family to a Benedictine monastery, her transition to the Cistercian monastery at 
Aywières, and finally her last years and death. However, these organizing devices, 
despite their shared tripartite structure, imperfectly map onto each other: Lutgard 
experiences the union with God reserved for the spiritual stage at a precociously early age 
and before undergoing the purgative process (in I.12), a union from which she retreats. 
She becomes a Cistercian at age twenty-four, in which situation she will be both 
“progressing” and for her final eleven years, perfect. Thomas will also sometimes 
compress the entire plot of the three stages of the soul into a single passage, as he does in 
I.12. 
Broadly speaking, the three books of the vita are structured according to the 
progress of the soul outlined by the Prologue’s typology and its allegorical elaboration in 
the terms of the Song as suggested by William. Thus in Book One—which contains her 
childhood, adolescence, conversion, novitiate, and consecration as a Benedictine—§I.1-7 
concerns the animal stage, addressing Lutgard’s life in the “world,” including her father’s 
desire that she make a suitable marriage, her love for a young man (I.2), and her survival 
of an attempted rape (I.5). The remaining passages of Book One, following her entrance 
to the Benedictine order, represent her beginning to make progress, and “[u]pon returning 
to her monastery,” exulting in her progress (proficiens) (I.7). The later chapters primarily 
document her visions of the human Jesus (I.12; I.13; I.14; I.19; I.21) and other saints who 
offer her comfort and confirm her calling (I.8; I.9; I.15), as well as miracles in which she 
manifests her holiness to the community (the sun descends on her at night (I.11); she is 
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suspended in the air (I.10), and is miraculously crowned (1.17). At the end of Book One, 
Lutgard moves to the Cistercian order.  
 Book Two, opening as it does with the dramatic verb transeundo (the technical 
word for the translation of relics in canonization ceremonies), marks a shift to the 
purgative work of the progressing soul bereft of the bridegroom, who in this loneliness 
learns the virtues, practices penance, and experiences fear. The language of love, so 
dominant in Book One, all but disappears. Instead of the visions of light and consolation 
that mark the first book, her visions are of the dead and the demonic. Lutgard’s own 
purgation is mirrored by her efforts to purge others as she takes up her role as healer and 
intercessor for those in purgatory. No less than twenty passages involve her intercessory 
work. She performs two seven-year fasts, one of them initiated after the Virgin comes to 
her distressed by the “cruelty” of the Albigensians, the other performed for the sake of 
sinners. In §21 she undergoes a “martyrdom” in which a blood vessel bursts in her chest, 
making her a second Agnes. A spying priest witnesses her spattered with blood while she 
ecstatically meditates on the Passion (II.23). There are two instances of female 
scrupulosity in this book where, despite her advanced state, Lutgard, debilitated by fear 
for her soul, seeks reassurance (§5 and §17). 
 In Book Three, Lutgard is further stripped of all extraneous comforts and 
privileges (signified most powerfully by blindness), and despises this world in which she 
feels trapped, unable to sustain the contemplation and union that she desires. Finally, she 
enters the full fruition of union in death.  
Broadly speaking, then, we see in the three books the progress of the soul outlined 
by the typology offered in the preface and its allegorical elaboration in the terms of the 
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Song as suggested by William. However, while this description of the vita suggests a 
fairly linear emplotment governed by William’s typology, closer examination reveals 
multiple reversals and prolepses within the narrative. I argue that the mixture of stages—
whether animal, rational, and spiritual or penitent, ascetic, and contemplative—are not 
evidence of an anecdotal structure dominating the vita, but of the oscillations of the plot 
of the Song that mark the incitement and crucifixion of desire in commentaries such as 
that of William. Furthermore, rather than disappear after its provocative appearance in the 
prologue, Thomas subtly rearticulates this typology in I.12 (which I address later in this 
chapter) and again in II.43, to which I now turn. 
While Thomas’s allegorization of Lutgard’s life in II.43 echoes William’s erotic 
language, it transposes the allegory into the vocabulary of struggle. This shift further 
nuances the vita’s structure, complicating the linearity that it at first seems to promise. 
The chapter discusses “[h]ow she lived in a triple state: that is, how she lay in the triple 
bed of the Song of Songs.” The first “bed” is the penance of the beginner where the soul 
lies wounded. In the second, the progressing soul battles until it becomes tired. In the 
third, the soul lies in enjoyment in the contemplative life of the perfect. The beginner 
cleanses her conscience with tears. The progressing soul undertakes ascetic practice, 
defeating the flesh and Satan, while the perfect soul enjoys equality with divinity, 
absorbed and “translated” (as Lutgard was translated into the Cistercian order at the end 
of Book Two) into the godhead, an absorption Thomas describes with the Bernadine 
image of the drop of water in a cask of wine.  
While penance characterizes the first book, ascetic discipline the second, and 
contemplation and union in death the third, frequent inconsistencies crop up. For 
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instance, contemplation appears in the purgative stage (for example, in II.1, Lutgard 
“rest[ed] in the sleep of contemplation” and in II.23, she is “rapt in contemplation”). In 
Book Two, the ascetic stage, Lutgard weeps penitential tears (II.17) and Christ appears in 
bodily form (II.6), even though, according to a strict interpretation of the typology, such 
somatic activities should remain in the first book. Finally, Lutgard continues ascetic 
purgation in the final moments of her life, despite her state of perfection (III.4; III.9).  
The allegory of the Song in II.43 enables a reader to look back on Book One and 
glimpse the perfection of union in Lutgard’s early life. She is described with bridal 
language in Book One: as William’s heroine, she is said to “perfectly follow Christ the 
lamb” (I.18; Exp. Sg. 46); oil drips from her hands like the bride of the Sg. 5:5 while she 
experiences the spiritual drunkenness of the perfect: 
Squeezing [her hands] she said, “Look, sister, how the Almighty deals 
with me!... Saying this as if she were drunk—and indeed she was drunk—
she danced around the reclusorium with wondrous gestures. What is so 
marvelous about this? Invited by the bridegroom, she had been ‘led into 
the wine-cellar.’ Afterward, like one beloved (cara), she ate the bread of 
penance with toil; then like one more beloved (carior) she drank the 
abundance of his grace; and finally like one most beloved (carissima) she 
became drunk and was filled with exceeding and ineffable joy and with a 
spirit of folly (modum excedens despientium spiritu ineffabiliter 
laetabatur)” 401 (I.16).402  
                                                 
401 There is a discrepancy between Margot King’s (The Life of Lutgard of Aywières, Toronto: 
Peregrina Publishing, 1991) and Barbara Newman’s (Thomas of Cantimpré: The Collected 
Saints’ Lives) translations of this passage. While King, whose version I use here, translates the 
“postquam” as “afterward” referring to a time after an initial state of drunkenness, such that after 
her first drunken state, Lutgard then eats the bread of penance, etc., Newman, on the other hand, 
understands the commentary following the “postquam” to be a gloss of the experience of the oil 
and Lutgard’s drunken state, and thus has her drunkenness occur after she has performed the 
requisite penitential acts: “After she had eaten the bread of penance with toil, like one beloved, 
and drunk the abundance of his grace, like one more beloved, at last she became drunk, like one 
most beloved.” However, Lutgard has not yet undergone any significant penitential experiences 
in the vita, nor has she truly experienced the progressing states of one carior. King’s translation 
thus better represents William of Saint-Thierry’s understanding of the bride’s stages in which the 
bride is invited to the groom’s wine cellar, becomes drunk, then returns to the toil of penance in 
his absence, until finally she returns to her drunken state, yet in a higher key. 
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This passage makes clear that despite experiencing the ecstatic drunkenness of a mystical 
adept who is “most beloved,” in Book One Lutgard has not yet arrived at the final 
contemplative stage; rather, this early encounter contains the seed of its later fruition. In 
fact, according to the logic of the Song, Lutgard’s experience of being “most beloved” 
(carissima)—the third and most perfect degree of love—in the wine cellar of the groom 
is necessary for the subsequent drama of purgation, impelled as it is by the bride’s 
removal from that place of ecstasy.  
Book Three foregrounds the oscillation between distance and union by which the 
purgations of the rational stage occur, as the book is driven primarily by her desire to die: 
“From her ardent yearning to see Christ, she had developed a fixed idea that she should 
pass over (transire) to the Lord at that time” (III.9). The day of her death is the reference 
point by which all events in the book are timed. The book contains her predictions of her 
own death (III.6; III.9; III.12; III.13; III.16), visions that both help her prepare for death 
(III.1; III.3; III.11), as well as visions that tell her death is not yet at hand (III.9). Thus her 
earthly life is narrated against the horizon of death, an event that throws the present into 
relief as a place of lack and longing.  
These mixtures of stages—whether animal, rational, and spiritual or penitent, 
ascetic, and contemplative—I would argue, are not, as Newman argues, evidence of an 
anecdotal structure dominating the vita but of the fluidity of the emplotment of the Song 
following commentaries such as William’s. As we have seen, Thomas periodically refers 
                                                                                                                                                 
	
402 “a sponso enim introducta in cellam vinariam, invitata erat; & postquam, ut cara, comedit, id 
est, cum labore edit poenitentiae panem; & ut carior, bibit abundantium gratiarum; tandem, sicut 
carissima, inebriata est; & ideo modum excedens despientium spiritu ineffabiliter laetabatur.”  
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back to the principle of the three stages, which roughly govern the arc of the work, even 
as he allows departures from their strict delineations appropriate to the narrativization of 
bridal purgation.  
 
Illiteracy in the VLA 
I have argued that Thomas’s emplotment of the life implicitly aligns Lutgard with 
the figure of the bride. As we have seen, assimilation to the bride in monastic practice 
typically occurs through the discipline of reading. Thomas, however, makes extensive use 
of the illiteracy topos in order to represent Lutgard’s sanctity. I will argue that he deploys 
the topos in ways that ultimately serve to transvalue the category of illiteracy such that it 
becomes a way to describe the Cistercian notion of literacy as feminine insofar as it 
entails the cultivation of humble passivity.  
Lutgard calls herself laica monialis four times in the second book. The vita’s 
seventeenth-century editor, Henschen, notes that this epithet does not mean that she was a 
laywoman or conversa. Instead, the phrase contrasts her educational status with other 
figures in the vita, such as the magis literata Sybille de Gages.403 The circumstances in 
which Lutgard described herself as laica monialis follow a similar pattern: she heard a 
divine voice quoting scripture, which she, as an “unlettered nun,” did not understand until 
it was “interpreted” by a human interlocutor. This pattern stands in contrast to those 
visions—whether of saints (St. Catherine, I.9), sinners (Innocent III, 2.8), or the godhead 
(I.15)—which Lutgard understood and reported directly without interpretative assistance 
                                                 
403 See Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives, p. 226, n. 62. The epithet magis 
litterata occurs in III.12. The episode in which this occurs follows the same pattern as those in 
book two where laica moniale is used, thus giving further evidence for Henschen’s interpretation. 
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(II.8). It is not, then, the visionary element that baffled Lutgard, but specifically the 
quotation of scriptural passages: it is to these latter experiences that Thomas refers in his 
use of the epithet laica.  
The first episode occurs in II.8. Lutgard was grieving the death of John of Liroux, 
who had been en route to Rome to plead the cause of the mulieres religiosae of Brabant. 
John appeared to her in clothing signifying the “perfection of the spiritual life.” Lutgard, 
however, was still grieving his loss when the divine voice spoke to her in the words of 1 
Samuel I.8: “Am I not more precious to you than ten sons?” Lutgard did not understand, 
but when she “heard them interpreted,” her grief dissolved (Hæc igitur, sicut Laica 
Monialis, cum non intelligeret, interpretata audisset, non ultra defunctum luxit).   
An episode in II.10 involves the issue of discretion. Lutgard was praying for a nun 
who received revelations that seemed divine but were in fact satanic. She heard God tell 
her to “Illumine those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death” (Luke 1.79). As an 
“unlettered nun” (laica) she did not understand (non intelligeret) but sought out another 
nun for clarification. She was then able to free the deceived visionary and thus becomes 
one who “illumined many others who sat in darkness by the example of her behavior.” In 
short, she lived out the instruction contained in the biblical injunction.  
In a third episode (II.20), Lutgard prayed for the assistance of a nun, Elisabeth, 
who, though needing to constantly eat, was too weak to stand. Lutgard heard the 
enigmatic words, “Arise, arise, daughter of Jerusalem and life of the chalice of his wrath 
which you have drunk at the hand of the Lord” (Is. 51:17). Lutgard asked the litteratis 
Monialibus what this means, and they replied that Elisabeth would soon become well.  
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In the final example of this pattern (II.33), the motif is elaborated in significant 
ways. Lutgard had a desire to do a good deed for a “poor little woman.” “In her spirit” 
she heard, “[i]n the psalm you read and say to me ‘O Lord, my portion, I have said I 
would keep your law’ (Ps.118:57). This is how you should understand it: I am your 
portion, you have nothing else. So then, you should respond to the needy woman, Gold 
and silver I have none, but what I have I give you’ (Acts 3:6). If you pray for her, you 
will have given her what is yours. You will have kept my law.”  
In this instance, rather than turn to a human source for interpretation of the 
scripture, Jesus himself told Lutgard its meaning and application. Lutgard went to Sybille 
de Gages who looked up the gloss for Psalm 118:57 and discovered that “the Lord’s 
response to Lutgard accorded exactly with the gloss.” Thomas takes this to mean that the 
scriptures “are expounded by the same Spirit by which they were composed.” In contrast 
with previous cases, in which Lutgard’s message was delivered to those able to make it 
intelligible in terms of the situation at hand, Lutgard’s vision confirmed the accuracy and 
authority of the gloss, even as the gloss confirmed her vision. Thomas underscores the 
miraculous nature (and thus authority) of this confirmation by placing it in relief with the 
previous series of events, which emphasized her “illiteracy.”  
In the first three episodes, Lutgard received her understanding from other humans, 
while in the fourth, divine interpretive intervention was appended to the vision proper. 
These are not, then, instances of divinely infused knowledge occurring in a moment of 
ecstasy; the vision and its interpretation occur in discrete moments and Lutgard attains 
understanding through an act of interpretation. Despite their divine impetus, the episodes 
are mundane: interpretation of the divine oracle is rendered in language anyone can 
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understand, and this understanding applies in immediate ways to the situation at hand. As 
such, the purpose of these tales is not to foreground Lutgard’s illiteracy but to emphasize 
the necessity of interpretation of scripture, learnedness, and its possible overcoming by 
divine intervention. Lutgard received divine messages and relayed them to other women. 
Her reception of the divine message does not, on its own, amount to understanding or 
“illumination.”  
These representations of Lutgard’s illiteracy underscore the necessity of 
interpreting both visions and scripture. In representing Lutgard as reliant on others for the 
interpretation of her visions, Thomas buttresses his treatment of the VLA as a rhetorical 
document that is effective only by means of the work of reading and interpretation. 
Furthermore, Lutgard’s illiteracy is a topos used to demonstrate her exemplary humility.  
Augustine opens the De Doctrina Christiana with the observation that some 
readers object to following the rules governing the interpretation of scripture, for they 
believe that “everything rightly done towards clearing up the obscurities of Scripture 
could be better done by the unassisted grace of God” (Pf. ii). 404 According to Augustine, 
such persons are bloated with pride, equating themselves with Antony or the slave 
Christianus, who learned to read simply through prayer (Pf. iv). Augustine counsels such 
people to “put away false pride and learn whatever can be learnt from man; and let him 
who teaches another communicate what he has himself received without arrogance and 
without jealousy” (Pf. v). Augustine’s exhortation suggests a distinction between 
visionary immediacy, in which one hears words that “are not lawful for man to utter” (2 
                                                 
404 Augustine, On Christian Teaching [De Doctrina Christiana], trans. by R. P. H. Green 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Hereafter referred as DDC and cited within the body of 
the text. 	
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Cor. 12:4), and the slow progress of learning through preaching and reading. Those who 
would purposefully avoid interpretation (which requires such things as the acquisition of 
other languages and knowledge of rhetoric) in the hope of achieving the ease of ecstasy 
are doomed to fail.  
Despite his status as exemplary ecstatic, Paul is offered by Augustine as an 
example of the ideal reader and interpreter, a humble man whose visionary experience 
does not preclude a willingness to be instructed by others.  
Let us beware of such arrogant and dangerous temptations, and rather 
reflect that the apostle Paul, no less, though prostrated and then 
enlightened by a divine voice from heaven, was sent to a human being to 
receive the sacrament of baptism and be joined to the church…All this 
could certainly have been done through an angel, but the human condition 
would be really forlorn if God appeared unwilling to minister his word to 
human beings through human agency. It has been said, “For God’s temple 
is holy, and that temple you are”: how could that be true if God did not 
make divine utterances from his human temple but broadcast direct from 
heaven or through angels the learning that he wished to be passed on to 
mankind? Moreover, there would be no way for love, which ties people 
together in the bonds of unity, to make souls overflow and as it were 
intermingle with each other, if human beings learned nothing from other 
humans. And, to be sure, the eunuch who was reading the prophet Isaiah 
but could not understand him was not sent by an angel to the apostle; nor 
was the passage that he could not understand explained to him by an angel 
or divinely revealed within his mind without human assistance. In fact 
Philip, who knew the prophet Isaiah, was sent to him by divine prompting 
and sat with him, revealing in human words and human language the 
passage of scripture that had been meaningless to him. (Preface, 12-14).405 
                                                 
405 “Caveamus tales temptations superbissimas et periculosissimas magisque cogitemus et ipsum 
apostolum Paulum, licet divina et caelesti voce prostratum et instructum, ad hominem tamen 
missum esse ut sacramenta perciperet atque copularetur ecclesiae…Et poterant utique omnia per 
angelum fieri, sed abiecta esset humana condicio si per hominess hominibus deus verbum suum 
ministrare nolle videretur. Quomodo enim verum esset quod dictum est, templum enim dei 
sanctum est, quod estis vos, si deus de humano templo responsa non redderet et totum quod 
discendum hominibus tradi vellet de caelo atque per angelos personaret? Deinde ipsa caritas, quae 
sibi hominess invicem nodo unitatis astringit, non haberet adytum refundendorum et quasi 
miscendorum sibimet animorum, si homines per homines nihil discerent. Et certe illum 
spadonem, qui Esaiam prophetam legens non intellegebat, neque ad apostolum angelus misit nec 
ei per angelum id quod non intellegebat expositum aut divinitus in mente sine hominis ministerio 
revelatum est, sed potius suggestione divina missus est ad eum seditque cum eo Philippus, qui 
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Like Paul, Lutgard was a visionary who required other human beings to enact the 
implications of her visionary experience. Like the eunuch, she relied on interpreters to 
explain divine messages “in human words and human language.” Her “unlettered” status 
as laica can then be understood as a device that underscores her humility and, 
paradoxically, reveals her to be a model reader.  
Unlike the hagiographical and scholastic formulations of women’s illiteracy 
discussed above—where to be illitterata was to be marked by humility, enabling men to 
protect their privileged status—for Augustine, it was literacy that was a mark of humility 
and caritas. Literacy contrasted with visionary knowledge, which veered into the 
dangerous territory of pride and self-reliance, and rendered hermeneutical and rhetorical 
techniques unnecessary. Thus, when the VLA is read along with Augustine’s DDC (which 
Thomas uses to open the vita), we see that Lutgard’s representation as laica does not 
simply relegate her to the realm of “mute flesh” or charismatically gifted yet 
intellectually stunted holy woman. In fact, it represents her as an exemplarily humble 
interpreter of scripture. Thomas transvalues the category of literacy, moving from a 
scholastic to an Augustinian formulation, turning it from a mark of clerical privilege to an 
indicator and expression of humility. Meanwhile, the charismatic knowledge of the 
visionary, typically ascribed to women in the late medieval period as a mark of humility 
and separation from male clerical prerogative, becomes a risky phenomenon whose 
potential arrogance is tempered by literacy. The divine and human, vision and text, are 
                                                                                                                                                 
noverat Esaiam prophetam, eique humanis verbis et lingua quod in scriptura illa tectum erat 
aperuit.” 	
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represented as mutually supporting. Thus, when Lutgard’s vision confirms the gloss 
(II.33), the gloss also confirms her vision.  
The most forceful instance of Lutgard’s representation as illiterate occurs in I.12. 
The passage is yet another iteration of the typology of the soul’s progress in tripartite 
vignettes, suggesting not only the three stages of the soul’s growth but also the fabulous 
trope of the three wishes.  
First, in response to her abundant compassion, she received an ability to heal by 
means of her saliva or touch. However, this gift left her overwhelmed by crowds. She 
asked that in exchange for this gift, she better understand (intelligam) the Psalter, so that 
she might be more devout (ad majorem devotionem). Lutgard’s request was granted and 
she miraculously understood the Psalter “more lucidly” (lucidius intellexit). However, the 
divine gift again did not satisfy. Thomas writes that “she had not yet made as much 
progress (proficere) in this grace as she had expected—for the reverence of a veiled 
mystery (reverentia velati mysterii) is the mother of devotion, what is hidden (res celata) 
is the more avidly sought (avidius quaeritus), and what is concealed is looked upon with 
more veneration (venerabilius absconsa conspicitur).” Though the gift bestowed 
understanding, the revelation of what was before hidden hindered rather than intensified 
her desire by delivering too much clarity. Like William’s bride whose desire is impelled 
by the absence of the bridegroom, Lutgard required mystery to impel her devotion. 
“What use is it to me to know the secrets of Scripture,” Thomas has her exclaim in an 
explicit invocation of the illiteracy and simplicity topoi, “I, an unlettered, uncultivated, 
and uneducated nun?” (idiotae et rusticae et laicae moniali).  
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 Lutgard asked that, instead of this knowledge of the Psalter, she might have God’s 
heart. He gallantly asked for hers, a request to which she agreed if he would “temper your 
heart’s love to my heart and that I may possess my heart in you” (ut cordis tui amorem 
cordi meo contemperes & in te cor meum possideam). Thomas describes this 
“communion of hearts” (gesturing to Bernard and William) as the “union of an uncreated 
with a created spirit” (unjo spiritus increati & creati), such as Paul describes, one “who 
clings to God is made one spirit with him” (Quae adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus efficitur) (1 
Cor. 6:17).406 From this union, Lutgard enjoyed Christ’s guardianship of her heart, which 
prevents any fleshly temptation or impure thought from disturbing her mind.407  
This communion of hearts performs what Bernard and William describe as the 
translation of the reader’s experience into the terms of the bride. Thomas literalizes 
Bernard’s notion of the liber experientiae, which through reading and askesis is purified, 
such that the subject’s experience becomes that of the other. Thus, while Lutgard initially 
desired the understanding of the Psalms with a devout love—a love that is the mark, 
according to William, of the good, simple, animal soul who (Exp. Sg. 16)—her 
understanding (intellectum) was not yet of a nature to be “read within” the heart. The 
exchange of hearts—the tempering of Christ’s heart to her own such that they exist in a 
perichoretic unity—translated Christ’s interiority into her.  
                                                 
406 Barbara Newman notes that this is the first mention of the “exchange of hearts” in the 
medieval tradition, a topos that will recur in Mechthild of Hackeborn and Gertrude of Helfta in 
the next generation. Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives, p. 227, n. 63. Newman 
has forthcoming book on the theme of the exchange of hearts in the secular courtly love and the 
mystical traditions. 
	
407 This narrative further confuses the temporal progression of Lutgard’s Life, as she seems here 
to have achieved a state later deemed impossible in this life, namely to have perfect concentration 
and “banish every thought while saying the Hours” (II.17). 	
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We should not, then, read Lutgard’s self-description as idiotae et rusticae et 
laicae moniali simply as a statement of her inability to read. Thomas attributes great 
understanding to her, an understanding that is, in some sense, too great, for it dissolved 
the desire that is incited by the text’s obscurity (which mimics the bridegroom’s absence). 
Her proclamation makes sense only if read through Thomas’s theological matrix. The 
figure for William’s exegete, who is passing into the spiritual stage, is the “simple soul” 
who “recognizes how he failed in poverty, humility and simplicity before he was 
dignified by this knowledge [of God] and understanding [of enlightened love].” As 
Bernard argued that the reader must turn to his conscience, so William writes that the 
progressing soul should apply “his faculties, made keener by simplicity,” to the 
awareness of his own failure, “relying less on book learning (litteratura) than on the 
powers of the Lord and his justice alone” (Exp. Sg. 21).408 The one who has found 
knowledge through study must return to simplicity in order that those faculties exalted by 
intellectual success might be strengthened through an experience of dependence on 
divine power. The simplicity of the beginner recurs, though in a higher key, in the 
spiritual state. 
William’s equations of literacy and arrogance seem to stand in opposition to the 
views of Augustine, who pairs literacy with humility. However, it is worth noting that 
William’s distinction between divinely and textually obtained knowledge appears in a 
book—indeed, in a passage that cites yet another text. Given this literary context, it seems 
                                                 
408 “Sed rursum, divinae gratia illa cognitionis, quae sicut dictum est non fit nisis in sensu, vel 
intellectu illuminati amoris…quanto beatus pauper spiritu, et humilis, et quietus, et tremens 
sermons Domini, et simplex animus, cum quo solet esse sermocinatio Spiritus sancti, anete 
cognitionis vel intellectus ipsius reverentiam, paupertatis, et humilitatis, et simplicitatis suae 
verius et devotius recognoverit infirmitates; et sensus ad hoc attulerit, tanto subtiliores, quanto 
simpliciores; non tam in litteratura, quam in potentiis Domini, et in justitia ejus solius.”	
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better to understand William’s assertion of the limits of literature as an appeal to the 
paradoxical passivity of a cultivated humility, the affect of humility affected in the soul 
by the divine power through the medium of the text. Thus, William’s appeal to 
dependence on divine power as opposed to “literature” is a comment on the uses and 
relation of various kinds of knowledge, rather than a denunciation of the book in itself, or 
its prohibition for those who receive infused knowledge.409 For William and Augustine, 
the aim is the cultivation of humility, humility that arises through a dependence on 
something other than the independent self, whether that be a text or God. 
 
Literacy in the VLA 
  The monastic vocabulary of literacy recurs in the Life with reference to Lutgard’s 
reading practices. Thus, while the construction of her illiteracy foregrounds her humility 
and represents the affective nature of her understanding, Thomas is also concerned to 
present her in the classical terms of a Cistercian student of the Bible, even as these terms 
are represented in keeping with what is appropriate to each stage of spiritual progression.  
In the earliest stages of her conversion, when she was a “simple” girl (simplex), 
her will still inclining towards a human rather than divine bridegroom, Christ “appeared 
(apparuit) to her in that human form” (in ipsa forma humanitatis) taken at the 
                                                 
409 The fraught relation between learning and the love for God—sometimes articulated as a 
distinction between the clerical and the monastic spheres, though that dichotomy is not a simple 
one—in Western monasticism was the subject of Jean Leclercq’s Love of Learning and the 
Desire for God. He argues that the relation between study and the desire for eternal life (which 
demanded detachment from all things earthly, including learning) was a constantly negotiated 
tension, which never achieved an ideal synthesis but was differently articulated throughout 
history (p. 23). The different articulations of this tension can be seen here in this comparison of 
Augustine and William, and in the complex way in which Thomas attempts to portray Lutgard’s 
humility in relation to the book.	
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incarnation. He shows Lutgard his bleeding side wound and tells her, “Do not seek any 
longer the caresses of unseemly love. Here you may perpetually contemplate 
(contemplare) what you should love…. Here I pledge (spondeo) that you shall attain the 
delights of total purity” (I.2).410 Terms of physical sight dominate the language of the 
passage. A young man attempts to steal a glimpse of Lutgard by “observing” (observaret) 
the right time and place to conceal himself outside her house. With the appearance of 
Christ, the context shifts to the vision of the divine suitor, who is described with the verbs 
appareo, video, ostendo, and contemplare. In this transition to divine sight, the terms of 
sensory vision remain intact. Likewise, Reypens argues that the term forma when used to 
refer to the humanity of Christ indicates that the vision is physical in nature.411 This 
physical vision of Christ’s human form is consonant with William’s description of the 
animal stage in which, as noted above, the simple, devout soul prays to Christ secundum 
formam humanam (Exp. Sg. 16).  
 This vision of Christ in his humanity moves into a new register in I.3, in which 
the language of vision aligns with terms derived from reading:  
Alarmed by such an oracle (oraculo), Lutgard therefore immediately held 
fast (haesit) with the eyes of her heart (oculis cordis) to what she had seen 
                                                 
410 “Quam cum juvenis, divitiis pollens & genere, procaretur, animum interdum cœpit verbis illius 
leniter inclinare. Cumque tempus & locum juvenis observaret, clam de nocte domum, in qua 
virgo jacebat, adire tentabat. Nec mora: cum accessisset, repentino timore correptus aufugit. 
Institit ergo diabolus miris modis, ut ad consensum. puellarem animum inclinaret: sed frustra, 
quia Omnipotens non permisit. Cumque ad colloquium juvenis simplex quandoque puella sederet, 
apparuit ipsi Christus in ipsa humanitatis forma, qua inter homines quondam fuerat conversatus; 
& pectori vestem detrahens, qua videbatur obtectus, vulnus lateris ostendit, quasi recenti sanguine 
cruentatum, dicens: Blanditias inepti amoris ulterius non requiras: hic jugiter contemplare quid 
diligas, & cur diligas: hic totius puritatis delicias tibi spondeo consequendas” (Col.0237D-
0237E). 
	
411 L. Reypens, “Sint Lutgarts mystieke opgang,’ in Ons Geestelijk Erf, 20 (1946), 7-49 (pp. 17-
19). Noted by Newman in the English translation, p. 218, n. 22. 
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(vidisset). Like a dove meditating (meditans) at a window at the entrance 
of the sunlight, she keenly observed (observabat) the crystalline opening 
of the Ark, the typological Body of Christ (arcae typici). At once her 
fleshly bloom was consumed away and, like every lover, her countenance 
paled. Inwardly brightened by a supernal brilliance, she sensed (sensit) 
that what she had lost was the darkness of total vanity.412 
 
The vision of Christ’s human form enters Lutgard’s heart (prefiguring the later exchange 
of hearts). She holds fast to its memory, “meditating” on it. According to Jean Leclercq, 
in the monastic context, “one cannot meditate on anything else but a text.”413 Meditation 
on the page is a fixing of the words in the memory—as we now say, “learning by heart.” 
However, rather than a proper text, Lutgard meditates on her vision of Christ’s body, 
extending the referential scope of Leclercq’s textuality. If one can meditate only on texts 
in a monastic context, then vision here becomes text. What Lutgard actually sees in this 
meditation, however, is not the bleeding side wound described in I.2 but the “typological 
body of Christ,” the Ark of the Covenant. Thomas transposes Lutgard’s visionary 
experience into the terms of the textual practice of the typological reading of Old 
Testament in the terms of the New, and thus emphasizes the textuality of Lutgard’s 
vision, tying her act of meditation even more intimately to that of lectio. In her 
meditation on her first vision of Christ’s human form, she “observed” his body as a 
crystalline opening to the ark; it is as if she turned a page and found a new passage that 
                                                 
412 “Tali igitur Lutgardis oraculo pavefacta, statim oculis cordis hæsit, quid vidisset excipere: & 
quasi columba meditans, in fenestra ad introitum solaris luminis, ostium crystallinum arcæ typici 
corporis Christi pertinaciter observabat. Mox flore carnis abeso, vultu palluit, ut omnis amans: & 
superno interius splendore lustrata, totius vanitatis se sensit amisisse caliginem” (Col. 0237E). 
 
413 J. Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, p. 16. 
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was the shadow and copy of the first.414 By comparing her with a dove, Thomas 
furthermore suggests that Lutgard’s allegorical practice began transforming her into the 
bride, for like the bride and dove of Sg. 5:2, in her meditation she “slept but [her] heart 
was awake.”  
 The assimilation of Lutgard’s visionary experience to the language of reading 
continues in I.13. Having been roused from a fever and impelled by an auditory vision to 
go to church for Matins, she meets Christ at the entrance to the church, nailed to the 
cross. In an intensification of the vision of his wound in I.2, he  
embraced her who was standing opposite and pressed her mouth against 
the wound in his right side. There she drank in so much sweetness that, 
from that time forward she was always stronger and quicker in the service 
of God. Those to whom she revealed this event have reported and certified 
that then and for a long time afterwards the saliva in her mouth tasted 
mellower than the sweetest honey. What is there to wonder in this? “Your 
lips, my bride, are a dripping honeycomb.” Thus did her heart inwardly 
ruminate (ruminabat) on the honey of Christ’s divinity and the milk of his 
humanity even when her tongue was silent (I.13).415 
 
This passage seems to manifest the literalization of female piety described by Barratt, one 
that reduces speech and interiority to the flesh. Vision replaces language and operates in a 
realm free from textuality, even as the constitution of Lutgard’s own body changes. 
However, Thomas describes this bodily experience as her “inward rumination.” He thus 
places Lutgard within the privileged sphere of the choir monks rather than that of the 
                                                 
414 This description of the visionary moment leads to the inevitable question of whether Lutgard’s 
first vision arose while the she was reading or looking at an icon of the bleeding Christ or the Ark 
of the Covenant, a hypothesis that makes sense given the scene’s elaboration in terms of 
typology. However, Thomas does not make this explicit. 
	
415 “In ipso ostio ecclesiæ ei Christus cruci affixus cruentatus occurrit: deponensque brachium 
cruci affixum, amplexatus est occurrentem, & os ejus vulneri dextri lateris applicavit. Ubi tantum 
dulcedinis hausit, quod semper ex tunc in Dei servitio robustior & alacrior fuit. Referebant qui 
hæc, illa revelante, illo in tempore & diu postea probaverunt, quod saliva oris ejus super omnem 
mellis dulcorem suavius sapiebat. Quid miri? Favus distillans labia tua, Sponsa; & mel divinitatis, 
& lac humanitatis Christi, etiam tacente lingua, cor interius ruminabat” (Col. 0239E).	
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conversi, who were relegated to the brute reality of their physicality as they worked the 
fields and performed violent ascetic feats in identification with Christ’s suffering flesh, a 
physicality that their hagiographers marked as indelibly masculine. For the choir monks, 
on the other hand, physical labor included the ruminative reading of scripture, a repetition 
on the tongue that fixed the text in memory and thereby translated body and mind into the 
terms of the text. It was their privileged means of becoming the bride. I would argue that 
the techniques of literalization employed by Thomas in this description of Lutgard are his 
attempt to capture the physicality of monastic meditation and allegory.  
Jean Leclercq notes that lectio divina and meditation were often described with 
the vivid verb ruminatio, which refers to the extended digestion of some animals. 
Rumination is the work of scriptural memorization. It “inscribes, so to speak, the sacred 
text in the body and in the soul.” Memorization proceeds through the “mastication” of 
divine words, speaking the page repeatedly until its nutritive value is fully extracted and 
assimilated by the reader.”416 While Barratt understands ruminatio to indicate the 
reduction of speech to bodiliness, it is a vital verb in monastic reading culture, one that 
indicates less the reduction of speech to bodiliness than a process of spiritual formation 
through mutual disciplining. Thus, Lutgard ruminates on the “text” of Christ’s body and 
the Christological doctrine of the two natures of Christ. Her rumination—an inward 
performance, in William’s terms—is so successful that she becomes the bride of the Song 
4.11, whose “lips are a dripping honeycomb,” tasting the text until her own mouth tastes 
sweet to others. Her actions offer commentary on the biblical text as well as replication of 
it; in her performance of the role of the bride, Lutgard becomes text and embodies the 
                                                 
416 Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture, p. 
73.	
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union with Christ promised by mystical marriage. As Origen instructs readers of the Song 
in De Principiis, she “portrayed the text upon” her own soul and body. 
 This assimilation to the bride recurs in 1.16 when, after contemplative prayer, 
Lutgard’s hands drip with oil. She shows (ostendabat) them to her friend “as if she were 
drunk,” saying, “I am so filled up inwardly by his superabundant grace that now my 
fingers are outwardly dripping a kind of oil as a manifestation of grace” (repleor 
interius…exterius ad signifcandum gratiam). Lutgard exegetes her dripping hands not 
only as a sacrament—an outward sign of an inward grace—but in reference to the bride 
in Song 5.5, who says, “My hands dripped with myrrh, and my fingers were full of the 
choicest myrrh.” Once again, the exterior, physical event is tied intimately to the interior 
workings of contemplation. The bodily miracle finds authority and warrant in the biblical 
text, even as Lutgard’s body becomes text, recapitulating the Song of Songs in its 
performance. Her allegorization of the text transmutes the letter into spirit (the carnal 
bride into the bride of Christ), but the spirit of the text again becomes “letter” as it lives 
in the particular lineaments of her flesh.  
 In associating verbs of reading and meditation with Lutgard’s visionary 
experience, Thomas may seem to rely on Gregory the Great’s famous dictum that images 
are appropriate for the laity who do not understand the written word. Thus, these passages 
could be understood as a recapitulation of Lutgard’s illiteracy. Thomas’s portrayal of 
Lutgard meditating on Christ’s body as text—in which lectio divina becomes, in effect, 
lectio domini—is a precocious example of a phenomenon emphasized in later vernacular 
treatises written for the laity, who had neither the time nor skills for the ruminative 
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practices of monks and nuns.417 However, to meditate on the body of Christ, particularly 
in the Passion, was not only the provenance of the illiterate; it was also elaborated by 
twelfth-century Cistercians as part of the very development of the notion of the book of 
experience and the affective understanding and transformation by reading.418 By 
transferring Lutgard’s reading practice to visions of Christ, I argue, Thomas attempts to 
render visible in bodily images what Cistercians articulate in theological commentary. 
The vita represents Lutgard as a woman who not only receives inexplicable visions but 
who also performs the entire exercise of allegorical interpretation and rumination upon 
those visions. The effect of these actions, as Bernard and William outline, transforms her 
into the bride, full of divine love.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The view that Thomas, in representing Lutgard as an illiterate who has “trouble 
with language,” relegates her to the confines of her body and its intractable femininity is 
unable to account for the complexity of Thomas’s notion of reading and Lutgard’s 
exemplarity of Cistercian reading practices. The interpenetration of reading and 
experience, communicated in the monastic tradition through Origen, Cassian, Bernard, 
and William, is vital to the construction of Lutgard’s exemplarity, for by representing 
Lutgard taking biblical exemplars into her soul and body, Thomas implicitly suggests 
how Lutgard’s exemplarity becomes available to his readers in their own acts of reading 
the vita. In the allegorical imagination of Christian monasticism, exegetical acts issue in a 
                                                 
417 Vincent Gillespie, “Lukyng in Haly Bukes: Lectio in some Late Medieval Spiritual 
Miscellanies,” Analecta Cartusiana 106 (1984), p. 11. 
 	
418 J. Leclercq, “Aspects Spirituels,” p. 66.	
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performance of the text within the body and affect that recapitulates and, in Cassian’s 
formulation, fulfills the scriptural text by making it present in history. Similarly, for 
William, the allegorist “follow[s]…through these metaphors of divine love” until the 
“outward dramatic allegory becomes in it a true story” (Exp. Sg., 144). The stages 
through which the bridal soul passes are not confined to the page, operating as two 
dimensions to be observed by readers. Rather, textual exegesis and meditation are in fact 
operations performed on the reader, rendering the textual model through one’s own soul 
and body. The bride’s desire becomes the reader’s desire.  
In representing Lutgard as a masterful reader of the Song, Thomas implicitly 
figures the vita as a commentary on the Song, not unlike the expositions of William or 
Origen. Thus, even as William built the edifice of his exegesis on the exemplar of the 
bride, so Thomas read and wrote Lutgard as the bride in order that he might “set love 
free” in his own readers (Exp. Sg., 4). As a living allegory of the Song, Lutgard models 
the knowledge of a reader who understands by reading within: intus legere. Assimilated 
to the bride, she is the scriptural text brought to life and re-textualized by Thomas in 
order to become available to his audience for their adoption and adaptation.  
Embodying the stages of the bridal drama in the complex plot of the Life, 
Thomas’s Lutgard is a reader who reads the text within her heart even as it is inscribed on 
and performed by her flesh. While such an embodied notion of reading clearly resonates 
with constructions of women as bodily and lowly, learning through experience rather 
than literature, I have argued that this construction conforms to Cistercian conceptions of 
the ideal reader, conceptions that Thomas self-consciously invokes throughout the Life. 
In this view, what has been understood as Lutgard’s “trouble with language” is, in fact, 
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its apotheosis of Cistercian ideals, in which language and literacy are manifest in the 
experience of the saint assimilated to the text of the Song. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Uses of Astonishment: Exemplarity, Apophasis, and the Writing of Mystical 
Hagiography 
 
 
According to every effect he had been able to trace, he was of the opinion that 
the pleasure we receive arose, not from its being a copy but from its being an 
imitation, and the word imitation itself means always a combination of a certain 
degree of dissimilitude with a certain degree of similitude. If it were merely the 
same as looking at a glass reflection, we should receive no pleasure. A waxen 
image, after once it had been seen, pleased no longer, or very little, but when the 
resemblance of a thing given upon a canvas or a flat surface, then we were 
delighted…We take the purest parts and combine it with our own minds, with our 
own hopes, with our own inward yearnings after perfection, and being frail and 
imperfect, we wish to have a shadow, a sort of prophetic existence present to us, 
which tells us what we are not, but yet, blending in us much that we are, 
promises great things of what we may be. 
 
–S. T. Coleridge, Lectures on Shakespeare (“On poetry as an imitation, not a copy”)  
 
 
 
From Inexpressibility to Ineffability: The Wondrous and the Apophatic in the Life 
of Lutgard of Aywières 
 
The fifth-century Life of Saint Martin of Tours by Sulpicius Severus (d. 397) 
contains several topoi that became standard in medieval Christian hagiography.419 
Eyewitnesses confirm the authenticity of Martin’s miracles and testify to his holiness, 
spreading his fame and giving the vita authority in the face of what the author believes to 
                                                 
419 As a well-educated author, Sulpicius Severus was familiar with the Latin Life of Antony and 
the Latin fathers as well as classical conventions of good Latin, and the metrics of proper prose. 
While he had no Gallic predecessors on which to model Martin, F.R. Hoare argues that Sulpicius 
was attempting to promote Martin as another Antony, aligning him with the venerable figure in 
order to oppose those who saw Martin simply as uncouth and unworthy of Episcopal office, 
which in Gaul was generally held by the refined and urbane. See Soldiers of Christ: Saints and 
Saints’ Lives from Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, eds. Thomas F. X. Noble and 
Thomas Head (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 2.  
	
249	
	
be the inevitable skepticism of his readers because of the miraculous nature of his tale.420 
This authorization through eyewitnesses is further strengthened by Sulpicius Severus’s 
own claims to having heard some of the material “from Martin’s own lips” (ch. 24). 
There is a concern to mitigate the tedium of the narrative—inevitable if one were to 
attempt to comprehensively account for of all Martin’s wondrous deeds—so that the 
claim of narrative minimization in fact emphasizes the largeness of the topic (Preface). 
The hagiographer invokes the humility topos in the dedication to the work, where he asks 
his friend, Desiderius, to circulate the text without his name attached (as many write the 
Lives of others in an attempt to bask in their reflected glory), and laments his unpolished 
diction and unworthiness to perform his important task (ch. 1).  
Sulpicius Severus’s claim of authorial incapacity is closely related to what Curtius 
calls the inexpressibility topos. The topos, Curtius notes, is found in Homer and in the 
panegyric of all ages. Its basic form is a claim of an “inability to cope with the 
subject.”421 Thus Sulpicius Severus writes that Martin “is beyond my powers to describe” 
(ch. 10), that “no language…could ever depict his interior life, his everyday behavior and 
his mind ever fixed upon heaven” (ch. 26), and that “not even Homer, if, as the saying 
goes, he returned from Hades, could do justice to [to him]…it was all so much greater in 
Martin than words can express” (ch. 26). Claims concerning the subject’s inexpressibility 
extend the humility topos, which not only asserts Sulpicius Severus’s writerly modesty, 
but describes the saint through negation: Martin is so praiseworthy and wondrous that he 
                                                 
420 Sulpicius Severus, The Life of Martin of Tours, Translated by F. R. Hoare in Soldiers of Christ 
from Vie de Saint Martin, ed. and trans. by Jacques Fontaine, 3 vols., Sources Chrétiennes, nos. 
133, 134, 135 (Paris, 1967, 1968, 1969). 
	
421 E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. by Willard R. Trask 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 160. 	
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escapes the capacity of language to name him. The panegyrist can at most make partial 
attempts at description, ever aware of the inevitable failure of the enterprise.  
The intimate relation between the humility and inexpressibility topoi means that 
the author is implicated in his assertion of the holy person’s ineffability. Both the 
author’s incompetence and the nature of his subject define the limits of hagiographical 
representation. This relation of the two topoi, however, is complicated by a tension 
between them: is the failure of representation due to the author’s inability to use words 
with sufficient rhetorical skill, or is it due to the nature of the subject, such that the author 
is humbled by the holy person’s grandeur? This very confusion constitutes the mutual 
dependence of the two topoi: Sulpicius Severus is humbled by his subject, placed in a 
position of authorial incapacity by Martin’s splendor, even as his inability to describe the 
saint re-emphasizes the saint’s majesty and inexpressibility.  
The exercise the virtue of humility in the hagiographical task is one that makes 
the work of writing the saint’s Life a spiritual practice. As Derek Krueger argues,  
Remarks denigrating style draw attention to the author’s prose, rendering 
it an object for reflection. The text…records the author’s own askesis. It 
…become[s] a relic of the performance of the virtue of humility, his 
imitation of the saints and Christ.422  
 
According to Krueger, the repetition of commonplaces such as the humility topos are 
ritual utterances that indicate and inculcate religious ideals. The humility topos “ritually 
humiliate[s]” the text and, in a further act of humiliation, conforms it to a model. Because 
the text is an extension of the writer’s body, an operation on the text is, according to 
                                                 
422Derek Krueger, “Hagiography as an Ascetic Practice in the Early Christian East,” The Journal 
of Religion, vol. 79, No. 2 (April 1999), p. 230.  
 
251	
	
Krueger, an operation on that body.423 A hagiographer does not simply describe an 
object, but is transformed by and implicated in the act of telling. 
 The nature of the hagiographer’s involvement with his or her saintly subject and 
the question of how to read claims of an inability to render a topic in language, however, 
change in history of Christian hagiographical writing. In the context of the Life of a holy 
woman composed by a male author, the inexpressibility and humility topoi become 
gendered sites, revealing much about the dynamic between the holy woman and her male 
hagiographer.  
In what follows, I consider Thomas of Cantimpré’s use of the inexpressibility and 
humility topoi in the Life of Lutgard of Aywières. Like Sulpicius Severus, Thomas 
implicates himself in the saint’s Life through these topoi. However, in the Life of Lutgard, 
there is a profound shift in their use from their fifth-century precedent.424 First, while in 
the Life of Saint Martin of Tours the inexpressibility topos has the doubled effect of 
describing the saint and engendering humility in Sulpicius Severus, in the VLA, the 
inexpressibility topos is deployed both to describe Lutgard and one of her private 
visionary experiences in which she encounters the ineffability of God. This encounter, in 
turn, renders her ineffable to Thomas’s eye, compromising his descriptive efforts. 
Second, Thomas not only describes Lutgard’s ineffability; in an important passage where 
he gives an account of his experience of her holiness, the inexpressibility topos is used 
again. The hagiographer’s imitation of the saint thus extends here from a mimesis of 
                                                 
423 Ibid., p. 232.  
	
424Thomas of Cantimpré, Vita Lutgardis Aquiriensis. In Acta Sanctorum, ed. by G. Henschen, 16 
June, III, pp. 187-209. Hereafter referred to within the text as VLA. English translation, unless 
otherwise noted, from Thomas of Cantimpré: The Collected Saints’ Lives, trans. by Margot H. 
King and Barbara Newman (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008).	
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saintly humility in the acknowledgment of the limitations of representational power—
such as Krueger addresses and Sulpicius Severus performs—to an imitation of the saint’s 
ineffable experience of God. However, while Lutgard has a vision of God, Thomas has a 
vision of Lutgard. The visionary “becomes a vision” for the hagiographer, a spectacle of 
wonder that capsizes Thomas’s linguistic power, enabling him to have an experience of 
ecstatic rapture through the humiliation of his intellectual capacities in the face of her 
incredible presence.425 The act of writing the hagiographical account of these two 
visionary moments is a performance essential to Thomas’s realization and continuation of 
this rapturous encounter. Writing the vita becomes, for Thomas, a spiritual practice 
whereby he incites and consummates his desire for the ineffable holy women.  
Amy Hollywood argues that the need to create vivid and compelling narratives 
led hagiographers to represent the interior states of the soul by means of marking the 
body of the female saint. She notes that this externalization was facilitated, first, by the 
misogynistic cultural identification of women with the body, such that sanctification was 
achieved through and visible in the flesh of female saints. Second, visionary experience 
was tied to the imagination, an ambiguous faculty understood to mediate the bodily and 
spiritual realms by means of its production of immaterial images of material 
substances.426 Because women’s religious authority often derived from their visionary 
                                                 
425 Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1995), p. 
35.  
	
426 On the mediating function of the imagination and its complex and confusing relation to the 
body in spiritual vision, see Augustine’s attempt to discern the status of Paul’s rapture in The 
Literal Commentary on Genesis, Bk. XII. Images—the product of the imagination—are the 
product of a mixture of the corporeal and incorporeal, and stand in distinction to the perception of 
“substance” by the intellectual faculty Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, trans. by John 
Hammond Taylor, (New York: Newman Press, 1982), XII, p. 181.  
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experience and were thus included in women’s vitae as proof of their sanctity, a 
hagiographer seeking dramatic narrative effects could easily (and often did) translate 
internal visionary experiences into somatic terms.427 In contrast to the externalizing 
strategies of hagiography, women’s own mystical writing of the thirteenth century, 
though often using physical images and metaphors to describe visionary experiences, 
also, in a radically anti-essentializing gesture, “subvert[ed] their visionary images through 
apophasis.”428 The modus loquendi of mystical texts—apophasis, the unsaying of 
representation—is, Hollywood argues, “notably absent” in hagiographical texts.429  
Thomas’s extended use of the ineffability topos as a means not only to represent 
Lutgard’s visionary experience but to mime that experience and thus achieve his own 
visionary encounter is, I will argue, his attempt to speak apophatically in a hagiographical 
context, to perform a mystical modus loquendi that enacts what is elsewhere 
thematized—union with the unspeakable godhead—by means of images, particularly 
those derived from the Song of Songs, and exegetical glosses on scriptural passages. In 
the extended use of the ineffability topos, Thomas attempts to unsay his descriptive 
efforts and thus divest himself of the role of witness in the hagiographical context. The 
way in which Thomas acknowledges the limits of representation enables the saying of the 
saint to become a play between secrecy and revelation, veiling and unveiling, though 
because of the externalizing demands of the hagiographical genre, this play is most 
                                                                                                                                                 
	
427 Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, p. 35. 
 	
428 Ibid., p. 37. 
 	
429 Ibid., p. 52.	
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typically manifest as a tension between external and internal inscriptions of divine union, 
witnessing and being, the veiled and the unveiling.  
If, for Sulpicius Severus, Martin’s hyperbolic greatness entailed the failure of 
language to capture him, for Thomas, Lutgard exceeds not only the capacity of his 
language—all language—to describe her but of the mind to comprehend her. This shift is 
one from the inexpressibility to what Simone Roisin names the “ineffability” topos. 
Roisin argues that the ineffability topos is Curtius’s inexpressibility topos articulated 
within the register of apophatic theology. The topos is a key element in the articulation of 
new emphases in Cistercian hagiographical writing in thirteenth-century Liège, including 
Thomas’s Life of Lutgard, which Roisin considers. According to Roisin, these 
hagiographies were a new genre, which she termed “mystical biography.”430 Mystical 
biography described a new kind of saint in a new milieu, their subjects being not solely 
aristocratic, both genders, and all economic classes. Virtues celebrated in these vitae 
included asceticism, charity, poverty, and union with God through contemplation—in 
short, a “total and continual crucifixion of nature.”431 These foci contrast with older 
hagiographical valorizations of thaumaturgical deeds, courageous missionaries, or 
impressive episcopal administrators.432 The saints of mystical biography were depicted 
                                                 
430 Simone Roisin, L’Hagiographie Cistercienne dans le diocèse de Liège au XIIIe siècle 
(Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1947), p. 8. 
	
431 Ibid., p. 151.  
	
432 Ibid., p. 8, p. 11.  
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using “sensible devotion to Christ to rise to the sublime contemplation of divinity.”433 In 
this portrayal, they became the “concrete realization” of doctrine.434  
The ineffability topos, which presents the saint as so inflected by divine grace that 
the hagiographer can only represent her through language that deliberately unsays itself, 
was essential to the portrayal of saints whose primary activity was the seeking of divine 
union, for if the saint becomes one with a God who defies all attempts to be captured in 
language, then the saint, too, becomes unnameable. The writing of such a saint must 
defeat the descriptive and taxonomic capacity of the hagiographer’s human language. 
Mystical biography thus makes use of the textual procedures of mystical theology in 
order to describe the mystic saint.  
 In order to delineate the category of mystical biography and determine the 
function of rhetorical gestures such as the ineffability and humility topoi, Roisin 
examines Ludwig Zoepf’s attempt to distinguish among biography, vita (which contains 
elements of biography along with miracles), and legend (biography that is dominated by 
the supernatural element) within the ideal category of hagiography.435 She argues that 
writers of mystical biography knew what it was to attend to the facts of a life, particularly 
as these authors knew or were contemporaries of the subjects whom they eulogized. The 
vitae thus attempted to reflect the life stories of their friends and colleagues and were, 
furthermore, written for others who also knew the saint and would thus be less amenable 
to exaggeration or the reduction of a friend to a “vulgar pastiche” of literary and 
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434 Ibid., p. 275.	
435 See L. Zoepf, Das Heiligen-Leben im 10 Jahrhundert (Leipzig: 1908), pp. 34-35. 
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rhetorical tropes.436 However, within this overarching “biographical drive,” Roisin notes 
that these writers did resort to hagiographical conventions in their compositions, 
including protestations of incompetence, supplications to the reader to tolerate their poor 
style, and anticipations of the difficulty the audience will have believing the narrative. 
The use of these commonplaces, Roisin argues, must be contextualized within the 
biographical frame and understood as necessary to the authors’ attempts to render their 
subjects vividly and truthfully. The use of traditional topoi was not, then, a way to 
circumvent the effort of writing by creating a narrative tissue of dramatically rendered 
hagiographical conventions in order to construct a putatively new narrative, nor an 
invocation of a humble piety, nor again an unreflective use of rhetorical conventions. 
Rather, she argues, the deployment of such topoi must be understood as essential to the 
attempt to render the saint with the greatest possible clarity.437  
For Roisin, when the authors of mystical biography write that they are unable to 
express the divine as glimpsed through human language, it must be read as part of generic 
demands particular to their context and project: they deploy this language because they 
understand the saint to be a theophany who requires an apophatic text in order to do 
justice to the manifestation of God on earth. Like must express like. Mystical language 
must portray the mystical saint. As it is used in mystical biography, the humility and 
ineffability topoi are rhetorical means of assimilating hagiography to mystical theology, 
such that protestations of incapacity or incompetence demonstrate the author’s (failed) 
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attempt to “enclose the divine in human words.”438 Claims of an inability to cope with a 
subject thus put the inexpressibility topos to new use, serving the description of the new 
saint emergent in a milieu of novel spiritual expressions and institutions.  
I agree with Roisin’s assessment of the ineffability topos as more than a repetition 
of ancient rhetorical convention. Like her, I would argue that it has a novel purpose and 
effect in the context of Thomas’s thirteenth-century Cistercian hagiography, as we have 
already seen in the comparison with the Life of Martin of Tours. In what follows, I 
explore further the implications of the topos in Thomas’s representation of both Lutgard 
and himself, implications that I will argue are even more radical and innovative than 
Roisin suggests.  
While thus far I have considered Thomas’s writerly practice in the Life of Lutgard 
as a mimetic operation that creates a linked chain between God, Lutgard, Thomas, and 
the readers of the Life, the ineffability at the heart of Thomas’s encounter with Lutgard 
refigures the possibilities and strategies of such a representational structure. Profound 
breaks in Thomas’s representation of Lutgard, rendered in part by means of the 
ineffability topos, ultimately issue in Thomas thematizing the failure of his textualization. 
Paradoxically, this failure is Thomas’s attempt to render Lutgard with greater clarity and 
accuracy and to forge—by means of the performance of his writing—his own encounter 
with the saint. Thus, the use of the ineffability topos has important implications for our 
consideration of hagiographical exemplarity. Thomas’s representation of the ineffable 
attempts to imitate the inimitable. A successful mimesis is one that, in this case, marks 
the drama of its own failed enterprise.  
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In Book One of Lutgard’s Life, Thomas recounts Lutgard’s vision of John the 
Evangelist: 
Now let us recall that eagle of keenest vision, namely John the Evangelist, 
“who drank the streams of the Gospel from the sacred fountain of the 
Lord’s breast.” An eagle appeared to her in the spirit (in spiritu), his wings 
brightly shining with such lustre that all the universe could have been 
enlightened by the dazzling clarity of its rays. She was so astonished 
(stupefacta) at this vision—with a wonderment exceeding any words to 
describe it (super id quod dici potest admiratione)—that she had to wait 
until the Lord tempered (temperaret) the glory of so great a spectacle to 
the capacity of her weak sight (secundum capacitatem debilis aciei). And 
so it happened. When the mode of the vision had been moderated 
(moderatius), she saw in contemplation (contemplata) that the eagle was 
placing its beak in her mouth and filling her soul with flashes of such 
ineffable light (animam ejus tam ineffabilis luminis corscatione repleret) 
that no secrets of divinity lay hidden (laterent) from her insofar as it is 
possible for mortals to know them, for as it was said to Moses, “No human 
shall see me and live.” [Ex. 33:20] For the more abundantly she drank 
from the torrent of pleasure (voluptatis) in the house of God, the more 
magnificently the eagle found the capacity of her heart increased by her 
desire (extensum desiderio) (I.15).439 
 
The passage begins by recounting an important visionary experience Lutgard had 
in the early years of her Benedictine profession, before she transferred to a Cistercian 
community. It is narrated alongside other accounts of vivid visions and moments when 
she is described as rapiebatur in spiritu, lifted beyond awareness and control of her 
physical body. These other raptures are, like that depicted in I.15, predominantly oral in 
                                                 
439 “Proinde ad recordationem illius acutissimae visionis aquilae, Joannis scilicet 
Euangelistae, qui fluenta Euangelii de ipso sacro Dominici pectoris fonte potavit; 
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contemplata, vidit quod aquilia ori suo rostrum imponeret, & animam ejus tam ineffabilis 
luminis coruscatione repleret, ut secundum id quod viventibus possible est (quia Moysi 
dictum est; Non videbit me homo, & vivet) nulla eam divinitatis secreta laterent. Tanto 
enim de torrente voluptatis abundantius hausit in domo, quanto magnificentior Aquila vas 
cordis ejus extensum desiderio magis inuenit” (Col. 0240B). 
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nature. They include two visions of Lutgard sucking sweetness from Christ’s side wound 
(I.13; I.14), an experience of her hands dripping oil while she was spiritually “inebriated” 
(ebria) (I.16), and Christ the lamb sucking a melody of “wondrous mellowness” from her 
mouth (I.19). However, in this case, Thomas attaches a description of his own experience 
when listening to the wisdom of Lutgard’s teaching to the recounting of her vision of the 
eagle. The two portions of the passage are carefully linked. 
Concerning this matter I have unerring testimony (testimonium) to her, as I 
hope in all conscience. Although she seemed and indeed was rather 
uncultivated and very simple (rudis et simplicissima) in common speech, 
yet in private spiritual conversations (in spiritualis collationis secretis), 
never from anyone’s lips have I heard more genuine, more ardent, or more 
decisive (decisa) words in accord with the spirit of truth—to such an 
extent that I often accounted myself to be quite uncultivated (rudum) and 
dull in my understanding (hebetem ad intellectum) of her speech. I still 
remember the place and time when, I confess, I was so astonished 
(stupuisse) by the subtlety (subtilitate) of her words that, had that sweet 
and ineffable wonderment (dulcis et ineffabilis admiratio) held me any 
longer, it would either have rendered me mad (amentem me) or utterly 
destroyed (extinctum) me. Yet this did not happen at the time about which 
I am writing, but about sixteen years before her death.440  
 
 Thomas carefully notes the transgression of historical progression in this passage, telling 
the reader that that his experience of ineffable wonder upon hearing Lutgard’s words did 
not happen at the time “about which I am writing”—the time of her early visionary 
experiences—but sixteen years before her death. He thus underscores the thematic 
                                                 
440 “In hoc autem ei secundum conscientiam, ut spero, non erroneum testimonium 
habebo; quod licet ipsa in communibus verbis, rudis quodammodo & simplicissima 
videretur & esset; tamen numquam ab ore alicujus ita sincera, ita ardentissima, ita 
secundum veritatis spiritum decisa verba, in spiritualis collationis secretis inueni; in 
tantum, ut rudem me prorsus & hebetem ad intellectum berborum ejus saepissime 
reputarem. Loci adhuc & temporis memor, tantum me aliquando in verborum ejus 
subtilitate stupuisse profiteor; ut si diu me illa dulcis & ineffabilis admiratio tenuisset, aut 
amentem me utique, aut extinctum penitus reddidisset. Sed hoc non isto in tempore, de 
quo ad praesens scribo, sed ante moretem ejus, annis ferme sedecim, fuit” (Col. 0240D). 
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connections between the two halves of the passage: it is not the temporal that links 
Lutgard’s and Thomas’s raptures but the dynamics and effects of their experiences. 
Furthermore, through this association of the two halves of the passage, Thomas draws an 
explicit parallel between their subjects, Lutgard and himself. However, while this 
parallelism aligns the figures, it also reveals important differences in their experience of 
rapture and what enables it.  
Lutgard’s mouth was filled by the divine eagle, the one who “drank the streams of 
the Gospel from the sacred fountain of the Lord’s breast.” The vision describes a 
supernatural infusion of the knowledge of the scriptures not unlike instances discussed in 
the previous chapter (I.12; II.33). However, in this case, the ineffability of the biblical 
revelation is emphasized. While initially blinded by the light of the vision, rendered 
“astonished,” her “wonderment exceed[ing] any words to describe it” (ad visionem ergo 
illius super id quod dici potest admiratione nimia stupefacta), the moderation of the 
vision enabled her to perceive the eagle. The clarity of this perception did not, however, 
diminish the unspeakable quality of the encounter. Thomas describes Lutgard as replete 
with ineffable (ineffabilis) light, writing that her capacity for desire (desiderio) and 
pleasure (voluptatis) were increased (extensum magis) the more they were fulfilled.  
Thomas draws upon the Bernadine inheritance essential to the VLA in order to 
describe Lutgard’s desire. Bernard’s Sermon 84 from the Sermons on the Song of Songs 
forwards the notion of an increase of desire for God that is incited by satiety. Bernard 
writes that even while contemplating the Trinity after death, there will be no end to 
seeking God: “I think that there will be no cessation of seeking even when he is found. 
God is sought by desire…and therefore that blessed finding will not beat out desire, but 
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will extend (extendit) it… Joy will be made full, but there will be no end to desire, and 
for this reason not to seeking either.”441 In Sermon seven, Bernard quotes Psalm 35, 
interpreting David’s exclamation as a reference to the bride inebriated with divine love: 
“Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae et torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos.”442 
Lutgard’s vision of the eagle is another instance of Thomas’s broad project of 
assimilating her to the bride. 
As Lutgard’s mouth filled with the words of the eagle, so Thomas’s mouth filled 
with Lutgard’s words. These secret messages are passed on in a “secret conversation” 
that parallels the isolation of her visionary moment with the eagle. The overlapping 
vocabularies of the two passages further connect the visionary moments. Like Lutgard, 
Thomas experienced ineffable wonderment (ineffabilis admiratio) in the face of these 
                                                 
441 (Sermons on the Song of Songs 84.1). Translation by Bernard McGinn in The Presence of 
God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. 2. The Growth of Mysticism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1994), p. 217. The notion of the extensum desiderio has a theological history much 
older than Bernard. While Origen of Alexandria, in line with classical Greek understanding, 
equated limitlessness (apeiron) with imperfection, a view that enabled his theorization that the 
first intellects found satiety (koros) in their original contemplation of the godhead (De Prin. 
2.8.3), Gregory of Nyssa departed fundamentally from this tradition. For Gregory, God was 
necessarily boundless. The limited human creature was thus incapable of fully comprehending a 
divinity whose infinite nature entailed a constant exceeding of the boundaries of human 
understanding. Gregory’s notion of epektasis, derived from the verb e0pektei/nw, “to extend,” 
and in the passive, “to be extended, reach out towards,” translated in Latin as extensum, is culled 
from Phil 3:13-14 (“Brethren, I do not consider that I have made it on my own; but one thing I do, 
forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead (toi=j de\ e1mprosqen 
e0pekteino/menoj), I press on toward the goal for the prize of the upward call of God in Jesus 
Christ”). Epektasis is the concept is that the aim of human life on earth and in heaven is the 
endless stretching forth of the soul after the ever-elusive godhead whose presence is 
paradoxically an experience of absence. This absence means that the desire of the soul never rests 
in satiety, but moves “from glory to glory,” impelled and deepened by every moment of contact. 
Like Gregory, Bernard frequently referred to Philippians 3:13 in order to emphasize that the 
divine-human relation continually increases the human being’s ability to be infused by the 
infinite, but that no perfect infusion is possible. 
	
442	Bernard de Clairvaux, Sermons sur le Cantique, Tome I, Sources Chrétiennes, no. 367, (Paris: 
éditions du Cerf, 2007). Sermon 7.3. 
	
262	
	
divine utterances. While she was made stupefacta by the eagle’s wisdom, he was 
stupuisse. While she seemed “uncultivated” (rudis) he found himself to be, in fact, the 
one who was “uncultivated and dull” in understanding (hebetem ad intellectum, rudis).  
However, the language Thomas uses to describe his own ecstasy is slightly 
different than that which describes Lutgard. While the “blade of her mind” (acies) was 
made “lame” (debilis) even as her heart was enlarged by drinking the “torrent of 
pleasure,” Thomas describes Lutgard as an active subject in her own overthrowing. It is 
her act of drinking or drawing forth of the stream of divine wisdom (hausit, an active 
verb), as much as the eagle pouring his secrets into her mouth, that creates the 
experience. In Thomas’s case, he was entirely passive, even victimized by the power of 
her words. Thus he tells us, “had that sweet and ineffable wonderment held me (tenuisset) 
any longer, it would either have rendered me mad (amentem) or utterly destroyed 
(extinctum) me.” Thus, while God gently “moderated” her vision, revealing to Lutgard a 
second order of the vision accessible in contemplation, for Thomas the danger of such 
vision is foregrounded; rather than receive the comfort of an interpretation by way of an 
attenuation of the ineffable moment, he was snatched back from the brink of madness 
only by the cessation of her speaking. Lutgard is like a torturer who at her own will stops 
her ministrations to Thomas, in contrast to her own experience of a kindly divinity who 
curbs the intensity of the vision in such a way that pleasure and desire continue to 
increase in an experience of satiety that is somehow able to be contemplated by a 
“debilitated” mind. 
Thomas’s account of Lutgard’s vision conforms to the exigencies of 
hagiographical narrative insofar as it provides vivid images of the “spectacle” 
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(speculationis) of the radiant eagle placing its beak in Lutgard’s mouth. However, the 
admiration (admiratione) and ineffability (ineffabilis luminis) that are caused by this 
spectacle are, I argue, in tension with the need to describe the vision in imagistic and 
objective terms.  
The Latin terms for the objects of wonder (mirabilia, miraculi, ammiranda) and 
the emotion they inspire (admiratio), share the same root, mir, which refers to visual 
phenomenon or the act of looking (as in miror, mirari).443 Visions of wonders and the 
wondrousness of the visions he depicts are appealed to in Thomas’s vitae as compelling 
and dramatic evidence, vital to the vivid description that makes a saint’s Life powerful 
and entertaining. The visibility of miracles led Augustine to consider them as a kind of 
divine semiology communicating God’s power and beneficence. God, he argues, planted 
seminum semina and seminales rationes within the one true miracle, creation, causing 
startling events in order to provoke the bored or jaded to have reverential wonder for the 
creator.444  However, as we saw in chapter two, Christina’s marvelous deeds threatened to 
thwart the exemplary efficacy of her vita by rendering her in terms that threatened to be 
demonic or, at the very least, ridiculous. In the case of Christina’s Life, I argued that the 
ambiguity of these saintly signs solicits interpretation from the audience—both readers of 
the vita and the public depicted in it—an interpretation able to frame, though not dispel, 
wonder, by subjecting it to a fraught process of discretion. Divine signs prove difficult to 
read. In the current passage from Lutgard’s Life, however, the wondrous vision is the 
                                                 
443 Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 27. 
444 Benedicta Ward, Miracles and the Medieval Mind: Theory, Record and Event 1000-1215 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), p. 3. 
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means to an astonishment contextualized and articulated through the discourse of 
mystical theology as the overthrow of the intellect in an experience of ineffability that 
enables the infinite extension of her desire.  
 In the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas Aquinas defines 
miracles as those “[t]hings that are at times divinely accomplished apart from the 
generally established order in things (praeter ordinem).” For, he continues, “we admire 
with some astonishment (admiramur) a certain event when we observe the effect but do 
not know its cause.”445 According to Aquinas, a miracle must have “a completely hidden 
(occultam) cause.” This cause, unknown to observers, is God, whose essence remains a 
mystery to the human intellect. Thus, “those things must properly be called miraculous 
which are done by divine power apart from the order generally followed in things.”  
Likewise, as his reference to the etymology of miraculum indicates, Aquinas 
claims that the miracle incites “ad-mira,” a provocation of the intellect in the face of its 
failure to find the cause of a peculiar event. However, the wonder of the specifically 
miraculous (rather than the natural marvel, or what Aquinas would call the qualified 
                                                 
445 Summa Contra Gentiles, III.101.1. Trans. by A. C. Pegis (Notre Dame Ind.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1975). Haec autem quae praeter ordinem communiter in rebus statutum 
quandoque divinitus fiunt, miracula dici solent: admiramur enim aliquid cum, effectum videntes, 
causam ignoramus. Et quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interdum est cognita et a quibusdam 
ignota, inde contingit quod videntium simul aliquem effectum, aliqui mirantur et aliqui non 
mirantur: astrologus enim non miratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam; ignarus 
autem huius scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. Sic igitur est aliquid mirum 
quoad hunc, non autem quod illum. Illud ergo simpliciter mirum est quod habet causam 
simpliciter occultam: et hoc sonat nomen miraculi, quod scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum, 
non quoad hunc vel illum tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta omni homini est Deus: 
probatum enim est supra quod eius essentiam nullus homo in statu huius vitae intellectu capere 
potest. Illa igitur proprie miracula dicenda sunt quae divinitus fiunt praeter ordinem communiter 
observatum in rebus. 
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miracle) finds its infinite source and end in divine ineffability.446 The wonder incited by 
the miracle Aquinas speaks of cannot, then, be exhausted, for the cause remains eternally 
unknown.  
In a similar fashion, the wonder Lutgard’s vision inspires has its source in the 
disclosure of the “secrets of divinity.” The passage marks the boundary in the visionary 
encounter between revelation and concealment, unveiling and veiling, both in the 
visionary moment, with its tension between the revelation of God’s secrets and that 
which remains undisclosed to “mortals,” and in the hagiographical representation of that 
vision. While Thomas’s account of Lutgard’s vision depicts her rapt figure with the 
dazzlingly winged eagle’s beak in her mouth—a particularly vivid image that resonates 
with other visions described in the first book—the passage shifts from this brilliant 
description of a wonder to the internal language of desire which is invoked but not 
detailed. In the transition to the language of desire, the passage demonstrates the limits of 
strategies of externalizing representation for the purpose of depicting visionary moments. 
The vision of the visionary—the vision of a wonder—is shown to be a veil that, even as it 
vividly displays the scene between saint and eagle, does not allow access to the saint’s 
interior experience of desire. Thomas further emphasizes the remainder of secrecy by not 
revealing the content of the divine secrets revealed to her. In other words, the passage 
                                                 
446 Although Aquinas agrees with the strict Augustinian position that all creation, having its 
source in the divine will, is a miracle—though one that does not often incite wonder due to its 
familiarity—Aquinas, in line with twelfth-century theorists like Adelard of Bath, opens a space 
for thinking about nature as an internally governed sphere with rules that are generally 
predictable, which providence can enter and disrupt in ways that are remarkable for their 
strangeness. On Augustine, see Benedicta Ward, Miracles and the Medieval Mind: Theory, 
Record and Event 1000-1215, p. 3-4. On Aquinas, see Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, 
Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 2001), p. 121. Aquinas, 
Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.99.9. On the distinction between marvel and miracle, see Jean-Claude 
Schmitt, Ghosts in the Middle Ages: The Living and the Dead in Medieval Society, trans. by 
Teresa L. Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 79.	
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makes explicit that as long as the reader is in the position of reader, he or she observes 
the saint from the outside; divine secrets remain unknown. The revelation of the text 
reinscribes the concealment of God and the text’s inability to render the saint’s 
relationship with the hidden God. The divine semiology of wonder has its root and end in 
a divine ineffability that limits the scope and capacity of hagiographical semiology.  
A comparison with an account of another of Lutgard’s raptures in II.23 further 
reveals the tension between inner states and their representation by means of physical 
signs, between veiling and concealment, in the sanctity of Lutgard. Thomas writes that 
“[w]henever she was rapt in spirit (rapta in spiritu), remembering the Lord’s Passion,” it 
seemed (videbatur) to Lutgard that her whole body was covered in blood. A “certain 
monastic priest” heard of this secret and decided to spy on her during a season—
presumably Lent—when it was likely she would be contemplating the Passion. He saw 
her “leaning against a wall in contemplation” (contemplatione) (showing that rapture and 
contemplation are not strictly delineated in this vita), gleaming with blood that covered 
her face, hands, and hair. The priest, in an impoverished act of seizure paralleling 
Thomas’s later reception of Lutgard’s finger, “secretly” cut off a piece of her hair and 
“carried it in his hand to the light, where he marveled, astonished above all measure” 
(cum supra modum attonitus miraretur). When she returned to her senses (revertente ad 
sensum) the hair was no longer bloodied.447  
                                                 
447 “Quoties, rapta in spiritu, passionis Dominicæ memor erat; videbatur ei, quod essentialiter per 
totum corpus sanguine perfusa ruberet. Hoc cum quidam religiosus Presbyter secretius audivisset, 
observans eam tempore opportuno, quo dubium non erat, secundum tempus Christi fore 
memorem passionis; aggressus est illam videre: ubi acclinis ad parietem in contemplatione 
jacebat. Et ecce, vidit faciem ejus & manus, quæ tantum nudæ patebant, quasi recenti perfusas 
sanguine relucere: cincinnos vero ejus, quasi guttis noctium, infusos sanguine. Quod videns, clam 
forcipe partem illorum in partem tulit; & ad lucem eos in manu ferens, cum supra modum 
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Like I.15, this passage recounts a curious male witnessing a rapt female (who, in 
turn, witnesses in contemplation a wounded God), enabling the man to have a moderated 
vision and experience of great wonder and stupefaction corresponding to Lutgard’s rapt 
state. The priest, compelled by the wondrous surface of her body, used Lutgard’s external 
state—her bloodied body—to attain to an experience of wonder. He further sought a 
token of this external miracle as a means of further apprehending the marvel and 
proving—against his and presumably others’ doubts—the reality of the miracle. The 
priest’s experience was enabled by his acts of “observing” (observans) and “seeing” 
(vidit) the spectaculum of Lutgard’s reclining figure. The visionary quality of his 
experience is further emphasized with the bold ecce introducing the introduction to his 
sight of Lutgard’s marvelous body.448  
However, the priest’s seeing stands in contrast to Lutgard’s experience of seeming 
(videbatur). Lutgard’s contemplation seemed to her to involve her body becoming 
covered in blood, while in the priest’s account, she was covered: this difference, I assert, 
shows Thomas attempting to articulate the interdependence of inner and outer in the 
visionary encounter, such that “ex intellectuali enim consideratione mentis interius, 
                                                                                                                                                 
attonitus miraretur, pia Lutgarde de raptu contemplationis ad sensum forinsecus revertente, 
cincinni quoque in manu stupentis ad colorem naturalem protinus revertuntur. Qui statim ultra 
quam credi potest, ad tam ingens spectaculum pavefactus, fere cecidit resupinus. Nota autem 
Lector, quod nimirum pia Lutgardis rubere sanguine visa est, quia de illis specialissime fuit in 
vita, qui laverunt stolas suas in sanguine Agni: ex intellectuali enim consideratione mentis 
interius, similitudinem traxit corpus exterius” (Col. 0249C-D). 
448 The term pervades the Gospels, particularly miraculous events announced by angels such as 
those surrounding the Annunciation, including Gabriel’s announcement to Zachariah of his 
muteness because of his disbelief in John’s conception (Et ecce eris tacens, et non poteris loqui 
usque in diem quo hæc fiant, pro eo quod non credidisti verbis meis, quæ implebuntur in tempore 
suo) (Luke 1:20); Gabriel’s announcement to Mary of her miraculous conception (Ecce concipies 
in utero, et paries filium, et vocabis nomen ejus Jesum) (Luke 1:31); and Mary and Elizabeth’s 
greeting (Ecce enim ut facta est vox salutationis tuæ in auribus meis, exsultavit in gaudio infans 
in utero meo) (Luke 1:44). 
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similitudinem traxit corpus exterius.” The priest, seeking external evidence of Lutgard’s 
miraculous state and the means of realizing his own visionary experience, did not 
understand the play of internal and external, the observable and the seeming. His mistake 
was literalization. Therefore, when Lutgard returned from her visionary state and her hair 
returned to normal, he was deprived of both proof and his marvelous object. The priest 
thus becomes a figure for the witness whose sight rests on the veil of the marvelous body 
and yet never accesses the saint’s inner state. Unlike Thomas—who, in the experience 
recounted in I.15, transcends his position as witness by going out of his mind, hearing 
secrets that are not, in turn, communicated to readers—the priest remained firmly within 
the realm of the visible and linguistic. Furthermore, the priest is represented as a vaguely 
illicit voyeur, not unlike Lutgard’s earlier suitor, who hid outside the window of her 
house in order to catch a glimpse of her after taking note of (observans) the best time for 
such an encounter (I.2). The lack of mutuality in the vision of Book Two and the 
depiction of the rapt female, marked by a deep sense of her vulnerability to the godhead 
and to a man able to touch and remove a piece of her body by invading the cloistered 
space of contemplation, suggest reflection on the limits of the externalizing strategies of 
hagiographical representation and, I would suggest, a critique of such strategies as 
potentially exploitative and sexualized. The play between description and ineffability in 
I.15 is articulated in Book Two as the interdependence of inner and outer, as the outer is 
represented as dependent on the inner, yet unable to deliver to the witness a full 
experience of the saint’s inner reality. Just as description falters in the first vision, the 
external fails to deliver a full or lasting encounter with the internal.  
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The dynamic of the catatonic and prostrate woman overshadowed by a curious 
man makes this passage intensely disturbing. The passage reveals the continuity between 
female vulnerability, physical rape, and divine rapture that, as Dyan Elliott has shown, 
pervades later medieval texts. According to the humoral system, the male sex is hot and 
dry. Female softness and humidity were thought to make women more susceptible to 
certain vices like concupiscence, as well as predisposed to rapturous states.449 Rapture, 
located at the contested interstices of body and soul, is a “bodily production,” Elliott 
argues, hence its close etymological and structural connection to physical rape.450 
Thomas understood the impressionable quality of Lutgard’s flesh, making her vulnerable 
not only to the predatory men in the world who would physically seize and rape her (see 
I.4, I.5, I.6) but to the male deity who would ravish her body, alienating her senses and 
possessing her by his overwhelming presence. Rapture, Elliott writes, “presupposes a 
heterosexual dynamic between a swooning female mystic and an overpowering male 
                                                 
449 Dyan Elliott, “The Physiology of Rapture,” in Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, eds. 
P. Biller and A. Minnis (Rochester NY: York Medieval Press, 1997), pp. 157-8. These rapturous 
states could, of course, be induced by good or evil spiritual influence, although in the thirteenth-
century, the issue of discretion was, according to Elliott, less fraught, as evidence for the source 
of such raptures was believed to be fairly easily read on the enrapt body, which bore obvious 
somatic signs. Elliott argues that Thomas was one of these thirteenth-century authorities who 
were casually optimistic about the possibility of interpreting the origins of an enrapt state (Elliott, 
“Physiology,” p. 151). 
450 Ibid., p. 142. Spiritual rapture (raptus) is derived from rapire, meaning to carry off by force, to 
seize, to ravish. It is synonomous with other terms like excessus mentis, in spiritu, alienato 
mentis, (Elliott, p. 143) or from the passage under consideration here, stupefacta, capacitatem 
debilis aciei, amentem.  
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deity.” Thus, Gerard of Liège describes God as the best rapist.451 The curious priest is a 
poor recapitulation of the male deity who desires and overcomes the beloved woman.452  
Elliott’s study demonstrates that in the late medieval period, some bodies—
specifically, women’s—were understood to be predisposed to the kind of passivity and 
porosity (the opposite of the classical ideal of the sealed sensorium) required for the 
success of divine approach. Identification of women with the body paradoxically 
facilitated their detachment from the physical and sensible in moments of encounter with 
God. The externalizing impulse of hagiographical writing discussed in this chapter was 
applied to descriptions of rapt subjects, as the detachment from the body was perversely 
made visible by means of its bodily effects, including insensibility to pain or, as in the 
second passage considered here, the catatonia of trance states, enabling the body to act as 
proof for the saintly woman’s encounter with God. 
There are, however, notable divergences between Thomas’s account of Lutgard’s 
rapture and Elliott’s analysis. These divergences complicate our understanding of 
                                                 
451 Ibid., p. 161. See also Barbara Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist: Studies in 
Medieval Religion and Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 286, n.20. 
	
452 Elliott’s essay does not consider the theorization of rapture as it appeared before the high 
medieval period. Early Christian and Byzantine theologians developed multiple theories and 
phenomenologies of rapture, which extensively theorized the passivity and helplessness incurred 
by the abstraction of the senses in the face of an overpowering divine other, as well as the status 
of the intellect and the relation between the intellect and body in the state of rapture.  
The exemplary enraptured figure of the Christian tradition is not a woman. Rather, it is 
the Apostle Paul, who left a richly ambiguous account in II Corinthians 12:2-7 of being “caught 
up” (raptum) to the third heaven, “whether in the body (in corpore) or out of the body (extra 
corpus) I know not, God knows.” The Latin raptum renders the Greek, ἁρπαγέντα, which like the 
verb rapire, connotes being seized and carried off by force. Paul thus describes his experience 
with the same language of violence and helplessness that Elliott finds prevalent in descriptions of 
later medieval women’s raptures. However, in Paul’s case, the status of his body is in question, as 
his account implies that his body could have accompanied him to the third heaven. Due to Paul’s 
ambiguous yet authoritative report, the status of the body in states of rapture remained an open 
question, receiving different treatments throughout the history of Christianity.  
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medieval notions of rapture as well as Thomas’s representation of Lutgard and his 
experience of her.  
First, the encounter outlined in I.15 subverts the passive position typically 
associated with women’s spiritual and corporeal formation. Lutgard’s porosity and 
vulnerability to God ultimately places her in a position of Thomas’s teacher (aligning her 
with the activity of the divine eagle), schooling him with “decisive” thought derived from 
her encounter with the eagle. In terms of the expectations of her gender outlined by 
Elliott, Lutgard’s capacities are augmented and not only intensified by this rapturous 
experience insofar as her porosity, passivity, and silence ultimately issue in forceful 
speech. That Thomas chooses not to represent her porousness by means of a wounded, 
suffering, or bleeding body here further emphasizes her intellectual capacities.  Second, it 
is Thomas who recounts his experience in the violent terms typical of rapture discourse, 
for he is forced by her speech into a position of passivity—“held” or “mastered” 
(tenuisset) and “rendered mad” (reddidisset amentem me). Like Lutgard, Thomas’s 
capacities are augmented through an encounter with an ineffable alterity. His 
augmentation occurs not through supplementation but through the loss and humiliation of 
his intellectual and linguistic powers. In the terms of Elliott’s argument, Lutgard is 
masculinized by her vision while Thomas is feminized. Thomas’s description of his 
feminization depicts it as an experience both deeply desired and frightening (and, 
perhaps, desired because frightening), as her words are “sweet” (dulcis) and yet render 
him mad (amentem) and almost annihilated (extinctum). Thomas thus undergoes a loss of 
his intellective capacities.  
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This loss of intellective prowess is present in earlier important texts, most notably 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, which describes an experience of “ecstasy” that 
emphasizes the role of the divestment of the intellect and sensory perception in the soul’s 
ascent to divine union. The treatise begins with the following advice for Timothy:  
Timothy, my friend, my advice to you as you look for a sight of the 
mysterious things, is to leave behind [apoleipe] you everything perceived 
and understood, everything perceptible and understandable, all that is not 
and all that is, and, with your understanding laid aside [agnostos], to strive 
upward as much as you can toward union with him who is beyond all 
being and knowledge. By an undivided and absolute abandonment 
[ekstasei] of yourself and everything, shedding all and freed from all 
[panta aphelon kai ek panton apolutheis], you will be uplifted to the ray of 
the divine shadow which is above everything that is.453  
 
In seeking a “sight of mysterious things,” Timothy must abandon his faculties and 
categories and thereby paradoxically attain to a stance of utter passivity in which he is 
“uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow.” By means of this divestment, Pseudo-
Dionysius promises, Timothy will suffer ecstasy (ti…heautou…ektasei). Sight, intellect, 
and knowledge—all things that fasten a person to their particular body, history, 
perception, and agency—prevent union with the unknown God. This account of the 
shedding of the perceptual and sensible in mystical ascent stands in the lineage of the 
approach to the mysteries (musteria) in Greek mystery religions. From the injunction that 
initiates keep silent about that which they encountered (muein) developed the notion that 
attainment of mystical “knowledge” of the divine required an initiate to close all their 
senses. Thus “mystical knowledge” in the classical Greek context was understood to be 
“knowledge available only to the mind or spirit that is as detached as possible from 
                                                 
453 On Mystical Theology, in Pseudo-Dionyius the Areopagite: The Complete Works, trans. by 
Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 1.1 997B-1000A. Henceforth MT.	
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bodily concerns.”454 Sealing soul from body, the initiate became capable of experiencing 
unbodily mysteries. Like the experience described for Timothy, Thomas undergoes a 
shedding of his intellective power and is thereby rendered passive and ecstatic. Unlike the 
ascent described in the Mystical Theology, however, Thomas’s account is inflected with a 
heterosexual dynamic and passionate language of madness and foreceful confinement 
that typically marked late medieval descriptions of rapture.  
 
Thomas and the Male Search for Visionary Experience  
In John Coakley’s study of late-medieval male-authored vitae of medieval 
women, he argues that the hagiographies reveal much not only about what men thought 
of the holy women they sought to represent, but also about what they thought about 
themselves.455 These men often acted as confessors as well as hagiographers, and the 
intimate relationship between holy woman and male admirer was revelatory of male 
aspirations, desires, and anxiety.456 Coakley takes up Caroline Walker Bynum’s argument 
that the physicality of the piety of later medieval women (putatively marked by extreme 
ascesis and ecstatic raptures) was both theologically significant and intrinsically gendered 
insofar as their piety was an enactment of an identification with the suffering Christ. This 
                                                 
454 Grace Jantzen, “Feminists, Philosophers, and Mystics,” in Hypatia vol. 9 no. 4 (Autumn, 
1994), p. 188.  
	
455 John W. Coakley, Women, Men, and Spiritual Power: Female Saints and their Male 
Collaborators (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 3. 
 	
456 Thomas was not Lutgard’s confessor. He notes another man, Bernard, fulfilled this task. She 
was, instead, his ‘spiritual mother,’ acting as a giver of advice and in many ways confessing 
Thomas, as when he went to her with the temptations he faced as a result of becoming a 
confessor.  
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identification was made possible by and a function of their femaleness. The porosity, 
vulnerability, and nurturing nature presumed to inhere in female flesh enabled women to 
easily identify with the humiliated, bleeding, and nourishing crucified God. Thus, the 
qualities that marginalized women socially and politically as the inferior, weaker sex 
were redeployed in the late medieval religious context as means of privilege and 
authority, including the capacity for greater mystical powers as celebrated in thirteenth-
century hagiography.457 The New Testament paradox that the weak are exalted, the last 
are first, so celebrated in movements inspired by the vita apostolica in the twelfth 
century, takes on an explicitly gendered nature in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.458  
 It is important to remember that women’s own writings of this period often 
display either a resistance to or disinterest in the construction of female piety through the 
lens of corporeality. This fact demonstrates that the male hagiographical representations 
of holy women are a discourse of female sanctity created by male fantasy and culturally 
dominant ideologies about and expectations for women, a point that can be elided in the 
work of Bynum and Coakley, which tends to accept the hagiographical documents as 
                                                 
457 John Coakley, Women, Men, and Spiritual Power, p. 10. For Bynum’s elaboration of this 
argument, see Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 261-8; Fragmentation and Redemption: 
Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 
pp. 151-79. Dyan Elliott is less sanguine about the implications and status of the privileges 
women accrued through this identification. She argues that while this marriage of femaleness and 
bodiliness enabled new formulations of the relation of body and soul and attributions of various 
talents, particularly of mystical powers to women, the marriage was not a happy one and 
necessarily culminated in the fifteenth-century witch hunts (“Physiology,” p. 141, p. 167). 
	
458 Thomas Aquinas explicitly argues that woman’s flawed nature also made her more humble 
and thus an embodiment of the New Testament ideal of “the last shall be first” (Elliott, p. 160). 
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revelatory of women’s actual practices.459 However, Coakley’s work can helpfully show 
us male hagiographers’ constructions of the women about whom they write.  
Coakley argues that one sees in the male-authored vitae a need to control and 
order female piety, as well as a desire for what the men themselves feel they lack 
spiritually. Ensconced in the comforts and authority of their clerical office, the privileged 
male cleric obtained a certain connection to the divine by the virtue of his office but that 
this position often undermined the realization of an affective connection or intimate 
relationship with the deity, for his privilege meant that he was not participating in the 
gospel admonition to be humble in imitation of Christ.460 Coakley hypothesizes that the 
male admirers of holy women obtained vicarious access to this realm of affective 
connection with God that was inaccessible (or at least problematic) for them through their 
relation to and writing about women who, in the stories they told, were able to more 
easily realize such a kinship with divinity. The hagiographers studied by Coakley were 
thus deeply invested in maintaining the gender alterity of the women about whom they 
wrote, for this difference paradoxically served to enable the man to achieve a relation to 
the divine similar to that enjoyed by the women they wrote of. The otherness of woman 
repeated, in a new register, the otherness of God. In their hagiographies, Coakley writes, 
authors such as Thomas did not perform symbolic reversal by  
                                                 
459 See Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995), pp. 45-52, for her discussion of the radical divergence between Beatrice of Nazareth’s 
autobiographical account of her spiritual life and its “translation” by her male hagiographer, who 
renders her narrative in physical terms that literalize her description of the spiritual life. See also 
the discussion of Marguerite Porete’s resistance to the centrality of bodily and emotional works in 
the religious life and in dominant theological models of the thirteenth century, pp. 105-107.  
	
460John Coakley, Women, Men, and Spiritual Power, p. 2. 	
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applying female imagery to themselves…but rather...[by] encountering 
real embodiments of the female, who retained an otherness both symbolic 
and literal. Through that otherness, the women signified to these men the 
presence of the divine…Unable to experience it through their own 
ecclesiastical office or theological expertise, they found it only outside 
themselves, in the women, those opposite creatures to whom they happily 
had access, who lacked their office or schooled knowledge they possessed, 
and possessed the charismatic gifts they lacked.”461  
 
The effectiveness of the relationship, from the male point of view, relied on maintaining 
the otherness of the holy woman. Her strangeness was key to the encounter with the 
otherness of God, by whose alterity the female mystic was overthrown in a rapturous 
encounter.  
Coakley’s argument cannot account for the myriad of male clerics who spoke of 
experiences of union with a divine other through means other than relationships with 
humble female counterparts, including Thomas’s fellow Dominicans Meister Eckhart (d. 
1327), Henry Suso (d. 1366), and Johannes Tauler (d. 1361). However, in the case of 
Thomas of Cantimpré, it seems that his relationship with a holy woman and writing of 
that relationship was a vital means for Thomas to realize the potentialities of his spiritual 
vocation as a person seeking union with a divine Other and as hagiographer. Importantly, 
the full realization of Thomas’s imitation of Lutgard’s encounter with divine ineffability 
does not occur, I argue, until he turns to us, his readers, in his account of the two 
ecstasies. The writing of hagiography—and its failure—is essential to the fulfillment of 
his vocation as devotee and describer of the holy woman. The mystical hagiography 
becomes Thomas’s version of a mystical practice, a vital performance of the experience 
he has in conversation with Lutgard. Only in writing his account can Thomas’s desire be 
                                                 
461 John Coakley, “Friars as confidants of holy women in Medieval Dominican Hagiography,” in 
Images of Sainthood in Medieval Europe, eds. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Timea Szell 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 225.	
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“extended” in a way that doubles the extensum desiderio Lutgard enjoyed in her vision. 
In order to realize such an extension of desire in his writing, Thomas must preserve the 
alterity Coakley argues is an essential component of the Friars’ relation to holy women.  
In chapter four, I described Thomas’s intense desire for Lutgard’s finger, of his 
need to have a trace of her bodily presence to hold and linger over after her death. In 
trading book for finger, the vita makes text and saintly body figures of each other; 
Thomas’s book becomes the relic the abbess Hadewijch desires and that readers linger 
over, searching for the presence of the dead woman. However, Thomas’s intense desire 
for a relic of his spiritual mother not only impels the writing of the text but is also 
performed in the scripting of the Life. The ineffability topos functions as an important 
part of the mechanism by which this infinite extension of desire is realized in the writing, 
acting not only as a rhetorical convention but as a performative means of realizing and 
replicating an experience of rapture. In the space of writing, the hagiographer can reach 
for the representational replication of the desired holy woman, even as he textualizes his 
inability to complete this project. Thus, while he ultimately wins her finger by writing her 
vita, in I.15, Thomas delivers his reading and writing of the sign, Lutgard, over to a 
confession of the failure of both his text and his incapacity to render fully what he 
perceives, or even his capacity to perceive its full splendor. Thomas desires to make 
Lutgard present in the text, to make her palpable, graspable, comprehensible, but he must 
also textualize the ways she escapes such rendering in order to make possible his own 
mystical vision, a vision of ineffability which in turn verifies Lutgard’s holiness. His 
failure to apprehend Lutgard, being “so astonished by the subtlety of her words that, had 
that sweet and ineffable wonderment held me any longer, it would either have rendered 
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me mad or utterly destroyed me,” not only enables him to maintain the alterity that 
Coakley argues is necessary for the male admirer’s attainment of what he lacks, but 
enacts an imitation of Lutgard’s own experience of ineffability in her moment of rapture, 
when she experienced a “wonderment exceeding any words to describe it.”  
 
Apophasis and Exemplarity 
Thomas preserves a central lacuna in his account, namely, the precise nature of 
Lutgard’s subtle words. Just as the eagle delivered its message to Lutgard alone, so 
Thomas became the sole recipient of Lutgard’s divine insights. The vita, whose stated 
aim in the Prologue is to provide a model (exemplum) of the ideal life, remains silent on 
its heroine’s most sublime teachings. The text fails to provide either an exemplary lesson 
for the reader derived from Lutgard’s experience or an opportunity for the reader to be 
astonished by Lutgard’s words for Thomas. The reader is left with a lovely description of 
the eagle and Thomas’s declaration that these events occurred as he tells them, but the 
text does not communicate the effect those events had on Thomas. Thomas thus preserves 
both Lutgard’s singularity and his own. The privacy of their two conversations—first 
with the eagle, which occurs in the intimacy of the bridal mouth-to-mouth and in his later 
collationes with her—remains uninterrupted, unexposed to readers and therefore 
incapable of their application. Here the exemplary function of hagiography, which 
requires a turn to the generalizable and universal principle, breaks on the shores of a 
rocky singularity, which Thomas’s practice of writing, seeking to maintain and extend 
desire, must preserve. The silence of the passage is both a function of Thomas’s sought-
279	
	
after astonishment and a means of preserving it in the text; it maintains the dynamic of 
revelation and concealment, revealing that it conceals.  
Thus, we witness a shift from the discussion in the previous chapter of experience 
and its transformations through practices of reading. In the passages considered in 
chapter four, Lutgard, in a continuation of the Cassianic tradition, becomes the bride by 
her assimilation to the biblical narrative in a contemplative practice of “taking up” the 
position of Solomon’s bride, a position the reader is encouraged to adopt through her own 
reading of the vita and the Song. However, in the situation of astonishment that is 
modeled in I.15, such a structure of imitability and appropriated experience breaks down. 
The vita seems to present a double message about reading, imitation, and exemplarity. In 
I.15, Thomas models the kind of imitative response to the exemplary figure we would 
expect from our reading of Cassian and William of St. Thierry; he mirrors Lutgard’s 
ecstasy, stepping into the stream of her experience when she pours her words into his 
mouth as the eagle did hers. It is, however, highly unclear from this passage how the next 
level in the imitative chain is reached. Thomas’s inability (or refusal) to repeat Lutgard’s 
words undermines the text’s promise to provide access to the perfect life. How does the 
thematization of the failure to represent the saint’s most “memorable” or powerful words 
(at least in terms of their effect on Thomas) correspond with the Prologue’s promise to be 
truthful and exhaustive as possible to provide a suitably complex didactic model? In 
placing Thomas between Lutgard and the reader, is the text suggesting that the reader 
imitate Thomas or Lutgard? If so, how would that be possible, given his preservation of 
the privacy of their conversation, which is in effect Thomas’s refusal to share the saint 
with readers?  
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While the act of reading and the concomitant transformation of experience 
(designed to facilitate the growth of desire and an encounter with God as the beloved) is 
proffered as a model elsewhere in the vita, I.15 makes exemplary an experience of 
astonishment that manifests in the failure of transmission. What is read does not offer a 
model for the reader to imitate. This very failure, which protects the privacy and the 
singularity of Lutgard’s and Thomas’s visionary experiences, results from that sought-
after astonishment, which, I have argued, Thomas perpetuates in his narrative for the 
purpose of extending his desire in imitation of Lutgard. By placing silence around and at 
the center of his story, his writing of mystical hagiography re-performs the desire 
awakened by the ineffable that Thomas witnesses in Lutgard’s vision. Thomas’s act of 
imitation leads to his own inimitability. Thomas’s failure to describe what he has heard is 
continuous with his enactment of the ineffability topos and the logic of apophatic texts, 
more broadly: were the divine face describable or Lutgard’s words less than rapture-
inducing, they would not be able to do their astonishing work.  
In an important passage in Book Three (III.9), however, Thomas seems to alter 
the strategy pursued in I.15 with regard to ineffable mystical experience, imitation, and 
singularity. The passage opens with Lutgard relating to an “intimate friend” what she saw 
when she saw Christ’s face.462 It thus would seem to document precisely what we are not 
shown in I.15. According to Thomas, she relates:  
[a]n indescribable brilliance (splendor inaestimabilis) appears to me in an 
instant, and I see an ineffable beauty (ineffabilem pulchritudinem) of his 
glorified being like a flash of lightening. Were this vision not to pass 
                                                 
462 Although the eagle in I.15 is identified with John the Evangelist, it was also a common symbol 
for Christ, who, according to some bestiaries, as one with eyes as strong as the eagle, alone can 
look directly at God. 
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quickly from the gaze of my contemplation, I would not be able to endure 
it and remain alive (vita praesenti hanc sustinere non possem). After this 
flash, there remains an intellectual brilliance (splendor intellectualis), and 
when in that brilliance I seek the one I had seen for an instant, I cannot 
find him (III.9).463 
 
Thomas immediately turns to the reader with the exhortatory “nota ergo, lector,” offering 
a biblical proof from the Song of Songs that makes explicit the allusions to the Song in 
both I.15 and this passage. Thomas quotes 5:6, “My soul melted when my beloved spoke; 
I sought him and found him not; I called and he did not answer me.” He then offers a 
gloss on the passage, giving an account of desire through the figure of the ever-
wandering bride, concluding with a memorable summary rhyme, ut tanto diligentius 
quaerat, quanto ardentius amat; & tanto ad possidendum mens latior praeparetur, 
quanto ad quaerendum frequentius innovatur (“Thus the more diligently the soul seeks 
him, the more ardently it loves him, and the more thoroughly the mind prepares itself to 
possess him, the more frequently it is renewed to seek him”).  
The silence that is absolute in I.15 is here pursued and somewhat subdued by the 
biblical passage and its implicit interpretive contextualization in a biblical frame. If we 
read III.9 as filling the silences of I.15, it could seem to undermine my reading of I.15 as 
a thematization of the failure of representation that re-performs the ineffability of 
Lutgard’s visions, for the descriptions of III.9 provide a detailed account of astonishment 
that captures the vision in language and thus provides a concrete model for all readers to 
imitate. However, while III.9 describes Lutgard’s vision according to tropes popular 
                                                 
463	“In momento, inquit, apparet mihi splendor inæstimabilis, & quasi fulgur video ejus 
ineffabilem pulchritudinem glorificationis: quæ nisi raptim transiret ab aspectu contemplationis 
meæ; cum vita præsenti hanc sustinere non possem. Post hunc vero fulgorem splendor 
intellectualis manet; & cum in ipso splendore quæro quem raptim videram, non invenio” (Col. 
0258B-D).	
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among Cistercian writers, what it ultimately describes—as Thomas’s description of his 
experience upon hearing Lutgard’s words—is an encounter in which she is nearly killed 
by a vision of “ineffable beauty” too intense for mortal beings. The descriptions of III.9 
thus reiterate the ineffability topos and thematize the failure of the text to articulate or 
capture a divine vision. In III.9, however, the thematization of failure is elaborated 
through scriptural discourse of desire rather than a performance of narrative silence. In 
both passages the problematic of apophasis and exemplarity—of how the unrepresentable 
can be communicated—is operative and called into question. 
While Thomas and Lutgard believe that she will contemplate Christ with an 
“unveiled face” after death, as Thomas glosses Lutgard’s experience in III.9, in this life 
the breach between infinite and finite entail a state in which the soul, in the presence 
(repraesentare) of Christ’s infinite goodness, wisdom, and virtue is made painfully aware 
(it “measures,” metiatur) of the gap between its nature and divinity, a gap that is the 
condition of its desiring:  
What else is it for Christ to speak in the soul except to make present 
(repraesentare) to it the riches of his goodness, wisdom, and beauty? 
From these riches let the soul measure how good, how deliciously wise, 
and how beautifully adorned with virtues one must be to deserve his love 
in perpetual charity. When the soul hears his voice, it melts with desire 
(liquescit in desideriis) and strives to obtain what is has glimpsed 
(conspicit), but since the time of perfect vision has not yet come, it 
suddenly loses him whom it held as if he were present (quasi praesentem) 
(III.9).464 
 
                                                 
464	“Quid est Christum loqui in anima, nisi repræsentare illi suæ divitias bonitatis, sapientiæ, & 
decoris? Ut ex his metiatur anima, quam bonum, quamque sapide sapientem, & a virtutibus 
decoratum eum esse oporteat, qui ejus amorem poterit in caritate perpetua promereri. Hunc ergo 
audiens anima liquescit in desideriis, & nititur obtinere quem conspicit: sed quia tempus perfectæ 
visionis nondum venit, illum quem quasi præsentem habuit, subito perdit” (Col. 0258D-E).	
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According to Thomas, the enraptured soul sees not the face of Christ but the re-
presentations (or “quasi-presences”) of divine goodness, wisdom, and charity. The soul’s 
awareness of the gap between itself and God opens the dynamic of pursuit, union, and 
loss. In Thomas’s telling no experience of divinity is an experience of God as such, only 
experience of the gap between the soul and the ineffable beauty that threatens to destroy 
it. Awareness of this gap, once “measured,” astonishes, leaving a “brilliance” that 
“infinitely darkens” the light of the sun of the mind, a darkness that renews the soul’s 
search for God. What the soul experiences in rapture is not an overwhelming moment of 
annihilation in pure divine presence but an experience of the soul’s lack of charity, 
wisdom, and virtue, the very qualities that God “represents” to the soul. It is an 
astonishing humiliation.  
The rapturous condition detailed by Thomas’s gloss in III.9 accords with his 
account of his experience of astonishment in I.15. He describes this condition as one in 
which wonderment at divine perfection exposes the soul’s deficiencies to the visionary. 
Thus, astonishment occurs through an experience of radical alterity that both humiliates 
and stimulates desire. The appropriation of such an ideal state by way of imitation is 
tremendously complex for the reader of either I.15 or III.9. This is so for two reasons: 
because the astonishment described in III.9 and modeled by Thomas in I.15 arises 
through an experience of a lack; and because that lack manifests through encounter with a 
reality so much greater than the self that it can be experienced only as ineffable. This 
ineffability is essential to its astonishing effects; were it assimilable by the mind, its 
alterity subdued, it would not have its necessarily humiliating effect.  
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As this ineffable alterity by which the subject is humiliated is by definition 
indescribable, it begs the question of how one might teach it. In fact, apophatic texts such 
as The Mystical Theology and The Cloud of Unknowing have a long history as advice 
manuals, written by master to disciple: a highly esoteric theology that protests the need 
for protection by the disciplina arcani presented in a pragmatic genre defined by its 
didactic purpose. The exemplarism of mystical hagiography is therefore continuous with 
other genres of apophatic texts, particularly the advice letter. However, hagiography 
requires the externalization of internal states in order to render the saint vividly for 
readers. Thus, while the VLA proposes an experience of astonishment as exemplary, it 
also presses against the possibility of teaching or transmitting the ineffable.  
 
Conclusion 
In the first passage considered in this chapter, I.15, the image offered as a model 
for imitation or edification remains “unsaid.” Thomas’s hagiographical discourse edifies 
by constructing an image that the reader can imitate then effaces this image with recourse 
to an extensive use of the ineffability topos. This effacement destabilizes both the 
representation of the saintly figure and the one who regards her. Thomas’s use of the 
ineffability topos thus serves to implicate him in the writing of the saint’s Life. The topos 
enables his act of composition to become an imitation of Lutgard’s ineffable experience 
of God and a performative means for the extension of his desire in the act of composing 
the vita.  
The silences at the heart of Thomas’s depiction of Lutgard’s encounter with God 
and Thomas’s encounter with Lutgard render these secret conversations unavailable to 
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readers, interrupting the text’s transmission of exemplary moments. This silence—a 
function of the ineffability topos—preserves the singularity of Lutgard’s visionary status. 
While this singularity questions the limits of exemplarity, as Thomas glosses it in a later 
passage (III.9), the singularity of the saint, like that of God, is the source of her alterity, 
an alterity that becomes in turn a means of saintly exemplarity. In III.9, Thomas 
articulates the relationship between ineffability and exemplarity as a function of 
recognizing and measuring the gap between the soul and God, a recognition that 
humiliates and astonishes. 
The passages addressed in this chapter also function as a critique of the 
externalizing techniques of hagiographical representation. Lutgard’s and Thomas’s 
visions in Book One, the experience of a “certain monastic priest” in Book Two, and 
Lutgard’s description of rapture in Book Three focus on the phantasmatic nature of the 
visionary encounter. The images perceived in these moments are named “quasi-
presences,” experiences of “seeming,” or as so brilliant that the eye and language cannot 
contain their sight. Thomas foregrounds the spiritual nature of visionary encounter in 
these passages. As a result, the body and, therefore, language, must be effaced, revealed 
as “quasi-presences” that can never fully deliver up the vision—whether of God or 
saint—to the witness. These passages thus call attention to the surfaces of hagiographical 
writing, the lineaments of body and deed that cannot ultimately deliver the saint’s interior 
state to the reader. The more seriously that Thomas takes the spiritual claims of Lutgard’s 
religiosity, the more his seeing is haunted by its seeming, and the more the hagiographer 
(and his readers) is shown to resemble a “certain monastic priest,” clinging to a proof that 
vanishes. 
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